KARL JASPERS FORUM

TA60 (Grandpierre)

Commentary 6 (to R1)

GÖDEL, TARSKI, LANGUAGE, AND REALITY
by Herbert FJ Müller
18 July 2003, posted 22 July 2003

<1>
I want to thank Attila Grandpierre for his reply to my earlier comment C2. There are a number of agreements in our views, but also some basic disagreements. I will focus on the latter points, not in order to be critical, but in an attempt to define "the work to be done", as one might put it. The difference, as almost always in such discussions about basic concepts, is in the starting assumptions - and this is of course also the reason for the existence of the many conceptual ("philosophical") schools, which may have difficulty talking to each other, and often do not even try.

<2>
In the present discussion, I will then start with AG's first sentence in (R1[1]) : "I agree with Herbert FJ Muller in that mind has a fundamental place in the Universe, and, more importantly, that mind is able to interact with matter in an autonomous manner."

<3>
I agree with the first half of this statement, but the second half implies the existence of a primary subject-object split and of mind-independent reality, both of which I suggest are mistaken assumptions. My opinion is not that mind interacts with matter; both mind (subject) and matter (object) are constructions within ongoing subjective mind-and-nature experience (SE) - where we always start and to which we remain confined - and both are built from no pre-existing structure. Also, they are not primarily separated. And furthermore, something impossible, namely absolute mind-independently pre-configured truth and reality (MIR) - naïve (traditional) Parmenidan-Platonic-Cartesian ontology - has not been and can not be proven, neither by Tarski or Gödel, who worked on language referring to reality-beliefs, not on reality, nor by anyone else, and can therefore be the basis of reality [1] only on an as-if or makeshift basis.

Since this is the main point of our disagreement, I will go into some details.

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<4>
We structure SE while it happens, and establish truth and reality by investing trust in the created structures. For instance a smell requires the activity of receptors in the nose, and of the olfactory neural apparatus, there is no smell-in-itself, and similar considerations apply to pain, hearing, vision, and everything else. This structuring activity is mostly automatic, on the basis of inherited patterns, only to a small extent deliberate. It establishes "qualia" and "Gestalten", etc., in animal and human undivided SE. But the crucial point is that none of this would occur without the activity of the (animal or human) INDIVIDUAL AND COLLECTIVE SUBJECTS, who STRUCTURE REALITY in that way : the world including the self, within SE - automatically and/or deliberately. It follows that subject and object are not primarily separated, any separations are pragmatic and secondary. The main difference for humans is that in addition we (can but do not have to) attach words to those entities, and call them (word-) concepts. This part can, but does not have to, be more deliberate.

<5>
The subject is therefore always a part of reality, which means that MIND-INDEPENDENT REALITY IS IMPOSSIBLE. So far I am not aware of any evidence (or even argument) which would invalidate this conclusion, although MIR-fiction is used all the time in a naïve manner, not only in everyday life, but also in science and philosophy. The use of the MIR fiction arises from the need for stabilization of thinking for both individuals and societies. This is largely a consequence of the efficiency of the created perceptual entities, which have increased the possibilities of individual and societal action. Particularly the word-conceptual products, as communication and stabilization tools, have made a great difference here, creating social cohesion as well as conflicts. (The working-ontology view which I advocate recognizes this need for stability and the stabilization properties of metaphysics-ontology, while avoiding the outside and absoluteness and pre-fabrication assumptions of naïve MIR-belief.)

<6>
The stabilization is required for humans because of the expansion and increased flexibility of perception and action, which is determined by built-in instincts to a much lesser degree than for animals. Some standards are needed to deal with that under-determination, and one obvious desire is that these standards not be arbitrary (haphazard, whim, or dictates). They were therefore understood to be backed up by one or another kind of more or less absolutely valid postulated authority, first provided by taboos and shamans, later by more organized religious teachings, with authority provided by gods or one God, prophet, or religious text. Since about 1600, religion was in Europe gradually replaced by beliefs in something called nature and natural laws, and more recently by political dogmas which were supposedly in turn based on natural (or even social) science evidence - as they were at other times based on posited theological truths. These bases (in particular the pseudo-scientific ones, which - because of their pretensions of absolute validity - excluded the possibility of separation of the state from the belief system) functioned often so poorly that the resulting political systems became idea-based dictatorships, partly by default. But all MIR-BELIEFS ARE STRUCTURING AND STABILIZATION MECHANISMS which in part try to shift responsibility away from humans onto one or another posited outside MI-authority.

<7>
Working ontology, as mentioned, explicitly recognizes this stabilizing function of the created working structures, while abandoning the notion of given-ness in ready-made form and of absolute validity. A prominent practical question here is how individuals and societies can function without belief in absolutes, especially on a world-wide basis. A corresponding theoretical question is why different individuals tend to come to the same or similar results in creating structures. This is actually another reason for the wide-spread MIR-belief ("objective truth and reality"). My view is that the created mind-and-nature structures have a limited range of possible configurations, just as one can build a car, or a sewing machine, in many but not infinitely many different forms (but you don't have to postulate the existence of a given MIR-sewing-machine-in-itself). Trying to discover "the one truth" may have a heuristic value besides the stabilization, but says nothing about MIR. Natural laws are formulations of regularities we find in this effort, via feedback (we try structures and sort and modify them according to results).

