KARL JASPERS FORUM

TA78 (Müller)

Commentary 84 (to C30 by Ernst von Glasersfeld)

BONES IN THE CONSTRUCTIVIST CLOSET

by David Kenneth Johnson

27 November 2007, posted 1 December 2007

<1>

In this essay I revisit an exchange of two years past, with hopes of clarifying my position on Ernst von Glasersfeld's globally agnostic response to the problem of solipsism. As part of a recent discussion of Gernot Saalmann's "Arguments Opposing the Radicalism of Radical Constructivism," Ernst von Glasersfeld writes:

<2>

"RC" [radical constructivism] has never made any bones about the problem of the subject that generates percepts, concepts, and the structure of the experiential world, it is that mysterious spot where awareness arises and experience begins. From my point of view it lies at the interface of the rational and the domain of the mystical to which reason has no access." (von Glasersfeld, "some Rash Conclusions," Constructivist Foundations, 3, 1).

<3>

I think there are bones aplenty here, why does RC problematize or otherwise enshroud in mystery the subject of constructive activity ? Because, by RC's lights, the world I can know and talk about is but a construct of the subject. A simple yet fatal reflexive turn in constructivism would see the subject, too, as a construct of the subject. But this entails the markedly anti-constructivist assumption of a pre-existing subject able and disposed to construct the subject who constructs the world of experience. And who constructs the subject-constructor ? One alternative might be for a fully constructed subject to appear ex nihilo. But that seems even more incredible than an infinite regress of subject-constructing subjects, it is a "mysterious spot" indeed.

<4>

The reason for this enigmatic exercise is, of course, the assiduously radical rejection of naturalistic or realist metaphysics, or MIR (metaphysical independent reality). I encourage epistemologists to suppose instead, in concert with the greater part of science and commonsense, that the constructing subject is not itself primarily a construction but a being that first exists prior to its many constructions (a developing human, for example, who begins not as a "construct" but a fertilized product of two other subjects) and subsequently as the active generator of those constructions (including, of course, percepts, concepts, and all the ideational furniture of that human's "experiential world"), if I am right, then, and contrary to von Glasersfeld's words, it is never the "subject that constructs..." but always the subject who constructs his or her experiential world. Most simply:

<5>

(1). The subject exists independently of (many of) the subject's constructions.{2}

Subjects are the conscious conceivers and perceivers of our world, most notably from our standpoint, they are sentient, connative, human animals. While mysteries remain about the fine structure of these subjects and their world, the basic notion of a subject is hardly mysterious : we not only know what subjects are, thanks in large part to the various human and natural sciences, but that the world currently contains about 6.5 billion of them.

<6>

Some will no doubt object that I unfairly smuggle metaphysics (or natural history, or evolutionary biology, etc.) into what would otherwise be a pure epistemological analysis; that I have radically misunderstood the radicalism of RC. This tired complaint flows all too readily from the pens of some minor RC apologists. {3} The many efforts to comment critically on, complete or render consistent, unearth the tacit metaphysical foundations of, or supplement the presuppositions of RC do not, in every instance, signal a misconstruction of the theory. {4} The persistent injunction to judge RC only by its own "internal" suppositions is doubly wrong : first, as I see it, RC is in many respects self-reflexively inconsistent; that is, no "outside" considerations are required to illuminate its structural defects. Most centrally, and as I will suggest once again below, the principal contention that RC provides an epistemological account of experience free of all metaphysical or ontological suppositions is false (this was the central theme of my TA 75, KJF). Second, and as a consequence of these internal difficulties, a faulty theory -especially one plagued by a crippling and axial mystery - may require "outside" help. To believe otherwise - to reject on principal any deviation from the foundational aspirations or features of a theory - is to court pure, anti -intellectual dogma. In this way, realism's fallibilistic, abductive inferences to mind- or subject-independent objects and relations are meant to inform or reform, not to bludgeon, talk past, or pervert RC.

<7>

To say that the subject exists independently of the subject's constructions is to locate the subject along with all other independently existing objects or relations in so-called MIR. NOW, what exactly does it mean to talk of the "metaphysically independent existence of the subject" ? I admit that, without further qualification, this brand of realist talk does seem a tad mysterious. In my view, metaphysical independence, if it is to mean anything at all in this context, means existing independently from (much of {5}) mind and its products. So, the mystery of the subject is actually the mystery of the mind-independent existence of the subject. I will, therefore, parse von Glasersfeld's mystery in the following way:

<8>

(2). The (mostly) mind-independent existence of the subject is a mystery.

