[1]
I think that any form of philosophy - e.g. objective, categorical, moral, or metaphysical - needs to be considered in the context from which it is derived for this can help differentiate and then refine. I do recognise that some aspects of Philosophy seems to have a very RH bias in that closure is avoided as attempts are made to consider all of the aspects that can in some way enhance and/or diminish an ideal, but at the same time we need to recognise that there are philosophical forms that seem to be culturally invariant and so are properties that have developed at the contextual levels (including genetics). Being able to EXPLICITLY identify these forms adds some reductionism (and so some closure) to areas of philosophy. (for example, Aristotle's 'discovery' of 19 forms of syllogism comes from an invariant form dealing with the use of dichotomous methods of analysis and the understanding of certain relationships. This may seem 'psychological/cognitive science' but ALL of our maps are now heading into this area and this includes Philosophy. Furthermore the 'discovery' that some of these syllogisms *fail* when we start to use 'fantasy' objects tells us something about aspects of 'in here' as well as 'out there' that have value in a philosophical context).


[2]
In considering LH/RH understanding and their affect on philosophical considerations, my emphasis on the left brain having it's roots in direct identification and a bias to reductionism leads to the realisation that concepts like 'fact', 'logic', 'truth' are mental abstractions of genetically-derived functions. This realisation can affect ontological and epistemological concerns when we consider in a philosophical context 'in here' versus 'out there' as well as questions like 'who we are' and 'where are we going' and 'what is truth'.

[3]
My other emphasis, dealing with the right brain having it's roots in indirect identification and a bias to illusion, leads to the realisation that concepts like 'spirituality' and 'god' are non-locational and so ANY 'logically-derived' description has to be MEANINGLESS or at best 'statistical' and so attempts to develop 'objective' descriptions of these concepts fail simply because objective models require explicit location (this does not stop us from trying to find the line that separates!)

[4]
Furthermore, this emphasis on illusion demonstrates how selective one must be in making aspectual summations and how easy it is to create philosophical illusions. By knowing HOW we process information and understanding the patterns than can emerge simply from the method applied, gives us a solid foundation upon which concepts like ethics and politics and logic rest and to be a philosopher WITHOUT understanding these 'basics' simply leads to illusion. (and the same goes for theoretical physicists etc).


Chris Lofting.
e-mail <clo@fmsc.com.au>