ABSTRACT

It is suggested that an experience-centered (or constructivist) view can help with some aspects of the conceptual questions raised in the paper and discussion by Vogeley and others.

<1>
The proposal by Kai Vogeley & al. to analyze the human self construct physiologically, pathophysiologically, as well as phenomenologically, may indicate the start of a new development in biological psychiatry and psychology. In particular, the multidisciplinary discussion of the proposal is felicitous as well as essential. In the following I offer some comments, chiefly on the conceptual questions they raise, which I hope may be of interest.

<2>
Vogeley writes (response 1, general comments) that the problem of the neuronal implementation of the self is a variant of Chalmers' 'hard problem' (this is the question: 'how do physical processes in the brain give rise to subjective experience ?'). The difficulty results, in my opinion, from trying to describe subjectivity in objective terms, which turns the question upside down (since subjective experience is the birthplace of objective knowledge including that concerning brain function, rather than the other way round, as it is formulated from Chalmers' primary objective point of view). Ongoing subjective experience is the central part of mind, and it vanishes in attempts to objectify it.

<3>
A consideration of the relation of subjective experience (phenomenology) to objective knowledge (science) may help. One is simultaneously on both sides of the subject/object fence: you make a deliberate subjective decision to move your hand, and watch it move as an object. The objective part is publicly observable, the subjective aspect is accessible to a lesser extent through empathy (which the paper alludes to as 'theory of mind'); but personal experience is a 'common entrance' to both subjectivity and objectivity. (One could also implant electrodes into the brain to record cell firing, etc., during the decision making and other parts of the neural process, so that the 'agent' can observe it himself, but for the conceptual question this would add no further clarification.)

<4>
And: there is no other entrance to any type of reality except through ongoing subjective experience, which cannot be reduced to objective functions, structures, or entities. Because it is the basis for viewing, it cannot be reduced to, or converted into, an - either pre-constructed (outside), or self-constructed (inside) - viewed object, in contrast to both nature-constructs and to a lesser extent self-constructs. Although the authors treat the self, and apparently also the self-world distinction (Pauen) as constructs, the question of the reality-status of mind does not become thematic in the discussion of the conceptual questions (Vogeley, Newen, Pauen). As a result, belief in mind-independence of reality is implied by default, and this in turn prevents access to the mind-(objective)-reality question, since ongoing subjective experience cannot become mind-independent. This is evident as well from Vogeley's definition of 'consciousness' as 'the integrated internal representation of the outer world and our organism'.

<5>
A more fully constructivist view would hold that 'self' as well as 'world' are constructs created inside originally unstructured (ongoing) experience (of the 'subject' as well as the 'experimenter'). Reality of the created structures is asserted on the basis of belief (Jaspers), not only for the subjective or objective self-construct but for all scientific opinions, even if the 'methods' differ. A frequent objection to this is that scientific and other truth is 'not just belief'. On scrutiny this means that the belief is based on solid evidence. While this is valid it does not change the situation: scientific (and other) 'knowledge of truth' is strong belief.

<6>
Vogeley writes (reply to Newen and Pauen) that the idea of a self construct is a pragmatic concept (as in the experience-centered view all concepts are, including metaphysical ones). He further distinguishes his scientific self construct from a subjective self 'model', based on differences of method. In an experience-centered view, the hard problem of consciousness is seen to be an erroneous question, to be replaced by one of method. The chief result is that the difference between the introspective self or consciousness and the objective neuronal activity is no longer fundamental. This also removes obstacles of ontological type to the conclusion that the neuronal function underlying the 'self' is anatomically distributed instead of localized.

<7>
This last point tends to be more easily accepted for the 'nature', or 'outside-world', constructs in experience, because the world is seen as manifold, whereas the mind is assumed to be unitary. An example of the ensuing derailment of the discussion is the debate about a postulated 'homunculus' agent in recent decades. But in the experience-centered view, the subjective self-model and the objective self-construct in the proposal by Vogeley et al., can both be seen as distributed. The two are then distinguished from each other, and from 'outside'-structures, by differences of method.

<8>
As an example for the distribution factor, ventro-medial frontal damage leading to impairment of the prefrontal output to the amygdala may partially eliminate emotional components of the self-function (Damasio). Despite such partial destruction, with personality impoverishment, a unitary self-agent, as needed for effective function, complete with subject-object perspective and autobiographical coherence, is usually maintained, and this on a mainly functional rather than anatomical basis.

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REFERENCES

Glasersfeld E von, Radical Constructivism. A Way of Knowing and Learning. London and Washington: Falmer Press, 1995

Jaspers K, Philosophie. Berlin: Springer 1973. (Vol I, p. 256ff, and other chapters.)

Muller HFJ, Is the Mind Real ? Karl Jaspers Forum, Target Article 1, 1997.

Muller HFJ, Limitations of the Ontological Method. Karl Jaspers Forum, Target Article 11, 1998.

Vogeley K & al., The Human Self Construct and Prefrontal Cortex in Schizophrenia. Target Article and Discussion. The Association for the Scientific Study of Consciousness (ASSC), 5th Electronic Seminar, 15 March to 9 April 1999.
(http://www.phil.vt.edu/ASSC/esem)

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Herbert FJ Muller
<mdmu@musica.mcgill.ca>