KARL JASPERS FORUM
TA106 (Müller)
Commentary 50 (Reply to R19 by Herbert FJ Müller)
TWO KINDS OF DUALISM
by William A. Adams
16 September 2009, posted 26
September 2009
<1>
Herbert Müller raised several
interesting and difficult points in his R19 comment. However,
before addressing them, I would like to clarify a possible misunderstanding
which, if uncorrected, would stymie attempts at further discussion.
<2>
Dr. Müller said [2] that mental
structures (knowledge and conjectures) “are our working-structures in the
unstructured. ‘Introspection’ is an
aspect of phenomenology and as such does not mean dualism, which itself is a
secondary development : it means that an ontological difference
between self and world is posited as fundamental. The statement that ‘observation’ does not
make sense without dualism (Adams <6>) reflects the prevailing opinion
that reality is mind-independent, but that problem disappears in a thorough
phenomenological view.”
<3>
It seems to me that the foregoing quote
mixes ontological dualism with epistemological dualism. Cartesian dualism divides that which exists
into extended (e.g., physical) and unextended (e.g.,
mental). Müller’s
objection to this dichotomy is at the very foundation of his T106, and much
else discussed on this site. I also
reject that distinction, except to allow it as a functional, pragmatic, “as-if”
distinction constructed by the mind to facilitate conceptualization and action.
I agree with Müller that traditional
ontological dualism has no intrinsic validity, and perseveres only by custom
and for convenience.
<4>
Epistemological dualism, on the
other hand, distinguishes between the knower and the known, the observer and
the observed, the believer and that which is believed, and so on. It is
orthogonal to (independent of) ontological dualism. A believer can believe that God exists,
whether or not God does exist. One’s belief, knowledge, and observations
imply to that person that the epistemological object does actually exist, but
that is just another belief. The fact of the matter might be otherwise.
<5>
A person can claim to know
something when in fact they do not, but that is not an ontological problem. I can
say that I know that 2+2=5, or that there is life on Mars, or that God exists,
and from my own point of view, this implies certain ontological truths about
what does exist and what is true. From the point of view of the larger knowledge
community, however, it might be ascertainable that the speaker’s claims are
either false, or at least not known to be true, with respect to ontology. The
community’s accepted body of ontological knowledge trumps individual belief
when it comes to truth claims, because ontological statements are defined
primarily by consensus in the germane community, and that is because there is
no omniscient point of view.
<6>
So when Müller asserts [2]
that ‘Introspection’ is an aspect of
phenomenology and as such does not mean dualism, which itself is a secondary
development : it means that an ontological
difference between self and world is posited as fundamental,” I do not agree. Introspection/phenomenology does entail
epistemological dualism, a separation between apprehender and that which is
apprehended, but that does not imply anything about the world. Husserl was clear about this. He
distinguished noema and noesis
as the poles of an epistemological dualism, but said repeatedly that neither
implied anything about the world. We
accept the phenomena as they are given to the mind. Where they
came from, we do not know and do not care, he said. That’s why phenomenology does not imply
idealism. It has nothing to do with Cartesian
dualism. (Later Husserl introduced the
transcendental ego which compromised this approach, but let’s skip that for
now).
<7>
Müller says [2] that “The
statement that ‘observation’ does not make sense without dualism (Adams
<6>) reflects the prevailing opinion that reality is mind-independent,
but that problem disappears in a thorough phenomenological view,” That is not a clear statement, as I don’t know
what the “disappearance” is all about. Observation (including phenomenological
observation) need not imply anything about the world, and does not entail
ontological dualism. Yet I still say that “observation” does not
make sense without epistemological dualism. What
does observation mean if we do not distinguish observer from the observed, the
knower from the known ? A state of unknowing existence is brute
existence, in which nothing is observed, nothing is known, nothing is believed,
etc. In order for any knowledge, belief, or
observation to emerge, an epistemological dualism must be established. I do
not understand the idea of knowledge without a knower, belief without anyone
who believes it, observations made by nobody and nothing. To my
mind, there is no point of view from which to assert such a unipolar
epistemology. Maybe I am in a mental
rut, but I cannot comprehend how observation could be defined without
presupposing epistemological dualism.
<8>
Having said that, let
me qualify it. The necessity of
presupposing epistemological dualism was Jack Petranker’s
objection to Alan Wallace’s description of a nondual
way of knowing, the topic of my earlier post.
I attempted to defend Wallace by suggesting (only suggesting) that there
might be a way of knowing that combines epistemological dualism and nondualism. But the
idea of doing away with epistemological dualism altogether is
self-contradictory, undercutting the very basis of communication. If I have misunderstood Müller’s
objection to all “dualism” I anticipate instruction. I think until we clarify this point, future
discussion will be confusing.
--------------------------------------------------
Bill Adams
e-mail <bill.adams111(at)gmail.com>