[1]
INTRODUCTION
In response to a number of commentaries (C) and short notes (N), I wish
to begin with thanks to the commentators who have, in their interesting
discussions, pointed out some weaknesses of my target article (TA) 'Is the
Mind Real ?'. This prompts me to propose some amendments which I hope will
deal with these problems.
[2]
This type of profit from discussion in an interactive peer review is what
I had hoped for in setting up the Forum, as a possibility for 'dress rehearsal'
of ideas, before more definite publication, and with sufficient time for
reflection for comments as well as for answers. (If we are lucky, the interactive
feature might also prevent censorship on the one hand, and the development
into a mutual admiration society on the other.)
[3]
The guideline in my responses will be openness to ongoing experience in
the sense of Karl Jaspers (as opposed to pre-conceptions, or conventions,
and pre-existing consensus), and with the unstructured center as point of
reference. This openness to experience includes openness to the views of
others - which does not necessarily mean that I will adopt their opinions.
I want, rather, to try to find the common roots of the various opinions;
the unstructured reference center may (but does not have to) be considered
'mysterious' if you wish, since it has no graspable structure.
[4]
In this first response I will deal with two related general topics which
concern several of the communications:
(A) Terminology and
(B) Effects of the Cartesian Split.
(A) TERMINOLOGY:
RESPONSIVE REALITY FORMATION
STARTING FROM NO STRUCTURE
[5]
Two comments have concerned the negative implications of terms like 'zero-reference',
'nothingness', and the like (see TA [8], table 1). Thus, Peter Morgan (N1)
wondered whether my proposition was nihilistic, and Paul Jones (C<27>)
wrote that my proposal annihilates science. The wider connotations of these
negative terms do indeed invite this type of comment, even though I did
not imply this in my paper, which points to the 'constructive' aspect of
the zero-reference method. For an initial exposition of this constructive
aspect, please refer to TA1[31,38-39].
[6]
I will deal with Jones' commentary in more detail in my next response; for
the moment I only want to say that my proposal does not annihiliate science.
If the term 'annihiliation' has to be used, it could refer to the notions
of mind-independent reality and truth, which cause difficulties and which
are not needed by science.
[7]
In order to avoid this type of misunderstanding, I want to offer the term
'responsive reality formation' (RRF), as interchangeable with, or in addition
to, 'zero-reference method', which might still be seen to refer to a negative
and static (non)object. 'Reality formation' puts greater emphasis on the
activity of construction, but maintains the implication of the origin from
an unstructured matrix; the two expressions could be combined, for instance
as ' RRF from a structure-free state '.
[8]
'Responsive' here refers to two related aspects: (a) the formation of mental
structures is responsive to experience in the wide sense (that is, 'reality'
testing including scientific activity); and (b) it is to be responsible
in an inter-personal, social, and wider (such as ecological) sense. Both
expressions (zero-reference and RRF) are meant to refer to the same hypothesis-and-procedure,
namely the structuration of ongoing experience as it occurs, starting from
no structure (or if you prefer, 'from scratch'). This formation results
in working structures or tools, such as objects, concepts, and theories,
etc., which are installed as 'temporary reality' with the help of the forces
of belief, and which are (or should be) exposed to reality-testing by further
experience, including experience by others (and thus including by science),
with the help of communication.
SOME OTHER TERMS
[9]
It is not mandatory to use the term 'matrix', which Hubey (C<3>) prefers
to reserve for use in mathematics; one can instead talk about 'origin' or
'source', etc. However, the word matrix was in use long before 1850, when
the mathematical meaning was introduced, and I do not believe that other
uses have to be abandoned because of the mathematical one. Hubey makes similar
points about some other terms: but the mathematical uses do not have to
have automatic precendence over other uses of the same words. What matters
is: to be clear which sense is being used in communication. <22> '
'Object' sounds more scientific than 'thing' ' ... 'objectivation is postmodernist
confusion': it may be better, for purposes of discussion, to avoid such
unqualified statements. It is probably more useful to describe methods,
such as the objective one, as well as world views such as the one of exclusive
objectivism, in functional terms, in order to examine their advantages and
difficulties.
