KARL JASPERS FORUM
TA102-103
(Vimal)
Commentary
3
CO-EVOLUTION ?
by Herbert FJ Müller
18 January 2008, posted 26 January 2008
<1>
In answer to your proposal for an epistemological view to deal with the
mind/brain question, I will start by discussing one central aspect which influences
your theory, and which I therefore think needs general consideration. This is not to say that this is the only
thing to be considered, far from it; but I think it is a better strategy to pay
attention to one important point at one time rather than many. I hope that this is ok with you, and that it
can serve as a starting point for further discussion, in case you are
interested.
<2>
(The following is quoted from the abstract of your TA103: ) “Our hypothesis is
that matter (mass, charge, and space-time) and associated elemental PEs
co-evolved and co-developed into neural-nets and associated neural-net PEs,
respectively. The signals related
to neural PEs interact in a neural-net and neural-net PEs emerge (possibly by
the chaotic process of self-organization), which are then embedded in the
neural-net by the processes of development and sensorimotor
tuning with external stimuli. That is, neural-net PEs are
a set of SEs embedded in a neural-net.”
<3>
Let me start by discussing this from a phenomenological point of view. Mental structures are formed within ongoing subjective
experience (SE); this concerns all mental structures, including for instance
qualia such as pain, color, heat; gestalt formations, ideas, words, numbers,
and word-gestalt concepts such as ‘objects’, and their properties such as mass,
charge, spin, etc. The decisive term
here is ‘within’, because it means that none of the structures, including the
ones referring to ‘the world’ (such as ‘matter’ or ‘micro-matter’), can occur
without (outside of or independently of) SE.
This is a ‘topological’ question if you like. Seen from the SE side, this means that SE is
‘encompassing’, which is a central concept in Karl Jaspers’ epistemology. He wrote (for instance in 1948/91 pp.38-39) that
‘we are in the encompassing and we ourselves are the encompassing’.
<4>
If Jaspers’ observation is correct, as I believe it is, both materialism and
idealism are impossible (and you appear, in principle at least, to share this
opinion). Neither matter nor ideas can
exist before and independently of SE, as mind-independent realities (MIRs =
metaphysics-ontology). This applies to
any kind of matter, no matter what its ‘size’ is; thus neither objects, nor the physical universe, nor quanta or sub-quanta are possible
before, outside, or independently, of SE.
‘Dual-aspect’ views are unhelpful because they tend to ignore and thus obscure
this problem.
<5>
Now that in turn implies that ‘co-evolution’ of SE and
matter is impossible. SE is first, it is
the background or matrix in which concepts like ‘matter’ can be structured. The idea of neural nets as material ‘explanation’
of mind would be an example of what Jaspers had called ‘brain-mythology’; and
the situation has not changed since he wrote this. As I see it, understanding of mental activity
in terms of brain and nervous function, or of any other ‘objective’ structure
or function, occurs within SE, and there is no way of inverting or otherwise
changing this relationship. The same reasoning
applies to more recent mythologies about microtubules, quanta, sub-quanta, etc. The subject can never become an object that
can be structured and observed (even though it can have a name like an object, such
as ‘subject’, or ‘SE’).
I add a quote on this last point from my
TA93 (and if you have time, I would be interested in your opinion of this paper) :
----------------------------------------------
“ [31]
E. THE SUBJECT IS NOT OBSERVABLE
The subjective aspect of
experience (or consciousness) has "to remain empirically
inscrutable"; it cannot become objective because "the reflecting self
... becomes the governor and cannot contemplate itself from the outside"
as an object (Glasersfeld 2001, [32]). There is no subject in exclusively-objective
studies. The unobservability
of the subject is a fundamental fact which is in principle recognized in
constructivism, but usually neglected in MIR-views. This point will need consideration in the
discussion of "second-order cybernetics" (below).
[32]
The mind-brain question cannot be
approached by MIR-views, because mind cannot be made into an object; as von Glasersfeld puts it (2001, [41]): "In order to do that
[understand consciousness objectively], I would have to step out of
[consciousness], and at the same time remain conscious, in order to face my own
consciousness." Brain function
studies take place within the encompassing mind but cannot in turn reach the
mind. This does not mean that objective
studies have no value, quite the opposite; but it means that subjective
experience is primary.
[33]
The relation of objective studies
(for instance of brain function, or of quantum physics) to subjective
experience (consciousness, observer, mind) is asymptotic, not one of identity
(notions like "the embodied mind" or "the mind-brain"
attempt to render the mind objective and thus imply a misunderstanding of this
relationship). Objective functions can
approach but not reach subjectivity, and in contrast to geometry, the
difference cannot be neglected without eliminating ourselves, as happens in
MIR-views. Words can become MIR-objects
(for instance as elements of grammar and syntax, in printed form, etc.), and
word-concepts too, but the ongoing experience which they express cannot.
[34]
To accommodate experience,
scientists must acknowledge that all working-structures (and the distinctions
between them) happen within mind or experience; keeping experience at the
center, without solipsism. When
maintaining this awareness, one can safely alternate between
working-objectivity, working-idealism, working-subjectivity, etc.
[35]
The inverted thinking {1} of
MIR-belief is a typically human problem. Animals too structure their own worlds (see
Horvath 1997), but the human capacity for distancing (reflection) is greater,
in part related to language use, i.e., the large-scale association of specific
communicable sounds to images (Glasersfeld 1995, Ch.
7; a classical example is Archimedes, who was so distant from events around him
that he did not notice that a Roman soldier was going to kill him while he
reflected on geometric problems).
[36]
The aim of the objective method
is to eliminate observer-bias, not the observer. ”
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REFERENCE
Jaspers, K. (1948 / 1991) Von der Wahrheit. Piper : München, Zürich. For other references, see TA93.
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Herbert FJ Müller
e-mail <herbert.muller
(at) mcgill.ca>