KARL JASPERS FORUM

TA31 (vanFraassen / Feyerabend)

Commentary 17 (to C14 by McCaffrey)

TO A HAMMER, EVERYTHING LOOKS LIKE A NAIL
by Dewey Dykstra, Jr.
3 October 2003, posted 7 October 2003

<1>
In paragraph <3> of his commentary C14 to TA31, McCaffrey writes:

"The criterion itself - functional fit - assumes to know the nature of reality.... namely, that 'it' is 'unknowable' and any descriptions of 'it' must consist solely in terms of utility and expediency. The defence that RC type thought views itself not as claiming 'the truth', but as exemplifying the functional fit criterion shows only that it, and it alone, conforms to the standards it has set for every other world view. This is not dissimilar to Christians who counter the theory of evolution by saying that 'mankind can't have appeared on Earth in that manner because that's not what is said in the Bible'."

<2>
The first sentence can be seen to be a manifestation of a point of view that 'knowing' is about, and can reveal to us, the nature of reality (MIR). From such a view then it is reasonable to attribute this characteristic to other views of 'knowing,' hence the characterization of Müller's position as a different 'take' on reality, that it "assumes to know the nature of reality" as "unknowable." What follows in the paragraph is then logically consistent. To a hammer, everything looks like a nail. Unfortunately, it seems to me that Müller's position, like that in radical constructivism (rc), does not take 'knowing' to be about, or that it can reveal to us, the nature of reality (MIR).

<3>
In order to actually attempt to compare and contrast two views as different as these are, the "hammer" must be able to distinguish "nails" from other objects and not in a merely binary (nail/not nail) sense. Certainly, to make the step to notice that something is "not a nail" is the necessary first step in this process, but the separation between the two views is a multiple-step process. McCaffrey seems to characterize Müller's position as:

'Knowing' is about the nature of reality. The nature of reality is that it is unknowable.

But, I think Müller would characterize his own position more like:

'Knowing' is about achieving functional fit with experience. We do not know how to know the nature of reality.

To miss this distinction between Mueller's position (also that of rc) and how McCaffrey apparently sees Müller's position is to miss an essential difference between any of the forms of realism (except possibly "unless it is used in an as-if or working manner" -- Müller, (2) TA31 C13) and positions such as rc or Müller's.

<4>
Müller's non-MIR, 0-D position sets standards only for itself and not other world views. One can also find Maturana, von Foerster and von Glasersfeld saying explicitly. In the case of von Glasersfeld, one can find this in TA17. All three in various writings point out that their positions place the responsibility on the knower and really no one else.

<5>
McCaffrey's last sentence raises some interesting aspects. By the example it uses, it can be seen to be consistent with this characterization that 'knowing' is about the nature of reality. It repeats the attribution in the previous sentence that Müller's position and other similar positions include what other world views and their holders should be by example. Again, it is logically consistent that if 'knowing' is about the nature of reality, since there is but one reality, then any position on the nature of 'knowing' must be a position on what *all* other positions should be. Again the hammer sees only nails. As such, Müller's position is seen as a defective nail. Müller's position is not a nail, not a position on the nature of reality. Müller's position is on the nature of knowing, that it is about functional fit with experience, instead. It is not a nail and it is not meant to be used with a hammer.

----------------------------------------------------

Dewey Dykstra, Jr.