[1]
ABSTRACT
The question whether subjective experience is accessible to science is discussed
in relation to several points of view, and some possible criteria for the
scientific quality are examined, such as empiricism, induction, objecticity,
reality, reduction, falsification, rationality, and practice. Objective
packaging is suggested as the most suitable one; the objective method of
science is in that case understood as a subdivision of subjective experience.
[2]
SUMMARY OF SEELIG'S COMMENTARY
Mark Seelig largely agrees with my proposal for the central role of subjective
awareness of reality, and emphasizes certain of its aspects. For instance,
he poses a 'meta-question': how real is real ? and points out that forces
which are 'real' have an effect on us and everything else. In <4>
he concludes from this that subjective data are scientific. This is a point
which he emphasizes is controversial; it needs detailed examination, and
I will discuss it and some related aspects further, below. He discusses
<5> the limitations of objectivity and <6> the peculiar reaction
which one is liable to encounter when one proposes that it cannot be exclusive:
either this is thought to be so self-evident that it is not worth mentioning,
or else on the contrary it is said to be entirely absurd, besides being
non-scientific (or even anti-scientific) and illogical (if the point is
understood at all). <7> 'Claiming a monopoly for objectivity is neither
scientific nor is it objective, nor does it comply with the basics of logic'.
And <8> reducing the mind to immaterial entities, to which goal at
present a great deal of serious work (as well as paper) is devoted, produces
some peculiar results. The objective method <9-10> produces the illusion
of stable structures, but it is only one among several mental activities,
and its advocated exclusiveness has had a disorganizing effect on intellectual
life <11>. He agrees also <12> with my proposal for 'working
metaphysics', and <13-14> the suggested zero-reference (or reactive
reality formation) theory and method, meaning that we have to go back to
ongoing experience, from which the fixed concepts arise.
[3]
THE SUBJECT AND SCIENCE
I want to discuss here mainly Seelig's point <4> that subjective data
are scientific. As he stated, this is a controversial point, which is under
discussion by many authors. Of concern is the relation between subjective
experience, reality, and science; and more specifically the contradictory
claims that
(a) subjective experience is part of science
or that
(b) it cannot be part of science.
[4]
SCIENCE AND ANTI-SCIENCE
Science has been criticized because it cannot provide positive ontological
contents for beliefs, nor verify those obtained from other sources. But
here one should distinguish quasi-religious anti-scientific forces from
those critics who only point out that exclusive objectivism is an incomplete
approach to experience, and to life in general, and that science needs to
be complemented by more global structures.
[5]
As an example of the exclusively objectivist stance, the physicist Gerald
Holton is concerned with the public influence of the forces of anti-science.
He endorses old-fashioned positivism and even anti-metaphysics: (p.1ff:)
Ernst Mach was a vigorous empiricist and proposed that 'all our testimony
concerning the so-called external world relies only on sensations... The
existence of Dinge an Sich is removed as an unjustified and unnecessary
assumption'. Mach had a decisive influence on the Vienna Circle and on American
thinkers like William James, Jacques Loeb, and then the psychologist B.F.
Skinner, who decided to study psychology without psyche (and actually also
without brain), by observing the behavior of rats in cages. - (p.57:) There
was considerable agreement between Mach and Einstein, though Mach was skeptical
of the theory of relativity. The subject (the observer) is left outside
of consideration. Although he does not quote Thomas Nagel, Holton would
appear to emulate Nagel's view of the 'view from nowhere' in science. If
subjective experience is eliminated, there is no one left to view.(Not all
physicists share the mind-free variety of world view, see Raman in [32]
below)
[6]
For Holton, anti-scientism is personified in the attitude of (p.150:) Dostoyevsky's
Grand Inquisitor (in 'The Brothers Karamazov'): 'no science will give the
masses bread..., they will say 'make us slaves but feed us'; and by those
whom Holton seems to view as the inquisitor's henchmen such as (p.157:)
Max Weber, who said that: 'events are not just there and happening, but
they have meaning, and happen because of that meaning'; (p.168:) Kurt Vonnegut,
who wrote that astrology and palmistry make people feel good; (p.176:) Vaclav
Havel: 'Traditional science, with its usual coolness, can describe the different
ways we might destroy ourselves, but it cannot offer us truly effective
and practicable instructions how to avert them...' (in 'The End of Communism').
