KARL JASPERS FORUM FOR TARGET ARTICLES
TA 1, Response 3, to Dimiter G. Chakalov's C2
9 September 1997

(Conventions and abbreviations: TA Target Article;
C Commentary; R Response; N Short Note;
numbers in brackets refer to paragraphs :
square brackets [1] in articles and responses,
pointed brackets <1> in commentaries and notes.)



EXPERIENCE, UNIVERSAL MIND, AND PARTICLE PHYSICS
by Herbert J.F. Muller

[1]
ABSTRACT

Chakalov wants to find evidence for the unstructured source of experience, and offers a number of possible leads for this. In my opinion he is on the right path. One can in principle trace the origin of any concept back to this matrix, and to remember this is the chief point to remember if one wants to get to the source. Some structures are, however, closer to the source than others. Since Chakalov also discusses quantum mechanics in his commentary, I try here to formulate an opinion on the likely relationship between QM and subjective experience, which I offer for discussion.

Key Words: Experience, Consciousness, Universal Mind, Quantum Mechanics


[2]
THE UNIVERSAL MIND

In his commentary D. Chakalov suggests to identify what I had called the unstructured matrix (TA1[10-11]) with Margenau's concept of the 'Universal Mind' which he thinks (C2<5>) could be both the source of cognition and the source of matter. This then might lead to a complete model of mind-brain and mind-reality relations, and might show materialism (such as biological naturalism) and dualism (interactionism) to be 'complemental, not alternative'. Furthermore, 'it cannot be ruled out that such epistemology could be of some help to quantum gravity ... '

[3]
He emphasizes <7,8> the need for a common language and procedure, perhaps in terms of an 'unspeakable cognitive 'common denominator', some 'most general Platonic idea' from which all concepts emerge' - 'how can we possibly speak about it?', and he draws a parallel to two types of measurement in von Neumann's quantum mechanics (QM) terminology (Hartle). He then discusses <9> the inverse relation between volume (generality) and content (specificity) of concepts, and suggests that such an ultimate Platonic idea leaves nothing 'outside' it because it is all-embracing, and extremely devoid of content.

[4]
' ... it is impossible to explain any act of communication without the undefinable matrix' <10> 'some unspeakable meta-language shared by all human beings'. Reducing this to some set of concerete explanations, 'and hence to model it with information processes' would lead to restrictions; here he speaks of decreasing the entropy of the memory substrate: 'how come we still cannot locate engrams ... ' ?

[5]
He then tries <11> to find examples for the undefinable matrix: that memories are on the tip of the tongue, <12> that in translations between languages meanings may be similar in quite different wordings, which he suggests is mediated by an unspeakable 'common denominator', corresponding to the undefinable atrix:
'it is actually one Platonic idea explicated through two sets of entirely different words'. He also tries to pply
this principle to time and space. Further <13> creative thinking, creation of new concepts <14>, and mental rotation <15> stem from the matrix. He also refers to the cognitive cycle of U. Neisser.

[6]
He concludes <17> by writing that it is difficult to think about that with which we think by that with which we think, which he suggests is also evidence for the existence of the undefinable matrix.

------------------------------------------------------------

[7]
I would like to start answering by emphasizing that all concepts can be used in two ways: (a) with an assumption that they are representations of fixed entities which exist outside the mind or (b) assuming that they are ad-hoc (or as-if) formations within mind-nature experience.

[8]
My overall 'project', if I may call it such, is to test the hypothesis that all mind-nature structures (including theories) derive from a common source, an unstructured matrix (cf. TA1[50-51]); or if you prefer : that various concepts can be translated to the language of Zero-Reference or Responsive Reality Formation (see my R1[7]). In the present context this means trying to study Chakalov's thesis by tracing its roots from the origin, mainly his suggestion that Margenau's 'Universal Mind' is identical with the unstructured matrix.

