SCIENCE FROM EXPERIENCE
There have been a number of recent communications which are of interest
to the question of the mind-brain relationship, specifically concerning
the ontological and epistemological aspects. I think that a discussion of
these points is of general interest.
HFJM
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The following is a note (9 Dec 1997) in JCS on-line, by Bill Adams, re-produced
here with his permission.
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<1>
In response to Herbert Muller's post of 23 November 1997 concerning a recent
JCS editorial, several ideas developed around phenomenology and science.
I would like to comment on ideas put forward by Roger Cook, Gary Schouborg,
Mike Arons, Rick Norwood, and Herbert Muller. I realize point-by-point argumentation
is usually deadly. I have no position to defend and I have no need to "get
the last word." This format is a fallout of asynchronous dialog. I
appreciate the serious consideration given to all ideas at this venue.
<2>
I agree with Roger Cook's sharp contrast of phenomenology and scientific
method. But that is the problem to be solved. How can scientific method
be reconceptualized to meet experience, and/or, how can phenomenological
method be extended to make contact with science?
Roger says, " A scientist takes as given... that the phenomenon is
replicable..."
Is that assumption justified? Since Zeno we have known that every phenomenon
is unique. There are invariant features of phenomena over time, and these
can be abstracted by a scientist into a regularity. No two hearts are the
same but we still have a science of cardiology.
<3>
[A scientist assumes] "that other people have the same experience..."]
Surely we cannot take literally that people have the SAME experience, which
is unintelligible. What is probably meant is that most people with appropriate
training will agree on a collaborative description of the private
experience of each.
[A scientist assumes] "that it [the phenomenon] can be studied after
the [singular] event..." Again the assumption is an overgeneralization.
There is a different cause for every airplane crash, but it doesn't mean
there is nothing to be learned from studying airplane crashes. Regularities
can be found in physics, and I suggest, in experience.
[A scientist assumes] "that it [the phenomenon] will happen in many
different locales..." Each thunderstorm happens in one and only one
locale. Still we have a science of meteorology.
<4>
I am not seeing any insurmountable obstacles here to a science of experience.
Have I missed a critical point?
<5>
Gary Schouborg asked rhetorically, " As scientific inquiry becomes
increasingly specialized and complex, consensus becomes Balkanized. What
confidence can one specialist have that scientists in some other specialty
are doing valid work?"
<6>
The confidence is there, though. Science is corrigible because of the institutionalization
of the method through peer-reviewed publication, socially accredited institutions
of learning that confer recognized degrees to people who have demonstrated
mastery of the scientific method, reputable research institutes that employ
only documented scientists; scientific conferences (another form of peer
review.) It works. Remember cold fusion? Polywater? Orgone? The David Baltimore
affair? Over time, the "findings" that don't pass the test of
the institutionalized methodology are discarded by the community.
<7>
Unfortunately for phenomenology, yoga, and other contemplative, non-scientific
approaches to the study of experience, the consensus institutions of scientific
epistemology do not acknowledge alternatives. Gary suggests the alternatives
"...will have to build their credibility on their related technology.
Thus, Christian scripture says, "By their fruits you will know them."
<8>
I agree that this is a powerful way to gather some social attention on the
potential viability of a new approach. But I doubt it would change any scientific
minds. Kuhnian "normal scientists" could watch your teleportation
device operate and conclude "Can't be done." That's not a criticism.
Part of what makes science effective is its extreme conservatism. However,
a nice fruit basket would be an excellent way to begin an alternate epistemological
community.
<9>
Mike Arons raises concern about rotten fruit. "Hitler and his golden
words and promises..brought home..incredible yields of military fruits ...in
a gilded basket" If I understand this concern, it is about how to evaluate
a technology demonstration. It is a difficult question. I would like to
believe that a demonstration produced in a principled way from an articulate
theory would constitute an operational definition of the terms of the theory.
That's why I am still interested in the Turing Test even though it is now
out of favor as a "mere functionalism." I think there is inevitably
a leap of faith in there somewhere. As Searle says, a model of the weather
will not get you wet. But so is there a leap of faith when pointing at red
things and saying, "That's red."
