KARL JASPERS
FORUM
TA112
(Müller)
Response 4 (to C5, Harwood Fisher; and
C3, Michael Schwartz)
STRUCTURE OR PERISH
by Herbert FJ Müller
3 March 2009, posted 7 March 2009
[1]
[HF C5 <2>] Pragmatically
structured or not, they are structured.
The term 'pragmatic' just 'kicks the can down the road.'
[HFJM]
But structured by whom ? The ‘pragmatic’ is an original aspect of the results
of subject-inclusive structuring; non-pragmatic (i.e., absolute) properties can
only be had in subject-exclusive ontology-views (the neo-metaphysicists
call them ‘dispositions’,
which they claim are fundamental; see
discussion to TA110). In 0-D, the
question of ‘regress
to pragmatics’ <3> does therefore not come up. ‘Endless
regress’ <2> too is a question only in non-functional metaphysical
questions; it means
an erroneous search for ontological ‘causes’.
(Within objective physical systems such questions can to some extent be
valid (i.e., functional); for instance massive black holes hold galaxies
together and may be said to be the ‘cause’ of the configuration of the galaxies; but all of this is structured within human
experience.)
[2]
Explanations of subjectivity involving
neural mechanisms are tricky, not so
much because we have to find engrams, but because we tend to mis-interpret
neural systems as ontic mind-independent realities (MIR). As HF
puts it <4> :
‘the problem of originating a thought -- or a choice -- cannot
simplistically be tied to a blind evolutionary type process of adaptation’. And <2> : ‘the regress to neural and sub-neural
structures and/or to sensory-motor patterns of action and reaction (1) neither
connects fully with the conscious apprehension and/or processing of 'meaning'
(2) nor provides a coherent idea of 'agency.'
I agree; this is at the root of
the mind-brain problem.
[3]
In MIR-terms : (from TA112 [4])
{ ‘The Biological
Basis Of Thinking.
The subject’s activity may be
difficult to see in the more elementary
structures, like qualia and gestalt-formations, because they arise biologically, automatically, and are
thus not deliberately influenced or designed
by the subject, who starts thinking from the later deliberate stage, and
perceives the early one mistakenly as
‘given’ in a pre-structured (ready-made)
state. Spontaneous gestalt-generation is indeed
a main reason for the prevalent
ontological leap of faith to a mind-independent world in the MIR-views. But contrary to this belief, pain, colour,
smell, gestalt-formation, touch sensation
are produced by the organisms’ activity, and would not occur without it.
And
more generally, all biological structures, starting with self-replicating
molecules, even before reaching the level of the DNA mechanism, affirm themselves;
they sort of assert ‘that is how I am
and what I do’. To what extent they
will further replicate depends on their success (natural selection,
Darwin). The long term overall results
of spontaneous-mutation-plus-natural-selection may be misinterpreted as-if acquired individual characteristics
were inherited - or
also, by the way, as-if they had been purposefully designed by an intelligent
agent, such as God or Nature. These views are extensions from the anthropocentric-design view,
which is our only available start-point for thinking.
One
can understand deliberate intelligent
design as a continuation of biological
development. That might respond to a question
which Byers poses in his book on mathematics (p.321) : whether it is reasonable to say that natural
processes are intelligent. Over the
long term, they behave as-if they were intelligent. ’ }
[4]
The objective relationships in
this quote are, as mentioned, complicated by the fact that no one can start thinking from anywhere except
from his own subject-inclusive (‘top-down’ as you call it <4>) anthropo-morphic ‘intelligent’
experience - assertions
to the contrary notwithstanding. All objective understanding and explaining happens
within primary subject-inclusive understanding. And also, the evolutionary explanations have
been around only since Darwin, and most other objective explanations are also
historically fairly recent, and are even for that reason alone secondary to subject-inclusive
experience, although they are often valid in the (as-if-) MIR view.
[5]
The scientific method of
objectivity wants to minimize subjective bias, not to eliminate the subject(s). If we forget that, we may be in trouble :
[HF] <4>
: ‘In a view, which is limited to
a 'blind' process, constructivism is given short shrift, since if conscious
choice is an outcome; that outcome, by definition, is a 'new beginning.'