[9]
From what Chakalov says in <5> it seems to me that the starting points, materialism and dualism (or naturalism and interactionism) which he wants to reconciliate with each other are both objectivist, and thus on the 'res extensa side' of Descartes' division. On the other hand, he also wants to reach the unstructured matrix, and this by starting from specific situational questions. In general, I would agree that this can be done. The question is: how does one know one talks about it or instead about a positive encompassing structure (TA1[47]) ? I would suggest it is a matter of being aware of the origin of concepts from the matrix, and then tracing back to it.

[10]
At this point both thinking and communication can indeed become difficult, and this is of course a reason why many do not want to go into it: it could too easily become very hazy. On the other hand this matter is of central concern, and it would seem by now that its discussion becomes inevitable if one wants to go beyond some road-blocks in the study of subjective experience. In practice: how can one discuss the unstructured origin despite the lack of words which are our tools for discussion - rather than giving up - what means for communication are available ? I would suggest to test concepts as one goes along, while making sure that the communication is still open.

[11]
As Chakalov writes <7> agreement on terminology is needed for any specific communication, and simultaneously each language (with its defined concepts) implies the limitations of its de-'finitions'. I have recently discussed (in my R1[12-17] and in N3, chiefly in discussion with V V Raman) the question of a common language - that is, an agreed-upon definition of terms - for discussion of subjective experience and related topics.

[12]
Because of the limitations which are implied in the definitions, there is a need for an additional discussion of the defined concepts themselves (since otherwise the discussion may be self-aborting) and this too with mutual criticism by the participants; this is difficult but necessary, and I would think it relates closely to Chakalov's point <17>. He suggests that the underlying origin of concept formation, as well as of matter, has to be the unstructured matrix. This in agreement with my position, if it is concurred that mind and matter are secondary (Cartesian) differentiations.

[13]
I have tried to identify what Margenau means by 'Universal Mind'. He writes (p.106) that 'A great variety of names have described this Universal Mind, among them Tao, Logos, Brahman, Atman, the Absolute, Mana, Holy Ghost, Weltgeist, or simply God.' In the context of my proposition concerning negative versus positive encompassing concepts (TA1 [28,45- 49]) the question is on which side Margenau's Universal Mind belongs. It would seem to me that it can be either positive (structured) or negative (unstructured), and that Margenau's position (chapter 10) is in this respect ambiguous. This in itself is not necessarily a problem, as long as it is realized that positive encompassing concepts (1) are secondary to (form within) the negative one, and (2) that the positive ones result in paradoxes or contradictions (see my R2[29]). Some oriental religions are atheistic, which I presume may be helpful in avoiding conceptual conflicts; clearly, ideas (or processes) like nirvana are close to the negative encompassing.

[14]
I will not try here to decide whether or not (or to what extent) Margenau was aware of this point when he wrote his book. But a greater difficulty results when one tries to prove the existence of a positive encompassing starting from particular positive concepts, in this case from physics, specifically from quantum mechanics. This would amount, I think, to an attempt to provide a positivistic physical-theory-proof of the mind-independent existence of God, something which has by and large been abandoned as impossible in the last two hundred years (even though something similar has more recently been tried in scientistic epistemologies; see my R2). The paradox in this particular attempt of devising a positive encompassing would be the attempt to create God starting from His created world. Again, rather than deciding from reading Margenau's book whether he had tried to do this, I would appreciate knowing Chakalov's opinion on this matter.

[15]
In answer to Chakalov's question in section <16>: Neisser's description (pp. 20-24ff) of the Perceptual Cycle (consisting of construction with the utilization of an existing 'schema', plus 'exploratory activity', and 'available information') appears to me to be compatible with the gradual buildup of reality from an unstructured matrix as it would be expected in RRF theory, although Neisser does not appear to expressly cover the initial aspect. But I would rather leave the discussion of this point to cognitive scientists who are acquainted with the literature of this field.