<10>
I appreciate Mike's insistence " ...that judgment of durability is
not simply a matter of one or another form of validation.." Durability
apparently means a kind of truth. There is one kind of truth constituted
by everybody agreeing it is true, as many admired the Emperor's new clothes
in the fable. Science is that, but something more. It is grounded in our
common experience as human beings with similar anatomy, physiology, habitat,
history, life cycle, and so forth. Scientific consensus stems from appreciation
of the most basic facts of our common experience. If the invariant features
of the human condition are not the final criterion of truth, I don't know
what else could be.
<11>
I don't quite understand Mike's assertion that "...[there is] an important
place here IN THIS REALM for phenomenology" I think the emphasis is
to contrast with the Platonic realm of forms. The implication is that phenomenology
can be or is, an epistemological method, which can generate "profound"
knowledge in the realm of senses, not just in the realm of forms. To the
extent I have got this idea right, I would dearly like to believe it. But
we are full circle: without an explicit methodology we can agree on, how
can one person ever know what is true? I don't think there is such a thing
as a private truth, for the same reasons Wittgenstein employed to claim
there could be no private language.
<12>
Rick Norwood also argues against totally unique experience: " Suppose
you claim, as some do claim, to have experienced a phenomenon totally unlike
anything anyone else has ever experienced or can ever experience. Since
I will never be able to know whether or not what you are telling me is true,
and, if it is true, what you are talking about, this will not be of particular
interest to me." I would add that the person who had such a hypothetical
unique experience could not even conceptualize it to themselves, since conceptualization
requires the categories and processes of language and socially constructed
reality. Such an experience would be like an unremembered dream. (There
are degrees of conceptualization, and not all experiences are equally effable.
But there are no experiences ineffable in principle).
<13>
Herbert Muller suggests that Husserl had not decided if he believed in Kantian
Dingen. Regardless, Herbert goes on to suggest a non-ontological phenomenology
which strains my notion of what ontology is. Ontology seems to be captured
in this phrase of Herbert's, " ...an assumption of pre-fabricated mind-independent
perceptual and conceptual entities..." I can almost get my head around
this. (I am a psychologist, not a philosopher). But I have to ask, what
is the "pre-" of "pre-fabricated?" Experience is not
a snapshot, and I think the assumption that it is has been the downfall
of both Husserlian phenomenology and Wundtian introspectionism, and I hope
also, someday the downfall of today's qualia-mongers. Experience, in my
experience, is lived over time. I prefer a constructionist approach to phenomena,
rather than a strictly analytic one. The fabrication is part of the experience.
How does that square with your definition of ontology, Herbert?
<14>
Herbert also gives another very challenging idea, that "belief in the
reliability of mental structures must always remain accessible to doubt
and concurrent re-evaluation, according to the method of doubt as it has
been advocated over the centuries, for instance by Descartes, but without
falling for (or into) his doubt-free ontological certainties, as empiricists
tend to do. ... We have to acknowledge that we are the creators of, and
responsible for, all mental structures"
This has face validity to me as a generative idealist. But without an apodictic
apple somewhere at the bottom of the barrel, aren't we in deep trouble here?
Can there be epistemology in the complete absence of ontology? I'm lost.
I wish everyone an enjoyable holiday season.
Bill Adams
(badams@halcyon.com)
Seattle, Washington, USA
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The following two notes by Kevin Johnson and Gary Schouborg were written
in response to R8 (TA1) to Chris Lofting. (Chris has sent a note that he
will reply later).
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Kevin Johnson comments:
<15>
I have snipped out your comments at the end of your commentary on Chris'
article. I intersperse questions and comments.
HM:
"If I may briefly here re-state my own position (which I have described
in more detail elsewhere): concepts, logic, mathematics, and particle physics,
etc., are tool kits, created by people for the exploration and expansion
of mind-nature experience, they are not ontological baselines or units."
There is a great deal of significance in choosing the term "created"
over, say, "gathered"... or "collected."
Can one create something and recognize in it something new? This is in the
vein of Hume's program of extreme skepticism.
<16>
The drift of my questions is to illustrate (at least what I see) that your
position allows itself 'mobility'. I am tempted to say temporal mobility
but that would serve only an illustrative purpose not a defining one. The
significance is that you can drift back to a "point of view" in
any given circumstance and see (in a complete encompassing manner not articulated
by the word 'see' normally) the theories of others.
<17>
There is nothing wrong with this. But note that it subsumes fixation in
whatever 'dimension(s)' you retain mobility. Fixation of the theories observed,
that is.
