KARL JASPERS
FORUM
TA 122
(Müller)
Response 3 (to C2, Fisher)
EMBODIMENT AND REIFICATION
by Herbert FJ M Müller
25 February 2009, posted 28 February 2009
[1]
I would like to thank Harwood Fisher for his commentary. As he writes, there are some differences of
opinion, and I would appreciate clarification.
Let me start by describing my
position about structures (from TA112 [3]) :
‘
Structures Created And
Determined By Doing
Versus Primary Given
Ready-Made Structures. The situation in perception and
reality-design is similar to the one in motor coordination development and
fine tuning, which finds its optimum in effective doing. All mental structures and their precursors -
concerning self, world, and everything
- are pragmatically
structured, affirmed, posited,
and tried out within ongoing experience which is an unstructured matrix or background for
structures : zero-derivation (0-D). All structures therefore require and include the subject(s)’ activity. Reality is not found or given in a
subject-exclusive mind-independently ready-made state (MIR). Instead of
trying to discover an imaginary given
single MIReality and world, we devise multiple conceptual designs for structuring and handling experience as it
happens; the world is a stage that we
build as we can. Instead of either
accepting or rejecting metaphysics-ontology (MIR-belief), it is transformed into reality-design (working-metaphysics). ’
[2]
Concerning particular points of HF’s comment :
Re <3> HF : ‘ Here come
the reifications -- on both sides of the fence.
I agree that Johnson's statements there mash things down so that the
levels of consciousness and the questions of agency are inadequately and
illogically handled. But the distinctions
between a 'proto-self' or sense of 'me' and the 'I' while involving a hefty
dependence on concepts of construction, make little sense without working in
assumptions of bounds -- whether in classicatory
conceptions or in categorical distinctions, replete with the constraints of the
logic necessary for thought and its evaluation. ’
HFJM : I have difficulty following this statement; and
that actually relates to my original question. ‘Here come the reifications’ : I guess there are two ways trying to understand
this.
(a) HF means
that there arise working-structures, which one needs to deal with the
subjective aspect of experience. This is how I would see it -
but then I don’t know what HF means by the term ‘reifications.’
(b) HF means that
the reifications are onta, that is, mind-independent
realities, which is the traditional
meaning of metaphysical-ontological entities, and also the one Strawson used for ‘things’ in his neo-metaphysics. In that case I have
to disagree, because the mind cannot be mind-independent, nor can the
self-structures inside the mind be mind-independent.
How does the notion of ‘bounds’ come in
? Structures
have pragmatic boundaries as one of their characteristics, so what is the
intention of this statement ? Also, I don’t see logical problems in the
constructivist view; what
are you referring to ?
[3]
Re <6> HF: ‘ I see your alternative as
ontologically loaded and headed toward the problems I outlined above. ’
HFJM :
My argument is that ontology is non-functional, because it excludes the
subject(s), and should be replaced by more functional subject-inclusive ‘reality-design’. That would imply that my proposal cannot be
‘ontologically loaded’
- unless by ‘ontology’ you
mean something different from what I described above.
---------------------------------------------------------
Herbert FJ Müller
e-mail <herbert.muller (at)
mcgill.ca>