[10]
Hubey <26>: Misuse of words, for instance of political or semi-religious
type, can and will happen; I would think that the best way to deal with
that is to stick to a particular meaning in the discussion, and to make
it clear which one is being used and why. He suggests <40> that 'virtual'
and 'unobservable' are more fashionable terms than 'as-if' and 'metaphysical'.
My problem with this proposal is that up to now I have not understood what
'virtual' means, and that the term 'observable' pre-supposes belief in mind-independent
reality, which in my opinion [TA<1>] is a mistake. 'Metaphysical'
is an ambiguous term (see TA[24-28]), but at at least there has been much
discussion about it, for a long time; and 'as-if' describes a functional
quality of concepts.
[11]
The term 'as-if' implies a notion of unreality, as Joel Henkel observes
(C<21>). This effect was intended by Vaihinger (TA[33]) when he introduced
this term (he wrote about 'the fictions of mankind'). This is not necessarily
a bad feature, because it can lead to thinking efforts. However, there are
other terms available if preferred, such as 'ad-hoc', or 'working', or 'makeshift',
or 'temporary', etc., all of which can convey the tool nature of mental
structures (see TA[27,28]).
CONSENSUS
[12]
V. V. Raman (N2) proposes some terms for consensus in the area of reality
and the mind. He emphasizes that what are needed are 'universally accepted'
(rather than merely 'acceptable') definitions. In my opinion, adoption of
the proposed definitions, like also binding adoption of some of Hubey's
terms (C<1>) would get us into a dead-end situation.
[13]
Terminology is important, because we depend on it for communication, and
consensus is an essential technique for the practice of life including science.
However, terminology can also constrain thinking, and consensus cannot be
the main criterion for validity of concepts; one only has to think of various
times and places, when there was or is consensus about the truth of the
most unbelievable beliefs.
[14]
Mark Seelig (C<14>) quotes Charles Tart's term 'consensus trance'
of objectivism, which can hinder understanding. One may also cite Paul Feyerabend's
critique of scientific concepts and methods ('science is essentially an
anarchistic enterprise: theoretical anarchism is more humanitarian and more
likely to encourage progress than its law-and-order alternatives'); his
opinion is particularly relevant on this aspect because he started from
an objectivist point of view. A problem with his formulation is, I think,
that the term 'anarchy' is unnecessarily destructive, similar to what was
discussed above concerning 'zero' and 'nihil'; and in particular that his
discussion does not emphasize the formation of structures from the structure-free
origin.
[15]
In my opinion (TA[1]), procedural consensus adopting exclusive objectivism
is at present a prominent obstacle, both in theory and in practice (the
latter due to censorship resulting from the theoretical fixation of editors
and reviewers), to progress in understanding the mind-reality and mind-brain
relations. In order to be helpful, concepts, and consensus concerning them,
have to be based on (and tested for viability by) ongoing experience.
[16]
Specifically: the definitions of 'reality', of 'perceived reality', and
of 'consciousness', as proposed by Raman, imply mind-independent reality,
an opinion which is supported only by the belief of some (or of many), but
not by other experience. 'Subjective' being defined (N<3>) as 'arising
in brain structures' is self-contradictory (that is, impossible), since
it proposes to understand subjective mental experience in terms of mind-independent
reality.
[17]
Raman's point <7>, that mind-independent reality is 'suggested by
the scientific world view' is reminiscent of Friedrich Engels' argument
that materialism must be true because it is being used, and that it must
be used because it is true: it is circular reasoning. This does not mean
that the theory cannot be useful, but rather that it should be understood
as a mental tool with certain advantages as well as limitations, instead
of as persistent truth (I will expand on Engels' view in my next response).
