KARL JASPERS FORUM

TA63 (Leslie / Rees)

Commentary 19 (to C16, vdMeijden)

ONTOLOGY BACK-UP PROPOSAL
by Herbert FJ Müller
7 December 2003, posted 21 December 2003

<1>
Adrian van der Meijden writes (C16<1>) that I am getting repetitive in talking about as-if-MIR. I agree - this has concerned me for some time, and he gives me a good reason to do something about it. Actually, I want to go further : since about 1994 I have tried to pursue one single point, namely that the notion of mind-independently pre-structured reality (MIR) is impossible if it is taken at face value (naïvely), that its use creates obstacles to understanding, and that it should be replaced by a more suitable concept.

<2>
For me, this difficulty came up while looking for a solution to the mind-brain problem, but it has often been voiced in the past, in various contexts (since pre-Socratic times), usually as the problem of metaphysics and/or ontology. Since I see the 0-D method as a - so far the only - solution to the mind-brain question (see TAs 1 and 45), I believe it should be further pursued. And since this proposition touches on many other issues besides the mind-brain relation, I have subsequently tried (mostly in the KJF) to discuss it in relation to other questions (e.g., TA57). So far I still think it is valid, or at least I have not heard any convincing arguments why it would not be.

<3>
That the uneasiness about metaphysics has now "somewhat lessened in academia" <1> may be true (some now try to see it once again as a language side-effect, for instance), but if so I don't think this is a good sign. It means yet another relapse, by default, into Parmenidan it-is thinking, with the main result that the mind-brain question and some other problems remain inaccessible. The reason for the relapse is, it seems, that no satisfactory access to the metaphysics question has been generally acknowledged. It is judged to be unanswerable, with a sense of failure about historical efforts.

<4>
My repetitiveness stems from having to explain my point of view when responding to someone who is not familiar with it. A possibility I want to explore here is to formulate instead a simple working version of the method for back-up of MIR-belief by as-if-MIR-belief, together with a statement of the underlying assumptions and a justification, which could be used as an annex or plug-in in discussions, so to speak. This proposition incorporates the results of discussions in the KJF, and is not meant to be here in a final formulation; it would have to be further developed and modified as needed. I am interested in comments and suggestions. Everything in this proposal is open to discussion.

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ONTOLOGY 0-D BACK-UP (Working Formulation, December 2003)

(A)
PROCEDURE

{A-1}
In general terms :

Discovery of pre-existing structures (aletheia) [impossible]

structuring unstructured and undivided experience (apeiron, the encompassing) [possible]

{A-2}
This procedure can be used to re-formulate more specific questions, as in the following examples :

How are the world, I, others ?

how do we structure the world, self, others, within our experience, and why in this particular form ?

{A-3}
Is reality objective ?

to what extent can one treat experience as-if it were mind-independent, the same for everyone ?

{A-4}
How do we know about MIR-objects ?

how and why do we structure as-if-MIR objects (for instance invest gestalt-formations with reality-trust), and what are the limits of usefulness of doing so ?

{A-5}
How do the brain and brain activity produce subjective experience ?

How and why do we structure the notions of brain and brain activity and their many aspects within ongoing subjective mind-and-nature experience ? How do the thus conceived objective brain structures and functions relate to our subjective experience ?

{A-6}
How can one have access to the whole of experience ?

How can one return from the details to the whole of experience ?

{A-7}
Are quanta particles or waves ?

Under which conditions is it helpful and/or possible to structure (understand) quanta as either waves or particles ?

{A-8}
God's commandment

Rules like the Categorical Imperative

(B)
ASSUMPTIONS UNDERLYING THIS PROPOSAL

(I) START-POINT, ORIGIN, AND STABILITY OF STRUCTURES WITHIN ENCOMPASSING EXPERIENCE

{B-1}
Ongoing experience is the only basis thinking can start from.

Experience has to be considered as originally whole, undivided, and unstructured in the sense that there would be no structures without activity of the subjects (both animal and human). All mental mind-and-nature structures and also their stability arise within experience, and therefore experience encompasses all structures. Collective experience is a constituent aspect of individual experience, particularly for humans.

{B-2}
Structures are not derived from given internal or external structures of any kind (principle of zero-derivation, 0-D). 0-D follows from the impossibility of mind-independently pre-structured or given reality (MIR), for instance in the sense of Parmenides or Plato, as discussed below in section (ii). 0-D starts from experience that is structure-free (apeiron, Anaximander) except for the structures created by the subject or accepted from others. The subjects (human and animal) build their own structures in order to deal with their experience structures. Humans may call them true or real if they trust them to be reliable, on the basis of feedback results during individual and collective use.