[16]
Chakalov's point <17>, that thinking tends to get into difficulty when it deals with itself is quite to the point. I would agree that this is closely related to the origin of mental structures from an unstructured source. What to do about that is a central problem. Raman (C1 to TA3) quotes ancient Hindu sources which refer to mind-nature structures as 'illusions'; this emphasizes two important aspects: that we form (or construct) them, and that they do not provide permanent truths. (Personally I would, for practical reasons, prefer a term like 'working structures' over 'illusions'). Keeping these aspects in mind might help with the difficulty which Chakalov describes in this section: since we know that we deal with self-made structures, we also know that we are responsible for them, we are at the origin, and have to take the lead - which is not always pleasurable.


[17]
SUBJECTIVE AWARENESS AND QUANTUM MECHANICS

Two of the commentaries to my article (Chakalov's and Henkel's) deal, among other things, with Quantum Mechanics (QM). This topic comes up in many recent discussions about 'consciousness', and I am afraid I have no alternative (if I want to answer to the commentaries) but to try to take a position of some sort on this matter, although I am quite uncomfortable in doing that, since I have no formal education in this area. But after all, if my epistemological proposition as described in my article is any good, it should work for QM as well. I will try to address a few points here, obviously at the risk of making a fool of myself - please tell me, someone, in case I do, and in what way.

[18]
QM is an extension of physical theory to small things (apparently with some exceptions such as macroscopic superconducting rings at very low temperatures). As part of physical theory, QM starts out by implying mind-independent reality (and this is usually handled in a fashion which implies an exclusive objectivist persistent metaphysical rather than an ad-hoc or as-if working framework which would be RRF compatible; see TA [1] and my R1).

[19]
One problem seems to be that the small things are not really things anymore, as Weyl has pointed out long ago: the individual particles are smaller than a wavelength of light and thus cannot be objects in the usual sense. And furthermore, their properties may be experienced as either particle or wave qualities, depending on how they are examined ('looked at'), and their properties are chiefly known in statistical terms only rather than individual ones. Also some of their properties are undecided before the are observed. All this is not easily compatible with the notion of mind-independent stable (that is, persistent metaphysical) objects.

[20]
For the further discussion I rely largely on a recent book by David Lindley, which defends the Copenhagen interpretation, and is a more comprehensible (to me) description of QM than some others which I have come across.

[21]
Exclusive objectivity is at a loss here: 'the Copenhagen view explicitly rejects the idea of a preexisting world whose attributes we are trying to tease out ... [although Penrose wrote:] ... 'I strongly believe it is the purpose of physics to provide an objective description of reality' ... But ... followers of Bohr rather than Einstein [or Bohm, or Penrose] will insist that the Copenhagen interpretation provides a 'description' of reality that is objective in the sense that everyone armed with a quantum mechanical education can do the experiments and come to the same general conclusions ... predictions are probabilistic ... but this is not to say that they are unobjective ... experiments by different people will produce results in accord with those probabilities ... ' (Lindley p. 158-159).

[22]
' Penrose himself goes on to say that it is not the indeterminism [of QM] that bothers him ... So what exactly is the trouble here ? ... We can divide the scientists' notions of objectivity into two parts. According to something we might call 'weak objectivity', it's essential to the function of science that all scientists can agree on the rules, and can unambiguously agree, when faced by a specified experimental setup, on what can happen and what can't happen. This indeed seems essential to science, and quantum mechanics, in whatever interpretation we choose, adheres to this principle. But what we can call 'strong objectivity' goes further, and declares that the picture of the world yielded by the sum total of all experimental results on all possible pieces of the world is in fact not just a picture, but really is identical to the objective world, something that exists outside of us, and prior to any conception or measurement we might have of it. ... ' Going from the first to the second 'is a matter of jumping to conclusions without any real evidence. And in classical physics, you run into no trouble making this jump ... nevertheless, the jump is not demanded by classical physics ... it remains a leap of faith, not a scientific necessity. And the new ingredient that quantum mechanics brings to this discussion is precisely that it drives a wedge between weak and strong objectivity. ... ' (Lindley pp.159-161)

[23]
In my understanding this is the same difference which I have tried to describe (TA1[14-17]) as the one between objective method (identical with Lindley's weak objectivity) and exclusive objectivism with its assumption of mind-independent reality (strong objectivity). But as will be seen below, Lindley does not stress the impossibility of mind-independence.

