KARL JASPERS FORUM

TA32 (Muller)

Response 2 (to C9 by Adams)

ORIGINS OF THE STRUCTURES OF EXPERIENCE
by Herbert FJ Müller
8 December 2000, posted 21 December 2000

I am much obliged to Bill Adams for his thorough commentary on my TA32. In the following I will respond to some of the points he made in his C9. In my opinion, the main difference between our points of view is that BA wants to maintain a belief in a mind-independently pre-structured reality, which I suggest is non-functional in attempts to deal with the mind-brain question.

Quotations from C9 are in "quotation marks", my responses are in [brackets].

[1]
"<14> * "not yet structured experience is the essence of "thinking"[51] To define thinking as unstructured experience is a divergent definition, to say the least."

[ This means that unstructured experience is an essential but not the only aspect of thinking, as discussed in TA32[11-12] : The origination of structures of thinking, self, and nature from within non-structured experience may be called zero-derivation (0-D). This does not mean that in practice thinking takes place without structures, nor that one would have to, or even could possibly, start with an unstructured experience - a la "tabula rasa" - nor also that all structures have to be always created anew. They are stored in individual and collective memory (eg, in books). 0-D means, in contrast, that structures (both pre-conceptual and conceptual ones, and including the difference between subject and object), are neither "given" in a pre-formed manner, nor are they copied from inner or external schemes (eg, so-called "referents"). They all imply the activity of a subject, without pre-given patterns. Without such activity no thought-structures exist, not in humans and not in animals. … ]

[2]
"<14> Elsewhere, HM uses terms such as "rational thinking" and "logical thinking," terms which I find opaque, given his definition of thinking. I would define thinking as the process of conceptualization."

[ This question should be clear from the above : thinking has to use structures, and to that extent it can be logical. But as Feyerabend (among others) has pointed out, this refers to islands of thought : " … discourse of this kind … would consist of an ocean of irrationality interrupted, briefly, by mutually incommensurable islands of sense" (TA31[4]). In accordance with this, my "definition of thinking" involves the use of structures within the unstructured encompassing. You can if you wish limit "thinking" to the process of conceptualization, but in that case you miss something important. ]

[3]
" <15> … a concept is the result of coupling a word to an earlier formation of sensation or thinking. Earlier forms include gestalt-formations and "qualia" [5]. The process of conceptualization then must be a linguistic one, according to HM. I find that to be a narrow approach to concept, conceptualization, and concept-formation, not consistent with the historical literature on the subject (e.g., Wertheimer, 1923, Bruner, Goodnow, & Austin, 1962). "

[ This narrow definition has the advantage of being clear. It confines concepts to verbalized items of experience, which animals do not use, in contrast to pre-verbal gestalt-formations and non-gestalt experience (eg., "qualia"), which animals have. ]

[4]
" <15> I would rather define conceptualization as discrimination (e.g., James 1890, Gibson, 1969) and gestalt-formation (e.g., Kohler, 1967). That would allow that at least some non-linguistic animals (including children) can form concepts, and think. "

[ I do not claim that animals do not think (see [2-3] above) but that they do not use spoken language in the human manner. Evidently one can use different definitions, but so far I find mine more helpful, because certain word-properties or -functions are important in the human use of concepts. ]

[5]
" <16> … Most people would agree that words are rarely, if ever, adequate to experience. I get the feeling that HM meant to express something more significant than this common sense platitude. "

[ The important thing is to remain aware of this, because even if most people agree, they also tend to forget it in practice. Simply to believe or to claim that some words express "the (whole, or even the absolute) truth", implies such forgetting. ]

[6]
" <17> I disagree that knowledge is defined only as knowing-that. HM says, "[the] subjective side [of early (pre-conceptual) and (verbal-) conceptual formations], sensation, action, and thinking phenomena, are to a large extent, even if not entirely, independent of what the agent (animal or human) knows of the objective events. Birds fly, using their sensation and motor control apparatus, but they do not teach aerodynamics" [14]. Does HM want to exclude "knowing how" from the definition of knowledge, reserving the term only for propositional, linguistically articulate, "knowing-that?" That would be a nonstandard definition of knowledge. "