(I suspect, as an aside, that Chris might tell you that you need observe
yourself observing and so on.)
HM:
"In my opinion, a non-ontological point of view is needed, which does
not assume mind-independent reality and truth, and thus permits intellectual
access to the process of reality-structuration, from no structure, within
experience."
It is a curiosity that when moving into infinite dimensions a completely
different or double standard is allowed or claimed. For example, your observation
activities can occur in the countably infinite (with time as an open variable
or dimension). Logic (I take we are speaking of something like propositional
logic) can be viewed as a superset of finite constructions or "proofs".
Thus in observing logic from a point of view that is fluid in time (non-ontological)
we can proclaim logic as some manner of disjunct entity of finite nature,
a "toolkit" and "not ontological baselines or units."
<18>
The escape hatch in operating in infinity seems to be the notion that assumptions
are not the same sorts of things when in a fluid non-fixed environment like
the countably infinite. This is the double standard. In effect, a "logic"
is being utilized but not being called a "logic". Full stop.
If you disagree with someone or claim that their view is incorrect, then
you are operating under one or more of the exclusionary principles of (normal)
logic. Maybe these are called "canons of thought", "tenets
of reason", whatever.
<19>
Now, to proceed, recognize that while being the observer you are being observed.
Recognize that your infinite qualities or abilities are to an observer in
the next level of infinity as the finite qualities of "logic"
are to you.
Hopefully, the circularity of ascribing this position the appellation Logicism
or some such is apparent. What is being encountered is the (or a) problem
in Philosophy of trying to separate everything up into distinct groups or
classes...they are all intrinsically inter-related.
HM:
<20>
"In that case metaphysics ceases to be immutable ontology and becomes
a functional tool ('working metaphysics')."
Really it is both. Or, at minimum, one (either) subsumes the other.
HM:
<21>
"Experience per se does not automatically lead to ontology. Ontology
is the result of the endowment with unlimited validity of certain aspects
of (or structures inside) experience, with the help of the force of belief."
I guess I am unclear as to what validity means here.
Is the experience itself not a validity unto itself? (?)
HM:
<22>
"This I assume would be the method by which Lofting reaches the conclusion
that cells, sine waves, and electrons are 'absolute'; please correct me
if this is not so. To assume mind-independent reality means to neglect its
origin from the unstructured matrix,..."
Caution, allowing origination from a matrix, structured or not, assigns
unity to that matrix, hence structure. The limitation here seems to be one
of language or perspective (paradox situation).
HM:
<23>
"...with the result of missing the access to subjective experience.
Experience is not primarily mathematical."
Does this mean that one can not necessarily abstract from experience...?
HM:
<24>
'The pragmatist's belief in the mathematical constitution of nature is not
compatible with his own postulate that 'reality' is built up from experience.
Mathematics cannot be the first line of experience, not even for those who
are mathematically gifted, and for this reason this belief cannot be validated
by experience, which as Peirce agreed is the 'ultimate evidence'.
More generally, the 'looking-in' aspect of Lofting's proposal would then
become a pre-subject/object-split procedure. The 'maps' ARE our world structures,
rather than being 'in-here descriptions' of a (fictional) 'out-there reality',
which is by definition unreachable because it transcends experience. Thus
I would agree with him that it is necessary to step back from implicit (exclusive)
objectivity, but I think the goal of this distancing process has to be a
non-ontological view rather than subjective explanations of objective (ontic)
processes.
I wonder whether an agreement on such or similar terms might in principle
be attainable.'
<25>
I suspect the 'goal' you wish to reach is that described by Wittgenstein.
Do you really desire to throw away the ladder, though?
Kevin Johnson
<starhawaii@microd.com>
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Gary Schouborg comments (to TA1 R8):
<26>
'... Ontology is the result of the endowment with unlimited validity of
certain aspects of (or structures inside) experience, with the help of the
force of belief.'
In the Anglo-American, as opposed to the Continental, tradition ontology
is simply what is implied by a particular conceptual system. Thus, there
are various ontologies. Nothing is implied about objective existence.
Although ontology and metaphysics are often used synonymously these days,
in medieval scholastism, esp. Thomism, they are often distinguished as ontology
: essences or possibilities : : metaphysics : existence.
<27>
Experience is not primarily mathematical.
I would certainly agree that experience is not prima facie mathematical.
