[1]
ABSTRACT

In his commentary on the 'encompassing matrix', Joel E. Henkel in effect presents an outline of a theory in which he combines a non-Cartesian point of view with a quantum physical explanation of the physical basis of consciousness. His proposal touches on a number of rather central questions, relating to both subjective and objective aspects. The conceptual aspects of the two components are treated separately in my response, but a unified view is also needed. For this one needs to explore the conceptual foundation of objective scientific aspects in the experiential basis. This means in effect a change from ontology to methodology, in which the onta turn out to be instrumental ad-hoc entities (this point is illustrated by a discussion of Descartes' Method). A cooperative multidisciplinary effort to deal with questions of such type, for instance concerning the relation of mind to brain, or of experience to scientific knowledge, appears desirable.


[2]
SUMMARY OF HENKEL'S ARGUMENTATION.

Henkel suggests that reality be understood from a point of view which is common to all organisms, where the ' 'indefinable encompassing matrix' from which human thinking emerges is the result of a lower level of experience involving a non-conceptual representation of the world, representation-in-kind.' This could be done in <1-2> an extra-Cartesian organism experiential approach. 'Each organism generates its own reality, based on its experience. To emphasize this, perhaps the term 'reality' should be qualified as experiential, rather than physical.' <3> 'I take *indefinable encompassing matrix* as an underlying frame of explanation beneath the level of abstract conceptual *experience* or representation of the world.' '... it is the upper evel or conceptual representation that allows mind to be *definable* through the code/symbols of natural language to denotatively refer to abstract categories, such as *objects*.'

[3]
<4> '... *representation-in-kind* ... : there is a commonality between what is represented and its representation. Such a common physical medium is vibrational frequency. This physical parameter seems universal in living organism function. ... need not use any arbitrary symbol/conceptual category pair to carry out the fundamental process of experience, representation of the world.' <5> ' ... the single-celled organism can experience and model the world using a QFT (quantum field theory) collective coherence, called a Bose condensation. ... biomolecules ... have electrically charged side groups ... (and) radiate both phonons (mechanical motion quanta) and photons (electromagnetic field quanta). The frequencies of these vibrations are common to environment and organism. ... cells can generate internal representations of their environment ...(via) microtubules ... Goldstone modes can support 'ordered standing waves' within microtubules ... where tubulin ... can act as an 'organ pipe' ... (this is) speculative but follows from ... literature.' <6> '... cilia and flagella are microtubules ...' <7> 'Single quantum states can spread among many cells whose vibrations cohere in synchrony. This ... sets the stage for the emergence of higher level conceptual experience.' <8> 'Neurons act through waves of depolarization that travel down axons. ... (which) can act as a common medium for representations-in-kind for neurons. ... two interacting kinds of representations-in-kind in nervous tissue: Goldstone modes and discrete depolarization waves. ... axons and dendrites both contain microtubules ... thus ... can cover cerebral cortices.' <9> ' The transition from representation-in-kind to code/symbolic conceptual representation involves a transition in the type of interaction among the brain's functional units ... a kind of thermodynamic phase change from a 'dynamic' liquid phase to a 'static', frozen solid phase. ... sight and sound representations-in-kind ... become denotatively associated with each other ... (and) fixed by ... words and their categorical referents ... The resulting conceptual model of the world is thus permanently established and is not subject to updating ... they evolve only as words change their meaning.' <10> ' There already exists a ... mathematical formalism for extra-Cartesian representation (which) generalizes Shannon's information theory, which is limited to conceptual representation ... (and) applies only to code/symbolic conceptual categorical representations.'

