KARL JASPERS
FORUM
TA95 (Nixon)
Commentary 5
THE CONTINUUM FROM REALITY
TO UNREALITY
by Leslie Dewart
7 August 2007, posted 11 August 2007
<1>
The objective of Gregory Nixon’s The Continuum of Experience is clear: “If this continuum of
experience — from non-conscious, to conscious, to self-transcending awareness —
can be understood and accepted, … the “outside” world as a construct of
experience … will gain a firmer foundation, panexperientialism … may gain
credibility, and psi will find its
medium.” But in my view this is not a philosophically valid project. It is
subject to substantive objections that I will not develop here, because it is
also vulnerable procedurally. And, to my mind, absence of methodological
propriety is sufficient and conclusive reason for rejecting any philosophical
investigation without further examination.
<2>
Philosophical knowledge is sometimes equated with
rational knowledge, but this is not true; it is at best a careless, oversimple
way of differentiating between philosophy and credulity. For philosophy (a)
excludes every form of unreason, and not only religious belief, and (b) demands
much more than the use of reason. Reason is, of course, an indispensable
philosophical organon for the purpose
of processing information into knowledge; but that is all that it is, an
instrument. The quality of the knowledge
derived by the exercise of reason depends not only on the quality of the
instrument, but also on the quality of the matter to which it is applied. For reason, if properly used, yields formal
validity, but no more; to reach material truth, reason must bear on empirically
grounded observations.
<2>
And so, if reason is applied not to observations, but to
what imagination may fancy, wish, or blindly guess at, it matters little
whether its premisses are supplied by what one takes to be a revelation from an
all-knowing source, or by one’s own original inventiveness. In either case, the result is the same. Whether in the uncouth, inelegant language of
computer engineers—garbage in, garbage out—or in the picturesque cadences of
biblical metaphor, the objection is the same: : you cannot make a philosophical
silk purse out of an imaginary sow’s ear.
<3>
Why must philosophical reason be grounded in empirical
observation? Because imaginability is
not a reliable indication of what anything is in reality like. And concepts are useful for the purpose of
understanding reality only to the extent, always limited, that they assert what
we have learned empirically from reality. Therefore, philosophy (and science)
are bound by strict procedural rules intended to avoid the substitution of what
one imagines for what one observes. This is easily grasped in what pertains,
for instance, to the evidence alleged to support a certain conclusion: hardly
anyone disagrees with the prohibition against inventing facts and then use in
evidence whether for or against any thesis. What is, apparently, less easily grasped is
that the very first fact that must not
be invented is the explicandum. If the fact or phenomenon for which an
explanation is sought is the philosopher’s imaginative invention, the
explanation is a fiction: it is a fictitious solution to a fictitious problem. It may be interesting and satisfactory to
construct the fiction coherentlty and ingeniously, but to suppose that one’s
creative fiction is true strikes me as a form of self-deception.
<4>
The same injunction applies, of course, to empirical
science. But empirical science, as a
result of the deeply seated Pythagoreanism and Platonism of its sixteenth and
seventeenth century founders, has increasingly found it acceptable to resort to
aprioristic procedures, particularly in the form of hypotheses that depend
entirely on purely imaginary facts. And
indeed, even on self-contradictory hypothesized facts. (1) In early modern times Isaac Newton condemned
groundless hypothesizing. Unfortunately,
Newton did not explain himself as carefully as he might have. He said that a
causal explanation of phenomena may not be properly arrived at by making a
“supposition”—a hypothesis—which is
then to be confirmed or denied in accordance with no more stringent criterion
than whether it “saves the appearances,” i.e., accommodates the known facts. However, Newton did not take into account that
more than one kind of “supposition” is possible. A “supposition” may mean a purely imaginative conjecture,
which is what he denounced; but it may also mean a possibility that may not be
certain but which is positively suggested by observable facts. Taking the term “hypothesis” in the sense of a
supposition that lacks all empirical ground, in the second edition of his Principia Mathematica Newton said;“hypotheses non fingo.” (1) It is a pity that instead of distinguishing
between the proper and the improper use of “suppositions,” Newton blunted the
edge of his doctrine by indiscriminately rejecting all “hypotheses,” and not
only a priori conjectures; for this meant that his teaching on this point has
been widely dismissed, since it makes sense only to those who make an effort to
enquire into the historical context in which his condemnation of the use of
“hypotheses” should be understood. But
Newton was right to claim that an empirically gratuitous hypothesis is simply
not adequate as a means of determining positive and reasonably probable
explanations of the causes of phenomena. Ingenuity exercised a priori is worse than
useless; it is destructive of philosophy.