<8>
Within science, physics in particular, such problems arose, mainly since about 1900, when firstly relativity theory abolished the notion of absolute time and space because they were non-functional and hindered progress (but a new stabilizing entity was posited : unchangeable speed of light in vacuum). And then quantum physics made it clear to Bohr and a few others that absolute (MI-)physics in general was an error; ALL ONE CAN KNOW IS ONE'S SE, as per the structures created within it.

<9>
One response to this difficulty has been a proposal that - instead of ontology - the only thing worth pursuing is logic, mathematics, and language in general (Russell, Wittgenstein, Gödel, Tarski, and others). However, it has surprisingly resulted in a resurgence of naïve metaphysics (ontology), this time as a property of language. This could result - and probably often has resulted - in a mostly implicit notion that language is identical with reality, and that for instance, as AG suggests [1], Gödel and Tarski have proven MIR. But this opinion overlooks that language is a product and tool, just like MIR-beliefs; it is a new functional layer in humans, super-imposed on those earlier (pre-verbal) ones. The use of language already pre-supposes the more basic experience-structuring (trust in the created reality) which occurs in animals as well as humans, who conceptualize it with the help of language and sometimes call it ontology.

<10>
In the words of Russell, "truth consists in some form of CORRESPONDENCE BETWEEN BELIEF AND FACT". That there were pre-fabricated facts was simply implied, not doubted, nor even explicitly mentioned, and their absolute (doubt-free) validity was also implied, for instance in Russel's statement. The correspondence theories of truth all PRE-SUPPOSED MIR, they did not prove it. The work of Tarski, for instance, dealt with the structure and function of languages (sentences in particular) which pointed ("referred") to such an already pre-supposed and trusted reality, such as the whiteness of snow (for an example see Prior). In working-ontology this means that the sentences pointed to already-believed-in-structures within SE.

<11>
Gödel showed that axioms cannot prove something beyond themselves (cf. Dawson; in effect this means : they cannot prove something beyond the truth already established by investing trust in axiom-structures, i.e., in the so-called self-evident truths which had already been posited earlier, and were academically canonized. The "appeal to stronger principles", mentioned there, would then mean that, in addition to already accepted truths, ongoing experience needs some more structuring from scratch, and more investment of trust in those of the additional structures that appear promising.) Tarski showed that in number theory truth is not definable. Both results mean that certain invalid assumptions, which had been implicitly held, are indeed invalid - just as Einstein had pointed out that an implicit or explicit belief in absolute rest is non-functional. They are compatible, as might be expected, with the proposition that new truth and reality can only arise from our trust in newly created structures (cf. <4> above, and TA45), and not from a mechanical extrapolation from already accepted belief (e.g., axioms). - Despite the many possible derailments of the truth-generating process, I find it a reassuring state of affairs that truth is made by humans, and cannot be a machine product (and Tarski himself also made a statement to this effect). This keeps us in the loop, reality is ours.

<12>
Thus neither G nor T dealt with the question of reality itself (MIR or other). They both obtained (negative) results about properties of language systems (which they thought referred to the pre-assembled MIR which they pre-supposed as already certain, real, true). In case you have evidence that Gödel and/or Tarski claimed to have proven MIR, I would be interested in a reference to that effect (if possible to writings by G and/or T themselves, not interpretations by others). So far I have seen no statements by G or T, nor about them (aside from yours), that they claimed to have accomplished such a proof. - It is on the other hand clear from their work that they each pre-supposed MIR-existence, which is something very different. In his later years Gödel even tried to produce a formalization of the ontological proof of the existence of God (cf. Dawson, p.81), which is as futile as trying to prove the ontological existence of anything else. (The problem here is not God, but the traditional static ontology).

<13>
I is another situation in epistemological constructivism (working ontology) which, as mentioned, starts from the observation that reality is our product - in form of working structures - and it always includes the subject.

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Some other points.

<14>
Re [2] : It should be clear by now that I think that the Cartesian ontology is mistaken (unless it is transformed to an as-if or working ontology), it is not my view; and I agree that we have to choose neither materialism nor idealism [1]. An "ultimate reality", if you like that term, is that one has to create working structures of mind and world, and must have - or develop - trust in them, just as animals trust theirs. A tri-unite structure of reality ([1], [14]) is fine, but only in case it remains pragmatic (as-if, a working structure), and in case you abandon the notion that the structures are mind-independent, and/or completely separated [5]. Inclusion of subject in reality and as-if nature of MIR-matter can be seen to occur in one step [2], if that includes the understanding that matter is not supposed to be earlier.