{B-3}
Whether the structures arise with or without deliberation is not relevant for this. They include structures which are predominantly genetically programmed, e.g., qualia like pain, color, or also gestalt formation. On the other hand, they also include formal structures like words, numbers, time, space, or theories. All mental mind-and-nature structures, including the subject-object split and other people, and also the stability of the structures, arise within ongoing subjective mind-and-nature experience.

For instance, the brain and brain functions are structures created within experience (TAs 1, 45, and other texts), which means that experience cannot inversely reside in the brain or in brain function. This is so despite the fact that in a secondary objective sense brain functions are needed for experience to occur. (This is the most difficult conceptual aspect of the mind-brain relation.)

{B-4}
Complex thinking is needed for many aspects of experience, but complexity is secondary to the simple unitary undivided whole of experience, within which simple as well as complex structures are created.

Because experience encompasses all structures, it is not possible to structure the whole of experience. Therefore attempts to provide complete (rational, objective) theories of everything are self-contradictory. Conceptual structures which are intended to deal with the whole of experience, like religious and similar teachings, must provide space for unstructured experience (such as meditation, mystery, nirvana, etc.)

{B-5}
To remain aware, at least in principle, that we structure reality, MIR-belief should be replaced by as-if-MIR-belief (i.e., by 0-D, instrumental or working ontology-metaphysics; see TA57 and other write-ups). In other words, not only can we not know about MIR, but because it produces misunderstandings, we are better off without traditional MIR-belief altogether. Nor are attempts warranted to replace the traditional MIR-object-reality by other tool-realities like language, which center on the language tool rather than on experience per se. The 0-D stance is closely related to though not identical with Radical Constructivism, as described by Ernst von Glasersfeld (TAs 17 and 43) and others (see also the RC web site).

{B-6}
Ethics does not follow from any specific knowledge, whether scientific or other, but the need for ethics is closely related to 0-D. It is required due to the great adaptability (and therefore biological under-determination) of human thought and behavior; in experience this appears as a lack of aims and uncertainty how to act.

{B-7}
For MIR-ethics esoteric contexts are needed, a set of standards via commands which need not be understood but have to be followed. The source of the commands is a postulated absolute authority, the contact of one (or more) persons with the authority is hidden from public view, not open for critique nor even enquiry. The positing of the maxims is here uniform for everyone as determined in the esoteric contact of one or more of the society's members with the postulated authority (they see the authority as real, not postulated).

{B-8}
Kant had formulated a Categorical Imperative, which did not rely on outside (MIR) commands : act in such a way that the maxim of your actions could be the maxim for a law for everybody. Such maxims have to be posited in the same way as other structures. Despite some difficulties in practice (e.g., conflicting duties) this is a useful starting point. The ethical question is a great deal more complex than this (see for instance Ch. Taylor, Sources of the Self, 1989), but I mention it here to suggest that it is possible to discuss it, without contradiction, within the 0-D proposal

.

(ii) MIR-BELIEF (NAÏVE ONTOLOGY) IS AN AVOIDABLE ERROR

{B-9}
Because mind-and-nature reality-structures originate and remain inside encompassing experience, reality cannot be mind-independent.

There are no structures during states like dreamless sleep or general anaesthesia. The structures would not be there without the (animal or human) subjects' structuring activity. Experience needs structuring - it is the only way in which it can be dealt with - but reality is not entirely invented, because the created structures are continuously tested during use (feedback).

{B-10}
The split between subject and object is not given as such, pace Descartes. It does not exist without subjects' activity, but it is one of the earliest mind-and-nature structures to be created. This structuring act creates the differentiation between mind and nature (self and world, subject and object). Only after this step can a part of experience be handled as-if it consisted of mind-independent (metaphysical or ontological) entities. In 0-D, metaphysics (ontology) is explicitly seen as a human working tool. Some aspects, like subjective experience, cannot be treated in that way, because the mind cannot be mind-independent. The same applies to some questions related to it, like the mind-brain relationship, and to some problems of particle physics.