(p.177:) Holton remarks: 'The next step is not difficult to guess ... throughout
history, opinions hostile to science prepared the ground for ... Goethe's
anti-Newtonianism, Blake's Visionary Physics, the 'Aryan' science in Germany,
the ... 1960's counterculture, the anti-science campaign ..(of).. China's
Cultural Revolution, .. (and:) Scientific Creationism...'. (A philosophical
statement of this point of view is the one by David Papineau and others
described below).
[7]
The problem is perhaps most clearly shown by Holton's reference to Weber's
point that events happen because of meanings. They do of course in human
affairs, and to deny that would be absurd. For instance, a student who wants
to become a physicist is presumably convinced that physics is a meaningful
field of activity. But for scientific objects, Holton seems to have a fictitious
'completely detached' view in mind, as T. Nagel did (see [16] below).
[8]
FUNDAMENTALISMS
The quasi-religious anti-scientists are the fundamentalist fraction of those
critical of the limitations of science, just as the exclusive objectivists
or empiricists are the fundamentalists of the objective scientific view
and method. The question here is not whether science is a field of great
importance, or whether on the contrary it is incomplete - both statements
I think are valid - but rather the exclusivity or fundamentalism (or as
it has recently been called, the 'totalizing' attitude) in either point
of view. Fundamentalism means absolute belief and adherence, and absence
of criticism and of distance, with respect to a particular point of view.
Fundamental teachings have some features in common, independent of particular
contents. And further, many doctrines can be used in a fundamentalist way.
For instance, scientistic as well as anti-scientistic opinions can be made
with claims of exclusivity. This step goes beyond offering wide ranging
access with the help of structures or methods (as do for instance mathematics,
or the objective method in general, or some religions): it implies an additional
denial of the legitimacy of other structures or methods, and in that case
it becomes restrictive. And in this context one should examine the phenomenon
of fundamentalist opinions per se.
[9]
The stultifying effects of fundamentalism are a pervasive problem, which
should be examined in itself, for all instances, and not just for one or
another doctrine at a time. By definition, any fundamentalist opinion implies
that it discourages thinking in directions which contradict its doctrines.
Thus scientism (such as exclusive objectivism) may deny that meanings are
of importance (Holton, above), and creationism denies some scientific opinions
such as the theory of evolution. Religious and political opinions are often
prohibitive of any rival opinions, even if these are very similar to their
own teachings; the reason is that their authority becomes threatened. Authority
per se provides structure, it helps to coordinate action, and relieves individuals
from some responsibility. Textbooks are used to provide an entry into fields
of study, as a kind of launching pad for individual thinking (which may
or may not succeed); fanatical beliefs are used to achieve practical (such
as political) goals, but do not usually encourage individual thought. In
the academic world it is sometimes assumed that authority is not important
- which may be an under-estimate of its pervasiveness.
[10]
SCIENCE, RELIGION, AND SUBJECTIVE EXPERIENCE
Gregg Easterbrook has suggested that there is a 'warming trend' between
science and religion. He writes about scientific orientation versus belief
in God. The moves toward a reconciliation are in many cases very tentative,
and the content of many religious beliefs, particularly when providence
is postulated, makes this difficult. Some scientists such as the zoologist
Richard Dawkins (who wrote a book on 'The Selfish Gene') are strongly opposed
to such trends ('only the scientifically illiterate accept the 'why' questions
where living creatures are concerned'), and finds religion 'very boring
and not worth talking about'. 'There is no evidence to support religion'.
(Non-theistic religions or substitutes such as scientism are not discussed
in this particular exchange).
[11]
It may be possible to arrive at a basis for discussion of these questions
by tracing conceptual structures like God or Nature back to the common (unstructured)
root of scientific knowledge and religious belief (that is, mind-nature
experience). To deny the need for an encompassing (religious or religion-substitute)
structure is as absurd as the denial of subjective experience: there is
no 'objective proof' for the 'existence' of either, particularly for a mind-independent
existence - which does not abolish them, because they are our structures
at the origin of thinking. Dawkins really denies evidence for the 'ontological
existence' of religion, which is of course true, but not different in principle
from the impossibility of ontology in all other circumstances. The encompassing
structures are needed instruments (just like the more specific thinking
tools are). They have indeed a fundamental role. The difficult practical
problem is: how can these structures be fundamentally active without being
held in a fundamentalist way ? (cf. TA1[40]).
[12]
A SCIENCE OF CONSCIOUSNESS ?
