KARL JASPERS FORUM
TA101
(Mohrhoff)
Commentary
1
EXPERIENCE ENCOMPASSES MATTER
by Herbert FJ Müller
20 December 2007, posted 5 January 2008
Ulrich Mohrhoff’s anti-materialistic opinion coincides
to a large extent with mine; but he comes from a different start-point, and there
are consequently some differences of procedure and of results, which will be
discussed in this communication. This
effort is incomplete, it is an attempt to compare
notes, and to establish a base for possible later more detailed discussion, if
desired.
In the following I respond to UM’s proposal (TA 101) in
three steps, all of them subject to revision if needed.
<1>
Firstly I try to summarize his proposal of a dual-aspect [19] theory of
knowledge, and of the role of the brain in this context, as I understand it at
present.
<1a>
He says [20] that the world is manifested as particles, which are behind the
manifested macro-world [14] (‘the real cherry out there, made of molecules’
[1]). The brain is an instrument for
seeing an ultimate reality (UR), but in that case the instrument itself is not
seen (it is transparent [24]), one would have to look along another axis to see
it [21].
<1b>
This UR is implied to be mind-independently pre-structured, since it is said to
manifest itself [13], it is the substance by which the world, and also the self,
exist [27]. UM calls the scientific
notion of perception (along the lines of epistemological efforts since the time
of Plato but minus the objections of critical philosophy; that is to say, naïve
realism), the ‘hypothesis of faithful depiction’.
<1c>
Phenomenal brains differ from real brains (this distinction did not become
clear to me) in that only the latter construct visual worlds [22]. It would be naïve to deny the existence of
unperceived aspects of the manifested world, and phenomenal objects are
directly perceived aspects of it [23].
Neural processes of vision likely mediate perception of the manifested
world rather than constructing it [25], and do not deal with the self [26].
<1d>
Colors are said to present a fundamental ontological mystery [28]. UM states [29] that
quantities are merely instrumental in the manifestation of
qualities. By dividing items, one loses
colors, and also items etc; what remains is undifferentiated UR.
<2>
Secondly I compare his proposal to my zero-derivation (0-D) view of structuring
experience, as I have described it in several papers in the KJF.
<2a>
The last item above, undifferentiated UR, is the start
point for 0-D which remains unitary rather than being dualistic. Dualities, such as mind (or self) and world
are not ontic, but secondary and pragmatic only, structured
within experience, which therefore encompasses all structures. This eliminates the problem of mind-independently
structured reality (MIR), which prevents studies of the mind-brain relation.
<2b>
Subject-inclusive structuring takes place within such otherwise unstructured experience : the
created structures include in principle always the self as well as the world, and
everything else, although one or more of them are mostly neglected. Structured objects result from
gestalt-function and -thinking, plus adoption of the results as reliable (and
may be called working-real).
<2c>
The addition of words, with their communication power,
and consequently often an implied universality, can result in a leap to the
belief in metaphysics-ontology, i.e., the fiction that there is a
mind-independent reality.
<2d>
In 0-D, ontology is a subject-inclusive working-instrument,
of use for structuring and stabilization of thinking and communication. But if in contrast entities are over-interpreted
to be pre-structured in a mind-independent way, or manifest-in-themselves
(‘given’, ‘onta’), this becomes metaphysics, i.e.,
fictitious, mysterious, impossible to verify or falsify. It implies an inversion of thinking, where
mental tools are promoted to mind-independent authorities (see TA78).
<2e>
The ontology proposition is less of an issue with qualia such as pain or colors;
colors are thus more straightforward and - if
anything - present less of a mystery than other aspects
of structured working-reality, for instance objects. (UM’s view that color is more mysterious is a
direct consequence of his traditional ontology, where mind-independently pre-structured
material objects, whether macroscopic or microscopic, are the real reality, and
qualia don’t fit into this scheme.)
<2f>
If I look at a cherry, or photograph it, or paint it, or eat it, it is just as
real, only in a different way, as when I study its molecules. There is no such thing as an UR-cherry.
