ABSTRACT.
Nunn provides promising suggestions that quantum theory and paranormal evidence bridge two worlds: the "epistemic" realm of space-time and the "ontic" realm, which is non-spatial and non-temporal. However, to understand what his account tells about consciousness (cs), we must distinguish between descriptive (phase of ) science and explanatory (phase of ) science. There is a descriptive science of cs, one which tells us under what conditions individuals are conscious. However, there can be no explanatory science of cs, whether cs is explanans or explanandum. Cs as such, no more than existence as such, can explain anything. Conversely, we can no more scientifically explain cs than we can scientifically explain why there exists anything rather than nothing at all. The inquiry that seeks to understand existence as such turns out to be the same as the inquiry that seeks to understand cs as such. Its fruit is not scientific explanation, but pure cs (attention), enlightenment (understanding), and liberation (valuation).

<1>
As a layman to quantum theory, I found Nunn's article erudite and informative. The distinction between ontic and epistemic was very helpful in understanding the paranormal, my skepticism of which is partly due to the quickness with which many devotees jump to the conclusion of evidence of non-materiality. Nunn's account opened up for me two hitherto unsuspected possibilities: (1) the material universe has largely unexplored depths beyond space-time; or (2) limit the attribution of materiality to the universe of space-time and call non-local and non-temporal reality ontic or non-material. The choice between (1) and (2) is semantic, not substantive. Either way, Nunn's framework seems to offer a view beyond space-time that maintains continuity of inquiry, thereby avoiding magical thinking and untestable speculation.

<2>
Just what light Nunn sheds on cs is unclear, since he shifts his subject throughout the article without explanation. The title refers to "quantum theories of CS" [my emphasis]. The abstract then shifts to "conscious mind" and "mental states", each of which is ambiguous. "Conscious mind" might mean either cs itself or a mind to which cs is attributed. Mental states may be conscious or unconscious. Furthermore, the introduction < 1 > refers to "religious belief", "mirth", and "abnormalities of cs", which are mental functions or states whose relationship to cs Nunn never identifies.

<3>
Nunn suggests "that the strongest grounds for continuing to bother about quantum theory in the context of cs centre on two considerations, namely the consequences of an adequate understanding of materialism and the experimental evidence" [4]. Quantum theory bridges the gap between the ontic and the epistemic, since we have developed quantum theory in the epistemic realm but found is an ontic, non-local and non-temporal, reality [5-6]. Similarly, paranormal phenomena such as telepathy [10], the ability of people to influence consciously the output of random number generators [11], and "acausal" EEG convergence [13] demonstrate epistemic data pointing to ontic explanations.

<4>
Another bridge is meaning, which "is not a characteristic of epistemicity; it does not belong to our everyday world of happenstance but refers basically to the ontic realm" [7]. The reason is that "[c]onscious meaning or understanding . . . is an overall attribute of the system and lacks any particular place or process to which it can be localized [8]. Thus, "cs, arising as it does from a complex brain but encompassing meaning in an essential way, is a denizen of both realms. It is like an amphibian poised between epistemic dry land and the ontic ocean, but experimentally accessible only on dry land" [8]. Therefore, "cs, belonging as it does partly to the ontic realm, should occasionally demonstrate the non-spatial, non-temporal, acausal nature of that realm" [9].

<5>
Quantum theory, paranormal phenomena, meaning, and cs therefore share both ontic characteristics (non-spatiality, non-temporality, and acausality) and epistemic characteristics (the experienced characteristics of spatiality, temporality, and causality). Telepathy and other paranormal phenomena, assuming they exist, seem to offer straightforward examples of non-spatiality and non-temporality. That is, they provide instances of communication not limited by space and time. Why Nunn then adds to these two notions that of acausality is unclear. He says, "Although all the experiments that can ever be performed manifest epistemically, space, time and causation are not fundamental but are derived from a deeper, mostly unknown, order in the ontic realm". < 9 > If the ontic realm is acausal, then how are space, time, and causation derived from it? It seems circular to say they are derived causally; but if not causally, the only alternative seems to be formally-logically or mathematically. However, the formal realm is the realm of theory, not reality. It is within the network of existing causes that theories are confirmed or falsified. This also explains why meaning is non-spatial and non-temporal-it is part of the "world" of theory, not of reality.

<6>
In any case, since Nunn's concern is with the relevance of quantum theory to cs, the fundamental problem here is attributing non-spatiality and non-temporality to cs. The justification for hypothesizing that quantum and paranormal realities are non-spatial and non-temporal is straightforward, although controversial: events A and B are claimed to be related in a way that is not a function of their spatial and temporal interrelationships. The claim about their relationship is ontological, not phenomenological; the claim is about what their relationship really is, not what it appears to be. In contrast, neither Nunn nor anyone else has offered a way of saying what cs really is (ontology). All we know from experience is how we experience cs (phenomenology). Perhaps we can say that the phenomenolgical - ontological distinction does not apply to cs, since in its case, uniquely, what we see is what we get. As we shall see, there is much to be said for this strategy. However, it raises fundamental questions about what we could possibly mean by a science of cs.

<7>
A descriptive science of cs, one which identifies the conditions under which individuals are conscious, is already well established. On a gross behavioral level, we know that if we go to sleep or suffer a sufficiently physical or emotional shock, we will lose cs. Pharmacologically, from before the dawn of history, we have known that ingesting certain substances would have the same effect. We have recently made great strides in identifying cognitive functions and neural processes associated with cs. All these tell us under what conditions we are conscious. However, we still know nothing about how or why these conditions bring about cs. In other words, we do not have an explanatory science of cs. Nunn himself seems to acknowledge this in asserting that "neuroscience cannot yet account for all the phenomena of cs, particularly not those involved in Chalmer's 'hard problem'" [1]. For the hard problem is precisely a plea for an explanatory science of cs, a science in which certain empirical conditions can provide an explanation for how or why cs will emerge from them.

