[1]
ABSTRACT
Lofting's proposal of a fundamental template with dichotomy characteristics can be understood as an attempt to provide a methodology for mind and nature structuring. The main problem with this proposal is its extension by an apparent ontological claim for his template which in effect means that he wants to replace other methods on the grounds that his is the only correct one. Some ramifications of this difficulty are discussed, and a tentative summary of the process of ontology formation is presented.
[2]
THE INTELLECTUAL CLIMATE
Chris Lofting has recently written a number of notes in which he discusses mental structures. Although I disagree with some aspects of his proposal, I want to start by expressing my appreciation of his point of view and the thoroughness of his thinking, which is evident from these texts. It shows, I suggest, a determined effort in answering the challenge which we all face these days to structure experience in new ways, as some traditional ones lead more and more evidently into dead ends. It also indicates his openness to discussion as it is clear for all those who submit their work for distribution in this Forum.
[3]
There is a change occurring in the intellectual climate, which was recently
characterized for the field of science by Bruno Latour (a) in the following
terms: 'In the last century and a half, scientific development has been
breathtaking, but the understanding of this process has dramatically changed.
It is characterized by the transition from the culture of science
to the culture of research. Science is certainty; research is
uncertainty.
Science does not enter a chaotic society to put order
into it any more ... but to add new, uncertain ingredients ... to the collective
process. The more connected a scientific discipline to society, the better.
... Science may be dead, but then long live research.'
[4]
My understanding of Latours opinion is that: fixed scientific knowledge
with traditional metaphysical (ontological) implications is no longer possible,
as opposed to (scientific) research which deals with working structures
such as methods, concepts, and hypotheses, which fall short of absolute
certainty. What Latour writes here I think goes beyond the question of a
paradigm change in Kuhns sense, and it also describes
the situation more completely than for instance John Horgan who says only
that science is at an end. And I think it is legitimate to add that this
applies to thinking in general as well: ontology is more and more being
replaced by working structures which are recognized as such. We are all
called for to construct our worlds, every day if necessary, instead of expecting
truths which are pre-formed and forever fixed. - This assessment of the
present intellectual situation may serve as a background for the discussion
of Lofting's communications.
[5]
LOFTING'S WHOLES/ASPECTS TEMPLATE
In N16<1>, Lofting asserts the existence of a 'wholes/ aspects template', which forms the basis of mathematics and other methods and symbols. Although he introduces this first as a possibility (in the abstract of his paper on dichotomy (b)), he later appears to suggest that this 'is' a basic positive structure. N18<2-5> The development of the template is heuristic it sits in-between the neurology and the psychology , the processing is hierarchic we can imagine the template as a filter, like the thalamus . And (N20<2-3>) it is a single template, through which all data must pass. He also proposes (N16<2>) a primary sense of dichotomy which internalizes the environment, and makes maps of it. In the abstract (b) he starts by discussing dichotomy as a method which consists of repeated bifurcations. This appears to describe it as one possible method among others. But he adds (in(b)) that dichotomy is 'more than an abstract tool which we have learned to use, but is a 'natural' but abstract form of neurologically linked sense, akin to the visual and auditory systems, and is the brain's way of managing information in the form of wholes, parts, and their aspects'. And further, 'the dichotomous point of view is the only method that allows for the maximization of choices and is a 'natural'' phenomenon. The latter in turn he proposes to be the cause and basis of various 'dichotomous' areas of experience, from mathematics to astrology.
[6]
Also (N21<1>)' ...ANY consideration of unstructured experience will
be structured and so the 'unstructured' is only theoretical and only determinable
within a context set by the template; it has no 'meaning' until 'viewed'
through the veil of the template. At best it takes on a genotypal form of
'potentials' in that from it come the expressions of wholes and aspect,
but note that my description 'imposes' structure on the 'unstructured' prior
to it becoming unstructured and so all discussion is 'meaningless' to (such
an) extent that it can be ignored.' He agrees (N18<20>) that meaning
is structured in us, but obviously implies that the template
does the structuring.
[7]
(N21<2>) ' ... experience as 'we' know it is 'structured' from the
start ...' '... the genes seem to 'set-up' the new-born child with a range
of possible experiences and so there is nothing 'new' but only things that
are 'novel'. As we develop, so the lack of experiences that would go towards
enabling the expression of a potential eventually leads to those areas that
have been set aside for specific experiences being 'stolen' by other neural
networks or just 'culled'.' (N21<2-3>) This is similar to the genetic
influence on cell function including that of neurons. (N21<4>) 'The
single neuron exists in a 1:many form (axon/dendrites) and changing scale
maintains this form throughout until it is 'abstracted' into whole/aspects,
specific/generals, reductionist/ illusionist and so on ... Adding feedback
allows for bi-directional functions and so axon activity can go towards
'controlling/guiding' dendrite-derived patterns that elicit firing.' (N21<7>)
'These whole/aspects processes occur at all levels within 'us'. At the micro
level we deal with the single neuron and at the macro level with 'the word'
or the meaning that the smell of a rose elicits. This subjective experience
has structure that allows for us to share the experience ...
