KARL JASPERS FORUM
TARGET ARTICLE 113
CONFUCIANISM AND TAOISM IN
RESPONSE TO CONSTRUCTIVE
REALISM
by Vincent Shen
1996, posted 14 March 2009
Journal of Chinese Philosophy 23 (1996) 59-78
Copyright 1996 by Dialogue Publishing Company, Honolulu. Hawaii, USA.
[ I am indebted to Rob Weedon
for drawing my attention to this paper, which I post here for discussion only;
I think it is of interest in connection with constructivism, even though it
does not deal with constructivism per se.
I did not find notes that correspond to the roman number superscripts in
the paper, as it was sent to me from the publisher. For discussion purposes, I have added
paragraph numbers. - HFJM ]
[1]
1. Introduction
In pondering upon the theme of the
9th International Congress in Chinese Philosophy, ‘‘Chinese philosophies as World Philosophies” probably it will be of interest to
respond to some promising philosophical theses of a recently emerging western
philosophy, Constructive Realism,
through the eyes of Confucianism and Taoism. This is to let the two oldest Chinese philosophies to respond to
an emerging western philosophy, thus bringing out the potentiality of two
Chinese philosophies as world philosophy. By “response” I mean a way of
conducting what I have called “language appropriation”’, or, in other words, a
way of practicing the strategy of ‘strangification”
which, as proposed by Constructive Realism, consists in translating the
language of one discipline into the language of another discipline, that is,
from one microworld to another microworld.
But what I am doing here is not only a strangification
between interdisciplinary microworlds, but rather a strangification between different cultural worlds.
[2]
On the
one hand, Constructive Realism is a new philosophy of science, based of course
upon the European tradition of philosophy of science since Kant, recently
appears in the context of Western culture.
After the decline of Logical Positivism, Constructive Realism’ emerges
recently as a new Vienna School, which in some sense is quite meaningful not
only in the domain of philosophy of science, but also, at least for my part, in
the domain of philosophy of culture, especially with its concept of “strangification” applicable to both interdisciplinary
research and intercultural understanding. On the other hand, Confucianism and
Taoism are two schools of philosophy developed in the context of Chinese
culture. What I am going to do here is to take Confucianism and Taoism from
their original context in Chinese culture, in order to conduct philosophical
reflection on Constructive Realism. By
doing thus I am trying to
enlarge the strategy of strangification from its
original domain of application, that is, the scientific microworlds, to the larger domain of cultural worlds. But in doing thus I will retain the same spirit
of conducting reflection by changmg the cognitive
context. The philosophical principle
implicit in both kinds of strangification (that is, microworld strangification and culturalworld strangification) is
that we cannot fully understand ourselves except in strangifying
ourselves to the context of other world and in understanding others first.
[3]
I will
not enter here into the details of both Confucianism and Taoism, except when
they are relevant for my philosophical reflection on Constructive Realism. And I have to point out also that
when I speak of Confucianism and Taoism, I do not envisage them as they
were in the history of Chinese philosophy.
They are presented here as already creatively interpreted by myself
through my appropriation of both Western and Chinese philosophical
languages3.
There exists a long tradition of
interpretation both in Confucianism and Taoism in which creative interpretations
were considered as a way of philosophical development. Therefore I will consider my interpretation of Confucianism and
Taoism within the context of my philosophy of contrast, and my putting them
into a confrontation with contemporary Western philosophies, such as
structuralism, phenomenology, hermeneutics, critical theory and Constructive
Realism as my way of developing them.
[4]
Generally speaking, we can characterize both Confucianism and Taoism as systems
of philosophy with practical orientations.
Confucianism emphasizes more the philosophy of man and moral philosophy,
and is less interested in metaphysical speculations. Taoism emphasizes philosophy of nature, and
is intensely interested in metaphysical meditations, especially concerning
ontology and cosmology, all in criticizing anthropocentrism, human values and
ethical norms contained in Confucianism.
On
the other hand, Constructive Realism is proposed, up to now, as
a new approach in philosophy of science, with epistemological as well as social interests. Its development into a system of
philosophy is still to be desired.