- Raman concludes with a distinction between 'perceived' reality and 'extrapolated'
(real ?) reality, which latter he writes is 'only of metaphysical interest
and/or validity'. This is a point which I have dealt with in TA[24-28]:
we need to acknowledge our perennial use of working or temporary metaphysics
instead of looking for the non-functional fixed or permanent metaphysics.
(B) THE CARTESIAN SUBJECT/OBJECT ERROR
[18]
A second aspect becomes clear from several commentaries: the method needs
to be demonstrated in practice. It is apparently not easy to communicate
what I am trying to do, even to some who (more or less) agree with the general
aim of my proposal. More specifically it appears that the main obstacle
is indeed the strong need for the certainty provided by one or another of
the Cartesian (positive, structured, ontological, and generally: mind-independent)
anchors, as discussed in TA[47-48], and this certainty, when adopted, in
turn tends to obstruct the access to the non-structured origin, or matrix
(TA[47]), and thus the access to understanding. We are all inveterate Cartesians;
what can we do about this habit ?
[19]
I will briefly mention here some examples of the Cartesian effect in various
commentaries (I will later respond more extensively to the various comments).
Dimiter Chakalov (C) and Roger Callahan (N1) want to find support for the
unstructured matrix, but so far as I can see they want to find it in already
structured mind-independent experiences; for instance Chakalov <5>
: ' 'onta' rooted on the quantum vacuum' as proposed by Margenau, which
he suggests could help 'elaborate a complete model of brain-mind and brain-reality
relations'. Callahan (N1) wants to find more original experience than meter
readings of electricity, for instance in touch and pain, but I would think
that this type of experience also is already structured (although not strongly
so, and it is closer to the unstructured state): for instance the localization
of pain or shock is a structured feature of that experience.
[20]
Morgan (N1) points out that there are many worthwhile structures, including
Jaspers' Encompassing, and that a positive Encompassing (that is to say,
a mind-independent one) is needed. This is quite true operationally, but
one must add: watch out, and don't rely on conceptual tools blindly, neither
on specialized concepts nor on encompassing ones (cogito: credo atque dubito,
TA[54]). Using concepts and theories is like using a car or airplane: they
can be helpful, but they can also cause problems, including fatal ones.
[21]
There is furthermore a practical trade-off concerning the strength of belief:
strong and doubt-free belief allows doubt-free action, but it obstructs
attempts to understand. Zero-reference allows understanding, but it is in
itself no basis for action. A combination of some sort is needed, and working
metaphysics, understood as makeshift tool, might help. It it perhaps worth
examining explicitly whether, and to what extent, such a more deliberately
understood view can replace a paradoxical fundamentalist one (it would be
more expensive, in terms of responsibility). This already happens in practice,
as it is evident from the somewhat clumsy efforts of international organizations
such as the UN, which cannot be said to have a uniform persistent metaphysical
basis to operate from.
[22]
Paul Jones (C) and Gary Schouborg (C) present themselves straightforwardly
as objectivists. Jones consequently talks <1> about (Kantian) things-in-themselves,
'since all what the observer may experience gets filtered through the person's
subjectivity', etc., and proposes <5> that mind-independent reality
'is not a matter of belief, but rather the fact of human activity and the
practice of scientific reasearch', that is to say: he presents Engels' circular
argument. As Seelig (C<6>) notes, Jones misses the point of my presentation,
and this I think is a direct consequence of his acceptance of the Cartesian
split.
[23]
Schouborg writes <2> that I intend to distinguish 'between subjective
experience and non-subjective reality', which is a misunderstanding due
to his Cartesian position (to repeat, I say instead [1,5,7, etc.] that the
belief in 'non-subjective' mind-independent reality is a mistake). He writes
<6> that 'reality is given as consciousness independent', and supports
this by saying that if he looks at his computer screen and calls it the
seashore he is wrong. My answer is that the computer screen, etc., are structurations
within the constraints of his mind-nature experience, they are not 'given'
ready-made outside it; and that experience is not originally divided into
mind and nature, a la maniere de Descartes, as Schouborg implies.
