<1>
Thank you very much for your careful answer. Perhaps, a consistent denial
of the existence of a mind-independent reality (MIR) might help psychologists
and psychiatrists, and all of us, as a useful method of thought, to stay
open for the possibility of very different 'working metaphysics' in our
empathic meetings with persons. I indeed sympathize with such openness;
we should not force our own views on other persons. Change should ideally
emerge in respectful dialogue. When we look around, it is obvious that many
very different metaphysics really work, in the meaning that persons get
on with their lives, often very successfully. Different cultures around
the world, also, are based on different thought patterns and traditional
habits, more or less well working in different situations.
<2>
Modern science, however, has taught us to abandon traditional structures
of thought and action, the habitual 'common sense', in order to create more
effective, 'rational' societies. The measure of the 'working' here, is often
the economic success or power achieved. It has made us somewhat used to
compromise; even very basic common sense notions are under critical attack.
An example is the neo-utilitarianism of the moral philosopher Peter Singer.
Below, I will argue that some common sense notions should not be compromised.
<3>
You say [1]: 'we must be able to have a sort of consumers' epistemology,
because otherwise only professional philosophers can talk to each other.'
Obviously, it is important which ideas of the universe are spread in societies,
and professional philosophers often have had a crucial influence on that.
Just think of the influence of Newton, or Marx. I like Whitehead's declaration
of his program (PaR p.3): 'Speculative Philosophy is the endeavour to frame
a coherent, logical, necessary system of general ideas in terms of which
every element of our experience can be interpreted.' Notice the 'every element
of our experience'. Whitehead criticized the tendency in the natural sciences
to overstate their success, and articulated his view in 'the fallacy of
misplaced concreteness' (TA1 C19 <2>). In western cultures, that tendency
has haunted the twentieth century; repeatedly it has been claimed that a
'theory of everything' based on physics is within reach.
<4>
Physics, however, is just one of many methods to understand and control
aspects of our situation, and it is impotent in more subtle human affairs,
in lack of moral and esthetical values. In his 'philosophy of organism',
Whitehead suggests a complete revolution in the fundamentals. As I read
him, he places our conscious experiences at the centre of reality, much
as you suggest in your 0-D or 'responsive reality formation' theory, and
as I claim to do in my 'detectism' hypothesis. Whitehead, however, suggests
that there is a physical (objective) pole in our experiences, connecting
with 'the external world', and a mental (subjective) pole, allowing for
the creative construction of thought structures. Thus, he reverses Kant's
system, where perceptions are subjective, and abstract thought approaches
the objective (TA1 C20 <5>). Also, he rejects the Aristotelian category
of 'primary substance'. In our current thought structures, we have a lot
of incorrect intuitions and harmful habits. By critical thought, but also
by frequent reference to the 'physical pole', we should aim at establishing
a coherent and logical idea of the universe. Since we live in a changing
world, according to Whitehead's epochal theory of time, this is a never-ending
endeavour. Also, such a theory has to be very general, but it should not
be allowed to neglect in principle any 'element of our experience'. It is
not enough that a few, an elite, are aware of such an evolving idea of the
universe. In the long run, every single person should have a chance to grasp
at least the general structure.
<5>
Newton, in his Scholium, said: 'the vulgar conceive those quantities under
no other notions but from the relation they bear to sensible objects.' Whitehead
comments (PaR p.72): 'The philosophy of organism is an attempt, with the
minimum of critical adjustment, to return to the conceptions of 'the vulgar'.'
The philosopher David Ray Griffin (1998 p.17)) says: 'The notion of common
sense that is not truly deniable reemerged in twentieth-century philosophy.
The best-known version of common-sensism has probably been that of G.E.
Moore; but his version fails to provide a clear criterion for distinguishing
between weak and strong meanings of common sense. Better is the 'critical
common-sensism' of Charles Peirce. But the best version, in my view, is
that of Alfred North Whitehead.' It may seem a contradiction that Whitehead
holds both that common sense can correct abstract thought, and that critical
thought can correct common sense. Griffin credibly solves this 'confusion
about common sense' by explicating the distinction between 'soft-core' and
'hard-core' common sense implicit in PaR.
<6>
When we place our conscious experiences at the centre of reality ('the reformed
subjectivist principle', TA1 C19 <2>), we also place psychology, merged
with philosophy, at the centre of a unified field of experience and knowledge.
Perhaps, they could, together with neuroscience, be thought to act at a
kind of meta-level, dealing with the 'detector and actor apparatus' we use
throughout the field.
<7>
You wrote [8]: 'But I think it is more helpful to see them in as-if-MIR,
because MIR is inaccessible and we only can start from (given) ongoing experience
within which we generate the metaphysics, along with all other aspects of
structures.' and ' 'MIR as potentiality' is not clear to me'. To make my
point clear, I will give you a somewhat brutal example.
