KARL JASPERS FORUM

TA33 (Mancuso)

Commentary 1

VICO AND MENTAL STRUCTURES
by Herbert FJ Müller
30 October 2000, posted 30 January 2001

<1>
ABSTRACT

James Mancuso presents his view of mental structures, as related to the writings of Giambattista Vico. His general approach has many similarities to my own. There are some differences, the main one being that I think his constructivist epistemology is incomplete, or two-track : he tries to combine a thoroughly constructivist (phenomenological) view with simultaneous use of belief in mind-independent reality. This leads to some conceptual difficulties, which are briefly discussed here, based mainly on the description in his paragraphs [1-23].

<2>
The word "referent" of "construction" [2] needs discussion. The usual meaning of "referent" is that of a mind-independent-reality (MIR) entity, to which a word is assumed to refer. And in agreement with this, JM writes : "every event or object that a person encounters evokes a construction - a mental map of the object or event". This is a two-track formulation which implies (but does not state explicitly) that the object or event is already structured as MIR and evokes a second structure in the mind. If this is not JM's intended meaning, it should be clarified. (JM also writes [22-23] that he is a "relentless constructivist" who does not look for outside objects - but this appears to be incompletely followed through; for instance he suggests that "psychollage interacts with the distal ecology", which if I understand it correctly makes sense only in an MIR-view).

<4>
The structure (construct, concept) should be understood as the basic element of the undivided mind-world-experience rather than as a psychological element [8]. It seems to me that if one does not explicitly accept the primary unity of experience as a fundamental feature, one relapses almost automatically into implicit (and usually involuntary as well as unacknowleged) MIR-belief and -use, as it has happened to some constructivists (and many others). It helps to be aware that this difficulty is at least in part a consequence of concept properties (cf. TA32), because this makes it more accessible for correction efforts. The functional answer to this problem is the explicit use of working (or as-if) metaphysics, which accommodates both the need for metaphysical structures and the impossibility (or fictitiousness and unavailability) of their static reality.

<5>
Some of JM's ensuing discussion suggests that there is indeed some ambiguity. For instance the questions [3] whether we are dealing, as others have put it, with a process or with an object, and the reference to grid technology [4] or modules in space coordinates [5], may imply objective argumentation. JM himself suggests the term "multimedia collage" [6ff] built of representations, symbols, etc., which again imply MIR-belief without saying so expressly. I agree that we are dealing with "doings" rather than passive happenings [7]. However, this is so for all concepts without exception, not only for the complex ones which JM discusses. It includes for instance very simple ones such as color, pain, numbers, time, space, or gravity : they are all structured or created by us.

<6>
If so, the word "psychollage" [11ff] would have to replace the terms "concept" or "word-meaning" in general, which is not practical. On the other hand, singling out complex or composite concepts for special treatment seems to be a central aim of JM's proposal, which is also evident from his emphasis on "narratives" [70ff]. But for purposes of conceptual analysis, this would be based on, or else might introduce, an unwarranted distinction, ie, a conceptual error, similar to the one of Vaihinger who tried to distinguish mental fictions from (MI-)reality. This does not mean that a distinction between simple and complex concepts is of no use. I only want to stress that the construction (or as-if-MIR, or 0-D) aspect applies to all of them, regardless of their simplicity or complexity. In my opinion, the best way to proceed is to become and remain aware that all word-concepts, as well as earlier pre-verbal structures in animals and humans, are of the 0-D type.

<7>
The question of "natural" categories [12ff] is identical with the one of MIR-belief (or "naturalism"). One needs to be aware that one deals with self-made conceptual tools (including DSM categories as JM mentions). The resulting classifications, like all concepts, need to prove their usefulness [17ff] (or "viability", as von Glasersfeld puts it). In addition, their inappropriate use can cause problems, as seen also with linguistic, racial, or religious groupings, and as is well known this type of problem is aggravated by absolute or fundamental beliefs. Related problems can result even from more elementary aspects of concept use; an example is the difficulty which stems from the notion of mind-independent objects in particle physics (the difficulty is of conceptual-theoretical type rather than mathematical-practical, and this would agree with Vico's view [25]).

<8>
"A psychollage is not discovered" [15] - true, but neither is any other part of reality within mind-and-world experience. This is a basic consideration if one wants to avoid MIR-belief. The notion that concepts are based on sensory inputs [18] is objective, because it pre-supposes a subject/object split, usually ontological (primary). Objective reasoning is useful but it cannot be used for constructivist (phenomenological) argumentation. We do not start from sensations but from structuring experience. "Stored representations of … patterns" in this case seems to mean "memories (rather than representations) of mental structures", ie, one selects previously-stored patterns for present re-use. Whether the result "has" certain properties (or "is real") depends on belief investment (knowledge implies strong belief).

<9>
The proposal of two-poled judgments [21] too mixes physiological (MIR) input with mental structure. In judging "short-tall" one concept of "size" is used, with the possibility (ie, possible action) of scaling by means of quantifications, with or without measurements. The dichotomy is secondary, I would think. Similar considerations apply to the other dichotomies. What I want to emphasize here is that there is one elementary item (which becomes secondarily graded for purposes of dealing with it), not two. This is a question of tool elaboration, for instance by means of quantification without or with the aid of numbers. On the other hand, if we look at this objectively, we tend to pre-suppose the tool-elaborations to a large extent.

Finally, I want to emphasize again that these various remarks do not preclude my general agreement with the author's view.

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Herbert FJ Muller