KARL JASPERS
FORUM
TA 101 (Ulrich Mohrhoff)
Commentary 2
WHICH REALITY WE PERCEIVE ?
by Serge Patlavskiy
29 December 2007, posted 5 January 2008
<1>
[Ulrich Mohrhoff] wrote: "[1] Suppose you see a
cherry. In what sense is the perceived cherry (the "cherry made of
qualia") a faithful depiction of the "real" cherry "out
there" (the "cherry made of molecules")?".
<2>
[S.P.] To satisfy the condition formulated in the
first sentence (namely, that I see a cherry, but not a peach), I already must grant
a necessary portion of "a faithful depiction of the "real"
cherry "out there" " to the perceived thing. So, the question formulated in the second
sentence is superfluous.
<3>
Let us see how the process of perception works. The electro-magnetic beam falls on a thing's
surface, reverberates, and enters the sense organ (an eye) where it transforms
into the electric signal which by neuronal channels reaches the brain. At this moment we end up with physical model
and come to informational model. So, the
electrical signal processes under the supervision of the already available
elements of our experience (or, the available information, or previous
knowledge), and then it conceptualises, or transforms into a new element of
experience (or, into new information, or new knowledge). The acts of processing and conceptualization
are modelled as reiterative loops (see [1], Fig.7a). So, on the first loop, the conscious subject
gains information that the object of perception is small (the conscious subject
has a previous knowledge how to discern between the big and small things), then
that it is round (he has a previous knowledge how to discern between the round
and square things), then that it is red (he has a previous knowledge how to
discern between the red and green things), and so on. The acts of processing and conceptualization
last for a fraction of a second, and finish by construction of the intellectual
products like : "What I see now
looks like a cherry -- a fruit that is already known for me", and "To
be sure that the thing is a cherry, I must conduct further investigation".
<4>
At this moment we end up with informational model and
return back to physical model. So, the
constructed intellectual product (by generating the electrical neuronal signal
to stimulate muscles movement) urges the organism to touch the thing that looks
like a cherry by its physical probe (like the arm or the lips). Having touched the thing, an electrical signal
generates by organism's skin receptors, and, by neuronal channels reaches the
brain. Then, as in the case above, we
come from physical to informational model, and describe the acts of processing
and conceptualization again. The
resulting intellectual product may be as follows : "What I have just touched by my fingers
and lips is soft, but to be sure that the thing is a cherry, I must conduct
more investigation". So, we have
just finished the second lap of the process of cognition. But, the more laps are ahead of us yet.
<5>
So, at the third lap of the process of cognition we construct an intellectual
product that the object of perception smells like a cherry, but more
investigation is required yet. At the
fourth lap we conclude that it tastes like a cherry. And, eventually, we make a conclusion that
what we see (or, better say, the object of perception we deal with) is a cherry
for 100 percent of certainty (in sense of being in one-to-one correspondence
with our previous knowledge about a cherry).
<6>
As one can see, "to see a cherry" means to
box several laps of the process of cognition. So, if the object of perception IS PERCEIVED
by conscious subject as a cherry, from this ALREADY follows that his knowledge
about the object of perception is for 100 percent consistent with what is
already known for him from his previous experience, and in this sense is
faithful. Albeit there is still a
possibility that what was known for us as a cherry could not be a cherry for
100 percent, and more investigation (say, on chemical level) is required;
therefore, each time we meet the seemingly same object of perception we add
some new information about it. Note : the sketched
above theory of perception makes no use of such a term as "qualia".
<7>
[Ulrich Mohrhoff] wrote: "[12] Now we seem to have three worlds — the phenomenal
world, the macroworld, and the microworld
— and we may be tempted to make the following identifications ...
macroworld = phenomenal world
microworld = real world
... and thereby vindicate the old myth that the senses give us appearances,
while science describes things as they really are. But this doesn't square with
the supervenience of the microworld
on the macroworld.".
<8>
[S.P.] Personally, I prefer to talk about Noumenal
Reality as a source of Phenomenal Reality. The last one exists as a collection of the
elements of our experience. Both micro-
and macro-worlds belong to Phenomenal Reality. The macro-world appears to us in the forms of
reflected or averaged phenomena, while the micro-world appears to us in a form
of probabilistic phenomena (see [1], Fig.3). A present-day Science describes things as
close as possible to what they really are. But, to describe the things as they really are
(or, to describe them as the elements of Noumenal
Reality) we have to apply some specific information-systemic modelling. Note: I may suppose that what Ulrich Mohrhoff
calls "UR" (short for "ultimate reality") may be
conceptually close to what I call Noumenal Reality. Phenomenal Reality -- it is a mental residue
that we, as the conscious subjects, have in the result of attempting to
percept/investigate Noumenal
Reality.
<9>
[Ulrich Mohrhoff] wrote: "[19] The relation between UR and the world has a
dual aspect : UR
is not only the substance by which the world exists but also the self for which
it exists.".
<10>
[S.P.] The irony is that Noumenal Reality (or, in
author's term, ultimate reality) is INDESCRIBABLE BY DEFINITION. So, we cannot say whether it is or it isn't a
substance, a self, etc. As I have
mentioned above, to formalize Noumenal Reality we
have to apply a specially constructed information-systemic models which enable
to formalize the Wholes as the informationally full
systems.
<11>
[Ulrich Mohrhoff] wrote: "[20] What is
instrumental in the manifestation of the world is particles, atoms, and such. The proposition is that what is instrumental
in the self's consciousness of the world is the brain. The brain is instrumental in the self's seeing
a cherry much as a telescope is instrumental in a person's seeing the rings of
Saturn.".
<12>
[S.P.] I think it's hard to disagree with. (I hope that by the term "self" the
author means "conscious subject" as the element of informational, but
not of physical model).
<13>
[Ulrich Mohrhoff] wrote: "[31] What about optical illusions, after-images,
color blindness ? What about people suffering from achromatopsia (who see only shades of gray) ? What about
Penfield's demonstration that micro-electrode stimulation of the visual system
results in visual experiences ? All of the above have been cited as evidence
that the visual world is constructed, rather than directly perceived, and that
colors are "in the mind," rather than "in the external
world." Yet all of the above can
also — and with better justification — cited as evidence that the brain
mediates the self's direct perception of (an aspect of) the manifested
world.".
<14>
[S.P.] What is important in colour vision is not a
colour as such, but a difference between colours. Second. There is no colour as such, and when we talk
about a colour, we mean a thing that has such or other colour. The colours only help us to make better
difference between the things.
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REFERENCE
[1] http://www.geocities.com/spatlavskiy/ElaborNewParadigm.pdf
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Serge Patlavskiy
e-mail <prodigyPSF
(at) rambler.ru>