<2g>
Neurons and brains are working-object-structures too, within experience. They can be used to study the physiology of mental
function in objective (‘materialist’) terms, but if one tries to replace
experience by neuronal events, one gets stuck, because subject-inclusive
experience cannot become objective.
<2h>
This produces the difference between our use of the brain as mental organ and the
brain studied as an object; the latter is only possible for to humans (UM’s transparency
and difference in axes, [21][24]). This point is related to the mysterious explanation
by John von Neumann that the probability wave collapses when it ‘meets a
consciousness’ (see TA93[41]).
<2i>
Particles (and so forth) do not manifest themselves but may be adopted as
working-real structures; the difficulties with quantum physics show that
gestalt-thinking has limits of usefulness, and that counting (numbers) offers
an access to more widely reliable procedures.
<2j>
Unperceived aspects of reality [23] become : not-yet-experienced and/or not-yet-structured
aspects.
<3>
Thirdly my evaluation of UM’s proposal in this
light.
<3a>
To start with his proposition of a dual-aspect view : such double-ontology views result in
predominance of objective-only mind-independently and subject-exclusive pre-structured
reality (MIR), once it is admitted as a possibility, since it is more weighty,
and much larger than the subjective-only part.
The subjective aspect then shrinks into a fuzzy appendix to the
objective material reality.
<3b>
‘We don’t expect the sensory system of a cockroach or a chipmunk to reveal the
true nature of reality’ [3]. Again, this statement makes sense only in the
context of belief in the existence of a true nature or MIR-reality-in-itself
(which is somehow revealed to humans but not chipmunks).
<3c>
But the MIR-part would have to be a ‘faithful depiction’ [2] of a
working-template (that is to say of a working-fiction posited by subjects).
<3d>
MIR-belief can however be replaced by use of working-MIR, which remains a human
instrument (like language, or mathematics, for instance), and that obviates the
need for such traditional metaphysics.
<3e>
The difference between macro-world and micro-(or quantum-) world [6] can
perhaps be explained at least in part by success or failure of visual gestalt
techniques (see <2i> above; and TA93[53]).
<3f>
An emphasis on microscopic aspects of MIR-matter
(micro-materialism) without correction of the inversion of thinking (see
<2d> above), can have consequences like the idea of ‘thought-carrying and
thought-retaining particles’ (see TA82 by De & Pal).
<3g>
The notion of manifest-ness also presents problems; it
implies a subject and does not describe subject-free things-in-themselves. What is manifest for one person may not be so
for someone else (e.g., John L. O’Sullivan’s 19th century slogan of the
manifest destiny of European settlers to conquer the West of North America).
<3h>
One can talk less equivocally about results of subjects’
experiencing qualia, or about the reliability of their using mental tools, such
as gestalt-function, or counting.
<3i>
UM’s difference between phenomena and reality [22] also implies
MIR-belief. For 0-D (and for
epistemological constructivism generally) there is no such difference (cf. also
Nietzsche’s opinion that the apparent (scheinbare)
world is the only one, and that the real world is a lie; Götzendämmerung,
1889). The question is instead how
adequate (viable) the structures are.
<3j>
That the brain perceives an already-structured manifested world [25] is
unlikely (see : ‘Brain and Visual Perception - The story
of a twenty-five year collaboration - David H. Hubel and Torsten
N. Wiesel’, Review by A Noë, Times Literary Supplement, #5379, 5 May 2006).
<3k>
The many attempts to reduce experience to brain
activity have failed; the best known one is probably Francis Crick’s
‘Astonishing Hypothesis’ (1994). Brain
activity is a human structure within ongoing experience, a very helpful and
important tool, but it cannot objectify subjectivity (which vanishes in such
attempts); nothing can.
-----------------------------------------
In summary, the main difference between our procedures appears
to be:
UM uses a dualistic view assuming existence of mind-independently
pre-structured reality (finding ready-made onta as
opposed to phenomena), while I propose unitary subject-inclusive structuring
within unstructured experience, with pragmatic-only differentiation
(structuring working-entities).
-----------------------------------------
Herbert FJ Müller
e-mail <herbert.muller
(at) mcgill.ca>