Bernard Baars has recently proposed to examine evidence for progress in
consciousness studies with the help of his Global Workspace Theory by 'contrastive
analysis', a set of comparisons between similar conscious and unconscious
processes in order to examine evidence for possibilities of understanding
consciousness. For instance, he points out the contrast between the multitude
of unconscious brain processes and the 'narrow bottleneck' of the conscious
capacity, which on the other hand creates 'global access'. This he describes
as a 'bright spot on the stage', which is surrounded by a fringe of unconscious
contextual systems (such as philosophical assumptions) which shape the events
in the bright spot. The conscious process can on the other hand recognize
millions of pictures experienced earlier, etc.; Baars cites Plato's cave
parable, as well as the thalamic effects on the visual cortex cited by Crick,
and further points out that all present unified models of mental function
are 'theater metaphors'. But Baars remains in the objective area all along,
and his only reference to subjective experience is a quotation from, surprisingly,
Daniel Dennett, that:'it is I who have access to that of which I am conscious'
(corresponding to the narrative interpreter in the left frontal cortex of
split-brain patients). This is quite true but: this I is the beginning,
matrix, and center point, and cannot be treated as only an after-thought.
Baars does not point out that subjective experience is the starting point
and center for all else, including theories of consciousness.
[13]
WHAT IS SCIENTIFIC ?
Certain qualities are, according various writers, required for scientific
studies. I will try to evaluate the internal consistency of some of these
stipulations, and then the question whether subjective experience is included
or excluded according to them. I will examine these and related questions
in relation to some sources in the literature, and from the point of view
of zero-reference (or reactive reality formation, RRF; see TA1[8,11,30],
and R1[7-8]).
[14]
EMPIRICAL, INDUCTIVE
Empiricists say that scientific studies must be based on experience, in
particular on sense data, and that some studies do not fulfill this criterion.
And scientific concepts are said to be 'induced' from experience: that is
that generalities are arrived at starting from multiple individual instances
(or observations). But this definition overlooks that 'empirical' research
starts with already-defined concepts and entities, which are mostly understood
as ready-made, that is, as mind-independently pre-established. It also implies
that subjective experience ('awareness' or 'consciousness') does not meet
such criteria, because it is not based on sense data, and that studies dealing
with topics like religion are not empirical. But experiences can also be
emotional, artistic, religious, and intuitive (including scientific intuitions)
etc., although they may or may not be 'sense data'. If the requirement of
exclusive empiricism were strictly followed, only already defined topics
could ever be scientific, but not new insights; changes in scientific parameters
and discussion of basic concepts would be considered out of bounds.
[15]
Subjective experience is obviously experience, but not always 'sense data'.
And further, the notion that science deals with sense data is itself mistaken:
it deals with 'objects' and other 'concepts', which means that the sense
data are already processed by the mind. 'Sense data' are actually 'objects'
which were invented in order to defend the idea of mind-independent reality;
and even if they were available as such, they would already need neural
(and mental) processes in order to be perceived. In my opinion, the question
of empiricism does not help to decide whether subjective experience is available
for scientific study.
[16]
OBJECTIVE, CONSENSUAL, PUBLIC
This is similar to the requirement of empiricism, with emphasis on the 'ready-made'
and mind-free aspect. The objects are usually seen as mind-independent,
and a consistent use of this criterion necessarily leads to the formulation
of a 'view from nowhere' (Nagel) and 'from nowhen' (Price). In my opinion,
this is an impossible requirement, which results from the misunderstanding
that there is a mind-independent reality. This opinion largely wants to
avoid the possibility that reality is a result of personal bias and thus
arbitrary (which might imply that the human mind is seen as God-like). One
should however distinguish between (a) the objective method, a specialized
way of thinking which treats mind-nature experiences 'as-if' they were mind-independent
self-contained entities and which is a helpful mental instrument, and (b)
exclusive objectivism which explicitly or implicitly assumes the ontological
mind-independent reality of objects and of nature in general with no as-ifs.
[17]
Since according to exclusive objectivism the mind is considered as not being
a part of the objective world, it cannot be part of science. If objectivity
is understood as a specialization of function within mind (or within consciousness),
the center of the mind (of consciousness) is seen as the matrix of all objective
studies, and thus it is a part of them. But it cannot itself become an object,
and thus is not available for objective study. In effect, both views have
the same result. - However, exclusive objectivism is a mistaken attitude
for all mental activity including science because it makes the assumption
that mind-independent objects are possible, and subjective experience is
excluded on the basis of this erroneous assumption. The distinction between
science and non-science, and the question whether the mind can be studied
scientifically, need other criteria than exclusive objectivism. But the
scientific objective method itself offers a possibility (see [35] below).