The concept of "mind-independence" requires further clarification. Since it can mean either existing independently of my mind or existing independently of all minds, we now have two further candidates for our critical attention:

(3). Whether a subject can exist (mostly) independently of my mind is a mystery.

And

(4). Whether a subject can exist (mostly) independently of our minds is a mystery.

<9>

Now, despite the familiarity of utterances akin to (4) and notwithstanding some notable constructi vist efforts to the contrary (for example, Maturana's and von Glasersfeld's prioritizing of "consensual domains" or "social interaction") the radical constructivist will not be inclined to accept the robustly realist assumption of a plurality of subjects contained in (4). For to do so is to assume that there exists several minds (or subjects), some of which might serve as the subjective basis from which to judge the reality (or non-reality) of the others. And, barring the assumption of a collective mind that creates and sustains parts distinguishable as individual subjects (something at least one commentator, Terren Suydam (TA 86-7, C28), on this forum does seem to fancy), the existence of a plurality of minds entails the independent existence of an individual subject. That is to say, of course, that (4) is self-reflexively inconsistent : the clearest imaginable answer to the purported mystery is contained within the sentence itself. That is, on simple reflection, no one - neither constructivist nor realist --ought to make such claims.

<10>

Quite apart from any logical concerns with (4), von Glasersfeld's preference for ontological agnosticism, for an "epistemology without metaphysics," no doubt inclines his view to the more Spartan ontology of (3) with its singular-sounding subject and object. So, for any number of reasons, (3) emerges as the best option for the radical constructivist.

<11>

But clearly (3) has its own set of problems. First, asking whether a subject can exist independently of my mind, when, for all I know, I am the only subject, sounds very much like asking whether my mind can exist independently of my mind, an obvious enough contradiction in thought. Now a lot rests on the phrase in the previous sentence "for all I know," and von Glasersfeld will not hesitate to point out that I have failed (yet again !) to consider the possibility that the question might be posed by one who remains agnostic about the number of real or existent subjects : "Perhaps I am alone; perhaps I am not. I are not to say; for I have no metaphysical ambitions at all."

<12>

This leads us to the second problem for (3); one that involves the specter of solipsism - a persistent thorn in RC'S side, von Glasersfeld' s position on solipsism is equivocal, since he variously suggests that RC "refutes" or "has nothing to do with" this homely outlook. Most frequently, however, he moves to dismiss the recurrent charge of solipsism, not by invoking, invading, or inferring to anything extra-von Glasersfeldian (the most obvious route), but by remaining "neutral" with respect to the existence and nature of anything beyond his experience. This kind of global ontological agnostiticism (GOA), as I have dubbed it elsewhere on this forum (TA78, C25), differs greatly from its more modest and perfectly agreeable cousin, selective ontological agnosticism (SOA), where a subject might choose to remain neutral on the mind-independent existence of any particular object or relation.

<13>

While SOA is nothing other than the fallibilistic imperative ingredient in rather ordinary, commonsensical realism, it no doubt strikes von Glasersfeld as naive or irrational (because of its supposedly mystical access to a world of things and relations beyond the Cartesian subject-as-constructor). He favors instead GOA's more expansive capitulation to the skeptics, refusing to admit as real anything that might escape mind's capacity for immediate inspection, construction, and verification. The challenge now facing RC is to find in such bare-bones metaphysics even the slimmest basis for rejecting solipsism.

