KARL JASPERS FORUM

TA61 (Andemicael)

Commentary 13

( TEMPORAL PASSAGE )
by Serge Patlavskiy
July 2004, posted 31 July 2004

<1>
[Adhanom Andemicael] writes: "[2] Any model of temporal passage must provide a mechanism to allow the present to move from past to future. Although various theorists have tried to explain the phenomenon of time flow, their models provide no such mechanism. (3)"

<2>
[S.P.] In Nonstatanalysis (it is some specific meta-theoretical system; see [1]) the two cognitive spaces are being regarded: the A-type of cognitive space and the B-type. The very term <cognitive space> means that the <theoretical (knowledge) base of the process of cognition> and the <means of cognition> are in <inverse link> with each other and evolve not separately, but being the elements of some cognitive space. E.g., the <device> and the <knowledge how to use it> evolve not separately but in inverse connection, which means that without knowledge we cannot use the device, but without the device our knowledge transforms into a "mental junk".

<3>
The First basic idea of Nonstatanalysis (see [1]) states that to get a full description of Reality we have to carry on the process of cognition as in the A-, so in the B-type of cognitive space. The A-space's theoretical base of the process of cognition was formed on the basis of the human's subjective everyday experience. The B-space's theoretical base is being theoretically constructed with the help of several cognitive paradoxes called the <algorithms of the inter-space's transitions> (see [1] for cognitive paradoxes). The main assertion of the B-space's theoretical base is the <Postulate on existence of the integrated information system (IIS)>. So, the application of the <method of IIS> makes it possible to formalize a lot of rare, anomalous, non-statistical (non-replicable), complex and consciousness-related phenomena.

<4>
Now then, according to Nonstatanalysis, the concepts <time> and <space> have their cognitive sense only in the <A-type of cognitive space>. In other words, those concepts both are subjective constructs. The processes formalized in the <B- type of cognitive space> happen in <no-time>, <no-space>. Such is the process of <information propagation> represented by the <inter-system interaction of the integrated information systems>. Consider the case that at some moment of the real present time a supernova star detonates anywhere in the Universe. Due to the inter-system interaction between the IIS{supernova} and the IIS{investigator}, the investigator gets information about the star's detonation immediately (instantaneously, or in no-time) because the state characteristic of the IIS{investigator} changes instantly (see the mentioned above Postulate for the systemic and state characteristics of IIS).

<5>
But only after the lapse of, e.g., 100 years the 2-nd systemic characteristic of the IIS{supernova} will change so that our eye (or, some device, like radio-telescope) be possible to registry that fact (the supernova's light or radio impulses). With this regard, I state that the theory of relativity cannot be regarded as a valid scientific theory, since Einstein associated the speed of information propagation with the speed of light - the fundamentally incorrect association. Hence, all conclusions concerning the "traveling in time" are nothing but the product of a hectic imagination which has nothing to do with the real state of affairs. My theoretical system grounds on the supposition that all processes in our Reality are simultaneous in spite of the distances between the places where those processes happen and despite the velocities with which the material bodies move. The past and the future are mere illusions.

<6>
[Adhanom Andemicael] writes: "[5] I must begin, however, with an analysis of existence. A material entity can certainly exist. However, in order to exist, it has to endure for a length of time greater than zero."

<7>
[S.P.] So, you are mere postulating the existence of material entity, but in my theory I answer the question why does the material entity exist (see [2] for my latest discussion with John McCrone).

<8>
[Adhanom Andemicael] writes: "[5] In the big bang description of the origin of time, time exists at all moments after the big bang but not at the big bang itself."

<9>
[S.P.] The theory of "Big Bang" won't wash because there cannot be any "bangs" into "nothing" (by definition, every bang happens in some environment; the terms "nothing" and "physical vacuum" are not identical). Second, the expression "time exists" is incorrect. Eventually, my theoretical system grounds on the idea that there was no time "T-0" in the history of our Reality. Moreover, when developing Nonstatanalysis I had not to answer the <terminal questions> at all (I mean by "terminal" the questions like "What was at the beginning?", or "What will be at the end of everything?", etc.).

<10>
[Adhanom Andemicael] writes: "[9] The traditional view maintains that existence is more fundamental than persistence."

[S.P.] The term "existence" is rather more general, but the term "persistence" is more specific which means saving an effect after the removal of cause causing it.

<11>
[Adhanom Andemicael] writes: "[13] Persistence is a type of motion."

[S.P.] Quite the contrary: the <motion> is a changing, but <persistence" is a stability, i.e., the absence of changes.

<12>
[Adhanom Andemicael] writes: "[13] The persisting entity described above can be pictured as moving rightward across a horizontal line. As the entity moves, it arrives at successive points (i.e., "nows") on the line. The entity is defined as existing at each point (i.e., "now") on the timeline. However, the entity's existence along the line cannot be described as a series of separate "snapshots.""

[S.P.] The problem with this model is that such a physical frame of reference can always be found so that the entity will be seen as not moving. The <physical movement> is relative, but the <movement in time> is absolute, i.e., it does not depend on the selection of the frame of reference. We can talk about (we can define) the <presence of physical movement> only in reference to the <absence of physical movement>. However, we cannot define the "movement in time" in reference to the "resting in time" since it is a senseless notion. Therefore, the notion <movement in time> is nothing but a metaphor. So, the movement in time can by no means be regarded by analogy with the physical movement along the geometrical line. I mean by saying this that the notions like <timeline>, or the <arrow of time> are the abstractions, the subjective constructs, that, together with many other abstractions, have proved to be useful in Physics.