[24]
'Accepting [this] means accepting that belief in an objective reality cannot be maintained, and that we will have to make do with what I have called weak objectivity. Fighting it means, like Bohm, looking for a way of restoring to [QM] an underlying reality, even if it means an unseen and undetectable one. In this sense, the traditional Copenhagen view is, despite its hoariness, the revolutionary philosophy, while Bohm and his followers (even Einstein, it must be said) are the counter-revolutionaries, seeking to turn back the clock to a simpler time. ... Because Bohm's theory is mathematically identical to standard quantum theory, it's possible that no experiment can ever really decide the issue. It's then a matter of philosophical taste which view one prefers. ... there seems to be no practical need for [a 'deeper'] theory ... Perhaps the ineffability of reality, according to the Copenhagen view, has its advantages. ... ' (Lindley, pp. 161-162).

[25]
It it possible, I think, to decide Lindley's question of 'philosophical taste' from outside of QM, on the basis of the mind-reality question: personal experience is not accessible from a view of mind-independent reality (TA1[7]), and in case we want one rather than two epistemologies, mind-independent reality can therefore be ruled out as a possibility.

[26]
' The Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen experiment; the two-slit apparatus in which a photon seems to follow two paths at the same time; delayed-choice experiments, in which a particle seems to need to know in advance what is expected of it, so that it can appropriately gear itself up for a measurement that occurs later: you will sometimes find all these things referred to as 'paradoxes'. ... none of them is really a paradox. ... what they contradict is not themselves (the true definition of a paradox) but our prior expectations of the way we think things ought to be. ... it's not nature's obligation to behave as we would like.' (Lindley, p. 163)

[27]
But the Copenhagen interpretation ' has one flaw, a genuine paradox ... : It asserts that measurements can be made, but does not explain how they can be made ... the 'half-up, half down' electron becomes definitely either up or down. Measurement, therefore, is the step we must take to get from the fuzzy quantum world to the sharply focused classical world. ... nowhere in Copenhagen [sic] can we find an explanation of how measurement comes about. Why is this a paradox rather than simply an omission ? Because we would like to believe that quantum mechanics is a fundamental theory of physics, and ... that the behavior of objects ... can in principle be attributed to the properties of their components, which are the atoms and electrons and photons that quantum mechanics describes ... Bohr 'solved' the measurement problem only by fiat: he just declared that ... measurements can indeed be made ...' (Lindley, pp. 164-165).

[28]
' The measurement problem, this one true paradox of the Copenhagen interpretation, is in fact what Schrodinger's cat is trying to tell us. ... quantum mechanics alone doesn't seem to allow measurements actually to take place. If we try to describe our detector using quantum language - which, if quantum mechanics really is fundamental and universal, we ought to be able to do - then indefinite states generate indefinite measurements. This is the measurement problem recognized long ago by Bohr ... [who] implied, without ever explaining how it came about, that macroscopic classical devices such as pointers and detectors, could not fall into uncertain states. They had to be one thing or another. We don't allow, in other words, pointers to occupy states such as half-UP, half-DOWN, but no explanation for this law was given. Certainly, it seemed, quantum mechanics itself supplied no such rule of impossibility. Measurement, in the Copenhagen interpretation, is therefore a magical, unexplained happening, if not an act of God then certainly an act of Niels Bohr.' (Lindley, pp.166-167).