<5>
A priori hypothesizing has increasingly appeared in
philosophy, under the influence of science. Instances abound. At one end of the
spectrum is the arbitrary definition of the explicandum
of philosophy of mind supported by the hypothesis of the “multiple
realizability of mind”—a hypothesis arrived at by supposing that if one
abstracts from enough differences between the mental and the non-mental
functions of human beings, what is left over need not be mental in nature. Naturally. If one abstracts from enough differences
between a circus bear and a piece of travertine, one could suppose that a circus
bear is a well-trained and highly intelligent piece of travertine. Well, at the other extreme is the endeavour
that The Continuum of Experience pursues.
<6>
I find it difficult to understand why anyone should be
scandalized by the traditional biblical form of theological argumentation but
seriously entertain, in place of the “God hypothesis,” the hypothesis of cosmic
consciousness or any other super-real reality. Every possible criterion whereby to
differentiate between “immateriality” and “materiality,” “other worldiness” and
“worldliness”—or “worldly consciousness” and “cosmic consciousness” (or the
like)—is purely imaginary. For the world
in which we live and of which we are part is the only measure of the meaning
that “reality,” “world,” and “consciousness” may be reasonably and veridically
given; it is the only standard of what “reality,” “materiality”—and
“consciousness”—mean. To make “immateriality,” “other
worldliness”—and “cosmic consciousness”—mean what they are intended to mean, it
is necessary to invent the meaning.
<7>
Such invention is achieved by the simple expedient of
gratuitously asserting the contradictory of the reality we do encounter in the
world. This procedure enables us to
conceive self-contradictions: a world-that-is-not-the-world; a reality-that-is-not-really-real; a reality-that-is-the-opposite-of-reality; a world-that-is-real-but-is-not-the-real-world; a
consciousness-that-is-not-any-subject’s-consciousness.
It seems to me that concepts such as
“immaterial being,” “transcendent reality,” “another world,” “life after
death”—and, of course, “self-transcending awareness”—are literally meaningless.
They are, in my opinion, empty of
meaning, since they designate nothing but the purely imaginary contradiction of
what we have actually observed in the real world.
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<Footnotes>
(1) For example, the SETI project supposes, on the one
hand, the validity of Darwinian evolution through “natural selection,” an
essential aspect of which is that natural selection does not tend to produce
specific outcomes; but at the same time supposes, on the other, that once life
appears, natural selection tends to produce “intelligent” (i.e. conscious),
human-type, life in every otherwise suitable planet.
(2) See his Principia
Mathematica Naturalis Philosophiae,(Second edition), Bk. III, General
Scholium; Eng. trans., The Mathematical
Principles of Natural Philosophy (New York: Philosophical LIbrary, 1964).
Newton’s meaning has also been obscured, in part, because in the first edition
of the Principia he used the term hypothesis in a different,
non-pejorative sense. Newton’s doctrine on why “hypotheses” must be avoided has
been discussed by I. Bernard Cohen, Introduction
to Newton’s ‘Principia’ (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1978),
pp. 240-245.