{B-11}
Scientific publications rarely mention this conceptual question; they tend to imply traditional MIR-belief. Despite that, the MIR implication is always an abbreviation for "can be treated as-if it were a mind-independent entity", and should be understood as such. Neglect, and particularly denial of this qualification implies using naïve ontology or realism. That leads into the blind alley of postulating or implying a realm of things-existing-in-themselves, which are strictly unknowable because they do not exist. (And besides, even in case there were such a realm, no one has suggested a way for subjects to have access to entities of this kind. Plato and Kant, among others, had already denied this possibility. But some present-day authors disagree, and even suggest that the subject can be objectified or "naturalized"; this automatically results in the subject's vanishing.)

{B-12}
All mind-and-nature structures include the subject. We do not invent the sun, the moon, and the stars, but the experience of sun, moon, and stars requires our structuring within undivided mind-and-nature experience, although the possibilities for structuring such experiences are limited. Traditional (naive) realism assumes that an outside reality produces this stability of experience. In 0-D, reality and truth result from investment of trust in (the reality and truth of) the created structures and the stability depends on the feedback experience during their use. In many instances, structuring does not imply arbitrariness, in others the possibilities are more varied : when structuring the self, society, religious beliefs, language. In these instances, collective agreement (and perhaps coercion) are used to make up for under-determination by feedback alone, that is, social construction complements the basic epistemological construction.

{B-13}
This epistemological inevitability of subject-inclusion in all experiences and structures needs to be distinguished from attempts like the "anthropic principle" in which it is tried to include humans on the basis of objective studies, postulating for instance the evolutionary inevitability of carbon-based life and of development of human intelligence.

{B-14}
The traditional belief in impossible MIR results mainly from two properties of concepts : (a) the limitation in the ways in which experience can be successfully structured (as is evident from the results of feedback when the structures are tried in practice), and (b) the resulting possibility to treat a large part - though not all - of experience as if it were mind-independent, and identical for everyone. For much of everyday life (including much of science) it would be impractical not to use MIR. But this should be coupled with an awareness that MIR is a shortcut for as-if-MIR. - In addition, MIR may suggest (c) belief in an outside authority (God, nature, etc.) for guidance, and sometimes perhaps a wish for relief from responsibility for one's opinions. Finally (d) since many authors use traditional metaphysics, neglecting its impossibility, others may not have enough incentive to address this point.

(iii) DECONSTRUCTION (SKEPTICISM)

{B-15}
The fact that subjects are involved in all the structuring of experience - and this within that same unstructured experience - also means that no structures are absolute. All posited structures can in principle be deconstructed (in the sense that they do not refer to a given pre-constructed mind-independent reality or truth). - This principle of skepticism does not detract from the practical importance of mental tools, neither in science nor elsewhere. But it rules out the possibility of absolute (external or internal) truth and certainty, that is, doubt can never be excluded. Logic and mathematics are precise instruments, but per se do not guarantee the truth and reality of the treated subject matter. In that respect, mental structures are like physical structures; cars and airplanes are useful but can by themselves not guarantee safety and certainty of function. Since the 0-D view presupposes no given structures, it cannot be deconstructed in that sense.

(C)
JUSTIFICATION OF THIS PROPOSAL

{C-1}
The conceptual difficulties that have so far not been solved with use of traditional metaphysics (or also by simple neglect of the conceptual problem), including the mind-brain relation and some other questions, justify the present attempt.

{C-2}
We are all faced with the same experiential situation; the many conceptual systems created since before pre-Socratic times have been attempts to come to grips with it. Therefore I assume that it still makes sense - despite the somewhat disappointing history of the philosophy of science - to look for a solution that is compatible with all aspects of experience. (In case this sounds overly optimistic to some readers, I would appreciate knowing their reasons why it cannot be done.) The possibility of knowing an unknowable mind-independent nature or reality is ruled out, because it is self-contradictory. Creating mental tools implies, among other things, focussing attention on circumscribed aspects of experience, thus selecting from its bewildering abundance (Feyerabend).

{C-3}
My reason for using 0-D is that it is the only view-point - that I am aware of - which can deal with the mind-brain problem, a central concern of mine (see TAs 1 and 45). Although this is a central problem in several respects, for thinking and for theory-building, it is commonly regarded as unsolved. But 0-D might also serve more generally as a fall-back position for posited (positive) concept structures. In addition, since the 0-D view pre-supposes no given structures, it cannot be de-constructed in that sense.

This proposal is open for comments and suggestions.

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Herbert FJ Müller