[5]
Therefore, the first moment we try to conduct
strangification between Confucianism, Taoism and Constructive
Realism shows immediately
their difference and their mutual need.
On
the one hand, Confucianism and Taoism do not have their
philosophy of science, though their philosophy of knowledge in general is quite
well developed. In this perspective,
Constructive Realism, with its origin in European philosophy of science, is
quite helpful in developing Chinese theories of knowledge into a philosophy of
science. On the other hand,
Constructive Realism, which is limited to philosophy of science, also needs to
be measured in the context of general philosophy; it can also strangify
itself into the context of other cultures;
otherwise some of its potentialities would be neglected and not
realized. Here, some philosophical principles of both Confucianism and Taoism
would be very helpful.
In the following, I will first
present briefly the philosophical positions of Constructive Realism. And then I will conduct some reflections
upon them one by one in referring to the philosophical resources of both
Confucianism and
Taoism.
[6]
2.
Philosophical positions of Constructive Realism
As I see it,
Constructive Realism, as it is conceived by Fritz Wallner
and his Viennese colleagues, is a recent philosophical alternative to Logical
Positivism, the latter denied any meaning in metaphysical discourse and refused
to talk about reality. Instead,
Constructive Realism thinks it is inevitable to talk about reality. The first concern of Constructive Realism is
therefore to envisage this fatal lack in Logical Positivism and to take into
account the truth contained in Wittgenstein’s philosophy of language.
It has inherited some elements of Wittgenstein’s philosophy of language
in Tractatus Logico Philosophicus, for example, that we can speak
about reality only in language4, therefore there is no need of
meta-language. Besides, Constructive
Realism also takes Wittgenstein’s position in Philosophical Investigations that to each language game
corresponds a form of life (Lebensformen)5. The first concern of
Constructive Realism with these problematics gives
birth to its theory of two types of reality.
[7]
The second concern of Constructive Realism is to envisage the need for an epistemological strategy in contemporary interdisciplinary research
works. Because of social as well as epistemological reasons,
interdisciplinary research works become inevitable now in science. But up to now there is no good strategy
epistemologically well founded for the organization and the self-understanding
of interdisciplinary research. Because
of this concern, Constructive Realism proposes the strategy of “strangification”.
[8]
The third concern of Constructive Realism is to do a philosophy of science
which will be based on an inside knowledge of what scientists are really doing and which can react properly
to the need of action in the Environment.
Very often philosophy of science neglects the practice of scientists and
the result of their research has no impact upon scientists. But Constructive Realism maintains the
position that a philosophy of science should base its own discourse on
the real practice of scientists and it should be able to guide science in the
domain of practical actions. This practical
concern gives birth to a pragmatic vision of science,
[9]
To sum up, there are three essential positions in Constructive Realism :
First, the theory of two types of
reality, which distinguish between Wirklichkeit and Realität, the one represents the Reality
itself, the other represents Constructed Reality,
Second, the strategy of strangification
for interdisciplinary research works.
There are three kinds of strangification: the
linguistic, the sociological and the ontological.
Third, a pragmatist
vision of science and its role in the society.
In the following, I will explain each
position point by point and at the same time conduct my reflection upon each
position in referring myself to the philosophies of Confucianism and Taoism.
[10]
3. Theory of reality
Constructive Realism distinguishes Wirklichkeit from Realität. Wirklichkeit represents the Reality Itself,
whereas Realität represents
Constructed Reality. This distinction reminds us of the
Kantian distinction between noumena and phenomena6,
but without presupposing Kant’s transcendental philosophy which posits the
correspondence of noumena to a transcendental
ego. As it is in the case of Kant’s noumena, the Wirklichkeit
according to Constructive Realism is unknowable. What are knowable are those microworlds constructed by our scientific as well as
non-scientific experiences and languages.
But Wirklichkeit, although unknowable, is posited by Constructive Realism as the Environment (Umwelt) in
which we live and practice science. Environment
is therefore identified with the Life-world, no
conceptual distinction is made in Constructive Realism of these two
concepts. On the other hand, the Realität is seen as the sum total of microworlds. The
idea of a microworld comes to Constructive Realism as
the philosophical consequence of Wittgenstein’s thesis that we can only speak
about reality with our language and that to each language game corresponds a form of life. The term “microworld”
is therefore invented by Constructive Realism to designate the reality
constructed by different kinds of language.