<8>
We can now turn to the stronger claim: not only do we not have a science of cs (not only have we not solved the hard problem), but no such science (solution) is possible. Now science can involve cs in either or both of two ways, as explanans and as explanandum. First, consider cs as explanans. Trying to explain anything by appealing to cs is necessarily an argument from ignorance of the mechanisms that do explain it (where "mechanism" is used in a broad enough sense to incorporate quantum theory). To see why, consider the nature of explanation.

<9>
Explanations must provide information that we can use to take action in regard to the explanandum. That is why they are better the more they tie the explanandum to some broader framework. By tying one thing to another, they provide us with options. The problem with any argument from ignorance is that at best it only releases the tension of our inquiry but offers us no information on which we can base any action. Consider the childhood answer to the question of why the sky is blue - because it is not green. Why do we refuse to accept this answer even though it is both meaningful and true? First, we should be clear that acceptance is based in part on relevance. It could be that the question is really about why the sky is called blue. In that case, the answer is a legitimate, if partial, explanation that we call it blue rather than green. The explanation is legitimate, because it provides us information that guides behavior - don't call the sky green. Usually, however, the question is about real causes, in which case the answer is not really explanatory. It provides no information to guide behavior. From knowing that the sky is not green, we can draw no conclusions, design no experiments, nor develop any applications.

<10>
An appeal to cs as explanans is just such an ad hoc argument from ignorance. For example, in the face of our incomplete understanding of how we make decisions, one might offer the explanation that we are conscious of making free choices, ones that are not completely caused by mechanisms outside of cs itself. In other words, we suppose that cs is the mechanism of free choice which fills an explanatory gap that cognitive and neural mechanisms will never fill. It is therefore one causal mechanism among others, but distinctively different in being free. Unfortunately, this account provides us no information to guide behavior. Whether or not we believe we are free, we will continue to make choices. Whether or not we believe we are free, we will still try to provide incentives for one another to act in ways we deem desirable. Whether or not we believe we are free, we will still feel impulses of vengeance, just as we do inanimate objects which disappoint and frustrate us.

<11>
A second example is the empirical evidence that conscious perceptions produce qualitatively different results from unconscious ones (Merikle and Daneman 1998). We should avoid the temptation to conclude that cs makes the difference, since we have yet to identify all the mechanisms that cause those qualitatively different results. In other words, the evidence does not rule out the possibility that there are mechanisms which cause the difference and which are accompanied by a non-causal cs. Appealing to cs releases the tension of inquiry, but does not expand the network of causes already identified. That is, cs is discontinuous with the inquiry for which it purports to provide an answer. This is necessarily the case, since the inquiry seeks an explanation in terms of cognitive functions or neural processes. In contrast, no one that I am aware of claims that cs is a function, and certainly not a neural process, but a state or property to be attributed either to functions or processes, or to an individual.

<12>
The second way science involves cs is as explandum. It is in this sense that a science of cs is equivalent to the hard problem. To see why science cannot explain the existence of cs as such, it will be helpful first to consider a parallel issue: Why is there anything rather than nothing at all? This question is not amenable to scientific answer, for the simple reason that science concerns itself only with the relationships between existing (and possibly existing) things, not with existence as such. In the same way, science concerns itself with functions and processes, not with cs as such. Any conscious function or process can be conceptualized as a function or process that is unaccountably accompanied by cs. Any explanation for such a function or process speaks to the function or process itself, not to the cs which accompanies it. The most we can do is what we have done: develop a descriptive, but not an explanatory science of cs; identify the conditions under which cs exists in our world of experience.

<13>
What, then, are we to make of our seemingly ineluctable impulse to ask about existence and cs as such? This question is not meaningless, though we are wrong to think of it as scientific. Rather, it is experiential (existential, religious, spiritual-take your pick). Medievalists thought it an intellectual question amenable to an intellectual answer. Moderns and postmoderns have concluded that is not so. Due to the relatively recent rapprochement between East and West, we are now in a position to see the question as a koan. Consider the classical koan of, What is the sound of one hand slapping? Like other koans, this one is articulated in the form of an intellectual question, a puzzle, asking for an intellectual answer. Enlightenment is achieved when the seeker becomes aware that the question, instead, is existential. That is, the seeker is enlightened when her conscious focus shifts from the prospective answer to the seeking impulse itself. She does not just intellectually realize there is no intellectual answer possible. Much more fundamentally, she experiences an awareness that she realizes is what she has sought all along.

<14>
This awareness is labelled differently according to which of its characteristics is being emphasized. It is PURE CS if the focus is on the awareness itself, rather than on accompanying cognitive functions such as perception, imagination, memory, conceptualization, etc. It is ENLIGHTENMENT if the focus is on the realization that this, rather than an intellectual answer, was what was being sought all along. It is LIBERATION if the focus on the supreme value of the awareness, a value that in being supreme liberates the subject from all other values as secondary.

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Reference
Merikle, Philip M, and Daneman, Meredyth (1998).
"Psychological Investigations of Unconscious Perception." Journal of Consciousness Studies, 5(1), 5-18.

[Commentator:
Gary Schouborg, Ph.D., Philosophical Psychology, is a partner of Performance Consulting, which facilitates planning, meetings, and teamwork efforts of both profit and not-for-profit organizations. He has published in philosophy, religious studies, poetry, and business.
Walnut Creek, CA.
Email: <garyscho@worldnet.att.net>]