KARL  JASPERS  FORUM

TA95 (Nixon)

 

Commentary 5

 

THE  CONTINUUM  FROM  REALITY  TO  UNREALITY

by Leslie Dewart

7 August 2007, posted 11 August 2007

 

 

<1>

The objective of Gregory Nixon’s The Continuum of Experience is clear: “If this continuum of experience — from non-conscious, to conscious, to self-transcending awareness — can be understood and accepted, … the “outside” world as a construct of experience … will gain a firmer foundation, panexperientialism … may gain credibility, and psi will find its medium.” But in my view this is not a philosophically valid project. It is subject to substantive objections that I will not develop here, because it is also vulnerable procedurally. And, to my mind, absence of methodological propriety is sufficient and conclusive reason for rejecting any philosophical investigation without further examination.

 

<2>

Philosophical knowledge is sometimes equated with rational knowledge, but this is not true; it is at best a careless, oversimple way of differentiating between philosophy and credulity. For philosophy (a) excludes every form of unreason, and not only religious belief, and (b) demands much more than the use of reason. Reason is, of course, an indispensable philosophical organon for the purpose of processing information into knowledge; but that is all that it is, an instrument.  The quality of the knowledge derived by the exercise of reason depends not only on the quality of the instrument, but also on the quality of the matter to which it is applied.  For reason, if properly used, yields formal validity, but no more; to reach material truth, reason must bear on empirically grounded observations.

 

<2>

And so, if reason is applied not to observations, but to what imagination may fancy, wish, or blindly guess at, it matters little whether its premisses are supplied by what one takes to be a revelation from an all-knowing source, or by one’s own original inventiveness.  In either case, the result is the same.  Whether in the uncouth, inelegant language of computer engineers—garbage in, garbage out—or in the picturesque cadences of biblical metaphor, the objection is the same: : you cannot make a philosophical silk purse out of an imaginary sow’s ear.

 

<3>

Why must philosophical reason be grounded in empirical observation?  Because imaginability is not a reliable indication of what anything is in reality like.  And concepts are useful for the purpose of understanding reality only to the extent, always limited, that they assert what we have learned empirically from reality. Therefore, philosophy (and science) are bound by strict procedural rules intended to avoid the substitution of what one imagines for what one observes. This is easily grasped in what pertains, for instance, to the evidence alleged to support a certain conclusion: hardly anyone disagrees with the prohibition against inventing facts and then use in evidence whether for or against any thesis.  What is, apparently, less easily grasped is that the very first fact that must not be invented is the explicandum.  If the fact or phenomenon for which an explanation is sought is the philosopher’s imaginative invention, the explanation is a fiction: it is a fictitious solution to a fictitious problem.  It may be interesting and satisfactory to construct the fiction coherentlty and ingeniously, but to suppose that one’s creative fiction is true strikes me as a form of self-deception.

 

<4>

The same injunction applies, of course, to empirical science.  But empirical science, as a result of the deeply seated Pythagoreanism and Platonism of its sixteenth and seventeenth century founders, has increasingly found it acceptable to resort to aprioristic procedures, particularly in the form of hypotheses that depend entirely on purely imaginary facts.  And indeed, even on self-contradictory hypothesized facts. (1)  In early modern times Isaac Newton condemned groundless hypothesizing.  Unfortunately, Newton did not explain himself as carefully as he might have. He said that a causal explanation of phenomena may not be properly arrived at by making a “supposition”—a hypothesis—which is then to be confirmed or denied in accordance with no more stringent criterion than whether it “saves the appearances,” i.e., accommodates the known facts.  However, Newton did not take into account that more than one kind of “supposition” is possible.  A “supposition”  may mean a purely imaginative conjecture, which is what he denounced; but it may also mean a possibility that may not be certain but which is positively suggested by observable facts.  Taking the term “hypothesis” in the sense of a supposition that lacks all empirical ground, in the second edition of his Principia Mathematica Newton said;“hypotheses non fingo.” (1)  It is a pity that instead of distinguishing between the proper and the improper use of “suppositions,” Newton blunted the edge of his doctrine by indiscriminately rejecting all “hypotheses,” and not only a priori conjectures; for this meant that his teaching on this point has been widely dismissed, since it makes sense only to those who make an effort to enquire into the historical context in which his condemnation of the use of “hypotheses” should be understood.  But Newton was right to claim that an empirically gratuitous hypothesis is simply not adequate as a means of determining positive and reasonably probable explanations of the causes of phenomena.  Ingenuity exercised a priori is worse than useless; it is destructive of philosophy.

