KARL JASPERS FORUM
TA 110 (Mind and Metaphysics)
Commentary 15 (to C14, Moodey)
THE BODY AS MENTAL CONSTRUCT
by William A. Adams
5 February 2009, posted 14 February 2009
<1>
Richard Moodey responded to remarks made by
Herbert Muller and me about Mark Johnson's "The Meaning of the Body,
2007." No doubt Muller will have
his own reply but I will comment briefly on Moodey's
response to Muller's and to my remarks.
Moodey on Muller on
Johnson:
<2>
Moodey <2>
disagrees with Johnson's contention that the search for truth has been up to
now disembodied, but Moodey does not explain his
disagreement. In what way, for example,
is the computational theory of mind not "disembodied"? It explicitly asserts that a human mind could
be implemented in a computer (e.g., Edelman, 2008, Putnam, 1961). We could ask
the same of Plato's Forms, Chomsky's transformational linguistics, and so on. Are they not all conceptualizations of a disembodied of
reality?
<3>
Moodey: <4>
reacts to Muller's distinction between experienced pain and described pain by
saying they are "different perspectives" on something. For that point
of view to be more than metaphor, Moodey should
elaborate (1) who or what agent enjoys these two perspectives (and from what
point of view); and (2) what is the unitary reality beneath the two
perspectives (and how would anyone know)?
I don't think double-aspectism is a viable
reframing of Muller's distinction, but perhaps I am under-informed.
<4>
Moodey <5> does
not reject metaphysics and ontology because as a critical realist, he would
like to use them to make truer statements about mind and world. That is a
reasonable strategy, as long as the statements are taken as true only in the
sense of having internal validity. Like a chess game, as long as each move is
conducted within the rules, it is valid.
However it seems that Moodey wants to make
True (or Truer) statements about the world that go beyond the arbitrary or
hypothetical, to statements with genuine external validity. What justification
is there for thinking that could be possible?
<5>
Moodey <6>
concurs with Muller that subjectivity cannot be omitted from an account of
reality, and says that if someone denies "I" as organizer of experience,
he or she should not use the pronoun.
However, there are some well-trodden paths around that conundrum. Dennett's (1991) notion of the narrative self
is one. Still, I wonder how Moodey accounts for experienced subjectivity in his
"double aspect" view of mind and body. Does the inclusion of subjectivity actually
make it a triple aspect?
Moodey on Adams on
Johnson:
<6>
Moodey <2> agrees
that the brain is not the subject of experience, not a homunculus, but reminds
us that learning does modify the brain, thus endorsing interactionism,
am I right? I agree there is no
universally accepted solution to the mind-brain problem, but that does not
acquit each person of coming to terms with it.
<7>
Moodey <3> does
not find Johnson's main thesis that "the purpose of the body is artistic
expression" useful. I found it
useful for implying that since artistic expression is social, the purpose of
the body would therefore be social. Why isn't that a useful insight about
embodiment? Moodey
does not elaborate his dismissal of the idea.
<8>
Moodey <3> asks
what it means to say the body is an expression of the mind. I was suggesting that the body is constituted
as a mental construct, as opposed to a biological - material entity that exists
in-itself regardless of mentality. This is an idea that has been suggested by
several authors, such as Merleau-Ponty
(1945/1962).
<9>
Moodey <4> is skeptical, but kindly not reactionary, to my proposal that
the purposes of the body are (1) to keep us apart, and (2) to bring us
together. I suggested that Johnson's
thesis is compatible with the second of these.
Moodey asks, who is
the subject that "performs" the purpose of the body? Why, it is me,
of course, in the case of my own body. Each person has introspective access to
the fact of their own subjectivity. Have I misunderstood the question?
<10>
Moodey <4> asks
if my proposed purposes of the body are compatible with the theory of
evolution. I believe so, although the
explanation would need a more capacious venue than this. But we should not forget that the theory of evolution
is a theory of biology for the purpose of accounting for biological data. It has nothing at all to say about
subjectivity, consciousness, or the mind, because as a scientific theory, it
simply cannot.
<11>
Moodey <4> asks
if I equate purpose to function, and if purpose implies an intelligent
designer. It does, and that designer is
me, and the community in which I am embedded and from which I arose. Individually and together we collaboratively
have projected (and reified into free-standing biology), the human body (Adams,
unpublished, 2008). Nothing supernatural
is involved however. "Purpose" implies intentionality, whereas
"function" need not.
<12>
I thank Richard Moodey for thoughtful and
challenging comments and questions, and I hope I have not put words into
Herbert Muller's mouth.
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REFERENCES:
Adams, W.A. (unpublished, 2008 revision). The Three-In-One Mind, Chapters 6 and 8. Available as of this date at
http://www.waadams.net/manuscripts/Three%20in%20One/06%20The%20Body.pdf and http://www.waadams.net/manuscripts/Three%20in%20One/08%20Purpose%20of%20the%
20Body.pdf
Dennett, D. C. (1991) Consciousness Explained. Boston: Little Brown and Company
Edelman, S. (2008). Computing the Mind: How the Mind
Really Works. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Merleau-Ponty, M. (1962). Phenomenology of Perception. London: Routledge
& Kegan Paul. (Original
published in 1945).
Putnam, H. (1961). Brains and Behavior. Presented at a conference
of the American Association for the Advancement of Science, December 27, 1961. Reprinted in Block, N.
(Ed.) (1980). Readings in Philosophy of Psychology, Vol.
1. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 24-36.
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Bill Adams
e-mail
<bill.adams(at)waadams.net>