[29]
' How can this dilemma be escaped ? There are only two possibilities: either quantum mechanics is incomplete ... or ... (it) contains some recipe within it ... that can in some way transform an indefinite into a definite state. ... all the fundamental strangeness of the quantum mechanical world do not, when we are thinking about the macroscopic and tangible world around us, have any practical or detectable significance. Which brings us to the most puzzling question of all: where does the weirdness go ? ... How does a superposition turn into a mixture ? ... A classical mixture [such as probabilities in throwing dice] defines our ignorance: the system is beyond doubt in one state or another, but because we don't yet know which, we must be content with a list of probabilities ... [on the other hand] a quantum superposition corresponds to nothing we have encountered in everyday life, and therefore baffles us ... Our familiar language is appropriate only to quantum objects that have been measured ... words fail us ...' (Lindley, pp. 167-172)

[30]
' We can, nevertheless, see the effects or consequences of quantum superpositions. ... a single photon passing through a two-slit apparatus creates an interference pattern ... It's only by accepting the idea of the superposition of states ... that you can begin to understand how interference in such a case can happen ... [A macroscopic example of QM is that at low temperatures] an electric current set up in a ring of superconducting material will flow ... without loss. ... because all the electron pairs follow a single wavefunction, that wavefunction has to wrap around on itself without any abrupt change. ... any magnetic field passing through the interior loop, connected as it is to the current flowing around the loop, becomes 'quantized', meaning that it can take on only certain discrete values. ... [even this large object] is, or should be, a single quantum system ... [A gap in the ring produces a system] that can jump from one state to another ... putting together a lot of individual quantum objects [thus does not] necessarily erase quantum behavior.' (Lindley, p.172-177)

[31]
In the latter case ' the electrons cooperate rather than compete amongst themselves to carry the electrical current', in contrast to the usual macroscopic systems, where 'a cat will not spontaneously turn into a dog (even though it may be possible to construct, in principle, a plausible lapdog out of the very same atoms that constitute a cat). ... Schrodinger's cat - the actual, real, macroscopic cat ... - ... has some probability of being alive, some probability of being dead, and no probability at all of being both ... This vanishing of the probability for the superposed state is known as 'decoherence'. ... That strange quantum superposition has been transformed into simple classical ignorance. ... Schrodinger's cat, in short, does not exist. Or rather, it has an immeasurably short lifetime, once the electron-spin measurement is made, before it evolves spontaneously into a regular, everyday, classical, Newtonian cat.' (Lindley, pp.193-199)

[32]
Lindley's treatment of the QM problem narrows it down to a rather specific question (the 'measurement' or 'superposition' problem), which makes it easier to focus on.

[33]
However, in the discussion of this 'one true paradox', he appears to forget Bohr's, and his own earlier, conclusion (p.160) that strong objectivity (that is, in my terms, mind-independent reality) cannot be maintained. He discusses (as indeed Bohr and others had done before him) measurements as if they were subject-free. For instance, he wants (p.164) to attribute the behavior of large-scale objects (such as measuring devices) to the properties of their particle components, without mentioning the measurer. But here too, as he wrote then (p.163) it is not nature's obligation to behave as we would like. Further, he treats 'time' as an abstract concept without referring to its rooting from experience (p.189; cf. my opinion in TA1[42]), although he adds (p.190) that possibly 'our minds have access to something more fundamental'. And he proposes (p. 206) to 'restore Einstein's moon' via quantum decoherence' (cf. TA1[33]). 'Measurements happen (p.214), and you don't need anything besides quantum mechanics to explain how'. And to complete the score (p.216), 'making those superpositions go away is what makes measurements happen, and it all happens without human intervention. It's a property of large systems in general, not of some specific 'act of measurement' ... there is no need of human intervention, still less of human consciousness.'

[34]
Overall, Lindley's book impresses me, despite his earlier statement that 'strong objectivity' cannot be maintained to start with, as an attempt to 'de-construct' physical objectivism from within exclusive objectivism, somewhat similar to the enormous efforts of the logical positivist philosophers and mathematicians, from Wittgenstein and Godel to Feyerabend, who have done the same for (or rather, against) absolute mind-independent truth in general. That is to say that while he de-constructs strong objectivity he remains within it despite his own stated opinion to the contrary. He writes that 'human consciousness' can be dispensed with, and this (I think) constitutes an ambivalent effort at best (someone may tell me off on that score).

