KARL JASPERS FORUM

TA32 (Muller)

Response 16 (to C39 by Mutnick)

MAKING DO WITHOUT SUPER-HUMAN POWERS
by Herbert FJ Müller
25 June 2001, posted 7 August 2001

My replies are in [brackets]

[1]
[I am obliged to Peter Mutnick for his considerable efforts in discussing my point of view. The discussion contains a great deal of interesting material, which I may be able to come back to at a later time. For the present I will mainly answer to some points of disagreement, in order to pinpoint the source of the differences. (For a response to the quantum-physical aspects of his comments, please see discussion to TA34 C19.)]

[2]

[In <10> PM writes that I cannot explain the bootstrap function of concepts. One can describe how they arise and how they are used, which in my opinion suffices. An "explanation" beyond this can only be attempted on the basis of a static MIR-view, which I think is not defensible (see TA32). I agree that the mental word-structures transcend experience; but I do not think that they are, as PM proposes <10>, an anti-thesis to it. As I discussed (in TA32[5ff]), it is a built-in property of word-concepts that they transcend experience in an asymptotic fashion, and thus can lead to the assumption of a mind-independently pre-structured reality (MIR). This belief can be of help in stabilizing thinking, but the MIR is not accessible for study because it is fictitious.]

[3]
[But PM insists that MIR is real, and is in effect related to a super-human reality and power. This theme recurs throughout PM's comments, and it seems that this is the main difference between our views. For instance, he insists that super-human powers are available, including to him personally <38-39>, and that this sets him apart from others, while I think we have to make do with what we have available to us as human beings. PM denies that he wants additional security and power for personal reasons <33>, and that MIR is required for science (which is not so : science needs functional convergence, not static metaphysics). But at the end of his comment <52> he writes that he will "go his own way", insisting in effect on traditional inaccessible ontology plus his own magical thinking, which gets him "out of the valley of the shadow of death". This may be the MIR function he wants.]

[4]
[In the following I discuss some of the particulars which PM brings up. Since the same themes keep recurring, my replies are somewhat repetitive.]

[5]
"<14> Is the human being then the creator of the world or is God? It soon becomes evident that God knows the human being better than he knows himself, and so the human being finds a new identity in God." [This question has puzzled people for a long time. The view of the mystic, Angelus Silesius (AS, Johann Scheffler), may be helpful, who wrote : "Ich weiss, dass ohne mich Gott nicht ein Nu kann leben, werd ich zunicht, Er muss von Not den Geist aufgeben" (Der Cherubinische Wandersmann, 1657). The answer to PM's question (i) depends on how much responsibility one is willing to accept (AS may have envisaged a sort of mutual creation of man and God). (ii) One should also distinguish between structuring experience (which we do entirely) and physical manufacturing (this we do to a limited extent only). The "imprisonment" <17> is due to the limitations which we FIND when using the mental structures which we have created.]

[6]
"<16> Subjective experience is not quite the sacrosanct "Holy Cow" that you make it out to be, nor is it the entirely solid foundation for a good sense of reality." [We have no choice but to start from SE (TA32[10]), which does not make it holy. But since it is the only starting point, it is also the only basis for reality, which we (including PM) ASSERT (with the help of belief in mind-and-world structures we have created) rather than find.]

[7]
"<21> … it seems then that you are putting [thinking] somewhere in between the objective structures of the physical world and the subjective structures of the meta-physical world. That is, you seem to be putting it in the phenomenal world of the ontological system of worlds." [Not at all, since I think that static ontology is a fiction.] "<22> "where is this subjective experience?" [It is the only point from which we can start, it "is" not in some static ontological sense] "What is the mode of its existence, especially the context or environment for its existence?" [the context is our later creation.]