-------------------------------------------
Leslie Dewart
Formerly, Graduate Department of Philosophy,
Professor Emeritus, Centre for the Study of Religion,
University of Toronto.
leslie.dewart (at) utoronto.ca
-------------------------------------------
Curriculum
Vitae
Leslie
Dewart
I. Biographical
1922 b. Madrid, Spain
1942-47 Royal Canadian Air Force. Pilot,
bomber-reconnaissance operations
1951 B.A. (Honour Psychology), University
of Toronto
1952-54 Teaching Fellow, Dept. of Philosophy,
St. Michael’s College, U. of T.
1952 M.A. (Philosophy), University of
Toronto
1954 Ph.D. (Philosophy), University of
Toronto
1954-56 Instructor, Dept. of Philosophy,
University of Detroit
1956-61 Assistant Professor, Dept. of
Philosophy, St. Michael’s College, U. of T.
1961-68 Associate Professor, ibid.
1961-68 Associate Professor, Dept. of
Philosophy, School of Graduate Studies, U. of T.
1964-70 Associate editor, Continuum
1967-74 Associate editor, Internationale Dialog Zeitschrift
1968- Member, Societé Europeénne de Culture
1968-75 Professor, Dept. of Religious Studies,
St. Michael’s College, U. of T.
1968-88 Professor, Faculty of Theology, St.
Michael’s College
1968-70 Associate Editor, Concurrence
1969-79 Professor, Institute of Christian
Thought, St. Michael’s College
1970-80 Member, Editorial Board, Studies in Religion—Sciences réligieuses
1970-71 Chair, Combined Departments of Religious
Studies, U. of T.
1974-78 Member, Advisory Board, Journal of Ultimate Reality and Meaning
1975-88 Professor, Dept. of Religious Studies,
U. of T.
1976-88 Professor, Centre for Religious Studies,
School of Graduate Studies, U. of T.
1979 Ll.B., Faculty of Law, U. of T.
1981 Barrister-at-Law, Osgoode Hall,
Toronto
1981- Member, Bar of the Province of
Ontario
1982-83 Member,
Advisory Committee on the Future of Education, Ministry of Education of Ontario
1988- Professor Emeritus, St. Michael’s
College, U. of T.
1988- Professor Emeritus, University of
Toronto
1995-2005 Senior Research Associate, Faculty of
Divinity, Trinity College
II. Books
1. Christianity
and Revolution, (New York: Herder & Herder, 1963), pp. 320
(Translations: Spanish, Catalán)
2. The
Future of Belief, (New York: Herder & Herder, 1963), pp. 223.
(Translations: Dutch, French, German, Spanish, Italian, Portuguese)
3. The
Foundations of Belief, (New York: Herder & Herder, 1966), pp. 526.
(Translation: German)
4. Religion,
Language and Truth, (New York: Herder & Herder, 1969), pp. 174
5. Evolution
and Consciousness: The Role of Speech in the Origin and Development of Human
Nature, (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1989), pp. 399.
III. Contributions to books
1. “Some early historical developments
of the New Testament morality,” in William Dunphy, ed., The New Morality, (New York: Herder & Herder, 1967), 83-106.
2. “Education and political values,” in
Abraham Rotstein, ed., The Prospect of
Change, (Toronto: McGraw-Hill, 1965), 286-307.
3. “Foreword” to Gabriel Marcel, Problematic Man, (New York: Herder &
Herder, 1967), 7-12.
4. “Neo-Thomism and the continuity of
philosophical experience,” in Gregory Baum, ed., The Future of Belief Debate, (New York: Herder & Herder, 1967),
211-229
5. “God and the supernatural,” in
Martin Marty and Dean Peerman, eds., The
New Theology, (New York: Macmillan, 1968), 142-155.
6. “Metaphysics and the concept of
God,” in Christopher Mooney, ed., The
Presence and Absence of God, (New York: Fordham University Press, 1969),
87-108.
