KARL JASPERS FORUM
TA 112 (Müller)
Commentary 4 (to R2)
( THEISM AND CONSTRUCTION )
by Richard Moodey
25 February 2009, posted 28 February 20009
HFJM  The recent discussions (for instance by Fisher and Moodey) about 'reification' (thing-ification) and 'construction' in embodiment are not clear to me, and I would appreciate explanation, concerning the metaphysics-ontology aspect : whether or not the 'thing'-structures are meant to be mind-independently real (see discussion above, especially the part concerning Strawson). Despite this ontology-question-in-principle, neural models can be, and are usually, dealt with in mind-independent objective terms, and in discussing biology this as-if-objectivity often poses no problems for discussion, while in discussing 'mind' it always does.
The real alternative is : imagined pre-structured subject-exclusive metaphysics versus active subject-inclusive structuring.
MOODEY: MY THEISTIC ANSWER IS, PRECISELY BECAUSE IT IS THEISTIC, NOT "PURELY" PHILOSOPHICAL (I AM SKEPTICAL ABOUT THE PERSUASIVENESS OF PHILOSOPHICAL PROOFS FOR THE EXISTENCE OF GOD). NEVERTHELESS, MY EXTRA-PHILOSOPHICAL BELIEF IN GOD INFLUENCES MY PHILOSOPHICAL POSITION. BECAUSE I ATTRIBUTE "MIND" TO GOD, I DON'T THINK ANYTHING IS, ULTIMATELY, MIND INDEPENDENT. CREATURES ARE CONTINGENT, AND THAT UPON WHICH THEY ARE CONTINGENCE HAS A MIND. BUT IT DO HOLD THAT THERE ARE ALL SORTS OF THINGS THAT ARE NOT CONTINGENT UPON HUMAN MINDS. I HOPE THIS CLARIFIES MY POSITION.
e-mail < MOODEY001 (at) gannon.edu >