[8]
"<22> … If you are simply ignorant on this point, you should say that, but in any case, from my point of view you are just not being straightforward. The reason you are doing that, IMHO, is that by being vague and obscure you thereby avoid criticism and scrutiny - it seems to be a form of dishonesty." [ You are simply implying your static-MIR-scheme as the obligatory basis for everything and everyone, which satisfies no one but yourself : I made it clear that static-MIR is invalid (and by the way, your language seems to run away from you at times when an opinion differs from yours). ]

[9]
"<24> I think the subject/object split probably is primary, …" [If you think that, static-MIR-belief is almost inevitable.] " … but even granting your premise that it is not, you admit that it is the internal structure of all "self-nature" experience." [I agree, it is a needed pragmatic structure which is quite basic] "… if you allow those concepts to be transcendental" [In my opinion this is not something one allows, it is built-in] " … this experience will then refer to something … " [That is where your problem starts: referring implies static MIR] " … beyond its solipsistic origin." [One has to distinguish between ontological solipsism (which leads into a dead end) and methodological solipsism (which everyone uses) – which one do you mean ?]

[10]
"<24> Presumably we have experiences in order to relate to that which is transcendental to ourselves. If you don't allow that self-transcendence to occur then it seems to me you defeat the whole purpose of the experience and indeed the existence of the individual organism, or soul if you will." [Transcendence is built into concept-use but static-MIR-belief ("something beyond") is not, it is a faulty development (see TA32 [24-27]). Such insight does not "defeat the purpose of experience", it leads to better understanding.]

[11]
"<25> … to go back before individuation to the original and universal consciousness … I have done it, and I can tell you that it is not the end-all and be-all that you think it is." [I don’t think that; it is the inevitable starting point, not something to get stuck in.]

[12]
"<27> How does SE conceptualize itself?" [By building its structures.] "In other words, "How does it fit into its own conceptual scheme? … You still have an unresolved "hard problem" in trying to provide for experience an adequate (functional) means of conceptualizing itself." [The scheme is a secondary invention for purposes of a larger world-view, not a primary given. The hard problem dissolves, because it is caused by implied fictitious static MIR.]

[13]
"<29> … Whether ontology and reality are primary or "as-if" as you say, they are a fact of our existence." [They are central; but the question is whether they are provided from outside (as you say) or by our structuring and only as-if-provided-from-outside (as I say).] "The problem remains exactly the same from a scientific point of view, in either case." [Agree, in case you see science as a functional, not ontological, enterprise; but it does not appear that you do, because you insist on static MIR in science too.] "How do we understand the functional relationship between subjective experience and all the structures we observe in nature and in ourselves?" [We create all mind-nature structures within SE. After that we see what we know, and we know what we believe about the structures.] "The presumption of the "hard problem" is that we can and must formulate this functional relationship in a scientific way" [please define "scientific" (also re. <33>)].

[14]
"<31> … not make the seemingly absurd claim that [SE] is all that really exists." [I don’t claim that; what really exists is not SE, but is determined by investment of belief in structures. For instance you believe in your MIR-scheme, but I don't.] "This is completely against the philosophy of complementarity, as I understand it, since nothing, including experience, can exist in such a vacuum …" [We have a need for overall understanding, and create structures for that. But remember Feyerabend's point that the rational structures float in a sea of irrationality.] "As is well known, which I can easily document, Heisenberg was a Platonist and affirmed the existence and importance of Platonic ideas for both physics and philosophy. Interesting dialogue, but please try to see my point and address it directly, so we can resolve this issue as best we can." [Plato said that his forms or ideas were out of reach, but you claim you can reach them with super-human powers <38-39>, "and that is the problem" indeed.]

[15]
"<39> ... This is basically just the argument over decoherence. Decoherence is based on the limits of human observers, which limits would not necessarily apply to other types of observers. Hence at best it defines *human* reality, but not what would be the reality for a higher type of observer than a human, or for a human under the influence of such a higher observer." [i.e., a Deus ex machina] "… We certainly would not want to limit reality to what an amoeba experiences. Why should we limit it to what we, in our creaturehood, experience?" [Because that is what we have available and can deal with, beyond that is non-functional phantasy.] "We can certainly conceive of higher types of observers - people have done it since the beginning of time. Why should our theories not be built on reasonable assumptions about the existence of higher types of observers, especially when they have revealed themselves to us?" [Because they are a form of magical thinking, using a Deus ex machina as instant solution to puzzles, fine for theatre and for theism, not for science.]

[16]
" <42> … you are conflating subjective experience (SE) with encompassing experience (EE). SE is the thesis, EE is the synthesis, as you admit (that its function is to synthesize what has emerged as elements potentially transcendental to SE). And yet, inexplicably you conflate these two and so insist that nothing (in the form of concepts or ideas - namely Platonic ideas, with a life of their own) has emerged." [SE is not a thesis, but basis for structuring, thus the basis for creating theses. EE is an aspect of everybody’s SE, not something super-natural.]