[18]
REAL
Some scientists and philosophers say that subjective experiences, because
they are not objective, are less real than objective ones. In particular,
this was and still is the contention of some logical positivists, empiricists,
and materialists. But is reality equal to objectivity ? The question of
(scientific) reality has undergone several re-assessments in recent decades.
For instance, Kuhn showed that the assumptions of what nature is like are
stable in periods of what he called 'normal science' and that such assumptions
may undergo revolutions (for instance, those started by Copernicus or Einstein).
Feyerabend went further and concluded that for the formation of scientific
theory (that is, theory of reality), 'anything goes', which is compatible
with the view that reality-theories are our constructed instruments, which
are accepted and maintained to the extent that they work. Although Feyerabend
did not quite say it, this might suggest that the idea of mind-independent
reality, which had been a central assumption of positivism, and of the 'naturalistic'
philosophers which were associated with positivism and empiricism, has been
given up. But even if he meant that, this point appears to not have been
accepted by many contemporary writers.
[19]
For instance, in his introduction to a collection of papers on the philosopy
of science, David Papineau quite recently (1996a) writes about 'metaphysics
of science', which (although this is a change from the opinion of the Vienna
Circle that metaphysics are to be discarded) again presupposes the idea
of mind-independent reality. Papineau discusses the difficulty of obtaining
'knowledge' of mind-independent reality - but instead of conceding that
it is impossible, he calls this an 'internal tension of realism' (p.2).
This 'tension' then gives rise to either 'idealism or verificationism' (he
groups 'phenomenalism' in this) or else 'scepticism', of which in his opinion
the latter is the more important one. In discussing other papers in this
book, he considers (p.9) that 'perhaps there is room for a non-sceptical
response' (to the evident under-determination of theories by the available
evidence), in terms of 'best explanations', although '(t)his alone won't
ensure that (the theories) will get at the truth', that one may only get
the approximate truth, with the conclusion (considering for instance that
the 19-century mathematics of electromagnetism functioned well although
they were associated with the ether theory) that (p.11) 'we should believe
in the structure of the unobservable reality postulated by successful theories,
but avoid committing ourselves to any claims about the nature of that reality'
(John Worrall). Papineau comments (p.12) that this opinion offers 'the best
hope for realism'.
[20]
At some points in these argumentations, one gets the feeling that Papineau,
or Worrall, are almost ready to discard the notion of mind-independent reality,
but if they have any such doubts they are quickly dispelled. Indeed Papineau's
comment that Worrall's theory is a hope for realism, as well as subsequent
discussion, show this not to be so. There are further angles to these discussions,
for instance whether certain 'entities' (such as subatomic particles) 'exist',
and so forth. Truth and reality are always the goal of these studies, but
despite all the difficulties resulting from this opinion, and despite the
differences in their points of view, these authors appear to have no doubt
that truth and reality are mind-independent.
[21]
Reality is not the same as objectivity. The mind is real because it is experienced,
but its most central aspect cannot be an object, and thus is not available
to science.
[22]
REDUCTION
In another recent publication (1996b), Papineau describes his position more
compactly and authoritatively: 'twentieth-century science denies any causal
properties to unreduced phenomenal properties'. He criticizes Chalmers'
opinion that mental states are different from physical properties, which
he says results in a dualist view (that is, mind versus matter). He concludes
that consciousness studies are: 'a discipline without a subject. There is
of course, room for reductive theories of specific psychological abilities,
like human vision, or cow learning. But there may be no corresponding theory
of consciousness as such. If we take materialism seriously ... we should
stop thinking of consciousness as a distinct phenomenon, a special kind
of inner illumination'.
[23]
My understanding of Papineau's opinion is that: mental events must be reduced
to material events in order to be real; my will or intention cannot switch
on a light, it needs material events in nerve cells, muscle cells, and the
electrical circuitry to do that. The mind disappears in the process, and
thus there is literally 'no subject' left for consciousness studies. This
is the same result as Nagel's, and I think it is the necessary outcome of
all exclusively objectivist (or exclusively 'materialist') theories - provided
they are thought through: because this is their basis (their point of departure),
beyond which they cannot go. Some writers have taken recourse to something
they call 'mind-brain', in order to bridge the gap between mental and physical
happenings, but this would seem to be only a verbal manipulation which does
not promote understanding.