<13>
[Adhanom Andemicael] writes: "[17] All things that exist necessarily exist for some *length* of time -- however short this length may be."

[S.P.] In Nonstatanalysis we come to the notion of <time> in a bit different way, and simultaneously with the notion of <space>. So, one of the fundamental properties of the elements of the DEC-models is the impossibility for one element of the DEC-model to be at the same moment of time in the same point of space with another element of the DEC-model (see [1], [3], Table 2). The elements of the DIS-model lack of such a property; therefore in B-type of cognitive space we do not talk about space and time at all.

<14>
[Adhanom Andemicael] writes: "[18] Let me define duration as the length of time for which an entity exists. Let us suppose that the entity I describe above is a brick. And let us suppose that this brick endures for a period of ten seconds. Certainly, this ten-second period is a duration. The brick itself, however, is obviously not a duration. If it were a duration, the brick would have been definable as a length of time for which an entity exists. Although the brick is not a length of time, it endures *for* a length of time (i.e., *for* a duration). Since the brick is not a length of time, it is temporally non-dimensional."

[S.P.] It is not the <brick's endurance for a period of ten seconds> that is a duration, but the time for which the brick was enframed as the <object of cognition> by the <subject of cognition>. Being smashed into small debris, the entity loses its duration as the brick, but does not stop to exist as the material object. Therefore, it is not the cognitively independent entity that has duration, but the <entity enframed as the object of cognition by the subject of cognition>. In other words, the duration is a pure subjective construct.

<15>\
[Adhanom Andemicael] writes: "[20] The reader must realize that the "present" and the "now" are two entirely different things. The present is an "entity." The "now," however, is not an "entity": The "now" is a "location." It is the location that the present *occupies* when the present persists. (As the present moves -- as the present persists -- it arrives at and occupies successive "nows" on the timeline.) "

[S.P.] Let us start with saying that it was the author who had defined the present as some entity. I would rather say that the present is an <object of cognition>, but the last is already not an entity (in the sense of being the cognitively independent), but an <enframed entity by the subject of cognition>. Also, it is not clear for me what does the term "location" mean in the definition of the "now" given by the author. I suppose that here the term "location" is only a metaphor, an term taken by analogy with the notion <spatial location>. The movement of the present is a mere subjective construct.

<16>
[Adhanom Andemicael] writes: "[22] However -- and this is a crucial point -- in order to exist, this one present moment has to maintain its existence for a length of time (i.e., for a length greater than zero seconds)."

[S.P.] The idea that "one present moment" can "maintain its existence" is beyond my understanding.

<17>
[Adhanom Andemicael] writes: "[23] It is now clear why time passes. If the present exists, the present has to endure. If the present endures, time has to pass. Therefore, if the present exists, time has to pass."

[S.P.] I think that the "passing of time", the "existence of the present", the "movement of the present", etc. are nothing but metaphors and cannot be used when constructing an objective scientific theory.

<18>
[Adhanom Andemicael] writes: "Since existence is persistence, P's *existence* is also represented as rightward motion."

[S.P.] Existence perfectly is not persistence - it is more general category.

<19>
[Adhanom Andemicael] writes: "[32] If the present moment exists "now" (at C), it must continue to exist after "now" (after C)."

[S.P.] Why it must? The existence of "now" is purely subjective idea. So, will the "now" exist in the future or not depends on the subject's desire.

<20>
[Adhanom Andemicael] writes: "[34] Let us say that P exists at a point on the line. This point cannot be the first point on the line, since existence is not possible at the first point."

[S.P.] As I am deeply convinced, the existence begets existence; the non-existence can beget nothing. Therefore I am disposed to regard the proposed "theory of time" as having no sense at all.

<21>
[Adhanom Andemicael] writes: "[39] Spatial distances are made up of points that exist concurrently. Duration, in contrast, is made up of points that exist non-concurrently."

[S.P.] Both "spatial distances" and "durations" are "made up" only of our subjective ideas.

<22>
[Adhanom Andemicael] writes: "[44] The distance between these dates is actually a type of space."

[S.P.] The "distance between dates" is a pure metaphor.

<23>
[Adhanom Andemicael] writes: "[56] In this paper, I argue that the present can move, and I define the mechanism that brings about its motion. This mechanism is persistence (i.e., existence) -- a dynamic process."

[S.P.] It is not clear at all which mechanism brings the present to move.

<24>
CONCLUSIONS

As follows from the Theory of sense and relation (see [3]), any scientific theory must satisfy some necessary requirements. Among them is the requirement of avoiding tautologies, hypostatization and notion-metaphor transmutations. However, the author, as it seems to me, tries to construct his theory on a basis of metaphors and subtle distinctions in the meaning of synonymous words like "time-duration", "existence-persistence", "present-now", etc. The more worse is that the theory contains, as it seems to me, a lot of senseless assertions like "This moving present brings about time flow", etc. So, will such a theory of time be effective ? The time will show ...

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REFERENCES

[1] "Elaboration of the New Paradigm of Interdisciplinary Investigations", Journal of Conscientiology (ISSN 1520-4049), Volume 1, Number 4, pp. 305-36, 1999

http://cogprints.ecs.soton.ac.uk/archive/00003571/ or at

http://www.geocities.com/spatlavskiy, First target article, full illustrated version, Msword formatted.

[2] See jcs-online posting #3095: Remarks concerning John McCrone's "Summary of the crucial points for a systems view of reality - from Aristotle's forms to the Infinoverse" at

http://www.geocities.com/spatlavskiy

[3] "The Theory of sense and relation" at http://patlavskiy.012webpages.com, section: "Theoretical background".

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Serge Patlavskiy