But Constructive Realism supposes that there is a sum total of all microworlds
which could be named the “Realität ”.
[11]
The theory of two types of reality constitutes an ontology in Constructive
Realism. The distinction it makes between Wirklichkeit and Realität has the following
consequences:
1. Philosophical discussions about
Reality Itself and about question such as whether Reality Itself is knowable or
not does not bring us any new knowledge.
It suffices to posit a Reality Itself.
2. In this
situation, we had better address one another and interact one with another
through the strategy of strangification, which would
bring us new knowledge about other microworlds and
help to construct together the Realität.
3.
Thus the theory of two types of reality offers an ontological foundation
for the strategy of strangification, and it
encourages strangification. We will analyze the strategy of strangification in the next section.
Now, we will conduct some
philosophical reflections upon this theory through the eyes of Taoism and
Confucianism.
[12]
I ) Taoism
Taoism seems to accept the
distinction between Reality Itself and Constructed Reality. Lao Tzu said that ‘Tao could be said, but
that which is already said about Tao is not the Eternal Tao.” 7 The distinction between Tao and the said
seems to confirm the distinction between Reality Itself and Constructed
Reality. But, in Taoism, this distinction is not posited for negation of the
epistemological status of microworld. It is rather posited, on the one hand, to
point out the necessity of tracing back those microworlds’
origin to Tao, the creative source of all knowledge and action. On the other hand, this distinction points
out the insufficiency of all languages.
In this perspective, Taoism is quite different from Constructive
Realism.
[13]
Compared with the ontology of two types of reality in Constructive Realism,
Taoist ontology is much richer in philosophical meaning. According to Taoism, Tao is a spontaneous
creative Being Itself which gives birth to all beings through the process of
self-manifestation and self-differentiation.
But there is an ontological difference between Tao, the self-manifesting
Being Itself, and beings. If we say
Tao equals to what is said, then in that moment Tao becomes a “being said”, or a conceptual being, not Being
Itself. Although Tao is
understandable, its understandability does not equal
to sayability, thereby Taoism sets a limit to our
language. If Wittgenstein’s’ thesis
“that which cannot be said should be kept in silence” is interpreted by
Constructive Realism as positing the Constructed Reality in language and the
denying of all meta-language, Taoism
would add the thesis that what should be kept in silence is still
understandable, which is not to be “said” but rather to be “shown.”
[14]
For Taoism, Tao manifests itself in Nature, which is a spontaneous process not
to be determined by human being’s technical intervention Human beings are
considered by Taoism as only part of nature, their ontological status is just like plants, animals and others
beings in nature, all taken to be sons of the same Mother Tao. This
vision of human being and nature is quite different from modern
science and technology.
In modem times, science defines
nature as the totality of phenomena to be explained and predicted by natural
laws, whereas technology treats nature as the totality of material resources to
be manipulated and transformed by technical process. The consequence of this concept of nature is that ecological disequilibrium,
pollution and other environmental problems become more and more serious now,
even to the menace of human existence.
[15]
But Taoism teaches us how to respect the spontaneous process of nature. Human
being’s knowledge should be constructed in such a way that it enfolds the
spontaneous dynamism of nature.’ We
should avoid humancentered or even egocentric
construction of knowledge. This
position is more ecological and it tends to construct knowledge and Umwelt in a natural way. To sum up, we can reformulate Taoist
propositions in the following manner:
1. Tao, the Reality Itself, and
nature, the manifestation of Tao, and human beings in nature, all are
co-related and co-natural.
2. Tao, as co-natural to human
beings, is understandable to human beings through a cognitive procedure worthy
of Tao.
3. What we understand should not be
equalized to what is said.
4. A human being should
be aware of the limit of his language and keep his mind open to the spontaneous
dynamism of nature.
5. Human being should
construct his knowledge
and Life-world, not according to the structural constraint of his language, but according to the rhythmic
manifestation of nature.
6.
