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ABSTRACT
In his comparison of two world views, view I based on mind-independent reality, view II on solipsism, Chris Hooley in effect discusses the future of metaphysics, a question which has again become of importance in a number of fields of study. There are two varieties of solipsism: a metaphysical one, which leads to absurd consequences; and an epistemological (or methodological) one, which is closely related to or identical with phenomenology, and to which most philosophers since Descartes have subscribed. View II includes view I as a shortcut procedure of limited validity, and this relation constitutes the bridge from phenomenology to objective science. Although the dual meaning of the word solipsism can give rise to misunderstandings and to over-interpretations, Hooley’s second world view offers promise for the study of topics like the mind-brain relation.

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HOOLEY’S PROPOSAL

Chris Hooley addresses the central question of the future of metaphysics in a unique way: by a personal experience, in which he says he has considered the world in two ways.

View I uses traditional metaphysics (ontology) which assumes a mind-independent fixed reality, or MIR. This includes most of the occidental way of thinking, including in particular most scientific thinking, with the use of empiricism and its further development in positivism.

View II starts from personal experience and keeps it as the center of thinking. Hooley calls this ‘solipsystem’. Views of this type have developed mainly under names of phenomenology, existentialism, and the various postmodern epistemologies.

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DISCUSSION OF SOLIPSISM

The distinction between the two views can be a helpful ‘working dichotomy’ (cf. the recent discussions with Chris Lofting) for the investigation of the present-day conceptual difficulties as they arise in some fields of investigation. I will discuss here a few points, as they arise from Chris Hooley’s presentation, and which I believe are of general interest, with emphasis on the concept of solipsism.

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The term ‘solipsism’ is tricky, because it comes in two very different versions. According to Rollins (a), metaphysical solipsism (the notion that ‘only I exist’) has been discussed since the time of St. Augustine, and was usually rejected as absurd (all ontological claims are paradoxical, but this one is more so than most).

On the other hand, epistemological or methodological solipsism, which is similar or identical to phenomenology, ‘has been espoused by almost every major philosopher since Descartes’, for the reason that ‘existential knowledge arises from immediate and thus unshared experience’ (a, p.490), just as Hooley describes it for his view II [18ff]. The logical positivist Rudolf Carnap, for instance, founded his epistemological construction (Aufbau) expressly on a solipsistic basis.

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But in this case, one must explain why the (epistemological or methodological) solipsistic position is so quickly and completely forgotten and ignored as it seems to be, certainly in most of the present mind-brain discussions, but apparently also even by some philosophers of science, in favor of a view-I type position. (Indeed, this appears to be a question of cardinal importance for the present-day conceptual conundrum.) It seems the reason is the need for a security of thinking which one hopes to be provided by jumping to an ad-hoc external source (such as mind-independent reality, MIR). This is expected to be more reliable than a self-creating bootstrap operation (TA8 [23]) of one’s own thinking plus feedback, with the built-in uncertainties as well as responsibilities of such a procedure. Seen from view II, the external source of view I is a part of the bootstrap operation.

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Rollins’ formulation that ‘existential knowledge arises from … unshared experience’ contains an unintended trap, it is in itself paradoxical. The ‘existential knowledge’ part involves a leap of faith (not mentioned by Rollins), because it implies the existence of mind-independent reality. In effect this amounts to the ‘credo quia absurdum’ of Tertullian (though in a non-theological sense, and with neglect of the absurdity aspect); this means the basic ontological step from experience to MIR, which thereafter quickly comes to override and obliterate everything preceding, because of the certainty which MIR is assumed to offer. MIR, I want to suggest, functions somewhat like a computer program, it is helpful, it is a conceptual unit (or if you prefer, a composite of many units), it may be reliable if you know its limitations; still, someone had to construct it from no program, it did not come pre-assembled out of the blue; to assume that it (or MIR) does so is a mistake and leads into a blind alley.

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The difference between the two varieties of solipsism appears to stem from this intrinsic paradox (or absurdity, or weirdness) of traditional metaphysics (or ontology, or MIR), rather than from the concept of solipsism itself. ‘Metaphysical solipsism’ asserts a paradoxical (positive) existential state, while ‘methodological solipsism’ would simply mean: to acknowledge that ‘the mind’ (or ‘experience’, ‘awareness’, or ‘consciousness’) is at the root of all mental activity, and in this case ‘methodological solipsism’ is simply another word for ‘phenomenology’. To say that ‘every major philosopher since Descartes started from phenomenology of experience’ (without use of the term ‘solipsism’), is stating something quite obvious, and even trivial. What other possibilities did they have ? And actually the deliberate consideration of this situation goes even further back, since Thomas Aquinas already said that ‘nihil est in intellectu, quod non est prius in sensu’. The difference between the two versions of solipsism is therefore enormous.

