KARL
JASPERS FORUM
TA 109
(Bhatt)
Commentary 2 (to TA109, S R Bhatt, and to C1 to TA109, F Holmgren)
THE
MIND-BRAIN PUZZLE AND BUDDHIST AND WESTERN EPISTEMOLOGIES
by Herbert FJ Müller
26 July 2008, posted 9 August 2008
<1>
Both of these very helpful outlines of the Buddhist theory of knowledge evoke
Karl Jaspers’ concept of the ‘Pivotal’ or ‘Axis Time’ (in the first millennium
BC) in the history of thinking, when important developments took place simultaneously
in several great cultures (China, India, the Middle East, and Greece),
apparently independently of each other : reflection and self-awareness then began
to confront traditional shamanism and mythos. This, one might add, was an
important early step in a development that still continues.
<2>
Of particular concern to me is what Bhatt describes in part I [2] of TA109 as
the ‘no-substance ontology’ of Buddhism, which corresponds to ‘reality’ as
unstructured and as directed toward realization of Nirvana. It may also correspond
to what I have called ‘structuring in the unstructured background’ or
‘zero-derivation (0-D) structuring’. Such a start point is in my opinion
a necessary condition for dealing with the mind-brain relation, which is my
primary interest. The unstructured start point has frequently been re-invented
(see my TA1 [8]); the reason is that it was often forgotten, because in the wish
for external certainty a primary pre-existing mind-independently structured
reality was desired and posited, and that is not compatible with an
unstructured start-point.
<3>
This meaning of ‘no substance’ seems also compatible with the ‘ineffability of
the real’ (part VIII [56] of Bhatt’s TA109), and there are of course some
parallels to the Western metaphysics-tradition concerning this point. But
because there are no given structures, I don’t think that the word ‘ontology’ in
the traditional meaning is helpful in characterizing it (since ‘onta’ are meant
to be mind-independently pre-structured entities). Instead it would appear
that the needed structures are created ad-hoc within experience, and that they
are in principle temporary even if of long duration.
<4>
From the descriptions by Bhatt and Holmgren it thus appears that there has been
a development in Indian, particularly Buddhist, epistemology, which can be
understood as zero-structure based. They occurred in parallel to the efforts
in Occidental thinking which were mainly shaped by Platonic-Aristotelian
metaphysics. Of course these various theories of knowledge originate in a
common underlying process.
<5>
In Buddhist epistemology, a stable metaphysical state was apparently not
perceived as evident for either subject or object. The result was that onta were
treated ‘as-if’ they were given, using Vaihinger’s expression (Holmgren in TA109
C1 <5>). This is compatible with the opinion that philosophy cannot be
rid of metaphysics (TA109 C1<7>).
<6>
It is also entirely compatible with a status of ontology-metaphysics as a
mental tool, rather than as an impossible and unknowable experience-transcending
reality (cf. ‘working-ontology’, or ‘as-if-ontology-metaphysics’, see my TA57
in KJF). Such transformation of the understanding of metaphysics can deal, in
a contradiction-free manner, with the traditional dilemma of metaphysics, which
is both necessary and impossible.
<7>
Metaphysics-ontology then becomes a structural tool for the design of
prototypes suitable for handling ongoing experience. It is an instrument like
gestalt-formation, language, or mathematics, which do not require an
experience-transcending status. In my opinion this change does not invalidate
the term ‘epistemology’ as such, since one still deals with (working)
‘knowledge’, albeit in a more operational sense than is commonly used. The
latter seems to agree with the Buddhist notions of ‘process-ontology’ (TA109
[16]), and that the notion of cognizing coincides with the cognition of an
object (TA109 [19]).
<8>
One should add that the split between subject and object is not primary but
pragmatic and secondary, which means that ‘reality’ always includes the
subject(s). Taking the requirements of the mind-brain relation puzzle as
criterion for the adequacy of theories of knowledge, a subject-inclusive
operational understanding of metaphysics is needed, since without that the mind
disappears from discussion (as it does for instance in Crick’s ‘Astonishing
Hypothesis’, where it is a consequence of the strict use of ‘naturalism’, i.e.,
traditional Western metaphysics with subject-free forms or ideas).
<9>
The subject-inclusiveness of Buddhist epistemological views also seems to be
implied, for instance, in the inter-dependence of knowledge and reality, as
described in TA109 [22]. Although subject-inclusiveness has so far remained
incomplete in the Western epistemologies, it has apparently been an aspect, to
varying extent, of Buddhist epistemology, for quite some time. If this is
correct, that fact might help to overcome possible hesitations about the needed
change in the Western theories of knowledge.
<10>
That the perception of objects is, according to Dignaga, free from mental
construction (TA109 [29]ff) is on the other hand not only in conflict with the
0-D view, but also contradicts experiences such as the perception of ambiguous
figures. Has this point been discussed in the more recent Buddhist
epistemological literature ?
I would be much interested in commentaries regarding these points.
-----------------------------------------------
REFERENCES
Crick, F (1994) The Astonishing Hypothesis. The scientific search for the soul. Charles Scribner’s Sons: New York.
Jaspers K (1955), Vom Ursprung und Ziel der Geschichte. Fischer Bücherei
(Piper, München).
-----------------------------------------------
Herbert FJ
Müller
e-mail <herbert.muller (at) mcgill.ca>