Microworld, as constructed by different
languages, should not be equalized with Life-world, which is partly constructed
by human beings, partly constructing itself spontaneously with the rhythm of
nature. But both microworlds
and Life-world could not be equalized with Tao, which is Reality Itself.
[16]
2) Confucianism
Confucianism is a kind of open
humanism, which takes human being as center of cosmos. Nevertheless Confucianism is also open to
the dynamism of nature. This openness
is based on the fact that human beings are interconnected to others, to nature
and to Heaven. This interconnectedness, which Confucianism expresses by the term ‘Jen’ i,
serves as the ontological foundation of the understandability
of Reality Itself and the possibility of communication. Based upon this interconnectedness, human
beings could have sympathetical understanding of
other human persons, of nature and even of Heaven.
[17]
Confucian philosophy of language is quite different from that of Taoism, which
looks at language from the negative perspective and underlines the limit of
language. On the contrary, Confucianism would take language in its positive
aspect. According to it, language, as human linguistic construction of reality,
should also be seen as a mode of manifestation of Wirklichkeit. This
could be achieved through semantic correctness and sincerity of purpose. The same with science and
technology. Contrary to Taoist critique of them,
Confucianism would look at science and technology as capable of being
integrated into the process of constructing a humanized world. The process of human intervention into the
process of nature is seen by Confucianism as humankind’s “participation in and
assistance in the creative transformation of Heaven and Earth” ii .
[18]
Confucianism emphasizes therefore the process of human construction of the
Life-world, which should be to the better and not to the worse. But what are the criteria for judging the
better construction from the worse ? Confucianism would say that the criteria
lie in the principle that human construction of Lebenswelt should participate in the
creative rhythm of Heaven and earth and not dominate it. Therefore Confucianism distinguishes
participative construction from dominative construction. Human construction of the Life-world should
be the participative one, not the dominative one.
[19]
To sum up, we could say that a Confucian reflection upon the theory of two
types of reality could be expressed in the following propositions :
1. There are universal
relatedness and co-naturality between human beings,
nature and Heaven which serve as ontological foundation for the understandability of Wirklichkeit. for
human construction of knowledge about reality, and also for strangification
and communication.
2. Reality Itself is understandable through
sympathetic understanding based upon the interconnectedness of human being with
other beings, by which there is a tacit understandable content liable to be expressed
through language.
3. Since there might be better as
well as worse constructions of the Life-world, depending on whether the construction is
participative or dominative, Life-world should not be identified with Umwelt (identified
with Wirklichkeit according to Constructive
Realism)
4. Life-world is to be considered
partially as human construction, partially as emerging spontaneously from the
dynamism of Reality Itself.
5. It could be suggested that the theory
of two types of reality be modified into a theory of three levels of reality:
Reality Itself,
Constructed Reality, and
Life-world.
[20]
4. A strategy for interdisciplinary practice
To envisage the need for an
epistemological strategy for interdisciplinary research works in science, Constructive Realism has proposed
the strategy of strangifcation, the act of going out
of ones own cognitive context into the context of
others. For example, we could draw
those propositions of our most cherished findings from one discipline and put
them into the context of another discipline, by translating them into the
language of that discipline. By doing
so, we can make our own
propositions understandable to another discipline. And this translatability of our propositions
means its universalizability
which bestows more value to the knowledge contained therein. If the translation
does not succeed, it means the lack of universalizability
of these propositions. For this reason,
we have to check over the methodology and principles by which I conduct
research work in my own discipline, which means a reflection on one's own
discipline.
[21]
Strangification, being a strategy for
interdisciplinary research, has the following functions : first, it serves to help microworlds
understand one another; second, by strangifcation, we can conduct reflection on the
methodology and principles of our own discipline; third, through strangification
we can correlate different microworlds into a
coherent Realität. In
other words, strangification is a strategy of
interdisciplinary work by which different disciplines can coordinate for a
common construction of Realität.
[22]
Strangification is not limited only to microworlds, it
could be conducted also between different cultural worlds. When we conduct strangification,
we make our own world understandable to others by translating our language into
that of others. At the same time, we
learn also from other's language. Strangification is therefore a kind of what I call,
in a more general setting, ''language appropriation". By strangification,
we appropriate other's language not only to translate and thereby make
understandable our own language, but also to enrich it by the same token.
