<1>
In TA6C4<3> Jones writes-off the consideration of brain function as
being an input to consciousness with a flippancy that is frightening in
its totality where he states that:
"Consciousness is no more the result of the brain's functioning than
the velocity of a falling stone is related to its mineral composition"
<2>
As far as falling stones are concerned, they fall due to gravity, but the
medium in which they 'fall' has affects that are responded-to by the mineral
composition; toss a stone into water and it usually 'falls' but composition
determines rate and even the possibility of it floating.
<3>
Consciousness goes one step beyond this in that it can dynamically adjust
'its 'composure' or 'density' and so sink or swim upon its whim. In extreme
conditions of deprivation consciousness is diminished in that we are like
automatons .. our senses of 'right' and 'wrong' can easily disappear as
energy untilisation is rationed to 'essential services only'; This introduces
the concept of consciousness reflecting a continuum of possible states that
'mix' self-awareness with others-awareness. The latter seems to be something
strongly refined in humans and so social input and so the possible context
for Jones' statement in C4<4>:
"Here I come to the definition of consciousness as a collective effect
in a social system."
<4>
However, this is limiting in that, to me, it implies that the last member
of the species loses consciousness the moment the second-last dies. To me
this is 'doubtful' in that self-awareness can still function (as do memories)
<5>
Jones continues in <4> by stating that:
"To produce consciousness, Nature had first to develop the three indispensable
components: 1) complex enough organisms with flexible reactions to external
stimuli; 2) complex enough environment that would make these organisms co-operate
to survive; 3) the ability of the individuals to reflect their co-operation
and its products."
There seems to be an underlying 'spiritual' tone here that need not be the
case and so this 'tone' can possibly lead to 'confusion'. Jones seems to
emphasise dependency as being the 'root' for consciousness but perhaps this
is for REFINED consciousness in that it is feedback that helps to refine
it and that requires awareness of others. Apes and lesser monkeys, have
a bias to self-awareness but seem to be not too 'others'-aware outside of
genetic socialisations. Any activity of others seems credited by the ape
to itself as in 'WOW! I MADE THEM DO THAT!!!???'.
<6>
Specific apes, when TRAINED by humans, seem to 'refine' this self-awareness
into a possible 'others'-awareness in that they can learn symbolic communications
but that does not mean that they 'recognise' the existence of consciousness
in others; they just recognise that a specific stimulus elicits a specific
(or general) response.
<7>
This puts your average ape at the level of a human 2 year old, the age in
which any a parent knows is the age of 'frustration' in that the infant
starts to come face-to-face with dealing with the nurture-driven needs of
others conflicting with its own needs.
<8>
In C4<4> Jones goes on to assert that...
"This system is essentially non-linear, with any activity distributed
among all the members of the community, being reflected in every individual
in a specific way. As it is well known, distributed non-linear systems may
exhibit collective behaviour, so that many individuals would act in sync
forming a relatively stable structure. When the structure is hierarchical,
there is a topmost element (like the crest of the wave), which could be
identified with the Subject. The reflection of this hierarchy in the topmost
element is consciousness."
<9>
In the brain, 'hierarchy' rules. At the surface of the neocortex we find
areas that seem 'specialised' but are more the 'tops' of cones/pyramids
of neurons going through multiple layers. 'Face' recognition is 'located'
in temporal lobe areas with an apparent bias of left side to specifics and
right side to generals. The network of visual representations and processing
splits into a 'where'/'what' set of pathways that fan-out from the visual
cortex that are specific as well as general but become more and more 'specialised'
the further they move away. The dichotomy of specific (the one) /general
(the many) seems to be a 'base' distinction 'in here' and as such the 'specifics'
of self-awareness is thus neurologically determined, as is that of 'others-awareness'.
<10>
Consider that damage to the RIGHT parietal lobe can lead to a 'loss' of
context in that one becomes totally 'blind' to one half of ones perceptions
and this seems to include perceptions of self, both literally and metaphorically.
Note that this is not perceived as a 'split', all perceptions are seen to
be 'whole' by the individual and so the overall form of self-awareness changes
and this would affect others-awareness (however, no detailed information
on this that I can recall).
<11>
The emphasis seems to be a loss of contextual range within its domain and
this affects consciousness. Unless Jones is going to suggest that the damage
has 'reduced available space' and so externally-derived 'full' consciousness
can no longer fit? The argument against this is that the non-development,
or early removal of neocortical areas leads to other areas making adjustments
and dealing with the loss such that the individual develops 'normally'.
Things are then 'set in concrete' during the neuron 'culling' period about
age 10-12. (this even introduces the idea of using foetal neuron transplants
to 'replace' the damaged areas...and so we get into the use of 'clones'
etc etc).
<12>
The point about consciousness is that there is a combination of nurture
and nature at work with nurture helping to refine consciousness but not
'originate' it. Social interactions can lead to the emergence of a 'social'
consciousness that can then appear to 'dictate' behaviours and so be perceived
as the 'root' of consciousness, but to me all you are 'seeing' is feedback
in a complex system and there is the choice to ignore it or bypass it or
even change it -- all options open to the individual.
<13>
Education seems to be able to 'refine' levels of consciousness, or even
'corrupt' them by emphasising 'one level only'. However, by 'playing' with
the neurology so I can also 'play' with one's consciousness; the neurology
is fundamental to consciousness - without it, there isnt any - but also
note that without 'others' consciousness is still there, just in an 'unrefined'
form.
<14>
In C4<5>, Jones states that.. "Thus understood, consciousness
is relatively independent of the particulars of the brain physiology"
<15>
I think this is a 'false' generalisation in that bio-feedback can get the
individual to control highly specific neuronal activity that can lead to
general and specific changes in mental states - meaning that to change levels
of consciousness so I have to change neuronal processes; the training just
helps me do it more 'efficiently'. Since the generalisation made by Jones
in <5> seems to be used as establishing context, then to me all that
follows is 'coloured' by it and accordingly 'doubtful'. Jones seems to emphasise
an external dependency as 'source' and I dont think this is necessary; the
external is more a source of feedback and so refinement but at the 'basic'
level, originates 'in here'.
<16>
If we look at things in the 1:many context, then consciousness is a SPECIFIC
aspect of the GENERAL form and so we can have MANY SPECIFICS. Genetics can
determine 50% of the details and then nurture can refine to a degree where
the thoughts of the one can affect the social consciousness (the many).
This said, it is the social consciousness that helps to refine the thoughts
of the one by teaching the individual the specific forms of social communications
required to 'get the message across' and all of this is VERY dependent on
BOTH general and specific brain physiology.
Chris Lofting
<clo@fmsc.com.au>