Everything rides on the meaning of "primarily". What if experience
has an ineluctable conceptual component and all our concepts can eventually
be shown to derive from Lofting's dichotomous template? I haven't a clue
whether that is possible. My only point here is that you seem to be insisting
(rightly) that math is not salient in our immediate experience, even for
the mathematician, but that the Peirce / Lofting primacy of math seems to
be theoretical / explanatory.
CC: Chris Lofting <clo@fmsc.com.au>
Gary Schouborg
<garyscho@worldnet.att.net>
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Reply to above notes by Herbert FJ Muller
<28>
I will start with the point made by Gary Schouborg <26 above>, who
distinguishes Continental from Anglo-American ontology. In trying to inform
myself on this point, the main reference I found was to Quine's work, who
emphasized the use of language, and of theories, and then suggested that
the use of such instruments commits one to certain views of the world (see
Presley, and MacIntyre). 'We are, according to Quine, committed to the existence
of physical objects because of the ways in which physical objects function
in our language' (Presley p.55). This, it seems to me, is one of the possible
methods of providing a rationale for materialism, and a rather instrumental
(even upside down) one at that; it takes language or theories as the basis
- which can only fail unless it is qualified by some validation method.
If products of language or theory are the main criterion of reality, one
of them is as good as any other one, including not only scientific theories
or religious beliefs but also delusions. For instance, if someone (a person
or a group of people) has the notion that they must die in order to board
a spaceship, and then proceed to kill themselves, this would, in the view
based on language or on theory, be just as valid as saying that the earth
circles the sun, that the universe is expanding, or that the mind forms
in tubules in the brain or in the liver (please correct me if that is a
mis-representation of Quine's view).
<29>
My main point is here that Quine's view is in practice 'committed' to mind-independent
reality and truth just as Plato or Kant were. However, due to the multiplicity
of possible meanings of the term 'ontology', it may be a good idea to not
use it (nor the term 'Cartesianism'), and rather come back to a more descriptive
term such as 'belief in mind-independent reality and truth' - as I had done
in my TA1 (this could be called BIMIRAT for short, not a very attractive
term, but at least I don't distort someone else's).
<30>
The pull of materialism (or objectivity) is very strong for all of us, and
cannot be explained by language or theory use, in my opinion. Consider for
instance the recent article in 'Time' by Damasio, who after debating various
aspects of the mind-brain relation (including a key statement that: 'consciousness
is an elaborate rite of passage into everything that makes us human') finally
settles in favour of an 'unknown aspect of brain activity' to explain the
relationship. It seems to me that this is not really different from Descartes'
notion about the role of the Pineal gland for bringing mind and body together.
<31>
This brings me to a central concern voiced by Bill Adams, namely his question
<14>: 'can there be epistemology in the complete absence of ontology
?' This is a difficulty indeed, and I think it is the reason why we get
stuck in 'naive' realism, objectivity, materialism, and the like: we are
pulled into objectivity by a strong need for doubt-free certainty, which
is also the reason why Descartes stopped doubting after his many efforts:
he wanted certainty and then proclaimed that he had found it (that is, he
'found' the fictitious 'apodictic apple', as Bill Adams called it, providing
certainty for much of science, but excluding original experience). Bill
thus is not the only one to be concerned. And the 'regularities' <2>
which we find in nature: it may be helpful to remember that we find them
in mind-nature experience. 'Confidence' <6> is a result of reliability
in practice, of durability or truth <10>. People create ontology <13>
and then proceed to believe in it; this is how I see it. Of course we are
in deep trouble <14> because the responsibilities increase, but I
think it is better to acknowledge that than to rely on fictitious certainties.
<32>
And Kevin Johnson I think has the same (or at least a similar) concern with
his question about 'throwing away the ladder' <25>. He also emphasizes
the difference between 'creating' and 'finding' <15>, and that there
is 'fixation' on a theory <17> or tool-kit (this sounds somewhat like
Quine's proposal). I am not sure what he means by 'double standard' <18>
- maybe he wants to distinguish ontology (in the sense of BIMIRAT) from
a zero-reference (or RRF) view (see TA1[30], and TA1,R1[5-8]). I do agree
however that all possible philosophical points of view (and indeed all possible
points of view) are interrelated <19>, for the simple reason that
they all are created from within the same ongoing unstructured experience
- the origin is thus the same. But I disagree with his point about metaphysics
<20>: it cannot be both immutable and 'working': because immutable
ontology is frozen metaphysics and becomes dysfunctional under certain conditions,
such as when asking about experience. The term 'abstraction' <23>
means 'taking away from': as applied to mathematics it simply means that
one concentrates on one aspect of experience, in isolation as it were, disregarding
others. By 'validity' <21> I mean reality or truth (see below).