7. “The fear of death and its basis in
the nature of consciousness,” in Florence M. Hetzler and Austin H. Kutscher,
eds., Philosophical Aspects of
Thanatology, vol. 1, (New York: Arno Press, 1978), pp. 53-63.
8. “Properties of speech and ideas of
reality,” in Bruce Alton, ed., Religions
and Languages, (New York: Peter Lang, 1991), 67-83.
IV. Articles
1. “Existentialism and the degrees of knowledge,” The Thomist, XIX (1956), 2, 193-218.
2. “American leadership and the future of the West,” Liberation, VII (1962), 5, 23-28.
3. “War and the Christian tradition,” Commonweal, LXXVII (1962), 6 , 145-148.
4. “The prospects of peace,” Liberation,
VII (1962), 10, 5-10.
5. “Modern war and Catholic morality,” Current, III (1962), 3, 182-193.
6. “Christianity’s vocation in the nuclear age,” Blackfriars, XLIV (1963), 512, 57-62.
7. “Christians and Marxists in dialogue: possibilities, prospects, and
perils,” Continuum, I, 2 (Summer,
1963), 139-153.
8. “Is this a post-Christian age?” Continuum,
I, 4 (Winter, 1964), 556-567.
9. “Academic freedom and Catholic dissent,” Commonweal, LXXX (1964), 2, 33-36.
10. “A comparison of the concepts of
‘peaceful coexistence’ in John XXIII’s Pacem
in Terris and in Soviet-American diplomacy,” Co-existence, I (1964), 1, 21-38.
11. “Pacem in Terris and Soviet-American relations: a comparative
analysis of the basis of international peace,” Cross Currents, XIV (1964), 3, 287-312.
12. “Neo-traditionalists and
pseudo-progressives: a note on recent conflicts within the Catholic Church,” Continuum, III , 1 (Spring, 1965),
121-123.
13. “Les bases morales the la paix,”
(1re partie), Comprendre, XXVIII
(1965), 137-154.
14. “The school of conformity: a
phenomenological critique,” Continuum,
IV, 2 (Summer, 1966), 171-177.
15. “Catholic philosophy and the
socialization of the intellect,” Ecumenist,
V (1967), 4, 52-55.
16. “Les bases morales de la paix”
(conclusion), Comprendre, XXIX
(1966), 85-102.
17. “Wahrheit, Irrtum, und Dialog,” Internationale Dialog Zeitschrift, I, 4
(1968), 330-345.
18. “Towards a new form of faith,” Ferment, II (1968), 2, 10-12.
19. “On transcendental Thomism,” Continuum, VI, 3 (Autumn, 1968),
389-401.
20. “The meaning of religious belief,” Commonweal, XC (1969), 1, 15-17.
21. “The nature of truth in relation to
language,” Continuum, VII, 2 (Summer,
1969), 332-340.
22. “The fact of death,” Commonweal, XCI (1969), 7, 206-208.
23. “A response to J. Donceel,” Continuum, VII, 3 (Autumn, 1969),
453-462.
24. “Hope and immortality,” Agora, XII (1970), 12-16.
25. “Unité et verité,” Lumière et Vie, XX, 103 (Juin, 1970),
70-89.
26. “Sprache und Wahrheit,” Theologie der Gegenwart, XIV (1971), 4,
198-202.
27. “Christianity and the philosophy of
language,” Drijarkara (Indonesia), I
(1972) 4, 96-102.
28. “Der Zustand der römisch-katholischen
Kirche,” Wort und Wahrheit, XXVII
(1972), 2, 116-119.
29. “Language and religion,” Philosophic Exchange, I (1972) 3, 35-44.
30. “The relevance of Thomism today,” Proc. Am. Cath. Phil. Assn., XLVIII
(1974), 308-317.
31. “The grounds for observing the law:
a critical analysis of H.L.A. Hart’s foundations of a theory of law,” Queen’s Law J., V (1979), 1, 116-152.