KARL JASPERS FORUM
TA 102 (Vimal)
Commentary 9
"THE NATURE OF TIME"
by Adhanom Andemicael
9 December 2009, posted 12 December 2009
http://listserv.liv.ac.uk/cgi-bin/wa?A1=ind0911&L=chora#64
<1>[Adhanom Andemicael]
In order for an entity to exist
concretely, the entity must exist at the "present moment of time."
Entities that exist in the past or the future do not exist concretely.
<2>
Let us consider the following two
statements:
A) There exists an objective,
three-dimensional world.
B) There exists an objective
present moment of time.
<3>
In order for statement A to be
true, statement B must be true.
<4>
Is statement B true? Does there exist an objective present moment of time?
<5>
We know that the mind experiences
its own *subjective* present (i.e., its own *phenomenal*
present). It is clear, therefore, that there exists a *subjective*
present moment of time. However, it is not at all clear that there exists an *objective*
present (i.e., a present that exists independently of the mind).
<6>[Danny
Frederick]
Hi Adhanom,
There is an ambiguity in your
(B). It is a familiar one. What does the 'present moment' mean? Is it an
indexical that picks out a particular time that we could date? Or is it a
general property that applies to any moment at the time that it is present? The
existence of an objective extended temporal dimension implies your (B) in the
first case but not in the second. To put
it another way, if time is objective (as an extended dimension) then any
particular point in time (or minimally extended temporal span) is objective;
therefore the present moment (let's say noon on 24 November 2009) is objective. But
someone could admit this even if he denies that there is any such thing as
temporal presence (the now).
<7>[Adhanom Andemicael]
One way of conceiving of time is
as follows:
There is an "objective
present." This present moves (somehow) from one date to the next (e.g.,
from Jan. 1, 2000 to Jan. 2, 2000). When the present arrives at Jan. 1, Jan. 1
comes into existence. When the present arrives at Jan. 2, Jan. 2 comes into
existence. (As soon as the present moves from Jan. 1 to Jan. 2, Jan. 1 ceases
to exist.)
<8>
In this conception, it is not
clear what the "objective present" actually *is*. Whatever the
present is, it is something that is capable of *moving* from one date to
the next.
<9>
If this moving, objective present
does not exist, dates (e.g., Jan. 1, Jan. 2, etc.) cannot exist. (They cannot
exist because they can never posses the property of being present.)
***
<10>
In my messages, I make reference
to the "objective present" and the "objective present moment of
time." Please note that I'm referring to the moving "objective
present" described above.
***
<11>[Danny
Frederick]
To put it another way, if time is
objective (as an extended dimension) then any particular point in time (or
minimally extended temporal span) is objective; therefore the present moment
(let's say noon on 24 November 2009) is objective.
<12>[Adhanom Andemicael]
"12:00 PM, 24 November
2009" is a "location in time." (Note however that the "objective
present" is *not* a "location in time.")
<13>[Adhanom Andemicael]
The
"objective present" *moves* from one "location in
time" to another. However, a
"location in time" remains fixed at a particular
"location in time."
***
<14>[Danny
Frederick]
I think your (A) was badly
formulated, which is why I have not referred to it. Did you mean to say
'four-dimensional world'?
<15>[Adhanom Andemicael]
No. Here is statement (A) again:
"A) There
exists an objective, three-dimensional world."
***
<16>[Adhanom Andemicael]
The following is a slightly
altered version of the message I posted on Nov. 23. I use the term
"objective present" in this version. Please note that I'm referring
to the moving "objective present" described above:
***
<17>
In order for an entity to exist
concretely, the entity must exist at the present. Entities that exist in the
past or the future do not exist concretely. (Past and future entities are less
real than present entities.)
<18>
Let us consider the following two
statements:
A) There exists an objective,
three-dimensional world. B) There exists
an objective present.
<19>
In order for statement A to be
true, statement B must be true.
<20>
Is statement B true? Does there exist an objective present?
<21>
We know that the mind experiences
its own *subjective* present i.e., its own *phenomenal*
present). It is clear, therefore, that there exists a *subjective*
present. However, it is not at all clear that there exists an *objective*
present (i.e., a present that exists independently of the mind).
***
<22>[Adhanom Andemicael]
I discuss subjective time flow in
my paper "Temporal Passage":
http://home.att.net/~Andemicael/intro.html
***
<23>[Danny
Frederick]
So someone can accept your (A),
that there exists an objective three-dimensional world, while denying your (B),
that there exists an objective present (in your sense of 'objective present').
Someone who did that would be denying that anything exists concretely in your
sense; but he would still accept that there are objective existents (past,
present and future). Basically, he would say there is a B-series but no
A-series (have I recalled those terms correctly?); he would say that there is
temporal order but no temporal passage. On this view tenses would be indexical
expressions that could be eliminated without loss by means of 'eternal
sentences.'
<24>[Adhanom Andemicael]
Please note that in statement A,
I'm talking about a *concrete*, objective, three-dimensional world. (I'm
sorry I wasn't clear about this.)
<25>
In my last posting, I wrote:
"Let us consider the
following two statements:
A) There exists an objective,
three-dimensional world.
B) There exists an objective
present.
<26>
In order for statement A to be
true, statement B must be true."
<27>
However, I should have written:
"Let us consider the
following two statements:
A) There exists a concrete,
objective, three-dimensional world.
B) There exists an objective
present.
<28>
In order for statement A to be
true, statement B must be true."
***
<29>[Adhanom Andemicael]
If there is no "objective
present," there can be no concrete, objective world.
<30>
Many B-theorists claim that there
is no "objective present." Yet they maintain that there is a
concrete, objective world.
***
<31>[Danny
Frederick]
So someone can accept your (A),
that there exists an objective three-dimensional world, while denying your (B),
that there exists an objective present (in your sense of 'objective present').
Someone who did that would be denying that anything exists concretely in your
sense; but he would still accept that there are objective existents (past,
present and future). Basically, he would say there is a B-series but no
A-series (have I recalled those terms correctly?); he would say that there is
temporal order but no temporal passage. On this view tenses would be indexical
expressions that could be eliminated without loss by means of 'eternal sentences.'
<32>[Adhanom Andemicael]
Okay.
***
<33>[Adhanom Andemicael]
Dates that lack the property of
being present are unreal. B-series dates
lack the property of being present. Dates in this series are therefore unreal.
(Note: B-theorists claim that
dates in the B-series are real.)
http://home.att.net/~Andemicael/intro.html
Target Article 61
http://www.kjf.ca/61-TAAND.htm
------------------------------------------------
Adhanom Andemicael
e-mail <Andemicael (at) att.net
>