[1]
I am indebted to James C Mancuso for his commentary which compares my proposition with his view, based on his work, over many years, in psychological experimentation and theory, with a constructivist view (his Target Article on this theme will be posted soon in the KJF). In general, I am much in agreement with what he writes, specifically concerning the phi-phenomenon. In the following I will discuss a few points which arise in this context, chiefly the ever-present risk of mind-independent reality (MIR-) relapse (cf TA32 [30,33,53]).

Quotations from Mancuso's C10 are in "quotation marks", my answers are in [brackets].

[2]
[ As Mancuso points out, the question of the phi-phenomenon is of great interest in the context of mental structure building. One may view the efforts of the gestalt-psychologists, among other things, as an attempt to deal with the problems posed by the prevalent mind-independent-reality (MIR-) assumption in science. In the formulation by Wertheimer <2> and others, the existence of MIR is still pre-supposed. In that case one has to explain why and how the produced mental structure differs from the assumed mind-independent objective data. In contrast, JCM describes this discrepancy <9> in terms of 'making sense' of what happens. He uses the term 'collage' to describe this process (rather than 'construction', 'image', 'schema', 'concept'). He endorses Rorty to the effect that one should switch from assertions of 'truth' to 'warranted assertibility' (Dewey), and comments : ]

" <12> ... At this time, one cannot separate the construct system with which a person builds his/her anticipatory constructions from whatever is out there in order to "verify" a match between his/her constructions and a mind independent "reality." "

[3]
[ The question which is raised in this statement implies (or at least leaves open) the existence of a MIReality. But the main emphasis, I would say, should not be on whether we are, or are not, able to distinguish between such personal constructions and a 'conceivable' outside reality, but that any 'out-there reality' too can only be an (in principle ad hoc) construction. The question itself thus invites an erroneous assumption, if only because MIR is not explicitly stated to be constructed, just like the personal construct in the phi-phenomenon. ]

[ One might instead say "one cannot separate this construct system, with which a person builds his/her anticipatory constructions, from a commonly assumed mind-independent 'reality', in order to 'verify' a match between the two, since the latter as well can only be an ad-hoc as-if-MIR." And this not only at this time but in principle, and thus never. All we will ever be able to do is create a gestalt-world that makes sense to us, and which initially includes both self and non-self, not yet distinguished from each other. ]

[4]
"<16> In Paragraph 9 Muller has written: "... The elaboration of given experience happens with the help of self produced structures: this is creation of structures, and not interpretation (or re- presentation') of an already pre-structured world" (italics Muller's). I provided a discussion of several studies, at the beginning of this commentary, to gain "warranted verifiability" of the part of the italicized material that precedes the colon. I can see no means by which I can request warrant for the second part of the italicized material. Though I might agree about the utility of that second section, I see no need to include that assertion. It simply does not matter. I need only say that the first part of the italicized material is the best we can now do, and I can try to offer demonstrations as I ask colleagues to warrant that claim. "

[5]
[ I agree that the first part of my statement is a positive assertion, and its viability can be evaluated. The second part is a negative statement, which contradicts the common belief of naïve or explicit realism; it has a function of demarcation of the position taken. As such it can be omitted - "it does not matter" - as JCM points out. But in the following I do want to defend its inclusion. The mind-independent-reality (MIR) belief is still very prevalent (including in Mancuso's <12>); in most discussions it is implicitly pre-supposed, and it can become counter-productive. Since it tends to slip into discussions unnoticed, I think one has to deny it explicitly. ]

[6]
[ In terms of experimental procedures one might, in principle at least, with a suitable test, come to a situation similar to that of the Michelson-Morley experiment of the 1880s. This crucial study of the existence of hitherto assumed entities (in this case absolute time and space, supported by the further assumption of an ether medium for the transport of light) furnished no evidence for them. One can say that this negative result shows that absolute time and space "simply do not matter" or, if you prefer, that this experiment was a fight against windmills. But it had important practical consequences, because it prepared the ground for the (limited) relativity theory. Einstein was then (1905) able to dismiss the old assumptions in a short statement, which he probably could not have done without the M-M experiment. He replaced the old widely held (or implied) belief in absolute time and space by positing (pre-supposing) a new absolute speed of light, which proved more suitable for further studies. It is sometimes not realized that this too is an MIR-assertion, like the earlier ones of absolute time and space, and not a test result. Despite relativity-theory, Einstein (and some of his followers) have continued to use MIR-belief. The main importance of relativity-theory for the history of thought may be the abolition (in principle at least) of absolutes. ]