[17]
"<43> … in the transcendental experience of Locke's tabla rasa … the difference between SE and EE vanishes and they are seen as two facets of the same self-transcending experience. But that experience does NOT start from SE - it rather ends in SE. It starts in the brain-located abstract "ego" (the part of the brain necessarily classical due to decoherence)" [The ego is neither abstract nor located in the brain. It is one of the words used for self-structures.] "which transcends itself by going into its own Unconscious" [one can - and should - leave one’s structures aside at times, in order to get fresh unformed input], "which is again a brain-located entity (having to do with coherent neuro-transmitter circuits)." [A category mistake.]

[18]
"<43> … The Unconscious is the gateway from the classical domain of the observer to the simultaneous experience within the quantum implicate order of SE and EE. SE, as the real origin of 0-D (zero-derivation), is in fact realized through the experience of Cosmic Consciousness." [No, on the contrary, any such religious type of notion is based on SE.] "Once Cosmic Consciousness is stepped down into the ontological Stream of Consciousness, it is already and automatically structured by experience and subsequent thought. That is why Muller admits that he cannot conceive of actually experiencing the tabla rasa. But I tell you that I have experienced it and that many others have experienced it and called it by different names, such as Kensho or the phenomenological reduction." [If you have, that is fine, I have nothing against it, but as you said <25> it is boring. Besides, my opinion is not that it cannot be done but that it is not necessary. And also, in case your cosmic consciousness is already structured, as you say, it is a belief-system and not original experience, which is unstructured.]

[19]
"<44> So, although in the phenomenological system of worlds SE and EE are the same, in the ontological world they most certainly are NOT. Within the ontological realm, we might well start from SE and define a dialectical empiricism, with PI as the antithesis and EE as the synthesis. By conflating phenomenological and ontological reality, Muller has created an indigestible mess that cannot be utilized scientifically and makes no sense in any other way, either. It is a shame and the waste of an otherwise insightful point of view." [Experience should not be replaced or superseded by "ontological" dogma, at least not in rational thinking. In dogmatic religion this is accepted, but then one still has to sort out the relationship between the two domains, and this in notoriously difficult (or as you put it, messy). What happens is that science becomes more functional and less dogmatic; but on the other hand, non-dogmatic religions are also available.]

[20]
"<45> … Bohr says … that "we are suspended over a bottomless pit, caught in our own words". The concepts are not caught in our ordinary experience, SE, but rather we in our extraordinary experience, EE, are caught in our words or concepts, and being caught in them is the only thing that gives us support." [The concepts are our doing, we must stand up for them, and if they are problematic, see how they can be improved. This implies a need for constant vigilance, not necessarily for mysticism, though some people like to use that.] "Falling back into the void of nonexistence, as Muller advocates, is NOT the answer, either scientifically or psychologically, although the womb of subjective experience is in a sense just the dream or deep sleep state, from which we emerge everyday into the waking state which clearly differentiates subject and object. So, we do indeed have a need to return to the womb of subjective experience every night in our sleep, but if we do not emerge from it we are said quite correctly to be insane. How droll it is to hear a psychiatrist advocating and promoting insanity. … " [I advocate that we take responsibility for what we do, during waking. This is what our existence requires. Sanity is promoted not by phantasies of superman powers, but by activation of everyone’s potential.]

[21]
"<49> It is ultimately just a prejudice of a very high order to presuppose that everything is contained within subjective experience." [Everything is not, I agree, contained in SE, but instead built within it. The world is your world. Which implies, among many other things, that you cannot escape from your experience by phantasies of super-human powers.]

[22]
"<51> … the metaphysical view … puts limits on the unlimited proliferation of possibilities." [In simpler terms : we try what we can do with our created structures, and find out about the limits as we do so.]

[23]
"<52> … In the end Muller cannot avoid the fact that his "experience" is after all a concept despite the fact that he thinks he is intending something so much more than a concept. …" [Concepts are tools, and we should be aware of what we do with them. If you wish you can say that this is "more", but you don't have to.]

-----------------------------------------

Herbert FJ Muller