[ My discussion refers here to "objective knowledge", which I do not offer as my definition of knowledge. What I want to show is that objective knowledge is limited, it is one specialization among others within experience, thus I would think my view is similar to BA's (see for instance TA32 [14] : … We all, including those who have an exclusively-objectivist point of view (such as Th. Nagel in his book "The View From Nowhere"), are caught inside experience. All objective considerations start as specializations from within (subjective self-and-nature-) experience.) ]

[7]
" <18> * I disagree with HM's implicit definition of subjectivity. From the example given in [14], cited above, it seems like sensorimotor learning is the criterion of subjectivity. Birds learn to fly, just as we learn to walk and ride a bicycle, even though neither birds nor we might be able to articulate ("teach") the details of our performances. Subjectivity defined as sensorimotor learning not linguistically articulated, is a plausible, but unusually constrained definition. I would think subjectivity would also involve one's sense of existence: how one knows an experience has happened to oneself and not to the person standing nearby. "

[ Sensorimotor function is one of many special developments within subjective experience, and I do not define subjectivity by it. I quite agree with BA. To go further, this subjective (encompassing mind-and-nature) experience cannot be defined, and this lack of definability is indeed an essential quality; see TA32 [49] … in this case the concept no longer "grasps", and the definition no longer "defines". … ]

[8]
" <19> * I disagree that the assumption of a primary (ontological) subject/object split is "erroneous" [2]. I expect that HM and I have very different definitions of the terms, "subjectivity" and "objectivity." I cannot find his explicit definitions and cannot understand his implicit ones. I would agree that a primary split between subjectivity defined as the common sense intuition of one's own consciousness, and objectivity defined as the material things of the world, is a particularly naive and erroneous formulation of the mind-body problem. However, other definitions of subjectivity and objectivity are possible. There is no a priori reason that I can see to fault the very conception of a subject/object split. Of course it does not follow that the only possible dualism is the naive Cartesian kind. "

[ This is a fundamental point and concerns the nucleus of my view. Concerning the definition, see [7] above. But I do not propose an '' a priori reason … to fault the very conception of a subject/object split ". What I do say is that the s/o split is practical (pragmatic) rather than ontological or given. (See TA32 [56] … all thinking structures, both for the outside world (eg, objects like brain and brain-functions) and for the internal experience (such as I, subject, self, soul) as well as the split (the difference) between them, are built within ongoing experience – and remain there.) ]

[ Thus I do not say that the s/o split is erroneous <19>, but that the assumption of its ontological nature is erroneous, as are indeed in principle all ontological assumptions. Nor do I say that the s/o split is a human weakness <20>. What I do say is that human thinking is under-determined by biological forces, which results among other things in instability (which is a weakness), and that structures (such as the s/o split) and their fixations by reality-belief are needed in order to stabilize it. ]

[9]
" <21> I find almost impenetrable the assertion that "For all (animals and humans) the undivided and unstructured experience is the only available entrance to any sensation or knowledge (including objective knowledge)" [15].

[ This again is fundamental. It means that the only available start point for knowing is subjective experience. And that subjective experience is not structured (nor divided) to start with, see [1] above. ]

"<21> I must ignore the distinction between "objective knowledge" and just plain "knowledge" since I do not know what that distinction is."