[24]
The central question of what reality, truth, knowledge, entities (or for
that matter the 'existence' of any of these) are, is not posed in the papers
in this book, and there are no references to philosophers who have dealt
with it (it appears that these authors do not consider phenomenology a worthwhile
field of interest). It is unfortunate, in my opinion, that so much effort
is still being spent in dealing with a problem which results from the erroneous
assumption of mind-independent reality.
[25]
Subjective experience is real because it is experienced, and its unstructured
center is the matrix of any possible experience, and therefore of any possible
reality. This opinion requires no 'dualism', nor that the mind be an 'object'.
Whether or how subjectivity fits into any particular scientific theory or
methodology is a separate question.
[26]
FALSIFIABLE
Popper has emphasized the need for scientific propositions to be falsifiable,
that is to say that they should be available for testing in such a form
that it is possible to arrive at a conclusion that they are wrong. If theories
cannot be tested in such as way (he particularly aimed at psychoanalysis),
they are useless for scientific purposes. This is a useful criterion for
the assessment of claims to 'scientificity'. But because according to Popper,
propositions can on the other hand not be verified, this results (as Popper
himself remarked) in an asymmetrical effect. If we take this at face value,
ontological truth (which Popper accepted as possible) would consist of the
left-overs of proposition testing. - Subjective experience is not falsifiable:
it is there or it is not there, and if it is there it is the basis for all
else.
[27]
RATIONAL
Pythagoras became fascinated with the mystical properties of the integers
which he considered, among other things, as the basis of secure knowledge.
The quotients, or ratios, of integers were then generally accepted as instruments
for exploring the world. The Pythagoreans were upset when 'irrational' numbers
were later discovered (such as the ratio of a circle's circumference to
its radius), which could not be expessed as a simple ratio of two integers.
(It is worth reflecting on other complications which arise from the Pythagorean
basis that integer numbers are the basis of everything: besides irrational
numbers there are the so-called imaginary and complex numbers, etc.; what
matters from a functional point of view is whether such numbers work, never
mind the magic, nor the ratios.)
[28]
However, starting from this mystical basis, 'rational' has come to mean
reasonable. In the present context it refers to the connection between assumptions.
For instance: can ghosts or flying saucers be reconciled with other (generally
accepted) experiences ? The answer is mostly no. Is subjective experience
compatible with objective knowledge ?, etc. As we have seen, the answer
varies, according to who talks. Since subjective experience is the most
basic experience possible, there should be no question that it is rational.
But, as the above discussion shows, exclusive objectivism (exclusive materialism)
tends to take 'objects' as the basic units of experience; the unstructured
center of subjective experience cannot be an object, and consequently assumes
that there is 'no consciousness'. It seems to me that the assumption of
'objects' as basic units of knowledge is no less mystical than the one by
the Pythagoreans of integers as the basic components of the world. Thus,
I would suggest, we should look for more suitable criteria than 'rationality',
if we want to understand the relation of mind to science.
[29]
GUIDANCE AND PRACTICE
Are the practical aspects of thinking and behavior suitable criteria for
the distinction between science and non-science ? And can they decide whether
subjective experience can be scientifically studied ? Theories are (or at
least they should be) used to the extent that they work. In this regard,
some aims of scientific and non-scientific views are similar: they try to
provide a secure basis for thinking and action. Religious and similar concepts
can be created freely within fairly wide limits, even more so than scientific
working hypotheses (see Feyerabend, above).
[30]
A difference is that religious and similar views try to provide a structure
for the unstructured center of experience, which science cannot do because
it deals only with circumscribed, not with encompassing topics ('theories
of everything', which try to provide encompassing views starting from objects,
are so far not successful, and - if I am right - will never be successful).
In order to provide an encompassing view, the unstructured center of experience
has to be addressed, and for practical purposes a positive (structured)
center of the theory is desired. But for science (that is, for analytical
purposes) the encompassing structured (positive) anchor views produce difficulties,
because they are always self-contradictory (TA1[47]).