[4]
<11>: 'Donald MacKay ... developed a theory ... that (covers representations-in-kind)'. <12>: ' ... We see the world as 'out there' by projecting our conceptual model to a 'view field' ... <13>: ' The past, present, future, self are conceptions ... <14>: (the non-Cartesian approach) 'is crucial for progress in the study of the study of the physical basis of consciousness ...' <15>: 'Extra-Cartesianism negates the Cartesian definition of reality ...' <16>: 'Using the term 'as-if' to qualify conceptual representations does give a proper extra-Cartesian flavor. However, it does have the connotation that it is 'make-believe' and that representations-in-kind are not 'as-if', so must be realer. This impression is somewhat misleading. Extra-Cartesian reality is the result of a two step progressive process. Stopping after the first step yields 'low level reality', continuing to the final step yields 'high level reality'. Neither is 'as-if'; both are 'real'.'


[5]
EXPERIENCE AND PARTICLE PHYSICS

Henkel's commentary calls for a consideration of a relation between particle physics and experience (or 'consciousness'), which is sometimes postulated these days. An unusual feature of his proposal is, however, that he also proposes to use a non-Cartesian conceptual approach in this undertaking, while most of the other proponents appear to be traditional objectivists. To evaluate this approach is not easy, because it involves two controversial aspects: the epistemology of particle physics, and the epistemology of mind, of subjective experience in particular. In developing my response I will start by dealing with the two questions separately, before discussing a possible synthesis.


[6]
EPISTEMOLOGY OF EXPERIENCE

The use of the terms 'representation' <1-4>, which Henkel employs in two ways, 'referents', and 'model of the world' <9> per se imply a belief in a Cartesian mind-independent outside (objective) reality which has to be 're'-presented inside the mind, either by concepts or, Henkel suggests, at an earlier stage 'in kind', for instance by 'vibrational frequency'. Now, while at such an earlier stage there may not be word-fixed concepts as such, presumably most organisms nevertheless react to units, such as gestalten, which are created with the help of such (visual, auditory, or other) means. I would suspect that the units are of fundamental functional importance: this would be the technique by which the organism, at least the one of animals with more developed brains, concentrates on important features in the environment, as it is necessary for biological success. Concepts would in this case be understood to be a further development, in which gestalten are more effectively dealt with, by fixation with the help of more or less invariable sound patterns (words). The presumed invariability of the meanings of words is of central importance for the efficient communication by language, and later by writing. This greatly facilitates cooperation and the fixation (definition) and achievement of communal projects. Certain central concepts tend to be communally fortified as having to remain whole ('holy') in order to assure doubt-free validity, for conflict-free function. (Language and its secondary products, in other words, tend to take on a life of their own, which is then rendered absolute in metaphysical beliefs.) For reasons of this type, some animals with large brains, such as elephants or whales or chimpanzees, have not developed many of the techniques which humans have.

[7]
The preceding considerations are on an objective level. But Henkel also suggests <14> to use non-Cartesian epistemology as 'crucial for progress in the study of the physical basis of consciousness'. In what sense can this be said to be so ? (a) For one thing, in the study of brain function, a continuity of conceptual with pre-conceptual experience (for instance, with what Henkel calls 'representations-in-kind') is an important consideration. This implies, among other things, an extension of the concept of 'experience' to animals; and of course in practice, some of the basic physiological work on 'human consciousness' is already being carried out on cats (actually on anaesthetized cats). But cats almost certainly already use gestalt perception, and an exclusive reliance on vibrational frequencies could only be expected for very simple organisms. But even in that case, how would Henkel's concept of vibrational representation include, for instance, chemical communication (olfactory and other)?

[8]
These considerations also are of an objective type (i.e., studies of brain function and of animal behavior), and do not include insights about (b) subjective experience - human or animal - which, in my opinion at any rate, would be the main aim of a non-Cartesian approach in this area. Here I have a difficulty with Henkel's point of view. Experience has a subjective unstructured center which cannot become an object, and which is furthermore at the center of all notions of 'reality' which it in fact creates and uses, on a make-shift basis (see TA1). Henkel suggests <16> that Vaihinger's term 'as-if' has a connotation of 'make-believe', and that this might result in the misleading assumption 'that representations-in-kind are not 'as-if', so must be realer'. To the contrary, he writes, 'both are 'real''.