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But theses formulations leave a decisive further question to be answered: from where and how do entities get into ‘the senses’ ? It would appear that Thomas Aquinas, the empiricists, and most phenomenologists did not give up the notion of MIR even while they emphasized the primordial importance of experience. The best known example of the last group is the existentialist Heidegger, who tried (paradoxically, and so far as I know unsuccessfully) to write a ‘fundamental ontology’ starting from a phenomenological basis. The reason for this maintenance of MIR seems to be that the question was not addressed whether the mental entities are ‘found’ in a pre-existing and pre-structured condition, or else ‘created’ (constructed) in the senses, in ‘consciousness’, or somewhere else (cf. N22[13-14]). As a result, the MIR notion (which is incompatible with a primordial role of experience as the origin of all one can possibly know) was not discarded, but kept in a mental safe, all along during the discussion of ‘sensation’, ‘experience’, and ‘awareness’, and later re-activated and once more sanctioned as original. This then leads, among other things, to the perplexing present-day attempts to ‘explain experience’ by its own derivatives, such as material events, including those described by particle physics (cf. also <15>, below).

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Jan P Verhey in his comment (TA8C1<3-4>) agrees with view II. He shows that view I leads to a ‘cat chasing its own tail’ effect. ‘… this observer-independent reality can only be understood (if it is) translated in terms of how it looks-like in our world of experience …’ Persisting objects, and concepts like time, space, past, future, self, others, etc. are all created within unstructured ongoing experience, and thereafter extrapolated from this ongoing experience. They ‘exist’ provided you believe they do and use them confidently in that way, which is: as-if they were mind-independent. <10> ‘The self is not an object’: quite so, it is not something that is found or encountered; but this applies to all other concepts as well. If these points are acknowledged, a translation back into experience (which would imply having accepted view I) is redundant. Experience remains strictly inescapable, and (except for practical purposes) there is never any reason to divide the wholeness of experience.

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ONTOLOGY IS A SPECIALIZED VIEW WITHIN PHENOMENOLOGY

How can objective science arise (TA8[25]) within a phenomenological background ? If we can agree that mental tools, including for instance images and concepts like ‘objects’, ‘quanta’, ‘I’, ‘consciousness’, and ‘other people’, are created (constructed) within unstructured experience, the question is open for a functional answer. After their construction, and although they can be ‘de-constructed’ at any time: according to view II, the images and concepts are mostly used ‘as-if’ they referred to mind-independent realities, because this simplifies and stabilizes matters; this point is mentioned by Hooley for ‘selves’ (TA8[29]), and in my opinion it can be extended to all concepts (TA1[33-39]). In everyday life, and in everyday science, the as-if nature of concepts is neglected (as a practical shortcut), but it may also be denied (an error which results in view I).

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View II is wider, but view I is more practical for most purposes (with the exception of some areas of investigation, where it fails). The relationship between views I and II can be rendered contradiction-free if view I is modified, to be used on an as-if basis, that is, as ‘working metaphysics’ rather than traditional fixed MIR metaphysics or ontology. View I can continue to function as before, but it is acknowledged to be more appropriate when the as-if correction is added. (‘Ontology’ might perhaps be modified to ‘as-if ontology’ or ‘working ontology’, but cf. <13> below). Seen from phenomenology (view II), ontology (view I) is a special case, usable in limited circumstances; somewhat like a geocentric view can be used for certain questions, but is more comprehensively understood within a wider frame, such as a heliocentric one. Phenomenology is a point of view (a tool), but I do not agree that it is a ‘rationalization’. The phenomenology-based view II is more encompassing (cf. TA8R1[18-19]); one may go one step further and state that phenomenology, as the basis of all concept formation, is the widest possible framework, and this is the reason why it is preferable to a fixed ontology.

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PHENOMENOLOGY AND SCIENCE

My conclusion here is the opposite of Gary Schouburg’s (TA8C2<1,7-9>), who wants to accommodate view II inside view I, because he understands view II as an ‘escape’, and even as an ‘intellectual lobotomy’. Apparently he means an escape from the pressures of uncertainty into a sort of navel gazing. But ontology also is a refuge from the uncertainty and responsibility of being at the origin of thinking, onto a fictitious external fixed point. Schouborg suggests <8> that view I is ‘useful but inevitably insecure’ without ontological explanation: this is an under-statement, because view I is identical with ontology. Schouborg’s interpretation of Hooley’s view II is a good possibility for proceeding in case one wants to remain committed to view I. Everyone has to deal with the uncertainties of experience in some way; but to label this generally as ‘escape’ is misleading (although this may be so in specific instances).

My disagreement with Gary stems mainly from his opinion that view II can be ‘explained’ by view I, although ‘we do not yet have the data’ (but we never will). In my opinion, view I is a dead-end road which has reached its limits in recent problem situations (the so-called ‘hard problem’ of consciousness for instance results from this), and it needs revision. View I can be accommodated within view II, as a shortcut with limited applicability; this is the needed bridge from phenomenology to objective science.