<8>
Imagine a meteorite approaching the earth at 10, which is detected for the
first time by a human person at 12, and destroys all life on earth at 14.
At 10 the meteorite is in MIR, it is inaccessible to conscious experience,
and it is mere potentiality. At 12, it enters human conscious experience.
As the minutes pass it becomes actual in more and more persons, and this
causes massive changes in human behaviour. At 14.05, there is no longer
any human experience. In MIR, there is just an ongoing global catastrophe,
and it would be meaningless to talk of potentiality. Where would 'as-if-MIR'
fit into this scenario ?
<9>
Potentiality, thus, is defined only in relation to human conscious experience.
And MIR is there, potentially entering novelties, all the time and everywhere,
permeating all our experience. Much of it never enters an actual conscious
experience, and that which enters is inaccessible for conscious experience
before and after that actual conscious experience (to be exact, MIR is actualised
uniquely at each time and place). Most noticeably, it connects at the 'physical
pole' of conscious experiences, but it is present at the 'mental pole' as
well, in neural firings and all. Right now, MIR is entering with novelties
into your mind via black dots on your computer screen or paper.
<10>
The term 'mind-independent', however, needs qualification. Is a car running
towards you mind-dependent, just because you are aware of it ? I would advice
you not to think of it as 'perhaps just an as-if-MIR' car, but take a few
steps aside. It is certainly not fully described as a construction of your
mind, based on your experiences. According to 'hard-core common sense',
it also has a lot of mind-independent potential (which you, in fact, has
no chance to be conscious of in that moment).
<11>
As I now understand your 0-D theory, it is a sound constructionism based
on an input of given experiences (however unclear where they come from).
Whitehead suggests a rather complex theory, where e.g. past experiences
influence current experiences, and I suppose most of that could also be
included in your theory. Then, you insist that there is no reality beyond
this, that there is no external world, and I still cannot understand why.
To me, it collides (to continue the catastrophic mood this essay turned
into) head on with hard-core common sense. Is it not enough to declare uncertainty;
that we don't have access to MIR (defined as that which is outside current
conscious experience), so truth-likeness is the best we can achieve?
<12>
In [10], you say that I mix phenomenology and objectivism, and you ask:
'do you suggest that you can find subjective experience by looking into
the brain, by studying neuronal firing, with or without set theory? More
concretely, do you believe that someone other than you can have your own
ongoing subjective experience (with methods other than empathy to some extent):
for instance with the help of a microscope, with electrical, chemical, blood
flow measurements of some type, or computer simulation?'
<13>
Whitehead said (PaR p.117): 'the philosophy of organism - as it should -
appeals to the facts.' Now, seventy years later, we have further facts to
appeal to, e.g. in genetics, neuroscience, evolutionary theory, etc. If
we aim at a unified field of knowledge, a 'system of general ideas in terms
of which every element of our experience can be interpreted', we cannot
normatively forbid certain mixtures of concepts, as long as demands for
coherence and logic are met with. I certainly am not infallible there, and
the body-mind problem is indeed a delicate one. In Whitehead's system, I
don't believe there is an insurmountable logical gap, but for me that remains
to be fully understood.
<14>
One should be cautious with negative predictions about the future. However,
no, I don't believe that someone other than me, by any method, can have
my own ongoing subjective experience. But I do believe that kinds of biophysical
correlates of qualia, perhaps something like distinct forms of neural firings,
naturally evolved, below the level of patterns of firings, will be found
in the brain in a perhaps not too distant future. Also, entities similar
to the a bit odd entity (for our biased modern minds) of a conscious experience,
being simultaneously 'one', 'many', and 'creative', may become in principle
theoretically understood in future physics. Qualia, thus, in principle will
take the place of Whitehead's multifarious 'eternal objects', approximately
eternal, since they change only in evolutionary time. Thus, a theoretical
framework, within which conscious experiences can in principle be described
and understood, might be developed. Such descriptions, obviously, will only
be actual conscious experiences in the describer, or in a reader of the
description. Also, the entities described will have to be defined in space-time,
so they cannot be identical with actual conscious experiences in a studied
person, which cannot be thus defined. This is not a potential identity theory.
'The final percipient route of occasions is perhaps some thread of happenings
wandering in 'empty' space amid the interstices of the brain.' (TA1 C21
<16>).
<15>
If a detailed such theory can be developed, the principles of human thought
may be discerned. For example, the structure of physical science may be
understood in principle. In that epoch, physics, as it should, will be defined
as a special domain in a general field of experience and knowledge, as understood
in psychology/philosophy.
------------------------------------
REFERENCE
Griffin, D.R. 1998. Unsnarling the World-Knot: Consciousness, Freedom, and
the Mind-Body Problem. University of California Press.
-------------------------------------
Jan Holmgren
e-mail: <j.holmgren@telia.com>