[7]
[ For the question of MIR (mind-independently structured reality in more general terms), which (in contrast to belief in absolute time and space in 1905) is now still widely believed, inluding by many physicists, a more general crucial experiment (in which different results would be predicted for with, as opposed to without, MIR-existence) might perhaps lead to a more general answer. Gödel's proof that conceptual systems remain incomplete could be understood as a part of such study, but it has not usually been interpreted in the more radical sense of an impossibility of naïve or explicit realism (that is : if concepts are believed to capture (or "re-present") a postulated MIR-world, this world would then always be incomplete, as shown by Gödel's work).]

[ Feyerabend's opinion that logical systems are rational islands in an ocean of irrationality (cf. TA31 [4]) belongs here as well. But both may not qualify as experiments in JCM's sense. In case this turns out to be an important consideration, it could become desirable to devise experiments which would test the question of MIR in general, rather than address it only with conceptual or logical-mathematical considerations. ]

[8]
" <17> In Paragraph 16, Muller makes a statement which nicely demonstrates the transcendence of a metaphorically developed epistemic collage into security-providing collage. Muller wrote, "Objective (scientific and other) concepts, as well as pre-conceptual structures, are always stepwise elaborated (and stored for re-use) . . . ." this statement suggests that Muller uses the metaphor of a file storing "whole concepts" to construe something that we might better discuss as memory processes. In modern psychology the matter of developing epistemic collages by which to discuss memory processes (note: memory processes instead of a memory) consumes as much energy as any other issue. There are psychologists, I for one, who would not agree that we "store concepts" for re-use (Mancuso, 1996). "

[9]
[ I have some difficulties with JCM's term 'collage', and would appreciate clarification. To me this word does not primarily indicate a 'process', as JCM seems to say, but rather a combination of small static units which then form a larger static unit. 'Processes' are, it would seem, firstly the original building (crystallization, creation, construction) of units, small or large, simple or composite, secondly the memory-deposit creation, and further their evocation. ]

[10]
" <17> One's view on this matter is crucial to building a general theory of human conduct. For example, how would one explain a person's very rapid and effective development of a self-guiding narrative that will be used in very novel situations. I would propose that the ability shown by persons to invent self-guiding narratives in novel situations requires a theory which speaks of something other than storage of epistemic collages. Briefly, I would advocate a theory based on "storage" of attributes (dimensions, two-polled constructs) from which people build, on the spot, the epistemic collages which will be used in constructing self guiding narratives. "

[ Are 'attributes' not themselves stored fixed entities ? And further, how would a storage of attributes account for the storage of color, smell, pain, words, numbers, shapes (eg, of a face), or other simple items ? How does JCM's view deal with the evocation of (already-formed) memories, for instance visual ones, rather than attributes, by epileptic discharges, by electrical stimulation, or in dreams, etc. ? ]

[11]
[ The stored memory units resemble, in this regard, more automatic mechanisms, such as spinal reflexes, which are stored (though not by way of memory formation in an individual but phylogenetically hard-wired by gene action) in a complete ready-to-be-activated form. One could view memories similarly, namely as stored (after memory formation via hippocampal mechanisms) cortically-subcortically fixed perception and/or action schemes. The word-components of concepts probably play an important role in the storage, since words can evoke other aspects of memories; thus the various components of 'concepts' (in the sense I have used in TA32) are stored. One can call the evocation 'a process of collage', but this would only shift the emphasis form larger to smaller units, it does not say how the collage elements, such as words, images, acoustic patterns, etc, are stored. ]

[ The effective use of stored memories does in my opinion not disprove that they were stored. In memory distortions, the elements are fitted (or 'collaged' as JCM says) to deal with present needs, and perhaps themselves in part altered. This shows that memories can be flexible, and sometimes less reliable than a knee-jerk, but I do not think that this changes the storage requirement, and also do not see how the notion of collage can help further with this. The elements will have been stored, whether or not they are altered. ]

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Herbert FJ Muller

e-mail <hmller@po-box.mcgill.ca>