[23]
We can find two cases of language appropriation in contemporary Chinese
philosophy, the neoConfucians such as Mou Tzong.san iii and
Tang Chün-yi iv appropriate the philosophical language of
German Idealism; and the Chinese neoScholasticism appropriates neo-Thomistic
philosophical language, both with the intention to articulate Chinese
philosophy in a philosophical language understandable to Western philosophical
traditions. By the same act of language appropriation, they also make German Idealism and neo-Thomism
understandable in Chinese philosophy.
[24]
Strangification is therefore a very useful strategy,
not only for different scientific disciplines, but also for different parts in
communication, for example, different political parties, different ideological
settings, different schools of philosophy and different cultural worlds ...
etc. It is even more feasible and
fruitful than Habermas concept of “communicative
action”. In fact, Habermas’ communicative action
is a process of argumentation in which the proposition-for and
proposition-against, by way of Begründung, search for a consensus in a higher
proposition acceptable for both parts.
Although Habermas has proposed the claims for
an ideal situation of communication such as understandability,
truth, sincerity and legitimacy, unfortunately in the actual world of
communication, there happens very often either total conflict or compromise,
without any real consensus. The Habermasian argumentation tends to fail if in the process
of Begründung and in the act of searching for
consensus, there is no effort
for strangification. If there is no effort of strangification, then there
will be no real mutual understanding and no selfreflection
during the process of argumentation.
Therefore, strangification as proposed by
Constructive Realism could be seen as prerequisite for any successful
communication and coordination.
[25]
According to Constructive Realism, there are three types of strangification
: the first is linguistic strangification, by which we translate one language in the
context of one particular discipline into the language of an other discipline, to see
whether it works or it becomes absurd thereby. If in
the latter case, reflection must be done concerning the methodology and
principles by which one has established the first language.
[26]
The second is pragmatic strangification, by which we
draw science from one social and organizational context, to put it into another
social and organizational context in order to make clear its pragmatic
implications and to enlarge its social
and organizational possibilities.
[27]
The third is ontological strangification, which, according to Fritz Wallner, is the movement by which we transfer from one microworld to another microworld.
[28]
For my part, I think both
linguistic strangification and pragmatic strangification are well articulated and are all of them very useful and very
pertinent in interdisciplinary research works as well as in communication
process in general. But I would say
that Constructive Realism does not yet have any clear articulation of the
meaning of ontological strangification. Because the fact that we do move from one microworld to another does not by that mere fact become
ontological. In Heidegger’s terms, it
is still ontic, not ontological. In order to make the meaning of an authentic
ontological strangification clear, we could refer to
Confucianism and Taoism for the following reflections:
[29]
1) Confucianism
From the Confucian point of view, the
fact that we can enter into an other
world (microworld or cultural world) presupposes that
there are some ontological relations existing between them. In other words, Confucianism would
interrogate on the ontological condition of possibility which render feasible
and legitimate the act of strangification as well as
the communication and self-reflection it makes possible. The Confucian answer to this question is
that it is the interconnectedness and co-naturality
between them, a kind of ontological relation, which make strangification
possible. Confucianism even takes a
further step to say that, upon the interconnectedness and co-naturality of human beings with each other, with nature and
even with Heaven, there could be a sympathetic mutual understanding one with
another. In other words, for
Confucianism, the act of strangification V presupposes a sense of sympathetic
interconnectedness VI.
[30]
Even if we need not go so far, in a philosophy of science, as to assume the
existence of this sympathetic interconnectedness between human beings or
between human beings and other beings, it
is still legitimate and necessary to ask the question about the
ontological condition of possibility of strangification. Confucianism, in positing the existence of a “sympathetic
interconnectedness” as an ontological
condition of possibility to strangification, has
elevated strangification to the ontological
level. According to Confucianism,
there is ontological strangification when we conduct strangification upon our sympathetic interconnectedness
with others.