[ Objective knowledge is a specialization of thinking, and if you want it can be contrasted with practical knowledge (see [7] above), intuitive knowledge, or with knowledge based on religious faith, etc., which are other specializations of experience and thinking. ]

" In any case, HM's assertion goes beyond Locke's doctrine that knowledge is based on sensory experience, because here, sensation itself is in turn based on "undivided and unstructured experience. "

[ The empiricists assumed that objects are "given in pre-structured form" within sensory experience, they did not consider that objects are structured by the animal or human agent. See TA23 C8 <8>, and further discussions on David Miller's paper. I do indeed propose that one needs to go beyond this type of assumption, which results in conceptual dead ends or circular reasoning. But I would formulate the statement somewhat differently : "sensation involves the structuring of experience which without this would not be structured". Thus experience is "given" but not structured (C9<22-23>). One can call this a "mere as-if exercise" <23> if one wishes, but the point is that this is all we have, and all we have ever had, despite MIR-opinions to the contrary. And the latter include phenomenological opinions <23> : if phenomenologists are not thorough in their pursuits, they end up, once more, with ontology of one kind or another (cf. TA24 [B27-B32]), and the same is true for empiricists, as just mentioned. How "arbitrary" the created structures can be <23> depends on practical possibilities : we can only use structures which prove themselves, see TA32 [9]. ]

[10]
" <24> Likewise, no assertion of any kind by any person, including HM himself, can have any criterion (other than consensus) for validity. There is no way to, or reason to, distinguish fantasy from reality, knowledge from belief, fact from value. We are left with no non-arbitrary knowledge and not even a viable method of knowledge acquisition. "

[ The most important criterion is not consensus but viability. One does not need consensus for accepting that a stone tends to fall to the ground. ]

" Consequently we can find only moral relativism, and ultimately a complete nihilism. Nihilism is not a particularly compelling, interesting, or useful philosophy. It is, I believe, a philosophical dead-end. "

[ Moral opinions are to some extent different, and depend on consensus, because more than one opinion are possible. This is the reason why human rights are seen differently in different societies. Nihilism can only be overcome by facing nothingness (as some existentialists have pointed out), which is to say we must acknowledge that we make the structures, including rules for thinking and behavior, and also accept the responsibility for that. But we are also responsible for our notions about the world, including our consensus(es), and it is not enough to refer to some dogma, either religious, or political, or MIR. The UN are an example for the practical work on such tasks. The viability is here also of paramount importance, but it may for lengths of time remain hidden behind dogmata of various kinds. ]

[11]
" <28> We can only conclude that structures somehow "emerge" from inchoate experience by some unknown principle of organization. We know at least that it is not a self-organization of experience, for an undefined concomitant meaningless, nonintentional, random "activity" of subjectivity is also required, for reasons unknown. This formulation is a non-explanation. It is tantamount to simply stipulating structures of experience. "

[ I suggest we call this "description of experience and of what happens inside it". "Stipulating structures" then becomes describing structure formation. They emerge, either spontaneously (like pain, or color, or shapes), or more deliberately, as in theory building; these differences are not fundamental. I think this description is what we can do. Whether this a self-organization of experience depends on your definition of "experience". As I use this word, it means mind-and-nature experience, which includes the subject, and also the prior-to-s/o-split part; in that case you do not need an additional subject. Wanting to "explain" this formation of structures within experience in terms of something else leads immediately into the vicious circle of MIR-belief : because you then have to postulate that it is possible to say something about entities which (as has been known since at least Plato) cannot be known; this is the old static metaphysics (called "reality" by some). We are the ones who structure reality, and for that we are responsible (but we do not invent experience per se).]