[9]
My general answer to this would be that all notions of 're-presentation', including Henkel's representations-in-kind, presuppose acceptance by the investigator of a (useful but fictitious) pre-existing mind-independent reality, which automatically characterizes this as a Cartesian (that is, persistant metaphysical or ontological) approach. It seems to me that our present task is to develop ways which assure reliable function in spite of the knowledge of the fictional (or 'ad-hoc', or 'constructed', or 'as-if') character of such tools. The central feature here is, I think, not one of 'make-believe', nor one of 'illusion', but of the tool-nature of concepts, of truths, and of realities. Henkel's opinion <12> that we 'see the world as 'out there' by projecting our conceptual model to a 'view field' ...' likewise implies acceptance of mind-independent reality (in this case the 'view field'); in operational terms the 'model' is the 'reality' as it is believed in. In my opinion, we create or construct reality, both inside our minds and out there (that is, both of them within an undivided mind-nature experience), in which case there is no primary assumption of such a split. In other words, in my understanding, although Henkel postulates a non-Cartesian reality view as necessary, his argumentation is Cartesian in type. However, in case I am mistaken I would appreciate clarification on this point.


[10]
DESCARTES: ONTOLOGY VERSUS METHOD

Raman has recently presented a spirited defense of Descartes against his detractors (in particular against those who are anti-scientists), which makes the main point that - despite the resulting difficulties - the use of the Cartesian paradigm of subject-object dichotomy has been very helpful for the progress of science. As he points out, it was largely 20th century scientific progress itself which has shown the limitations of Descartes' conceptual framework, as for instance in the case of Heisenberg's uncertainty principle. I think that Raman's point is important. We do not have to discard scientific or philosophical achievements because they have imperfections or side effects. And announcements (for instance the one by John Horgan) of the end of science are exaggerated, as Mark Twain might have put it.

[11]
As I understand it, non-Cartesianism does not abolish Descartes' work any more than non-Euclidian geometry eliminates Euclid's results. The amendments mean, rather, that the earlier results are to be seen as tools of limited usefulness, rather than as complete, final, and absolute (that is, ontological) truths. In this connection one may note that Descartes entitled his main work 'Discours de la methode pour bien conduire sa raison et chercher la verite dans les sciences' - to the effect that, although he was after absolute truth (for instance, 'je suis'), what he offered was chiefly a method (namely: to doubt all certainties) for getting to it. And it seems to me that these days, where difficulties in understanding reality re-surface, going back from his ontological structure to his original method is perhaps not a bad idea (see also below).


[12]
NON-ONTOLOGICAL KNOWLEDGE

Similar points can be made of course for the ideas of many other investigators such as Pythagoras, Copernicus, Newton, Einstein, and also for various viewpoints which philosophers have advanced. (This way of proceeding is quite parallel to asking how to benefit from the technical fruits of science such as automobiles, while minimizing their shortcomings, for instance accidents and pollution. This does not necessarily imply rejection of Benz, Daimler, or Ford, nor of their products, but calls for improvements, and sometimes replacement by more appropriate tools. In contrast to philosophers, the technical inventors have, however, not usually maintained - outside of sales promotions - that their product was the ultimate achievement, and they themselves usually strove for improvement.)

[13]
What matters mainly in every instance, I think, is: (a) how beneficial the various instruments prove to be for all, and (b) how the difficulties which occur in their use can be effectively dealt with. In the case of concepts, difficulties arise when ideas are accepted as absolute (ontological) truths rather than as tools which are available for general use. There is thus a practical question: how do we use the conceptual instruments while avoiding such an error ? The answer which I have suggested (TA1[54]) amounts to a correction procedure for the 'ontology error' in the use of various mental tools. It consists of becoming and remaining aware that all beliefs (even long lasting and fundamental ones) are provisional, that critique and doubt are always needed, that nothing ought to be taken for granted. The tools are kept invariable for the time of use, but to assume their persistent invariability is either a (wishful) artifact or an ontological error.