[31]
2) Taoism:
From the Taoist point of view, in
order to know an other world
by conducting strangification, it is not enough to
appropriate an other language and to translate our
language into an other language. It is also necessary to communicate with the
Reality Itself and to enlarge our knowledge of it. In Lao Tzu’s words, “Having grasped the
Mother (Tao, Reality Itself), you can thereby know the sons (beings, microworld); Having known the sons, you should return again to the
Mother.” 9 Here Taoism
posits an ontological detour to the Wirklichkeit as condition sine qua non for the act of strangification into other worlds (microworld
and cultural world). Since the Reality
Itself is understandable, the ontological detour is thereby made possible.
[32]
In terms of Lao Tzu, we understand the Wirklichkeit by
the process of a “retracing regard” (Kuan)VII,,
,an act of intuition of essence in returning to Tao. The process of formation of our experience
is therefore seen by Taoism as a process of back and forth between the act of
interacting with beings (sons) and the act of returning to Tao (the
Mother). The act of returning to
Reality Itself and communicating with it is therefore considered by Taoism as
nourishing our strangification with other microworlds. This
act of ontological detour to Reality Itself bestows an ontological dimension to
strangification.
When an act of strangification is conducted
with an ontological detour, it becomes thereby an ontological strangification.
We can represent the ontological detour in the following figure: [
For the figure click here ] [
To see the figure please refer to this paper on the KJF web site - HFJM
]
[33]
This concept of ontological detour is very suggestive for Constructive Reahsm. Because in
doing strangification, sometimes an other microworld and its
language are not easily accessible. It is here that an ontological detour
to Reality itself is very helpful. In order to understand in an easier way a
treatise on music, that of Adorno’s Philosophie der neuen Musik for
example, it would be better to listen to the music of Schönberg
and Stravinsky. In order to a understand a treatise on sociology, it is helpful to look
at the social phenomenon in question.
In order to understand a particular scientific treatise on nature, it is
better to experience once more nature itself.
The ontological detour, not only will render easier the language and the accessibility
of another microworld, it can also serve as remedy to
the limit of language, which is essential
to Taoist philosophy of language.
[34]
Strangification does not by itself clarify the
ontological situation of different microworlds in
relation to one another. By the mere
act of strangification, we cannot figure out their
ontological status in a possible
synthesis of Realität. But, according to the paradigm of
contrast which has its historical background in the philosophical wisdom of
Confucianism and Taoism, they are in a situation of contrast. In other words,
in the act of strangification and in the act of
constructing Realität, those disciplines and their microworlds are different, but in the meanwhile
complementary. This ontological
situation renders necessary the act of strangification. It also makes strangification
possible. The act of strangification based upon this ontological situation of
contrast is thereby an ontological
strangification. The status of disciplines and microworlds in the resulting construction of Realität could also be defined by the
philosophy of contrast.
[35]
5. Pragmatic vision
of science
In order to connect the enterprise of
philosophy of science with the actual activities of scientists and to determine
the role of science in the social and physical reahty,
Constructive Realism maintains a pragmatic vision of science. This
means that, for Constructive Realism, the construction of a microworld by scientific activities offers us a new possibility of action and is
judged by this criterion. As Fritz Wallner
puts it, “As soon as they are
invented, they offer new possibilities of activity; in this sense they are
real. We could convert this
argumentation. If they did not open
new possibilities of action, they would not be scientific inventions.” 10
[36]
This pragmatist vision of science is sound and helpful for the understanding of
both the activities and the function of science. “Pragmatism” means a way of thinking which
attaches itself to the dimension of human action. But, in our philosophical reflection, two
questions might be asked of this pragmatic vision of science.
First what are the criteria of action
in science ?
Second, in addition to understanding
science, how to give ideal incentive to the development of science
?
[37]
Concerning the first question, we can think of the following criteria:
1. The criteria of efficiency. We
can judge actions in science according to their efficiency in bringing out the
desired end. Although this is
important for measuring science, it falls under the category of instrumental
rationality. In the case of modem
Western science and technology, the excessive and abusive use of instrumental rationality has led to man’s exploitative
domination over nature and society.
This is against the intention of
conserving and constructing a better Life-world.