[HFJM] Precisely; the result of the short shrift is what
Thomas Nagel called ‘the view from nowhere’;
or more to the point, a ‘view without
viewers’. We, the subjects, are eliminated in such an
exclusively-objective view, which as just mentioned is NOT required for
scientific study. And : as
you point out, it is impossible to conclusively derive or explain the primary (encompassing
experience with its meaning and agency)
starting from the secondary (circumscribed
objective findings) even though one can sometimes
approximate them in an as-if manner, as sketched above.
We will therefore have to
understand the objective understandings as structures within subject-inclusive experience. It is ‘by definition a new beginning’ only if one posits (erroneously) that
subject-exclusivity is fundamental. What
objectively may appear to be a ‘new beginning’ is really the original beginning.
[6]
Constructivism does the opposite : all mental
structures emerge within the (human or also to some extent animal) experience,
which is encompassing, as Jaspers has emphasized; the encompassment is a starting characteristic
and cannot be derived from elsewhere. In difference to the subject-elimination in
exclusive objectivity, the structures are not eliminated in
the 0-D structuring view, but they are no longer understood as primary and
mind-independent (MIR), but as our (pragmatic) tools. This would apply also to what you call <5>
‘organically morphological’, which I guess means naturalistic onta.
Michael Schwartz (in C3) raises
the point that one always has the resources of the world and of other people
available for the task of structuring one’s self. Quite
true, but even with this help one is ‘left to one’s own devices’; autistic persons have
problems utilizing the social resources, for instance. I
would also tend to disagree with MS’ opinion that ‘all structures are abstractions’;
for instance the ones which are
discussed in this note, including the
self, are mostly quite concrete working
tools everybody needs for thinking and living.
[7]
[HF]<4> ‘Agency' implies that the
determinative process loops from the top-down.
It 'gets
going' from whence we can be conscious
of it.
[HFJM] ‘Agency’ means that we (subjects) create and
use the structures with
some degree of (conscious) deliberation.
Nevertheless,
the question arises how we understand them : are they our creations and tools (for our
operations) or do we assume that they are mind-independently
created and structured (either by themselves, or by some imaginary outside
agency, both of which mean metaphysics).
Metaphysics
implies that we deny our agency, at least in part.
[8]
Re <5> I agree that
‘bounds’ are aspects of forms, and that <6> natural forms have evolved,
but should not be taken to explain the forms of thinking : the latter are primary. <7> ‘Awareness of forms’ sure, but the
point is that they are not ‘given’ in a ready-made state, we
have to do all the structuring within the range of the possible (what is
possible is shown by feedback during use), with and without
gestalt-formations. Even pain is not there if we don’t
participate, it is abolished by anaesthesia, and smell by a cold. The
basic situation is that : all takes place within encompassing
experience, there is no other possibility.
Perhaps you want to say that
consciousness cannot be explained in objective terms : indeed it cannot, and that causes the problem
of the mind-brain puzzle. One has to acknowledge
encompassing experience as the basis.
[9]
Re <10> From what you say, it seems that by ‘reification’ you mean that one uses nouns instead of verbs
or adjectives - but that is (pace Jacques Derrida) a purely
grammatical difference. The question which matters is whether one sees the concepts as human
tools or - perhaps
largely by default - humans as the mind-less tools of mind-independent structures. The mind (experience) is something we do, not
a thing, and it cannot become a thing,
because that could make it a structured object, that is to say, as-if-mind-independent. If you find the term ‘mind’ difficult to use,
maybe ‘experience’ or ‘awareness’ are
more acceptable (though, mind you, they are also nouns). ‘Organisms’ and ‘systems’ are useful concepts
for research, as you say. I would think that if we are mindful that all
concepts are our tools (and not vice versa) there are no grave dangers.
You might be interested in the
book by Byers, which I discuss in the appendix to TA112. He
shows that questions of this type also arise in the center of mathematics, which I found
surprising.
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REFERENCES
Byers, W. (2007) How Mathematicians
think. Using
Ambiguity, Contradiction, and Paradox to Create Mathematics. Princeton University Press
: Princeton and Oxford.
Jaspers, K. (1947 / 1991) Von der Wahrheit. Piper: München.
Nagel, T. (1986) The
View from Nowhere. Oxford University Press: Oxford.
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Herbert FJ Müller
e-mail <herbert.muller (at) mcgill.ca>