[8]
DISCUSSION:
TEMPLATES, DICHOTOMIES, AND THE TEMPTATION OF ONTOLOGY
Loftings terms 'neurologically linked, heuristic, and 'natural phenomenon' seem to indicate a step from formulating a methodology among other possible ones to asserting the existence of a natural phenomenon, a step from construction within mind-nature experience to ontology. It appears he wants to establish a mind-independent and doubt-free reality (MIR) and truth in this way, in an attempt to make his method (and perhaps also his subjective experience and intuition) objective. (Such a procedure would parallel Engels' attempt to establish dialectical materialism as a true 'science' which is binding for everyone.) He proposes (in (b)) that 'science is metaphor', but metaphor for what ? For 'reality' ? Lofting writes that science's 'maps are founded on our brain's way of dealing with reality'. How do 'brains' deal with 'reality' ?
[9]
If he does not want to establish a mind-independent truth, what could be
the purpose of postulating a 'natural' phenomenon for his template ? If
'dichotomy' is the basic activity of thinking, how does this explain the
age-old use of concepts like the one of the holy trinity, or that the world
was created in seven days, or that time was counted in units of sixty ?
And for that matter, why do we use a decimal system rather than a zero-one
dichotomy like computers do ? And further, by asserting (in (b)) that this
dichotomous point of view is the only natural method, does he
thus want to use it as a fundament, a positive corner stone, on which to
base the structure of all experience, to the exclusion of others ?
[10]
In N16<3-4> he appears to pre-suppose the MIR existence of the
template, and writes for instance that it 'is dual' and 'has cells'
of which each 'is coded with a specific emotion', etc., and which are related
to each other by processes of bounding, etc. All these assertions (which
in my opinion are not demonstrations to the satisfaction of others) imply
acceptance of his initially stated postulates as 'real'. Their aggregate
seems to amount to a belief system, which one has to accept in order to
follow the further discussion. The assertion of a positively-true template
prevents the possibility of a structuring process which starts from an unstructured
origin (see [7] above). All view-points with positive anchors do that; their
purpose is to replace the fundamental uncertainty of experience by a positive-certainty-
creed of some type (cf. TA1[47-49]). Lofting clearly believes what he writes,
but it is less clear why someone else would want to follow him on this path,
unless he emulated his belief in the mind-independent existence of 'the
template'. He then (N16<6-9>) discusses terms like free will, determinism,
illusion, reduction, education, socialization, environmental feedback, all
on the basis of his template concept in terms of (objective)
brain function, DNA, feedback, micro and macro information, etc. Although
belief is needed for the establishment of reality, a belief alone is not
sufficient to establish such a belief in others who want to be convinced
not only of the usefulness but also of the necessity of such a belief. They
may wish to be shown that this is a better way than other methods.
[11]
THE QUESTION OF MIND-INDEPENDENT REALITY (MIR)
In N17, Lofting discusses MIR. <3> We find truth in various metaphors 'not because they are real but because what is behind them is 'real'; the whole/aspects template with its associated set of potential and expressed meanings.' This implies his assumption of a metaphysical 'referent' (that is, MIR) which 'is behind' the metaphors, which he identifies here with the template. On the other hand, (N17<4>) truth is 'nothing but labels given to contextual patterns that seem invariant over time. Our reductionist seeking brain strips away the chaff to identify the wheat ... and cultural consensus goes to determining 'value' and to establishing whether we consider the pattern as a 'truth' or not, but once established as such it is taught to a degree where it 'feels' hard and 'absolute' and 'one' - an eternal 'whole'. <5> 'MIR is 'ontic', while mind-dependent reality (MDR) 'is 'epistemic' (I include senses and brain as being 'covered' by the term 'MIND')'.
[12]
I find this difficult to follow, in particular the inclusion of 'senses
and brain' under 'mind' (although I am aware that various investigators
in this area recently try to circumvent conceptual difficulties by talking
about an entity which they call a 'mind-brain'). Is Lofting's 'reality'
an MIR referent, as suggested by <3>, - behind the consensus-and-teaching
procedure of <4> - or isn't it, as the definition of truth as consensus,
etc., implies ? If it is not, what is the purpose of distinguishing MIR
from MDR ? Actually, how can reality be both mind-dependent and mind-independent
(this would appear to be self-contradictory) ? And, what is the difference
between reality and illusion, another term which
he uses on occasion ?
[13]
(N17<6-7>) 'MIR goes to determining MDR', apparently on an objective
(MIR) level, involving feedback and genetics, and the establishment of a
successful relationship between 'in here' and 'out there' (is that: between
subject and environment ? Is the environment = MIR ?). How is this opinion
compatible with his nothing-but-labeling-consensus-and- teaching view of
truth in N17<4> ? (N17<8>): '... subjective experience has form
... this form is found in our senses ... and so subjective experience is
not 'only me' since here are elements that I share with others ...' This
I think is an important point: in my opinion, the structures are not 'found'
(in ready-made condition, as proposed by empiricists and naturalists
since the time of Locke), but instead they are actively constructed or created
(forms, wholes or Gestalten, tools, methods, templates, etc.), within an
originally unstructured mind-nature experience, the frequent lack of choice
- and genetic pre-dispositions - not withstanding. It seems that it is at
this point <9> where Lofting 'finds' his 'template', and where my
disagreement starts.
