The editors are to be congratulated on their decision to maintain the Journal as a forum for all approaches to the question of 'consciousness' (and for this reason I will renew my subscription). I would like to comment on a few points which they mention.

Concerning Metzinger's suggestion that consciousness studies are in a chaotic, pre-paradigm state: I would quite agree. However, it seems to me that the path to pursue is in a rather different direction from the one he indicated. He suggested that phenomenology is a 'discredited research programme that has been intellectually bankrupt for at least 50 years', and he apparently thinks that it should be abandoned.

In my opinion, phenomenology has failed in one major respect, which is central to the present discussion: it has not sufficiently examined the basis of objective scientific knowledge in experience, and this is what should be done now, preferably in interdisciplinary efforts.

I propose that the mind-brain problem is the same as the relation of experience to knowledge, for the following reasons.
a) Whatever we know stems from ongoing experience (not from sense 'data').
b) The exploration of experience is the task of phenomenology.
c) Experience is originally not divided into subject and object.
d) Mental structures including the subject-object division originate (crystallize, are created, structured)
inside the unstructured mind-nature experience.
e) Structural entities (including 'objects') can often be handled as-if they were 'onta' independent of mental
activity, that is to say, of ongoing experience.
f) 'Truth' and 'reality' are statements of a strong belief that the mental structures in question are reliable.
This includes 'ontology' as a whole.
g) Objective science is usually seen as an ontological (that means: persistent metaphysical) belief system,
and scientific as well as other 'knowledge' are strong ontological beliefs.
h) The 'as-if' clause can be omitted without practical problems for much of the natural sciences, including
behavioral and brain studies, but doing so is nevertheless a shortcut in argumentation.
i) There are at present two main areas where the ontological approach does not work because stable mind-
independent (ontological) structures cannot be assumed: particle physics and subjective experience. In
both cases one has to go back to before ontology, that is, to ongoing experience.
j) Ongoing experience is the most central aspect of what is nowadays often called 'consciousness', as in the
title of your Journal. This central aspect cannot become one of its own mind-independent (ontological)
creatures, and thus of objective knowledge. (It may be objected that since we can talk about 'it', it must
be an object; but this argument overlooks that it can only be understood as experience without structure,
something akin to nirvana experience.)
k) Knowledge (for instance knowledge about brain function) originates within ongoing experience, but
ongoing experience cannot become (or be understood within) objective knowledge.
l) The mind-brain problem is thus identical with the relation of experience to knowledge - qed.

'How does consciousness work ?' is another question which was raised in the editorial. It seems to me that the above points suggest a part of the answer: ongoing experience is an aspect of every experience, including objective knowledge. Mental structures have ongoing experience as a permanent but 'soft' center, while forming 'hard' but exchangeable instruments at the periphery.

One further point. You write (p.388) that 'any scientific theory will eventually be proved wrong'. This is correct only if 'theories' are taken to be statements about ontological truths. From a more functional point of view the statement would be that: theories are tools of limited usefulness, which will eventually be modified or replaced for better results. On the other hand, your statement itself, as you formulated it, amounts to a denial of the possibility of ontological reality, so we may be in agreement after all.

It appears from various discussions that some investigators are allergic to the word 'epistemology', but they would perhaps not object to: coming clear on the chief concepts which they employ in their work. I believe that clarification of concepts should have a more prominent place in discussions about consciousness.

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REFERENCES

The Editors, The Future of Consciousness Studies, Journal of Consciousness Studies, Vol 4, No. 5/6, 1997,
pp.385-8

Muller, HFJ, Is the Mind Real ? Karl Jaspers Forum, Target Article 1, 27 June 1997

Muller, HFJ, The Mind-Brain Problem is the Relation of Experience to Knowledge. Karl Jaspers Forum,
Target Article 1, Response 7, to JE Henkel. 18 Nov. 1997.

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[Author:
Herbert JF Muller e-mail <mdmu@musica.mcgill.ca>]