2. The ethical criteria. This means criteria which refer to ethical
norms of action and to the ethical responsibility of human beings. This
is the kind of criteria that Confucianism would emphasize. According to Confucianism, there are three
most important ethical norms for human action.
First, action should be conducted in such a
way that it leads to the fulfillment of human potentiality.
Second, action should be conducted in
such a way that it leads to the unfolding of the object acted upon or under
scientific investigation.
Third, action should be
conducted in such a way that it leads
to the harmonization of relationship
between one human being and other human beings, between human beings and
nature.
3 . Ontological
criteria. Both Constructive Realism and Confucianism,
in the eyes of Taoism, are too much human-centered. ln Nietzsche’s terms, they are ‘’human,
much too human” Taoism on the other hand, is more nature-centered, but with an
ontological foundation. This means
that for Taoism, human actions should be situated in the cosmic process. For Taoism, action should be conducted in
such a way that it is not human
centered, but situated in the global context of nature and Being. In other words, action should be conducted
in respecting the dynamism of nature and in serving as a manifestation of
Tao. Reality
Itself. In this way, it is no
particular action. Compared with any ontic and dominative action, it is rather a kind of
non-action, but by which nothing is left undone.
[38]
Concerning the second question, Constructive Realism’s pragmatic vision of
science is sound in helping us understand
the activities of science, yet it offers no ideal incentives for the
development of science.
Today, the world is full of all kinds
of pragmatism. More urgent problems
such as ecological crisis, economic profit, management, ...
etc., need more efficient actions. A worldwide pragmatist spirit is now
also having it :
erosive effect in the domain of science. For example, some theoretical or pure
research in natural and human-social sciences are now being neglected and
sacrificed by such a secular pragmatism.
Of course, Constructive Realism is
not a kind of secular pragmatism. It is pragmatism in
the sense that it emphasizes the dimension of action in science. Since Constructive Realism emphasizes also
the role of reflection in the construction of knowledge, it should also include
in itself a certain detachment : from action, in order to do reflection.
[39]
I say this because reflection demands always some detachment from action. Athough the
notion of theoria in Greek
philosophy is now gone for good, since science is now always related in its
essence to action, I will claim a new spirit of theoria for this world menaced by nihilism. Not a theoria which quests
for knowledge for knowledge’s own sake.
But rather theoria as the
reflexive self-understanding of action, that is, a theoria which is in intimate interaction
with action.
[40]
For my part, science is now losing its ideality. It has no long term goal for
development. Science needs to renew
some ideals, such as truth, to serve as
idealizing incentives for its own
development. Otherwise,
science is falling down more and more into the darkness of nihilism, in which
human beings have no ideal values for their existence and thereby life becomes
meaningless. To help humankind go through this nihilist valley of
darkness, Constructive Realism, with the rich spiritual resources of Western
philosophy, and Eastern philosophy such as Taoism and Confucianism, should work
out, besides the pragmatic aspect of science, the ideal dimension of the future
development of science and
society.
[41]
6. Conclusion
As I
have presented elsewhere 11, the paradigm of contrast is based upon
the philosophical wisdom of both Confucianism and Taoism. This wisdom
is best illustrated in the traditional representation of the Great Ultimate, Tai Chi VIII, which is the common philosophical
background of both Confucianism and Taoism.
I develop it into a paradigm of contrast, which is constituted of
structural contrast and dynamic contrast, both are
also in a global contrast interaction.
On the one hand, ‘structural contrast’ is constituted of interacting
elements, different but related, opposing yet complementary. On the other hand, ‘dynamic contrast’ is constituted of moments characterized by
continuity and discontinuity, sedimentation of the past and creation of future
novelty. Both are in a global contrasting
movement so as to constitute the
structure and the dynamism of history.
With this paradigm of
contrast in mind, we can propose the following propositions as conclusions to
this essay on Confucianism, Taoism and Constructive Realism :
.
1) Concerning
the theory of two types
of reality
Proposition 1. Reality Itself (Wirklichkeit) and
Constructed Reality (Realität)
are different but complementary, continuous yet discontinuous one with another,
but they have to be mediated by the construction of Life-world.