[14]
He uses a kind of formalism (N17<10-16>, N18<12-15>, N20<9-13>)
which he seems to claim is universally valid, presumably because it is 'found',
rather than being one of the various possible methods which can be constructed
or created, although from what I can see he sometimes emphasizes method
(or 'can-ness'), at other times ontology (or 'is-ness'); the point did not
become entirely clear to me. But chiefly I understand this to be an MIR
argumentation, without an as-if correction. Lofting treats (N17<12-13>)
MIR and MDR as a dichotomy with interaction, ' ... where 'pure' MIR and
MDR are extreme conditions and very rare ... If you then look at the dynamics
of their interactions ... you 'get' a wave interference pattern -- another
property of the method'. Pattern partition leads to 'feel', and combinations
give 'meaning', due to recursive dichotomisations', etc. Lofting seems to
suggest that such procedures with the help of a formalism can clarify the
question what reality is. In my understanding, this type of truth-finding
had been abandoned since the work of Godel, Tarski, and Popper.
[15]
Further to this, N17<17-20>: The QM 'wave equation is an abstract
mathematical construct rather than something 'real'; it is an example of
using the wave metaphor for degrees of probability'. What is 'real' here
? (see above). (N17<18>) Lofting answers to my questions whether reality
and truth are mind-independent and whether 'in here' and 'out there' are
the same as subject and object by stating that 'these are all dichotomies'
(which can be subjected to his formalisms). <20> ' ... for me context
decides which one I choose'. This may be a meaningful answer for him, but:
what is it supposed to convey to others ?
[16]
I for one do not believe that it depends on the context whether reality
and truth are mind-independent and in what way. In my opinion (TA1[10]),
it is more helpful to consider that reality is formed not from a pre-determined
structure but rather from no structure (zero-reference), and that templates
and dichotomies are secondary, rather than being fundamental 'givens'. This
procedure is preferable to one which starts from an assumption of primary
structures with a positive content (TA1[47-49]), for the reason that analysis
cannot go back to before such primary positive postulates (in Lofting's
proposal the basic template and dichotomy procedure including the subject/object
distinction), unless the postulate itself is abandoned, so that the way
to the unstructured origin is re-opened.
[17]
One should add that the abandonment of traditional structures may lead to
instabilities of function, which a measure of procedural conservatism helps
to avoid. Such conservatism should also be understood on a functional (rather
than absolute) basis. In practice, this could mean simply that a naïve
realism (or a deliberate empirical) view will continue to be used where
it works, even though it is understood to be valid on an as-if basis only.
Seen from here, it is quite correct to state that we can talk about an unstructured
origin only in a structured way (N21<1>) but this ought to be a functional
statement and not an ontological one.
[18]
SUMMARY OF THE PROCESS OF ONTOLOGY FORMATION
In conclusion I will present an attempt to formulate in a more general way the steps which are involved in ontologization, in order to make its various components accessible to investigation.
(a) The first step is to structure (conceive of) a tool (a concept or hypothesis or method) which promises to be of help in certain situations, and to try it out.
(b) If it appears to be helpful in some situations, one may then recommend it to others on the basis that: 'if you do this you will find so-and-so' (subject to confirmation or refutation).
(c) One may perhaps find it so helpful that one assumes that it will always work; this would give it a wide-ranging usefulness. It would have to be studied how wide this usefulness reaches, and whether indeed it perhaps even applies to all situations which can ever be encountered. 'If you do this you will find so-and-so in all circumstances' (subject to confirmation or refutation). This is how far science, a specialization of experience, can go.
(d) In a naïve or deliberate transgression of this limit, one may, in many situations, use tools as-if they were mind-independently real. This is a shortcut for thinking, and it is not problematic in case the as-if-MIR quality of such statements is kept in mind.
(e) But a statement that the structure 'exists', no matter whether or not someone ever uses it, transcends experience and is an ontological (MIR) statement in the traditional metaphysical sense; this tends to be done in order to provide certainty. Because it goes beyond experience, this statement cannot be made on a scientific (that is, experiential) basis, and it is therefore not verifiable.
[(f) Some people may even wish to go further still and promote such a MIR notion 'because it is true', and claim that all who do not share it are in error, or worse. This can produce problems chiefly when the one who believes and promotes it has the intention and power to enforce it.]
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REFERENCES
(a) Latour, B., From the World of Science to the World of Research ? Science 280, 208-209, 10 April 1998.
(b) Lofting, C. The Sense of Dichotomy (http://www.ozemail.com.au/~ddiamond/sense.html)
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[Herbert F J Muller
e-mail <mdmu@musica.mcgill.ca>]