<15>
[3] (Quote) "… subject-inclusive physical laws would mean that the behavior of subjects would be governed by the laws of physics, therefore, the result is a materialism or physicalism again which (although perhaps implicitly) is based on the assumption that any possible subjects should have necessarily a material nature, following in its behavior exclusively the laws of physics."

Not so : subject-inclusive means that, even when it is not mentioned, the subject is part of all understanding. "Material nature" and "laws of physics" happen inside SE, not vice versa. This is self-evident in a working-ontology view (which by the way is not monolithic since it consists of working structures - see also Feyerabend's "Conquest of Abundance").

<16>
[4] (Quote) "Causes are determined as one-sided, asymmetric, constant and outer … objective inclinations occurring in certain situations. In contrast, propensities and atomic instincts as generalized causes."

Objective causes are regularities encountered in postulated MIR-systems. In as-if-MIR, this does not differ from the governing principles in the other situations mentioned in [4] because the subject (knowledge) is always involved. But particle events mostly do not work with Gestalt features, and instead of supposedly deterministic Gestalt properties one may have to use statistics (cf TA57, part 3). Statistics clearly is a human activity and thus involves the subject more unavoidably than Gestalt functions, which have traditionally been ascribed a MIR-life of their own. The subject is, however, active in both, except that in the so-called objective situation one can often get away with treating them as (as-if they were) mind-independent. The non-MIR does not require a pan-psychism (e.g., atomic instincts) if the subject is included, because in that case universality is present - namely via the subject (mind) which is in everything.

<17>
[6] (Quote) "… the formulation of the first principle of physics evolved with the evolution of our knowledge. It changed from the least action principle of Maupertuis into the Hamilton-principle, and the action principle of quantum field theories. Therefore, although the formulation of this first principle developed through the ages, the essence of the principle did not change, and it expresses a reality independent of our present-day knowledge, actually, it presents a principal reality."

The operative term here is "our knowledge". People have always tried to find working schemes, and these evolved, within individual and collective SE, over the centuries, with the help of various tools : concepts, machinery, mathematics. That does present a principal reality, which is : a mind-and-nature structure inside SE that really works (within limits, for instance for most of physics, or even perhaps for all of it), and not a mind-independent something. To repeat, the first and ultimate principles are our structures within SE.

<18>
[7] (Quote) "Life may be present in most parts of the Universe, from molecular clouds near to absolute zero to stars, galaxies and the Universe as a whole. Life-principle may be active in organisms which do not self-reproduce but simply transfer life from one life-form to any other. In my book "The Book of the Living Universe" I argued that the Sun powers terrestrial life not only with energy but also with information."

It is quite possible that life exists in some form in various parts of the universe, but so far this has not been proven, it remains speculative. Also the meaning of the word "life" is unclear here. I am not sure that attribution of life to molecular clouds or to the nuclear fuel mechanisms in the sun is helpful; my impression so far is that it confuses the issues. In your TA60, you write that "a brain-approach to understand the connections between Man and the Universe has been recently developed …" I agree, except I think that the brain is ours - however, I would like to know more about your reasoning.

<19>
Re [8] : How do you explain the occurrence of aromatic chemicals in asteroids ? Does that also require a pan-psychism ? It fits with what you write about tendencies toward life [12] but contradicts your claim in [8] about the improbability of life development.

<20>
Re [9] : I agree that the definition of life should be more detailed. If you wish, this could be done on another occasion, it would take too much space here.

<21>
[10] (Quote) "In my approach, your SE is the relation between the phenomenal and parental (ontological) levels of reality. This means that I distinguish a deeper than SE level of reality - the principal level where the ultimate principles live."

For this you would have to explain how you propose to jump out of SE and into these MIR-principles. The same for [11] and [13]. See also <16> above.

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I think (so far) that it should be possible to come to an agreement about the mentioned points, and would like to have comments by you and others on this question. I would also be quite interested in your comments on my TA57, which deals with some of these and other - closely related - questions.

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NOTES AND REFERENCES

DAWSON J W, Gödel and the Limits of Logic. Scientific American June 1999, p.76-81. ("… if axioms do not contradict one another, then that fact itself … will be "formally undecidable" - neither provable nor refutable - on the basis of those axioms. Any proof of consistency must therefore appeal to stronger principles than the axioms themselves.")

PRIOR A N, Correspondence Theory of Truth. The Encyclopedia of Philosophy, ed P Edwards, New York and London, Collier Macmillan, 1967. (On Tarski's work : "Recursive definition of "true sentence": (1) "Snow is white" is a true sentence if and only if snow is white, and "Grass is green" if and only if grass is green. (2) The sentence formed by prefixing "It is not the case that" to a given sentence S is true if and only if S is not true. (3) The sentence formed by placing "or" between the two sentences S1 and S2 is true if and only if either S1 or S2 is true. …")

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Herbert FJ Müller