 

<5>

A priori hypothesizing has increasingly appeared in philosophy, under the influence of science. Instances abound. At one end of the spectrum is the arbitrary definition of the explicandum of philosophy of mind supported by the hypothesis of the “multiple realizability of mind”—a hypothesis arrived at by supposing that if one abstracts from enough differences between the mental and the non-mental functions of human beings, what is left over need not be mental in nature.  Naturally.  If one abstracts from enough differences between a circus bear and a piece of travertine, one could suppose that a circus bear is a well-trained and highly intelligent piece of travertine.  Well, at the other extreme is the endeavour that The Continuum of Experience  pursues.

 

<6>

I find it difficult to understand why anyone should be scandalized by the traditional biblical form of theological argumentation but seriously entertain, in place of the “God hypothesis,” the hypothesis of cosmic consciousness or any other super-real reality.  Every possible criterion whereby to differentiate between “immateriality” and “materiality,” “other worldiness” and “worldliness”—or “worldly consciousness” and “cosmic consciousness” (or the like)—is purely imaginary.  For the world in which we live and of which we are part is the only measure of the meaning that “reality,” “world,” and “consciousness” may be reasonably and veridically given; it is the only standard of what “reality,” “materiality”—and “consciousness”—mean.  To make “immateriality,” “other worldliness”—and “cosmic consciousness”—mean what they are intended to mean, it is necessary to invent the meaning.

 

<7>

Such invention is achieved by the simple expedient of gratuitously asserting the contradictory of the reality we do encounter in the world.  This procedure enables us to conceive self-contradictions: a world-that-is-not-the-world; a reality-that-is-not-really-real; a reality-that-is-the-opposite-of-reality; a world-that-is-real-but-is-not-the-real-world; a consciousness-that-is-not-any-subject’s-consciousness.  It seems to me that concepts such as “immaterial being,” “transcendent reality,” “another world,” “life after death”—and, of course, “self-transcending awareness”—are literally meaningless.  They are, in my opinion, empty of meaning, since they designate nothing but the purely imaginary contradiction of what we have actually observed in the real world.

 

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<Footnotes>

 

(1) For example, the SETI project supposes, on the one hand, the validity of Darwinian evolution through “natural selection,” an essential aspect of which is that natural selection does not tend to produce specific outcomes; but at the same time supposes, on the other, that once life appears, natural selection tends to produce “intelligent” (i.e. conscious), human-type, life in every otherwise suitable planet.

 

(2) See his Principia Mathematica Naturalis Philosophiae,(Second edition), Bk. III, General Scholium; Eng. trans., The Mathematical Principles of Natural Philosophy (New York: Philosophical LIbrary, 1964). Newton’s meaning has also been obscured, in part, because in the first edition of the Principia he used the term hypothesis in a different, non-pejorative sense. Newton’s doctrine on why “hypotheses” must be avoided has been discussed by I. Bernard Cohen, Introduction to Newton’s ‘Principia’ (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1978), pp. 240-245.