[14]
For instance, the Cartesian ontological assertion 'I think, therefore I am' would in this case be modified to a more 'operational' statement along these lines: ' I think: that means I believe that my ideas (for instance the one of my personal unity) will work, but I remain also open to doubt and re-evaluation, and this includes my own subjective entity, as well as the validity of natural entities such as the world and the things in it '. Another example among many others is the work of Heidegger, who aimed at formulating a 'fundamental ontology' (with 'das Sein' as the corner-stone) within phenomenology; to me this seems a self-contradictory effort, which cannot, and so far as I can tell, did not, succeed, and the ontological aspect ought to be discarded, here as elsewhere, except on a makeshift basis.

[15]
The need for doubt (or critique) may sound like a self-evident and even trivial point, except that in practice it is often not utilized: immutable ontology is assumed instead, either explicitly or more often implicitly. In most areas of science this distinction makes no practical difference, and ontology works quite well whether or not the as-if aspect is considered. But for the discussion of subjective awareness, on which at present so much effort is spent, such an omission causes a complete obstruction, and something similar seems to apply concerning particle physics. The re-evaluation (correction) is made on the basis of experience, which for purposes of handling and stability had prompted the creation of mental structures in the first place, and which is the only possible arbiter in this situation.

[16]
To summarize: the needed correction concerns the avoidance of (persistent mind-independent) ontology, and this in various approaches to thinking rather than corrections of features which have been developed by one or another scientist or philosopher (whether it be Descartes or the positivists or Heidegger or someone else). It would appear that a term like 'non-ontological' or 'working-metaphysical' characterizes the situation better than 'non-Cartesian', concerning the approach which is under discussion here.


[17]
EPISTEMOLOGY OF PARTICLE PHYSICS

How do such considerations apply to particle physics ? To me as a non-physicist the conceptual difficulty in this area appears related to the impossibility of maintaining stable images of entities as it would be required for traditional (ontological) objective science. One can no longer speak consistently of particles, nor of waves, in the way to which physicists were used before 1900. It is this lack of stable mind-independent images which particle physics has in common with 'consciousness studies'. One may suspect that this is also the feature which makes some people think that the one can explain the other. Particle physics has developed as a branch of objective science, and seems to have come to a point where mind-independent objects can no longer easily be postulated, it reached a limit of possibilities in the use of the 'modern' objectivation method. One can only talk about 'observations', which include a subject, and not about 'things' which are subject-free.


[18]
QUANTUM MECHANICS AND THE MIND

Quantum Mechanics may or may not eventually be able to help explain certain aspects of brain function, including the conditions and development of subjective experience. It is not within my competence to assess the particulars of Henkel's proposals <5-10> in this regard. But I suggest that neither QM nor other branches of science will be able to explain ('explain' tends to mean reduction to objective knowledge) human subjective experience per se, which comes earlier in the process of our understanding, and which always remains subjective. This is a starting condition which, I think, we can under no circumstance get out of. I would therefore think that the indefinable matrix cannot be said to be an 'explanation' <3> of subjective awareness, it is a descriptive term.

[19]
Everything we know (knowledge being a strong form of belief) takes place within our mind-nature experience, and this includes scientific knowledge, including quantum mechanics. Knowledge is a specialization of experience, and using it must follow certain technical rules if it is to succeed, for instance the rules of logic or mathematics, as we find out in the action, just as we find out about gravity in the act of moving. That quantum mechanics needs the original subject once more may have been surprising for objectivists, but it brings science back to its roots. And so does the problem of subjective experience.

[20]
So here is the overall situation (as I see it at present): particle physics cannot be treated as if there were no subject, but only within the mind-nature continuum of experience, and this is so too for subjective experience. For both of them we create tool structures inside this undivided mind-nature experience (with an active unstructured center and a temporarily fixed peripheral part), as we need them, but there is no a priori assurance how they will perform, and we need to be vigilant about how they work or don't work for us ('working metaphysics', TA1[28]). In effect, for mental structures mind-nature experience is both start point (as origin) and end point (as doubt and critique): experience is a matrix which has unconditional precedence over structures.