[35]
It may be a consequence of this objectivist line - or lapse - of reasoning (that is, omitting the observer) that Schrodinger, as is reported, has said he regretted to ever have had anything to do with quantum mechanics (Yam, p.124). And other recent attempts to explain the problem also still appear to imply a belief in mind-independent reality, for instance in statements (Yam, p.127) that 'the system decoheres because the system leaks information' (whatever that may mean) and gets in touch with the 'rest of the universe', etc., which 'does away with any special need for a consciousness ... to effect a classical outcome'.

[36]
' Measurements' are means of 'perception' in the field of particle physics, standing in for vision, hearing, touch, taste, and smell; or more accurately: they extend visual perception. Without perceptions, one could not say anything about the world, or at least one would have a very difficult time forming a reality in a reactive fashion (RRF, cf. my response 1). Measurements are 'acts of God or of Niels Bohr' (see [28] above) only if one has an exclusively objectivist point of view, otherwise they are part of our perceptual activity just as in any other perception. One cannot see or smell electrons, but one can 'measure' some of their properties. It turns out that 'the world' is somewhat different in that small realm (or when things get very cold) which should not be surprising.

[37]
Leaving subjective experience out of QM theory appears to be self-defeating. Whether one considers experience as a part of quantum theory, or as an addition to it, is of secondary importance (that will depend on the basic orientation of the theorizer: if he is an exclusive objectivist it will have to be an addition, as Lindley mentions.) For me at any rate subjective experience is a constituent aspect of any thinking, including theories: it is us who 'perceive' or 'measure', or 'theorize', not the things or the instruments (in or by) themselves. Magnifying glasses or hearing aids are also instruments, and no one would suggest that they do their work without perceivers.

[38]
This leads to my next point: the 'weirdness' of QM may, in the first place, be a side-effect of our habit of thinking in terms of a stable metaphysical mind-independent reality. 'Reality' and 'truth' are shorthand for 'I believe in the reliability of what I have constructed, or have accepted from others, as functioning structures' (TA1[32]); if this reliability is mistaken for absolute, it becomes an impossible 'mind-independent' extrapolation. One might wonder whether the term 'weird' should not perhaps be applied instead to the habit of thinking in such classical but ungraspable (Platonic or Kantian) metaphysical extrapolations (with its trend to primarily divide experience into subject and object), which has characterized occidental thinking for much of its history, and which was canonized by Descartes three and a half centuries ago. Since we are used to a picture of the world as consisting of stable pre-packaged items, we may be upset when this does not work in some areas - but this upset is not necessary: we can perhaps alter our habits. In QM it does not work, and the possibility may be worth considering that here we are closer to original experience than in stable metaphysics. Despite the conceptual problem, one can use the procedures in a reliable fashion, as Lindley writes (pp.158-159).

[39]
Why do people talk about QM when they want to discuss subjective experience ? Is it perhaps because QM, just like subjective experience, is seen to be in a conceptual quandary (and if so, would it not constitute a proposal to have the blind leading the blind) ? And is it not first of all because they want to explain the mind in objectivist terms ? If then people try to 'explain' experience by QM, do they not have things backwards ? QM theory is an extension of a working metaphysical structure (TA1[28]) to small items, where it does not work well. Rather than trying to explain experience by QM, one should go back to original experience in order to come up with something more appropriate for QM: nothing can be said, in terms of stable (extrapolated) concepts, beyond the results obtained, which depend upon apparatus etc., and which hold up quite well. And in particular, the scientist's subjective experience is an essential ingredient of the working structure (or 'measurement', or 'observation').