[24]
Mark Seelig (C) and Joel E. Henkel (C) are largely in agreement with my
proposition, they both want to get away from Descartes. I do have difficulties,
however, with Henkel's (or anyone else's) quantum physical considerations
to explain subjective experience, not only because it is far removed from
my field of work, but mainly because I do not understand the motivation
for it. My present opinion is that this is a (complicated) way of including
Cartesian exclusive objectivism in the anti-Cartesian reasoning; if I am
wrong about this I will take it back.
[25]
Mark Hubey (C) has a mathematical world view, which is rather interesting
in many ways; he and it have also a clearly Cartesian orientation. For instance
he writes <1> that reality is that which exists objectively and in
fact, and 'the sum of all that is real, absolute, and unchangeable' etc.,
or <42> 'Belief is built up on data which is inputted via our sensory
organs'. This Cartesian view I would think does not automatically follow
from the use of mathematics as a tool, and is thus to be considered an additional
feature. But one possible reason why the two go together is that the mathematical
procedures can be applied only to entities which have already been accepted
(one might say 'certified') as 'existing' - (how does this apply to particle
physics ?)
[26]
Mariela Szirko writes (N1) that she cannot deal with my article because
it presents a monopsychist view. This interpretation presupposes her belief
in mind-independent reality, or perhaps more accurately in this case: the
possibility of a reality-independent mind which can neglect nature, and
thus it implies her acceptance of the Cartesian split. She proposes a hylozoist
stance (which I have not yet comprehended, but this may be because I do
not know the literature she mentions). Just for the record, I want to repeat
that I talk about mind-nature experience, and that the separation into the
two parts 'mind' and 'nature' is a secondary (Cartesian) development (or
artifact).
------------------------------------------------------------------------
[27]
If for an epistemological view absolute positive certainty is claimed or
implied, there has to be a self-contradictory nucleus in the doctrine, because
positive anchors are secondary to the negative one (TA[47]): we construct
them from nothing but then we tend to claim that they are mind-independent.
This is clearest in theistic thought systems, where commonly an external
voice (of God, or of his messenger, such as an angel, etc.) tells the absolute
truth; such notions were at least somemetimes recognized as being mysterious
or even absurd (TA[46]), and the way was thereby left open for immediate
experience, for instance by allowing mystery to be perceived and meditation
to be practiced.
[28]
But in scientism the situation is more fuzzy: absolute (closed) truth is
often assumed to be obtained from research, the (paradoxically) well acknowledged
role of intuition not withstanding. Scientific terminology tends to reflect
such an opinion. Science, however, furnishes nothing of the sort: it provides
and uses tools for the exploration, expansion, and manipulation of experience.
[29]
Structures including terms (terminus means boundary) stem from the unstructured
(apeiron means unlimited), as Anaximander had suggested. The task of the
RRF analysis then becomes: to find the paradoxical center of any particular
positive epistemology, and to show how it arises from the unstructured source.
[30]
In my next response I will start with a somewhat detailed discussion of
Dialectical Materialism as a proposition for an epistemological point of
view, and in further responses I intend to follow this with shorter comments
on others.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
'Belief alone can comprehend belief. To comprehend it does not mean to adopt
it, nor to only comprehend its content, but to experience the incomprehensible
at the border of comprehension, as being related to oneself but also as
foreign, in the other source of belief.'
(Karl Jaspers)
REFERENCES
Paul Feyerabend (1978-84), 'Against Method', London: Verso, p.17. See also
the contributions by Feyerabend and other 'critics within objectivism' in:
Imre Lakatos and Alan Musgrave (1970-94), 'Criticism and the Growth of Knowledge',
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Karl Jaspers (1932-73), 'Philosophie', Berlin: Springer-Verlag, Band II,
p. 434 (transl. HFJM).
[Author: Herbert FJ Muller
e-mail <mdmu@musica.mcgill.ca>]