KARL JASPERS FORUM
TA106 (Muller)
Commentary 48 (to R18 Muller)
CAN NOUMENAL REALITY BE THOUGHT ABOUT ?
by Serge Patlavskiy
13 September 2009, posted 19 September 2009
<1>
[Herbert Muller] wrote:
"[3] Consciousness as an
‘ability to deal with information’ <8> is correct but incomplete, because
firstly mental structures are also developed within mind (or consciousness);
..."
<2>
[S.P.] There are short definitions and
long (full) definitions. The one above is a short (or presentational, or
advertising) definition. I may also extend this definition by stating that
consciousness is an ability of making the life-sustaining profit on dealing
with information.
<3>
But, the full definition is much
longer: consciousness is "an ability of a system to keep ones entropy on a
sufficiently low level by (1) performing the loop-like acts of (a) processing
the physical sensory signals, and/or the already available elements of
knowledge, and (b) conceptualization of the processed physical sensory signals
by converting them into information (by which we mean or the difference between
the known and the unknown for the given subject of cognitive activity, or the
increment of information, or the new element of knowledge), and (2)
constructing the intellectual products in the form of inner speech,
imagination, behaviour, language, etc."
<4>
Since it is not always convenient
using the full definitions, the whole sentence in the quotation marks replaces
by the phrase "a way of dealing with information". By the way, what
do we mean by the term "mental structures"? Do we mean the elements
of subjective experience, or the elements of the mechanisms of consciousness?
<5>
[Herbert Muller] wrote:
"[3] "... and secondly
all kinds of non-conscious systems, biological and other, deal with
information."
<6>
[S.P.] This idea coincides with my own
view, which holds that for anything to exist, it must be describable
simultaneously by informational, material and energetic characteristics. The
correlation of these three characteristics gives rise to the entropy
characteristic of the whole system. Both the system{stone}
and the system{living object} are "information-sensitive" -- their
informational characteristics are equally changeable. So, I suggest a doctrine
of pan-informationism instead of panpsychism.
The difference between these systems is only in a value of their entropy
characteristics. The case is that if the value of entropy characteristic
becomes sufficiently low, then the system acquires the possibility to keep its
entropy on such a low level itself -- the system becomes self-organizing. Only
from this point onwards we may start talking about consciousness. I mean that a
stone does not possess consciousness yet. At any rate, I have already addressed
this point in my C41 <12>.
<7>
[Herbert Muller] wrote:
"[5] You and the
neo-metaphysicians are right that the noumena are in the
mind, but not as knowledge of a fictitious external mind-independent world.
This claim overlooks that one cannot even perceive objects directly, because
they require completion by the subject, ... The ‘noumena’ are reality-designs within the mind and they
should be called that."
<8>
[S.P.] I have never stated that
"the noumena are in the mind"!!! Please, refer
to my C41 <11>: "The meta-theory, I elaborate, presumes that there are
two realities: Noumenal Reality and Phenomenal
Reality (but not only one reality, as constructivism holds). The first one is
cognitively independent (or, mind-independent) and, thereby, existent
objectively. The second one is given in perception to the subject of cognitive activity,
and, thereby, is subjective. The task of Science is to make Phenomenal Reality
as closely approaching Noumenal
Reality as possible."
<9>
So, it is a phenomenon (or,
Phenomenal Reality in general) that is in mind. We postulate the
mind-independent existence of Noumenal Reality, and
what we have in mind is just a model of Noumenal
Reality. We permanently test out in practice whether this model is sufficiently
correct. The noumena are mind-independent, and can by
no means be treated as "reality-designs within the mind". During the
process of cognition, the subject of cognitive activity enframes
(isolates) some entity (some noumenon), ascribes such
or other properties to it, thereby transforming it into the object of cognition
(or the phenomenon). Hope, there will be no misunderstanding this time.
<10>
[Herbert Muller] wrote:
"[5] In sum, it seems to me
that in your discussion you have not dealt with my initial question: how can
you think something if it is not in your mind? I would still be interested to
know your answer concerning this point."
<11>
[S.P.] I do not understand what the
problem here is. It stands to reason that nothing can be "think" if it is not in mind. As it seems to me, the phrases
"to think about something" and "to have something in mind"
have identical meanings. The other question is whether Noumenal
Reality can be in mind, or can be thought about. Yes, the noumenon
is not formalizable (at least, by the conventional
means of formalization). But, my approach presumes formalising (or thinking
about) the noumenon as some integrated information
system, since, by definition, this system includes all possible information
(all possible knowledge) about the entity of interest. When the system{noumenon} collapses (say,
during the process of cognition), then the noumenon
transforms into phenomenon. In other words, the phenomenon -- it is a partial
knowledge (or, limited information) about the noumenon.
Moreover, when I formalize Noumenal Reality as the IIS{Noumenal Reality}, I presume
that it must obey the universal law of IIS-development. In other words,
whatever Noumenal Reality might be, the IIS{Noumenal Reality} must obey the same natural law as the
IIS{atom}, the IIS{living cell), the IIS{human}, etc.
<12>
Yes, the integrated information
system -- it is some theoretical model, but any model is in mind. Therefore,
what I call "the IIS{noumenon}"
is nothing but some phenomenon in mind. But, my now-how here is that the IIS-model
of Reality (or, the IIS-version of Phenomenal Reality) is in one-to-one
correspondence with Noumenal Reality, and that the IIS{noumenon} is in one-to-one
correspondence with the mind-independently (objectively) existing noumenon (such is the Third basic idea of my
meta-theoretical system, see http : // cogprints .
org / 4633 /). Consequently, a theoretically possible is that if we produce some
change to the IIS-model of Reality (to the model which is in our mind), this
will (may) cause a (physical, actual, etc.) change in Noumenal
Reality. Therefore, the application of the IIS-formalization must be enough
dangerous enterprise. For example, if we construct (in mind) the IIS-model of a
solar system and produce a certain change to it, this may cause, say, the
Jupiter to move in an opposite direction.
------------------------------------------------
Serge Patlavskiy
e-mail <prodigyPSF (dog) rambler . ru>
.