<33>
Gary Schouborg asks <27> what I mean by 'primarily': here I refer
to a developmental sense of the word, for instance in every single new experience,
or also probably historically, and etymologically, etc.
<34>
If we define reality and truth as 'structures we believe in', the situation
becomes more permeable. Jaspers, for one, has defined truth as belief. He
wrote: 'the objection: that in that case there would only be a bottomless
relativism', (1) implies an assumption that there is only a single, compelling,
objectively existing truth, (2) eliminates Existenz in favour of a supposedly
present absolute objectivity (once you have done this you cannot get experience
back; this I think is what Chalmers called the 'hard problem'), and (3)
it reduces all communication to a common understanding of something supposedly
objectively valid. Considering that Jaspers wrote this in 1932, one might
wonder what would have happened if this thought had been taken more seriously,
especially by empiricists - at least much paper could have been saved (question:
how much do philosophers try to comprehend each other's viewpoints ?). But
a further practical problem, in my opinion, is that: Jaspers and others
have not provided a (generally acceptable) description of the birth of science
inside mind-nature experience, which would have been based on this insight.
This still needs to be done, so far as I can see (cf. also my TA1 [31-40,54],
and N9).
<35>
One way of rendering this problem more accessible may be to consider that:
'we' (that is, people all over) have proceeded in that fashion for thousands
of years. The fixed but fictional (that is, transcending experience), supposedly
'external', structures have always been used as-if they were 'BIMIRAT-ly'
real. Consequently, if it is suggested that these are temporary ad-hoc structures
(or as Raman pointed out, if in Sanskrit writings they are even seen as
'maya', illusions), people get frightened - as they well ought to (me too).
Heidegger had, in his earlier days, set out to frighten people, rather than
comforting them (discussion with E. Cassirer, 1929).
<36>
From this point forward one can see the origin of science as a specialization
from within an unstructured (and specifically: undivided into subject and
object) mind-nature experience. Objective science usually neglects this
origin (but does not have to) and treats the as-if assumptions without doubt
as though they were 'given': pre-fabricated data or objects, etc. This,
I would think, explains the 'sharp contrast' between phenomenology and scientific
method, which was emphasized <2-3 above> by R Cook ('a scientist takes
as given ...'). Concerning Bill Adams' question <13> 'what is the
pre- ?': the pre- is the fictitious (or ontological or persistent-metaphysical
or BIMIRAT) aspect. I agree with Bill that 'fabrication is part of the experience'
and that time belongs to that, but 'time' (like 'space' or 'objects'), itself
is also one of the fabricated structures, which is to say that it too is
a structure which is created by us (TA1[42-44]).
<37>
But the subjective experience (I assume that this is in part what Jaspers
meant by 'Existenz') cannot become one of those entities because it was
and remains there first and forms their center, and therefore attempts to
'explain' it objectively are self-defeating. Subjective experience is the
'soft' center of all knowledge, 'hard' tool structures (concepts, mathematics,
logic, and even percepts etc.) are created at the periphery and they are
exchangeable (see N9). This I think is the reason why subjective experience
cannot be studied objectively: it cannot be parceled as a hard peripheral
entity, and it is not exchangeable (TA1 R5 to Mark Seelig, [35]).
<38>
I am interested in knowing whether consensus along these or similar lines
might become possible; we need something like that in order to get through
the present chaotic state of conceptualization in the mind-brain area.
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REFERENCES
Damasio AR (1997), A Clear Consciousness. Time, Special Issue, on The New
Age of Discovery, Winter 1997/98.
Jaspers K (1932-72), Philosophie, Berlin: Springer, Vol II, P.434
MacIntyre A (1967-72), Ontology, in: Encyclopedia of Philosophy, New York:
Macmillan, Vol. 5, pp.542-3.
Presley CF (1967-72), Quine W V O, in: Encyclopedia of Philosophy, New York:
Macmillan, Vol.7, pp.53-5.
Herbert FJ Muller
<mdmu@musica.mcgill.ca>