[ "Stipulation" <28> can also mean asserting or positing (eg, as true, real, valid, viable), which is what we do with structures, in building our world. This will do <29>, we do it all the time, except that we often use some make-believe outside (absolute or not) sources ("an entity to posit"), in order to feel more comfortable. We structure us (the subjective entity) together with the world (the environment, society, etc.) ]

[12]
" <30> Elsewhere, HM tries a different tack, suggesting that genetics somehow catalyzes the origination of structure from chaos: "All structures of experience [are] made by us within experience; they are not given or found, even though beside their practical success other objective (e.g., genetic) factors largely determine which structures are developed." [10] But we must take the final term, "developed" literally, as unfolding or revealing of further structure, for HM cannot appeal to biology in his story of origination of mental structure. "

[ I agree that one has to keep the objective considerations separate from the phenomenological ones, except that one can demonstrate that objective reasoning is a specialization of experience (phenomenology). I am not sure what BA means by his last sentence. One can demonstrate the development of structures, and this is one kind of development. One can also describe biological development, which is a different kind. Further one can show that the two must be kept separate but do not contradict each other, if their origins are kept in mind, namely that : objective biological developmental considerations themselves constitute a development within experience. ]

[13]
<31> "Elaboration, yes; origination, no." [ I am not sure I follow this. Everybody creates mental structures all the time; perhaps the question boils down, once more, to the one of mind-independent versus mind-created structures. ]

[14]
" <32> It turns out then that HM's assertion that structure spontaneously arises from non-structure is logically equivalent to Kant's assertion of conceptual categories that exist prior to experience. The only difference is that Kant had twelve pre-existent structures of experience, whereas HM suggests that if he had only one, he could bootstrap the rest. One, twelve, or twenty: in any case origination is not explained, only asserted. "

[ Quite the opposite. I deny the existence of structures (including "categories") which exist prior to experience. The bootstrapping occurs in the act of asserting the created structures as real or true. Assertion is essential for reality-belief, using the created structures. "Explanation" is assertion with the help of other assertions which are implied to be doubt-free (eg, scientific or religious ones). "The one" is in my opinion the undivided and unstructured experience, which persists always as the encompassing. If you want you might say that the encompassing (experience) pre-exists in this sense, but not as a structure. ]

[15]
" <33> Personally, I find nothing wrong with asserting some kind of structure prior to experience. "

[ This is the main difference between our views. How do you propose to know about such mind-independent structures ? ]

" In fact, without some such axiomatic principle, no theory of mind can ever get off the ground, for nothing comes from nothing. "

[ It cannot if you insist on reduction of experience to something else. ]

" I don't like Kant's elaborate schema of pre-existent categories, but I think that some very simple structural principle of consciousness could serve the purpose. Lacking any such principle, the 0-D approach is inert. "

[ The 0-D view means doing without such reduction. It implies that reductionist views are destined to fail, if they try to deal with the mind-brain question. ]

[16]
" <38> … wider than all of experience … is a kind of experience which should not properly be called experience at all; it is a non-experience which I have come to call, for lack of another term, "the black hole." Like its astronomical namesake, it can be known only at its transition horizon, and only by inference from the perturbations It causes on the experience around it. "

[ This I would think is yet another term for the encompassing. ]

" The black hole cannot be experienced, but it can be "entered" from experience, and some time later, one finds oneself "ejected" from it, back into the experience which constitutes the encompassing that HM describes. "

[ I agree, except that here again you seem to confine "experience" to "structured experience". This is a matter of definition. (Why would you talk about such a black hole unless you have some experience which prompts you to say this ?) "Being ejected" is not clear, perhaps you mean that structures arise quickly, and in that case one is no longer in the unstructured ? ]

" All of this would be irrelevant to the present discussion except that the non-experience of the black hole causes "perturbations" or effects on experience. I believe that these effects are the source of the original structures of experience that HM cannot account for in 0-D theory. "

[ I can, see above, except that I deny the possibility of reduction of experience to something else; this would be a kind of make-believe. 0-D is not primarily meant to be a theory, precisely because theories tend to be understood as attempts to reduce. Perhaps it is better to see it as an attempt at description. ]

[17]
"<39-40>" [I agree with most of what AB says here. Concerning the difficulties of communication which he mentions, this might be modified by considering that there are a very large number of people who have, or try to have, religious experiences, which in principle, though often not in practice, (should) include the encompassing. ]

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Herbert FJ Muller