[1]
I am not sure whether Gert Morgenstern's remarks in <1 & 2> are intended to apply to a larger area of the KJF exchanges or just to the discussion of TA17. As a recent invitee I entered the fray neither to preach nor to convince, but in the hope of being criticized in a way that might push me to think and above all to express my thoughts more clearly. The comments received so far have not been a disappointment. On the one hand they have expanded my horizon, on the other, they have made me realize once again just how difficult it is to put ideas into language that is not open to unforeseen interpretations.


[2]
RELIGION, METAPHYSICS, AND ART

The 'us' in 'Clearly none of us will deny that God is not to be identified with any human concept' <4> surely does not extend very far beyond groups of people who get involved in philosophical/scientific discussions. Are there not millions (apart from those who know the word only as an expletive) who see Him as a PERSON that listens to their prayers and takes a very human interest in them?

[3]
As I said in my R4 to Edward Close, given the apparent mutual incompatibility of some of Einstein's statements, I don't know how he really thought about reality and God. However, I am somewhat disturbed by Morgenstern's suggestion that a good scientist might consider his theory 'a convincing, useful LIE' <4> (my emphasis). This would imply that the good scientist still posits an ultimate truth that could be captured by theories.

[4]
'Surely any Radical Constructivist must be an instrumentalist, and believe with Kant and Piaget that reason itself is an instrument' <5> - Yes! There is no doubt about this. Not so easily accepted, however, seems to be the constructivist tenet that reason is an instrument for the management and systematization of experience and not for the production of ontologically true representations.

In the meantime TA18 has been posted, and I was delighted to find in it Professor Raman's admirably clear exposition of the differences he sees between science and religion. Many of the differences that enable him to separate the two domains are the same that I see between rational knowledge and metaphysical assertions. He says, for instance, 'religious faith is not based on proofs and rationality, but results from an experience of a different category' (TA18 [5]). In my view, metaphysics is, as Vico suggested, a form of 'poetic knowledge' characterized by the use of irreducible metaphors. This is to say, it relies on metaphors that have at least one part that is not interpretable in terms of generally accessible experience. When the author of psalm number 139 wrote the inspiring phrase: '... had I the wings of the morning and dwelt in the furthermost parts of the sea ....', he did not expect his readers to interpret it rationally. He wanted to convey a 'cosmic' feeling that defied expression in cut and dried terms. Metaphysical statements are rarely quite so imaginative, but they, too, try to convey a feeling about the world of being that lies beyond ordinary, repeatable experience.

[5]
The rare moments when we genuinely feel a sensory experience to be a work of art are of the same kind - the moment we try to explain the effect, 'we are aware that the expression falls short' and, as Morgenstern so aptly says, 'we feel that we have encountered [the experience] coming to meet us from its mind-independent sphere' <6>.


[6]
TRUTH AGAIN REARS ITS HEAD

'Neither Piaget's texts nor v.G's are able in themselves to ring true ...' <8>. If, as I hold, constructivism explicitly substitutes the notion of viability for that of truth, the complaint is unwarranted. Considered as a proposed way of thinking and not as a description of the way things are, the question to ask about the constructivist model is simply: does it give a viable account of the knowledge I rely on in my actual living. I obviously believe it does - but this in no way denies the possibility that tomorrow or the next day a more elegant or effective model might be constructed.

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Ernst von Glasersfeld
e-mail <EVonglas@aol.com>