Proposition 2. The construction of Life-world (Lebenwelt) in
the process of
time, which serves as the mediation between Reality Itself and Constructed
Reality, should take into account the contrasting tension between the two types
of reality, thus leads to a better construction, not a
worse one.
2) Concerning the strategy of strangification
Proposition 3. Strangification presupposes that
different microworlds constructed by various
disciplinary languages are different yet complementary one with another, and
therefore rendering possible and necessary the act of strangification,
Proposition 4. Besides linguistic and pragmatic strangifications, ontological strangification
which bases itself either on the ontological relation between different worlds
or effected through an ontological detour to Reality Itself, is also necessary
and feasible.
Proposition 5. In
interdisciplinary research work, no individual discipline should dominate other
disciplines in constructing Realität. Nevertheless, it demands, in the
construction of a specific aspect of reality, that there are guiding discipline
and subsidiary disciplines. Different
disciplines are also in the relation of contrast to coordinate for a synthetic
construction of Realität.
3) Concerning rhe
pragmatic visions of science
Proposition 6. Both scientific action and ethical action
belong, although in a contrasting way, to human action in the Life-world.
Proposition 7. Human action, although to be integrated into the
cosmic process, is nevertheless in a contrast relation with the latter, that
is, they are different yet complementary, continuous but also discontinuous one
with another.
Proposition 8. Finally, theory and action are also in a
contrasting situation. In order not to
let action in science be secularized and become the servant of optimization of
economic profit, science should not be too much pragmatic. The spirit of theoria, not the one in Greek philosophy
searching for knowledge for knowledge’s own sake, but the spirit which sets up
theoretical ideals for the development and the self-understanding of science,
should be renewed today.
Proposition 9.
With the renewal of this spirit
of theoria, science would not fall down in
the darkness of nihilism. On the contrary, science in moving
by the contrast of theory
and action, will progress by
self-understanding action, and together with other ideal values offered by
different cultures, could eventually lead human beings beyond the dark valley of nihilism and let them see the
light of truth.
NATIONAL CHENGCHI
UNIVERSITY, TAIPEI
-------------------------------------------
NOTES
1.
Vincent Shen, Creativity as Synthesis of Contrasting Wisdoms: An Interpretation of
Chinese Philosophy in Taiwan since 1949, in Philosophy East & West, Vol. 43, Number 2,April.
1993.pp.279-281
2. For
introductions to Constructive Realism, see Fritz Wallner,
Acht Vorlesungen über
den Konstruktiven
Realismus, (Vienna: Vienna Univeraty
Press, 1992). pp. 96; Fritz
Wallner/Joseph Schimmer/Markus
Costazza (Eds), Grenzziehungen zum Konstruktiven Realismus, (Vienna,
Vienna University Press, 1993), pp. 236
3.
For Example, What I have done as regard to Confucianism m the Rebirth of Tradition,
(Taipei: Yeh-Chiang, 1992), pp. 207
4. This is how I interpret
the last phrase of Wittgenstein s Tractatus, ”That which cannot be said should be kept in silence.”
5.
L. Wittgenstein, Logical
Investigations, (Oxford: Blackwell, 1968), p. 11
6. Kant, Kritik der reinen Vemunft, (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp Verlag, 1968). A. 249
7. Lao Tzu, Tao Te Ching, ch. 1
8. Vincent Shen, Annäherung an das taoistische Verständnis von
Wissenschaft. Die Epistemologie des Lao Tses und Tschuang Tses, in
F. Wallner, J. Schimmer ed., Grenzziehungen
zum Konstruktiven Redismus,Wien : WUV-Univ. Verl., 1993), S188ff.
9.
Lao Tzu, Tao Teh Ching. ch. 52
10.
Fritz Wallner,
Aspect of Constructive Realism (Vienna:
Braumüller, 1994) p. 14
11. Vincent Shen, Method,
History and Being, An Introduction to
Philosophy of Contrast, in Essays in Contemporary Philosophy. (Taipei:
Lih-ming Press, 1985), pp. 1-28
------------------------------------------------
Vincent Shen
e-mail <
vincent.shen (at) utoronto.ca >