 

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Leslie Dewart

Formerly, Graduate Department of Philosophy,

Professor Emeritus, Centre for the Study of Religion,

University of Toronto.

leslie.dewart (at) utoronto.ca

 

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Curriculum Vitae

Leslie Dewart

 

I. Biographical

 

 

1922            b. Madrid, Spain

1942-47        Royal Canadian Air Force. Pilot, bomber-reconnaissance operations

1951            B.A. (Honour Psychology), University of Toronto

1952-54        Teaching Fellow, Dept. of Philosophy, St. Michael’s College, U. of T.

1952            M.A. (Philosophy), University of Toronto

1954            Ph.D. (Philosophy), University of Toronto

1954-56        Instructor, Dept. of Philosophy, University of Detroit

1956-61        Assistant Professor, Dept. of Philosophy, St. Michael’s College, U. of T.

1961-68        Associate Professor, ibid.

1961-68        Associate Professor, Dept. of Philosophy, School of Graduate Studies, U. of T.

1964-70        Associate editor, Continuum

1967-74        Associate editor, Internationale Dialog Zeitschrift

1968-           Member, Societé Europeénne de Culture

1968-75        Professor, Dept. of Religious Studies, St. Michael’s College, U. of T.

1968-88        Professor, Faculty of Theology, St. Michael’s College

1968-70        Associate Editor, Concurrence

1969-79        Professor, Institute of Christian Thought, St. Michael’s College

1970-80        Member, Editorial Board, Studies in Religion—Sciences réligieuses

1970-71        Chair, Combined Departments of Religious Studies, U. of T.

1974-78        Member, Advisory Board, Journal of Ultimate Reality and Meaning

1975-88        Professor, Dept. of Religious Studies, U. of T.

1976-88        Professor, Centre for Religious Studies, School of Graduate Studies, U. of T.

1979            Ll.B., Faculty of Law, U. of T.

1981            Barrister-at-Law, Osgoode Hall, Toronto

1981-           Member, Bar of the Province of Ontario

1982-83        Member, Advisory Committee on the Future of Education, Ministry of Education of Ontario

1988-           Professor Emeritus, St. Michael’s College, U. of T.

1988-           Professor Emeritus, University of Toronto

1995-2005    Senior Research Associate, Faculty of Divinity, Trinity College


II. Books

 

 

1. Christianity and Revolution, (New York: Herder & Herder, 1963), pp. 320 (Translations: Spanish, Catalán)

 

2. The Future of Belief, (New York: Herder & Herder, 1963), pp. 223. (Translations: Dutch, French, German, Spanish, Italian, Portuguese)

 

3. The Foundations of Belief, (New York: Herder & Herder, 1966), pp. 526. (Translation: German)

 

4. Religion, Language and Truth, (New York: Herder & Herder, 1969), pp. 174

 

5. Evolution and Consciousness: The Role of Speech in the Origin and Development of Human Nature, (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1989), pp. 399.

 

 

 

III. Contributions to books

 

 

1. “Some early historical developments of the New Testament morality,” in William Dunphy, ed., The New Morality, (New York: Herder & Herder, 1967), 83-106.

 

2. “Education and political values,” in Abraham Rotstein, ed., The Prospect of Change, (Toronto: McGraw-Hill, 1965), 286-307.

 

3. “Foreword” to Gabriel Marcel, Problematic Man, (New York: Herder & Herder, 1967), 7-12.

 

4. “Neo-Thomism and the continuity of philosophical experience,” in Gregory Baum, ed., The Future of Belief Debate, (New York: Herder & Herder, 1967), 211-229

 

5. “God and the supernatural,” in Martin Marty and Dean Peerman, eds., The New Theology, (New York: Macmillan, 1968), 142-155.

 

6. “Metaphysics and the concept of God,” in Christopher Mooney, ed., The Presence and Absence of God, (New York: Fordham University Press, 1969), 87-108.

 

7. “The fear of death and its basis in the nature of consciousness,” in Florence M. Hetzler and Austin H. Kutscher, eds., Philosophical Aspects of Thanatology, vol. 1, (New York: Arno Press, 1978), pp. 53-63.

