KARL JASPERS FORUM
TA32 (Muller)
Response 14 (to C33 by Haselhurst)
IS THE UNIVERSE RATIONAL ?
by Herbert FJ Müller
12 May 2001, posted 22 May 2001
[1]
In the following, I will respond to some of the points raised by Geoff Haselhurst in his C33. Quotes from GH are in "quotation marks", my responses are in [brackets].
[2]
[ To start with, I am not comfortable in discussing physical theory and its conceptual implications, because my understanding of physics and mathematics is rather limited. But there are some reasons why I will try anyway : firstly, some theoretical physicists are quite active in discussing the mind-brain relationship, which is my field of interest. Secondly, it may be assumed that the basic properties of concepts have similarities in both fields. And finally, I find Geoff Haselhurst’s comments stimulating, and would like to respond to them. In doing so I will for the moment only refer to his C33, and this may of course be much too incomplete for a proper understanding of his view. However, a crucial conceptual point - which should be clarified before further discussion - comes early on, in <4> where he writes :]
[3]
"you seem to believe that there can be no absolute metaphysics which describes reality (truly, not as how it is represented to us)".
[4]
[ This characterization of my opinion needs a correction. It seems to me, rather, that a mind-independently pre-structured reality (MIR) - which can be described, or re-presented by or to anyone - is itself neither needed nor possible, and that in addition its assumption causes problems. My question thus is : for what purpose do you want to postulate such a pre-assembled, mind-independent and therefore also mind-inaccessible reality ? Such an opinion can help with stability of thinking, but it has for instance also the consequence of making the subject disappear, and so far I think that the disadvantages outweigh the advantages.
[5]
It is thus preferable, in my opinion, to utilize a modified more functional (as-if-MIR) view. Such a working metaphysics (or ontology) treats conceptual fixations as tools, created by us from no structure (zero-derivation, 0-D), rather than as structures which are somehow given to us from outside our minds. The convergence on what is real comes in practice, where unsuitable structures and procedures are weeded out. Reality then results from investment of belief in the used (and more or less proven) structures. - I will pursue this question through some of the following paragraphs of C33. ]
[6]
"<5> I can describe this metaphysics of reality to you such that it is logically consistent with our senses. (It necessarily/logically connects our language to the real world). The Metaphysics of Space and Motion is founded on :
What we call Acceleration, i.e. The velocity of Waves in Space is dependent on; (This still requires mathematical verification) i) The Wave Amplitude and phase relationship (This explains Charge and light (anti-matter is opposite phase SSW) ii) The Wave Density - higher Wave-Density slower Wave Velocity (This explains gravity) <6> Now I can describe a common experiment (experience that we can both agree with) that confirms the existence of these four things (out of the many things that exist). Let me hold a ball in my hand and then drop it. I sense;
Space - The ball exists in this Space around me.
Motion - The ball Moves through Space (falls to the earth).
Spherical Form/Shape - The spherical shape of the ball.
Acceleration - The ball falls with an increasing velocity.
Thus my senses (and yours, please confirm this !?) clearly confirm that these four things exist in the universe, or at least in our common sense (that we both sense this) in the universe."
[7]
[ I can confirm the experience (that we both - and we all <10> - sense this), but perception cannot prove "existence of this", in one or another version (ontology). "Seeing is believing" is only partly right. By running a film backward you can show that a broken glass assembles itself and jumps onto a table, but since it contradicts your earlier belief, which you take for more valid, you don't believe what you see. To Aristotle, the falling, etc, suggested that each of his four elements had a different built-in gravity. You see what you know, and you know what you believe. Existential (ontological) beliefs are posited (asserted, affirmed), experience cannot prove them. Existential proofs based on them are circular.
[8]
On the other hand, as Popper (who despite his analytical attitude remained a static ontologist) stressed, some such beliefs can be falsified by experience. From an ontological point of view, this is an asymmetrical situation, because truths can be falsified but not verified. From a 0-D point of view this is more straightforward : we produce the structures and they work (to some extent), or they don't work in which case they need to be replaced by others. To me, the concepts of objects, space, motion, form, acceleration, including their mathematical aspects, are tools that have - more or less - proven themselves for structuring, handling, and exploring experience (rather than an MIR). The reality (existence, truth) stems from investment of belief in the created structures. Popper’s falsification (of MIR truths) would then become "invalidation of concepts".
[9]
Absolutes of ontology (such as concrete objects) can in working metaphysics be re-defined as word-concept fixation tools with asymptotic properties. Other word-concepts, including space and motion <5>, time, counting (numbers) and mathematics in general, are secondary tools and techniques (secondary in the sense that they are added to the concrete ones, historically they have developed later). Word-concepts can help with stability, handling, and exploration, but MIR-belief is not needed. This would fit with the observation that mathematics works well for quantum mechanics, while QM ontology is less clear. One can explore experience and the tools which one uses for this, not a fictitious static MIR; and so far as I know this was, by and large, the opinion of Bohr and Heisenberg, and in principle also the one of Stapp (see TA24 C7 and R4), in contrast to Einstein, Bohm, and others. ]
[10]
" <9> All problems of human knowledge can be simplified to two things 1. State What Exists (Either material/ relational/ process) 2. Show how the existents MUST be necessarily connected. <10> Let me make a few further comments on this; The Metaphysics of Space and Motion is founded on the fact that we ALL sense that we exist in Space, and conversely, without Space nothing can exist. (All things require Space to exist in) For 2,500 years the problem has been "What is the second thing that can exist within the One thing Space". (Explain the problem of the One and the Many) (The mistakes have been to assume both particles and time as also existing). <11> The answer is obvious once known. The second most fundamental thing that exists is the (Wave) motion of Space. Space is rigid (like the ether of e-m theory) and vibrates. (Space is most like a solid - rather than a liquid or a gas, which are merely properties of loosely connected Wave Centers in a nearly rigid Space). Thus we see how the second existent Motion exists within the First Existent Space. "
[11]
[ You posit space and motion as primary existents, which is your belief. That is fine, but it is an assertion, not a proof, and in practice the existence is not needed here. You may or may not be able to show that such an assumption is practically more helpful than others. As mentioned, in my opinion all statements of existence (including one and many) are posited, how helpful they are in practical terms is a separate question. Einstein replaced absolute time and space by positing absolute speed of light, which works better. But it seems that with respect to QM (and in general) he remained a static ontologist.
[12]
Concerning "process" <9> : this may help provided that the process includes the subject (observer), and is not confined to MIR (as usually in "theories of everything"). The most important point here, it seems to me, is to avoid assuming a primary (static ontic) subject-object split, from which a static ontology arises in a second step. If the posited existents are found to be logically related, it shows that you have a coherent or consistent working theory - an island of sense in an ocean of irrationality, in Feyerabend's words. Or are you trying to show that the ocean itself is rational ? What is really real is always a matter of faith, and is better kept operational (we make it up, assert it, use it, and test its performance) than static.
[13]
One could also proceed in an opposite manner : starting from the finding that concepts and other mental tools work well (for instance in QM) what do we gain by adding a static MIR assumption ? Here is a simple possible answer : we may or may not increase stability and certainty (obtained from one or another posited fictitious mind-independent source) by abandoning doubt. But abandoning doubt is perhaps not a good idea, because it makes us uncritical, it locks us into fixed positions.
[14]
This would apply also to the following sections of your text. Perhaps we ought to try to come to an understanding about what you want to achieve. Are you discussing a rational universe-in-itself or rational tools to deal with experience ? This might then provide a point of reference for the various aspects of your proposal. ]
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Herbert FJ Muller
e-mail <hmller@po-box.mcgill.ca>