KARL JASPERS FORUM

TA31 (vanFraassen / Feyerabend)

Commentary 15 (to C14, McCaffrey)

ABSURD EXTERNAL CERTAINTY
by Herbert FJ Müller
September/October 2003, posted 21 October 2003

{1}
John McCaffrey points to an important feature of religious belief, the truth-claims of theistic doctrines (C14<2>). This presents a difficulty that has been known for a long time, for instance in the form of Tertullian's "credo quia absurdum". A more recent example was given by Horgan (C24 to TA51), who quotes Voltaire as follows : "It is truly extravagant to define God, angels, and minds, and to know precisely why God defined the world, when we do not know why we move our arms at will. Doubt is not a very agreeable state, but certainty is a ridiculous one." *

{2}
Voltaire not withstanding, the wish for certainty about a mind-independent reality is a strong reason for people to adhere to theistic dogmata. But this has two aspects that need to be distinguished. Providing MIR-certainty is indeed one of the main functions of theisms, but the believers tend to see the MIR-truth contents as the main point, with subjective certainty as a (secondary) result, and it seems that this is what JM wants to convey. The functional fit <3>, in contrast, has to do with the wish for certainty per se, and does not imply knowledge of a particular unknowable MIR. The wish is fulfilled by one or another dogma (religious or not), and accepting this as being the operative mechanism might prevent some fanaticism, which takes the content for mind-external, and often literally.

{3}
On the other hand, some non-theistic religions call for less credulity on the part of their adherents. Even though the Dalai Lama has lost much of his base in Tibet <8>, he attracts attention elsewhere, and so does Buddhism in general, for instance among Western intellectuals - a reason may be that the demands are less mind-bending in the sense of what one is expected to accept as true. Positive dogma is here largely replaced by facing the absence of structures (nothingness, nirvana) as a central concern. And furthermore, nirvana is intended to be a state of achievement and bliss, not failure or dread. This could perhaps serve as a fallback position for positive beliefs, with an acknowledgement that we build all structures from scratch, and that they can therefore in principle be deconstructed. That is not the same as saying that one positive truth is better than another (e.g., the Bible versus Evolution <3>; both are working structures, because that is what mental structures are).

{4}
These considerations apply not only to religion but to all certainty about a postulated mind-independent reality (traditional metaphysics or ontology), which is - surprise - a mind-internal construct, similar to logic and mathematics : a tool for conquering abundance, as Feyerabend put it (one ought to add : conquest of abundance of unstructured experience). We know and can be certain about such constructs because they are our creations, but then have to find out how well they work when we use them in ongoing experience. Why, and to what extent, does metaphysics work ? Mathematicians too have sometimes wondered why mathematics works as well as it does.

{5}
From a knowledge point of view it helps to use a zero-structure start-point (see TA57). The MIR-assumption then becomes as-if-MIR in all instances, and this might eliminate a barrier between science and religion (desirable because scientists too have religious needs, and religious authorities have to deal with science). It could also remove at least some of the reasons for armed conflict between religious groups. And further, the existing theisms could perhaps be modified in a functional sense. Such steps are already underway, as it is evident in the changed attitude of for instance the Vatican to the views of Copernicus, Galileo, and Darwin, although evolution of the soul is so far excluded. Likewise, for ecumenical efforts, a change from MIR-truths to emphasis on aiding individuals and society is helpful, and probably inevitable.

{6}
Traditional physics <5> also used a basic assumption of MIR (nature-in-itself). And therefore the developments since the time of Niels Bohr have been somewhat earth-shaking - he suggested that one can only know about one's experience, thus the subjects are a part of knowledge (although this insight has had a bumpy ride since then). In the religious domain, mystics have known this for some time. For MIR-belief of all types (everyday object-thinking, MIR-truth-religion, objective science, etc) the subject-object split is a basic implication, but in each case MIR can be changed to as-if-MIR. So far I think that this does not differ in principle in religion from the scientific knowledge question <5>, indeed to recognize this communality can help to build bridges - but please let me know in case I am missing something important here.

Some of the points I have discussed in this commentary are quite contentious, but I think that open dialogue might help.

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* I have tried to trace this quotation in Voltaire's texts, but so far without success (in his letters to Frederic II of Prussia, or in Candide). Also, on the Internet, this particular quote is only given in English, not in French, it seems. I would be obliged for help in finding the original wording and the source, to clarify the context of this statement.

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{7}
NOTE added 18 October 2003, in response to the discussion between McCaffrey, Dykstra, and vonGlasersfeld.

McCaffrey asks (TA31 C19, last paragraph) why a constructivist position would be preferable to others. Discarding traditional MIR-belief is required for an understanding of the mind-brain relation (see TAs 1 and 45), which is of interest to me, and which in turn affects some other questions. The 0-D view then still includes the use of as-if-MIR (working ontology), useful in many areas, and thus it does not contradict results of objective studies, in areas where they are appropriate. MIR-views (scientific, theistic, etc) could presumably be treated as special cases of 0-D. And this might answer (in a preliminary way) the question of the relation of 0-D to other views, which has been brought up in the discussion.

{8}

Now does that imply that 0-D is THE truth ? In my opinion it is useful to regard 0-D as a procedure that can be applied to various questions including world views. A main ingredient here is that there is no such thing as THE truth - and Dykstra says much the same about his view of rc (C20<3>). The various truths (including MIR-beliefs such as in Nature-in-itself or in word-of-God) are the results of investment of trust in mental-mind-and-nature-structures. The absence of MIR-structures should prevent 0-D from being subject to deconstruction.

{9}
My opinion is then more or less as follows : it is not my business to interfere with (or set standards for) anyone's belief-system. In case they are interested they can apply the 0-D procedure to their views; I expect that this might result in a reduction of their view to the 0-D view. If that were widely confirmed, the 0-D view (epistemological constructivism) could help - as a common fall-back position - to build bridges between conceptual systems. This could constitute another reason for using this view. Still further ones could be the likely anti-fanaticism effect mentioned in {2} and {5} above and the resistance to deconstruction {8}.

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Herbert FJ Müller