 

8. “Properties of speech and ideas of reality,” in Bruce Alton, ed., Religions and Languages, (New York: Peter Lang, 1991), 67-83.

 

 

 

IV. Articles

 

 

  1. “Existentialism and the degrees of knowledge,” The Thomist, XIX (1956), 2, 193-218.

 

  2. “American leadership and the future of the West,” Liberation, VII (1962), 5, 23-28.

 

  3. “War and the Christian tradition,” Commonweal, LXXVII (1962), 6 , 145-148.

 

  4. “The prospects of peace,” Liberation, VII (1962), 10, 5-10.

 

  5. “Modern war and Catholic morality,” Current, III (1962), 3, 182-193.

 

  6. “Christianity’s vocation in the nuclear age,” Blackfriars, XLIV (1963), 512, 57-62.

 

  7. “Christians and Marxists in dialogue: possibilities, prospects, and perils,” Continuum, I, 2 (Summer, 1963), 139-153.

 

  8. “Is this a post-Christian age?” Continuum, I, 4 (Winter, 1964), 556-567.

 

  9. “Academic freedom and Catholic dissent,” Commonweal, LXXX (1964), 2, 33-36.

 

10. “A comparison of the concepts of ‘peaceful coexistence’ in John XXIII’s Pacem in Terris and in Soviet-American diplomacy,” Co-existence, I (1964), 1, 21-38.

 

11. “Pacem in Terris and Soviet-American relations: a comparative analysis of the basis of international peace,” Cross Currents, XIV (1964), 3, 287-312.

 

12. “Neo-traditionalists and pseudo-progressives: a note on recent conflicts within the Catholic Church,” Continuum, III , 1 (Spring, 1965), 121-123.

 

13. “Les bases morales the la paix,” (1re partie), Comprendre, XXVIII (1965), 137-154.

 

14. “The school of conformity: a phenomenological critique,” Continuum, IV, 2 (Summer, 1966), 171-177.

 

15. “Catholic philosophy and the socialization of the intellect,” Ecumenist, V (1967), 4, 52-55.

 

16. “Les bases morales de la paix” (conclusion), Comprendre, XXIX (1966), 85-102.

 

17. “Wahrheit, Irrtum, und Dialog,” Internationale Dialog Zeitschrift, I, 4 (1968), 330-345.

 

18. “Towards a new form of faith,” Ferment, II (1968), 2, 10-12.

 

19. “On transcendental Thomism,” Continuum, VI, 3 (Autumn, 1968), 389-401.

 

20. “The meaning of religious belief,” Commonweal, XC (1969), 1, 15-17.

 

21. “The nature of truth in relation to language,” Continuum, VII, 2 (Summer, 1969), 332-340.

 

22. “The fact of death,” Commonweal, XCI (1969), 7, 206-208.

 

23. “A response to J. Donceel,” Continuum, VII, 3 (Autumn, 1969), 453-462.

 

24. “Hope and immortality,” Agora, XII (1970), 12-16.

 

25. “Unité et verité,” Lumière et Vie, XX, 103 (Juin, 1970), 70-89.

 

26. “Sprache und Wahrheit,” Theologie der Gegenwart, XIV (1971), 4, 198-202.

 

27. “Christianity and the philosophy of language,” Drijarkara (Indonesia), I (1972) 4, 96-102.

 

28. “Der Zustand der römisch-katholischen Kirche,” Wort und Wahrheit, XXVII (1972), 2, 116-119.

 

29. “Language and religion,” Philosophic Exchange, I (1972) 3, 35-44.

 

30. “The relevance of Thomism today,” Proc. Am. Cath. Phil. Assn., XLVIII (1974), 308-317.

 

31. “The grounds for observing the law: a critical analysis of H.L.A. Hart’s foundations of a theory of law,” Queen’s Law J., V (1979), 1, 116-152.