<14>

Von Glasersfeld is likely to counter that I have deliberately, or by virtue of the exercise of some naive realist blind spot, failed to notice some more fitting version of neutrality or agnosticism; one that sports an exclusively "epistemological" character and is capable of rebuffing solipsism, free of any metaphysical referents. In response to my suggestion that GOA is either a cognate or simple expression of solipsism, von Glasersfeld writes:

"I submit that the rejection of all claims to KNOW experiencer-independent objects or relations has nothing to do with solipsism, because solipsism designates a belief about BEING whereas the agnostic's rejection concerns KNOWING (E. von Glasersfeld, TA 78, C30). "

<15>

There are several problems with this response, solipsism, as a "designator of beliefs," is the epistemological -ontological thesis that limits both what there is (and, therefore, what I can know) to the lone subject. {6} There can be no purely ontological form of solipsism (or any other view, since it would be, after all, a view). As von Glasersfeld recognizes, global ontological agnosticism (GOA) neither affirms nor denies the existence of all things external to the (lone) subject and his or her constructions. {7} However, since GOA shares with Descartes the reasonable (I think unavoidable) assumption that the subject-who-constructs exists at each moment of construction (at the very least), GOA has this minimal ontology. There can be no purely epistemic view of anything (since it is, after all, a view of something). Two considerations follow which help to explain RC's vulnerability to the charge of solipsism. First, solipsism's hermetic world shares a striking family resemblance to GOA'S minimal ontology of the setf-and-its-constructions. And second, GOA'S "openness" to the reality or non-reality of a world beyond the lone subject-and-its-constructions is logically consistent with a claim – solipsism - that denies the reality of that world. My overarching point should now be clear : white embracing GOA is preferable to embracing solipsism, GOA is not a means of refuting or avoiding it. In short, "I am not a solipsist, because I am a thoroughgoing ontologicat agnostic," is invalid.

<16>

Realism is the only viable alternative to solipsism, it is hardly surprising, then, to see von Glasersfeld invoking the specter of independent constraints at nearly every turn, either in the guise of "independent, ontological obstacles," appeals to the "necessity" of social consensus, "fitness" (a fa11ibi1istic cognate of correspondence), or myriad other references to the way the "real world steps on our toes." In fact, and in the fashion of Berkelean or Kantian or Cartesian idealism, RC temporarily avoids quick refutation by exceeding its own restrictions on the (idealistic) scope of sensible utterances. Luckily for RC, solipsism is averted by the very mention of a possible, mind-independent external constraint, in the fashion of "my experiential world appears to contain 6.5 billion subjects, and perhaps, though I can't say for sure, those 6.5 billion-minus-one subjects exist - independently of me."

<17>

Unluckily for RC, such claims run directly counter to - that is, logically contradict - von Gtasersfeld's radicalism. (Note, too, that the seemingly marginal "mystery" of the subject is actually the all-embracing "mystery" of everything not dependent for its existence and nature on von Glasersfeld and his constructions.) why is von Glasersfeld forever defending opposing positions ? Because RC rests on a set of contradictory assumptions (again, the central message of my TA 75). He wants both to resist, as a consistent practitioner of GOA, all references to a world beyond the lone knower; and at the same time, since GOA is ineffective against the charge of solipsism, to embrace commonsensical, nonsolipsistic reflections grounded in the recognition of a plurality of subjects and (at least the possibility of) a constraining, extra-conceptual world that contains and constrains those subjects. The sort of metaphysical innocence or purity von Glasersfeld periodically covets is for the solipsist alone. The selectively agnostic and consistent von Glasersfeld, in rejecting solipsism, is a metaphysical realist. Mystery solved.

-----------------------------------------

NOTES

{1}

I've argued previously on this forum (TA 75, R4), for reasons that wi11 emerge presently, against the continued use of MIR and in favor of SIR (subject independent reality) and HIR (human independent reality).

{2}

And not, as prevailing caricatures of the realist project would have it, that the subject exists independently of the subject or that the subject's constructions exist (entirely) independently of the subject.

{3}

See, for example, Dewey Dykstra's contribution to this same article, "into the Breech...", construct! vist Foundations, 3, 1.

{4}

While frequently compelling, Saalmann's "critical realist" take on RC's radicalism suffers from an apparent lack of familiarity with the debate.

{5}

I employ the qualifications "much of" and "mostly" to reflect the logical truth that no (mindful) subject exists entirely independently of all mind. However, in a nonsolipsistic universe (this one, for instance), each of us exists entirely -independently of every other subject's mind.

{6}

I have expressed in previous commentaries, however, my concerns about the very sense of solipsism (TA 75, R1).

{7}

I have expressed concerns about the very sense of this position, too, which strikes me as a nonviable species of solipsistic phenomenalism (TA78, C30).

---------------------------------------

David Kenneth Johnson

e-mail < D.johnson (at) mcla.edu>