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TERMINOLOGICAL QUESTIONS

It is probably better to avoid the word ‘solipsism’, because the difference between its metaphysical and epistemological versions is commonly not made. Unless it is accompanied by an explicit discussion of it meaning, it is liable to be misunderstood to signify an absurd ontological claim. Indeed, in discussion of view II, it would be better to avoid any reference to ‘ontology’ (such as in TA8[29]), because this concept, as it is usually employed, is meaningful only in an unmodified view I. A term like ‘phenomenology’, which indicates the origin of mental content from experience, is probably less vulnerable than ‘solipsism’. - Further, it might be more accurate to call view I ‘inverted’ (it uses concepts in an inverted way, where concepts are understood as more original than experience itself) rather than view II. - And also, in my opinion, using Vaihinger’s term ‘as-if’ as applied to MIR is more precise than some other terms with a similar meaning such as ‘language game’, or ‘irony’, or ‘illusion’. - Gary Schouborg’s proposition (in TA9C1<8>) to maintain the term ‘ontology’ would require a modification of the word’s meaning (to ‘as-if ontology’); but this is likely to result in misunderstandings because ‘ontology’ usually implies View I.

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RELATED QUESTIONS

(a) Solipsism and Postmodernism:
Although Chris Hooley’s presentation is clear and succinct, the danger of vague thinking and loose talk is rather great in discussions of topics like solipsism, or of ‘post-modern’ epistemological views. In a recent book, Sokal & Bricmont (b) attack post-modernism by providing many examples of scientistic ‘impostures’. As their own epistemological remedy, they offer old-fashioned realism. We have no direct access to an objective world (b, p.54). The belief in an objective world does not refute solipsism, and as Hume pointed out, experience cannot refute it either (b, p.55-56). The authors do not distinguish between the two varieties of solipsism, and are content to reject Hume’s skepticism with a return to simple realism for the reason that in everyday life people are not skeptics (b, p.56): ‘La meilleure facon d’expliquer la coherence de notre experience est de supposer que le monde exterieur correspond … a l’image que nous en donnent nos sens’. But the present-day conceptual difficulties cannot be resolved by a realism (view I, MIR) which simply ignores them. These difficulties do not primarily arise in practical daily life but in more esoteric areas such as meditation, religious experience, quantum physics, or the mind-brain relation question; they have also, among other things, contributed to the excesses of postmodernism, which these authors seek to remedy.

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(b) The Product is not the Cause of the Producer:
Simple realism is not a good way to understand (‘explain’) the coherence of experience. The following alternative formulation may be more helpful: ‘The coherence of experience is primary. Mental tools which we construct work well (for most but not all of experience) on a supposition that they ‘re-present’ a fictitious external mind-independent world; in those areas where this works one may treat them - provisionally, as a shortcut, as a matter of expediency - as-if they did indeed arise in that way; where this doesn’t work, the construction aspect must be taken into account’. ‘Explanations’ are tools, produced within experience, and imply view I, belief in mind-independent reality, either on a permanent (ontological) basis, or pragmatically (as-if) within view II. In view II (phenomenology): trying to explain experience by science (see <8,12,14> above), or for that matter by any other mental products, means offering an inverted argument (one which uses products of experience to explain experience), which cannot work, and this instead explains the failure of scientific explanations of experience.

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(c) Hooley’s Test Question:
‘Do you experience a boundary between yourself and the environment?’ (TA8[5]) is less clear for the distinction between his views I and II than he claims, because everyone (including, I suggest, Hooley himself at all times) will use such boundaries in practice, since they are necessary for living. He suggests [30-31] that both subject and world are ‘unimportant’ (does this mean ‘theoretically’ unimportant ? or practically irrelevant ? if the latter, what is ‘important’ in this view ?). But the question can be modified to: ‘do you believe the world is independent of your thinking’ ? The answer to this will distinguish between the two views which he discusses.

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CONCLUSION

Chris Hooley’s consideration of solipsism helps putting the present-day central conceptual difficulty into a sharper focus. To emphasize the inescapability of the primacy of subjective awareness, which has been acknowledged since the time of Descartes, for instance by the phenomenologists, or recently the ‘movement for science within consciousness’ (see TA7 and its discussion) is an important first step in the investigation. The next step is to understand that for certainty reasons the endorsement of the primacy of experience has only been half-hearted and was commonly obliterated by a secondary ‘relapse’ into MIR confirmation. This is where one should investigate further. I agree with Hooley’s opinion in his excellent response (TA8R1<14>) that ontology (view I) is destined to become obsolete as a general epistemological background, although it will remain practically useful for limited purposes. The implications of such a change will require much study.
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REFERENCES

(a) Rollins CD (1976), Solipsism, in Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Vol.7, pp.487-491. New York: MacMillan.

(b) Sokal A et Bricmont J (1997), Impostures Intellectuelles, Paris: Odile Jacob.
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[Herbert FJ Muller
<mdmu@musica.mcgill.ca>]