KARL JASPERS FORUM
TA106 (Muller)
Commentary 51 (to C46 by Adams)
WHAT IS CONSENSUS-GENERATING
DE FACTO ?
by Serge Patlavskiy
17 September 2009, posted 26 September 2009
<1>
[William Adams] wrote:
"And we agree because our
biological sense receptors and language cultures are similar. Biology is the common denominator."
<2>
[S.P.] The question of biology is not
germane to this discussion altogether. But, let us be methodical. The case is that as a scientist, I feel myself
better (just like a fish in water) if I ground my reasoning on some
ubiquitously applicable universal principles, models, laws, and theories. But, when I see the total absence of any
theoretical instruments (like in case of consciousness studies), I try to fill
up this gap -- I try to construct the required explanatory framework myself. So, I apologize in advance for my doing this.
Now then, I have formulated a law according to which all exemplars of
consciousness are equal as to their mechanisms, so their potentialities (see my
C33 TA106 at http : // www .kjf.ca/ 106-C33PAT.htm). This means that the mechanisms of
consciousness, as well as the schemes of the process of cognition are the same
to all possible subjects of cognitive activity, including those ones with the
grey skin complexion and six fingers on their feelers.
<3>
If the subjects of cognitive
activity are looking for consensus, their intellectual products must meet the
same quality criteria (like the formulated in my C42 TA106 <6>
"Criteria of scientific correctness"; at http :
// www .kjf.ca/ 106-C42PAT.htm). Only
certain quality criteria may be "consensus-generating", but not the
"biological commonality".
<4>
[William Adams] wrote:
"However, it is not possible
for a scientist and a religionist to reach consensus on fundamental
descriptions because despite a shared language, one group does not make use of
the consensus-generating layer of biological commonality."
<5>
[S.P.] It was funny to learn that
scientists and "religionists" differ in their biological organization.
Moreover, I can hardly imagine how Bill's
idea may be applied in a case when the scientist and "religionist" is
the same person. The irony is that
sometimes it is not possible "to reach consensus on fundamental
descriptions" even for scientists from neighbouring laboratories within
the same research institution (I know this from my personal experience). The same may be said also about the
"religionists" belonging to the same confession. In both cases, the
discussions often result in "wigs on the green". :-) The problem is that one and the same R-fact (I
have coined this term as a collective name for the Reliable, commonly
observable / perceptible, scientifically well established facts) may be
interpreted from different stand-points, using different models, including
those based on the different meta-theoretical principles (see [1], p. 16 for
the list of R-facts).
We may find consensus in the
question that we do observe/register/percept something (like in a case with the
UFO, or with the phenomenon of anomalous information acquisition), but we
cannot reach consensus in explaining the observed fact. So, the very empirical observation
is not consensus-generating yet. (For more on this question see my TA74 at http : // www. kjf.ca /74-TAPAT.htm).
<6>
[William Adams] wrote:
"Probably this last dispute
is based on a false dichotomy derived from preconceptions about
"levels" and hierarchy. My
point is that to exclude the D-level in attempting to revise the communal
epistemology is a mistake. I think a
better strategy is to examine in detail exactly what constitutes an empirical
observation and its description."
<7>
[S.P.] I must have missed something
here. As follows from the spirit of Bill's
post, Religion lacks the D-level and in this it differs from Science, but now
he says that we should not exclude that level. Isn't here some contradiction
?
<8>
If we talk about Religion, and
take it to be some intellectual product, then we must accept that it may be on
any of four levels, including the D-level (the level of description and
observation). The theory (that one which
takes any intellectual product as its object of study; I call it the Applied
ADC Theory -- the theory of appearance, development and compatibility of
intellectual products; see [2]) holds that whatever intellectual product we
take, we should take into account its four (nor more nor less) levels. Even if
we say that Religion -- it is some belief system (i.e., it is the MT-level
intellectual product), we all the same must remember that there necessarily are
other three levels which are just not actualized in this concrete discussion,
or in this concrete context. For more on
this question, see my C1 (TA106), C24 (TA81-82) and C5 (TA88).
----------------------------------------------------
References:
[1] http :
//www. serge-patlavskiy.webs.
com/KeyIngredients.pdf
[2] http :
//www. serge-patlavskiy.webs.
com/ADC-theory.html
-----------------------------------------------------
Serge Patlavskiy
e-mail <prodigyPSF @ rambler . ru>
.