[21]
UNITY OF PHENOMENOLOGY AND SCIENCE ?

In order to investigate subjective experience (or as it is presently often called, 'consciousness'), in relation to research on brain function and other objective science branches, science and phenomenology have to get together, and this is possible only by treating science as a specialization within phenomenology. To investigate the possibilities of this unification is, in my opinion, one of our main present tasks in the field of studies of subjective experience. 'Unified Science' in the sense of logical positivism implied impossible mind-independent ontology and can therefore no longer be seen as a realistic goal.

[22]
Henkel suggests <2> that reality be defined as experiential rather than physical, and the principle of primacy of experience has been recognized and formulated by many scientists and philosophers. But instead of 'experience', words like 'sense data' or 'facts' are commonly used; these are ambiguous terms because they imply that these items are already 'made' (formed) before they are received ('given'). Other mental structures also tend to be used as if they involved pre-formed units: sounds (words) referring to perception of already formed - and accepted as such - entities (gestalten, objects, concepts, observations, data, facts, measurements); numbers are words referring to counting activity, which also can only deal with entities which are accepted as already formed.

[23]
But experience has unconditional precedence over any type of mental structure (gestalt, word, number, concept, observation, datum, fact, theory, etc.): this is a point which has been emphasized by phenomenologists (cf. also the recent comment in 'Dialogues' by S. Bindeman, quoting J. Habermas (1971) on objectivism), but which is neglected by many writers in the new field of 'consciousness studies'. Objective (empirical) science is a specialization within (mind-nature) experience.

[24]
Experience ('phenomenology') cannot secondarily be attached to objective science, although something of that type appears to be suggested by some recent e-mail exchanges (for instance in comments on the recent work of D. Chalmers, concerning the 'hard problem of consciousness', or on the work of B. Baars on his 'Global Workspace' theory). Roughly speaking, such proposals amount to posing a question like 'how is the mind glued to the brain ?' - which is indeed a hard problem, as Augustinus had already remarked. The crucial point is in my opinion that 'science' has to be integrated with its own basis of (or better: within) experience, and that this cannot be done vice versa, namely phenomenology within a basis of objective science. The question of the relation of mind to brain is, in other words, the one of experience to the objective knowledge of science.


[25]
A COOPERATIVE EFFORT IS DESIRABLE

As Henkel's presentation shows, it is helpful to discuss such questions in a multi-disciplinary setting, which encourages approaches which might otherwise not be formulated. If a frame of reference can be agreed upon, it might furthermore be a good idea to work in an inter-disciplinary group in common attempts to deal with the formulation and implications of such a proposal (of integration of science with phenomenology) and related aspects, such as the intense 'pull' of objectivity, which is helpful in some regards and a hindrance in others. The members of such a group might advance propositions, and provide critical evaluations, from several points of view. The electronic medium has some advantages for such exchanges over other types of communication, in particular, it seems to me, the one of allowing sufficient time to reflect before answering, but without having to wait for printed publication of the presentations.


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REFERENCES

Baars, B. (1997), In the Theatre of Consciousness. Journal of Consciousness Studies, 4, 292-309.

Bindeman, A. (1997), communication in Dialogues, 25 October 1997, distributed by Louise Sundararajan.

Chalmers, D.J. (1995) The Puzzle of Conscious Experience. Scientific American, 273; 80-86.

Chalmers, D.J. (1997) Moving forward on the problem of consciousness, Journal of Consciousness Studies 4, 3-46.

Horgan, J. (1996), The End of Science. Redding, Mass.: Addison-Wesley.

Raman, V.V.(1997), Hooray Descartes ! Dialogues Newsletter 2; Sept. 1997.

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[Author: Herbert FJ Muller
<mdmu@musica.mcgill.ca>]