[40]
' ... in quantum mechanics nature is, at the most fundamental level, genuinely unknowable, but despite that, the world at large, the world of which quantum mechanics is the foundation, can be known and understood ' (Lindley, p.226). This opinion is similar to some others; I want to only quote from a recent letter by Henry Stapp, who writes 'My aim is to construct the simplest ontology that will provide a reasonable, naturalistic explanation of our basic physical theory, namely, orthodox quantum theory ... the [wave form] collapses are naturally associated with human brains ... each conscious event is closely connected to a collapse of the wave function ...' Stapp's naturalistic ontology is evidently an exclusively objectivist one (TA1[16]), and his discussion of experience I find difficult to grasp ('... each actual conscious experience is created, according to this model, by the non-unitary process of actualizing the state whose actualization is that experience: it is the actualization of the state that is the experience, not the continuing (via unitary evolution) existence of that state'). Roland Cook commented that 'experience is our sole avenue to understanding the world', which is a clearer statement. - Ontologies are, by definition, self-contradictory attempts to justify a belief in mind-independent reality (cf. TA1[25]).

[41]
Here I beg to differ, and would suggest to put it this way: we, the experiencers, form reality within our initially unstructured mind-nature experience. For the most part this works well, even when we neglect this origin and treat our constructs as if they were mind-independent entities, as for instance in classical physics including relativity theory. But there are some areas, including subjective experience and quantum mechanics, where this is less successful. This should not surprise anyone if one considers that the formed ad-hoc structures are only working tools (but it is perhaps an overstatement to call them 'illusions'), and they may have to be modified or replaced at times.

[42]
Quantum mechanics theory is an extension and specialization of more classical physical theory, which in turn is an extension and specialization of everyday as-if thinking with ad-hoc working structures. QM theory is a specialization of ordinary experience (which we structure from the unstructured beginning), not vice versa. The 'wave form collapse' is an attempt by mathematical means to go from QM to gestalt perception, or even unstructured experience, which is like trying to persuade us that - because playing a film backward can show it that way - a shattered glass can re-assemble itself and jump back onto the table.

[43]
It is possible, I imagine, that eventually QM theory will have something important to say about brain function (it is already of practical help in tests like magnetic resonance and single photon emission scans), and including perhaps even about the reasons why 'consciousness' has evolved, but: it will not 'explain' subjective experience, because that comes and remains earlier. The differentiation and specialization of thinking proceed from unstructured experience to objects and from there to the non-objects of particle physics. A de-differentiation ('decoherence' or 'collapse') which would go the other way and 'explain' (the experiencing of) experience is not possible. There are some unconvincing attempts to circumvent this obstacle for instance by declaring that certain quantum events 'are mental' (Sarfatti). - One can objectively study the derivation of big things from small things, or of warm things from cold things, etc., but that is a different question.

[44]
My present guess is that this conceptual approach might help in dealing with some questions concerning QM, in particular the QM-experience relation, and that this might also in part answer Chakalov's point <5> which relates to QM. That means I suggest to concentrate on the epistemological rather than the experimental or mathematical side of the QM-mind relation.

[45]
I expect that among the readers of this note some will disagree with my position as stated. Since for the moment I plan to maintain this opinion, I would appreciate commentaries as to why and how I might be wrong.


REFERENCES

Cook, R. (1997) in <PSYCHE-D@LISTSERV.UH.EDU> 24 August 1997

Lindley, D. (1996) Where does the Weirdness go ? Why Quantum Mechanics is strange but not as strange as you think. New York: Basic Books.

Margenau, H. (1984) The Miracle of Existence. Woodbridge, Connecticut: Ox Bow Press .

Neisser, U. (1976) Cognition and Reality. San Francisco, W.H. Freeman and Company

Sarfatti, J. (1995) Matter, Mind and God. (Book announcement on the Internet).

Stapp, H. (1997) in <PSYCHE-D@LISTSERV.UH.EDU>, 24 Aug. and 2 Sept.1997, and contributions by various discussants.

Weyl, H. (1949) Philosophy of Mathematics and Natural Science. Transl. O. Helmer. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Yam, P., (1997) Bringing Schrodinger's Cat to Life. Scientific American 276, June 1997, pp.124-129.


[HFJ Muller is psychiatrist and electroencephalographer
e-mail <mdmu@musica.mcgill.ca> ]