[31]
A complication of this situation is that: science is sometimes used as basis
for quasi-religious positive-anchor world views (i.e., for those of 'scientistic'
type). Examples of the many attempts of this type are dialectical materialism
and exclusive objectivism, and they are just as self-contradictory as other
positive anchors. Whereas scientific objectivity is a methodology and cannot
provide ontological certainties ('science-based ontology' is a self-contradictory
notion), scientistic views try nevertheless to do this, just as many religions
or other quasi-religious doctrines do. Science tries out explicit concepts
and hypotheses, created ad-hoc, and as applied to 'regularities' in mind-nature
experience, and tests whether they have wide (general) usefulness. Religious
and similar world views in contrast want to provide guidelines, in the interest
of stability and coordination of thinking and action, by making assertions
about undoubtable truths, and then often by enforcing them.
[32]
Some bona fide scientists, as well as many others, are convinced of a scientistic
world view, and thus use science as a dogma. This is a consequence of a
misunderstanding which results from the prestige and other effects resulting
from the practical results of the scientific objective method. But other
scientists agree that science does not create absolute truths (for instance,
see Raman's C1 to TA3 by Lofting).
[33]
Guidelines and encompassing views are not falsifiable ontological assertions,
because there are no test cases, and thus they are not scientifically accessible.
Statements like 'you must not kill', 'let us take a trip to Greece', 'God
is great', or 'the mind consists of id, ego, and superego' are sign-posts
or envelopes for thinking, but not well-defined testable entities which
can be demonstrated to be erroneous.
[34]
Subjective experience needs structuring. It can use positive-anchor (ontological)
doctrines for that but they cannot be provided by science, and such use
leads to paradoxes of knowledge. It can also use 'as-if positive anchors'
(that is to say, structured anchors which refer to the unstructured anchor),
and this works well for analytical (scientific) puposes but may pose practical
difficulties of stability and reliability of action. This practical problem
cannot be avoided, and we need ways of dealing with it. Guidelines and practice
can in this way distinguish between science and non-science, and sort out
the possibilities and impossibilities of the scientific approach to subjective
experience, but the distinctions are cumbersome, and are likely to remain
controversial.
[35]
PARCELLING TECHNIQUE
Scientific views, theories, and concepts can deal with circumscribed packets
of experience but not with encompassing aspects such as subjective experience.
This is a cardinal aspect of objectivity: the investigation of circumscribed
parts of experience, which are already well defined and verbally labelled
before the study. 'Subjective data', in order to be data, have to be parcelled
off from the ongoing experience and labelled, and then communicated by means
of behavior including words. In this way various derivatives of subjective
experience can become objects, and objects of science. The primary experience
itself, because it contains the unstructured nucleus, cannot be treated
in this way, but it is always present as the envelope of parcelled scientific
endeavors. - Note that scientific objectivity is seen here as a subdivision
or specialization of subjective experience rather than as the most fundamental
function. This is the basic relationship. That subjective experience becomes
a topic of objective science is a secondary step, and this is possible only
for 'peripherals': namely for the 'finished products' of mental activity.
- My impression is that this differentiation is the most useful one for
decisions concerning what can and what cannot be scientifically evaluated,
and I would appreciate receiving comments on this point.
----------------------------------------------------------
'The doctrine is like a cadaver of the thought'
(Die Lehre ist wie ein Leichnam des Gedankens.)
Karl Jaspers
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REFERENCES
Baars, B. (1997) In the Theatre of Consciousness. Journal of Consciousness
Studies 4, pp. 292-309.
Easterbrook, G. (1997) Science and God: A Warming trend? Science 277, 890-893
(15 August 1997), and
discussion of this article in Science 277, 1589-1591 (12 September 1997)
Holton, G. (1993) Science and Anti-Science. Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University
Press
Kuhn, T.(1962-70) The Structure of Scientific Revolutions. Chicago: University
of Chicago Press.
Jaspers, K. (1948-91) Von der Wahrheit. Munchen: Piper. p.203
Nagel, T. (1986) The View from Nowhere. New York: Oxford University Press.
Papineau, D. (Ed.,1996a) The Philosophy of Science. Oxford, Oxford Univ.
Press. Introduction, pp.1-20.
Papineau, D. (1996b) A Universe of Zombies ? The problem of consciousness
and the temptations of
dualism (Book review of 'The Conscious Mind', by D.J. Chalmers), Times Literary
Supplement,
21 June 1996, p. 3.
Popper, K.R. (1934-92) The Logic of Scientific Discovery. London: Routledge.
p.40-42.
Price, H. (1996) Time's Arrow and Archimedes' Point, ew Directions for the
Physics of Time. New York:
Oxford University Press.
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[Author: Herbert F.J. Muller, M.D.
e-mail <mdmu@musica.mcgill.ca>]