ABSTRACT

The as-if-MIR point of view concerns structuring but not inventing experience and reality, which is not any less real (indeed more real) than if it were pre-assembled outside of experience. The difference from traditional MIR does not concern events, but the belief about the source of certainty, and the extent of responsibility. It is important in this connection to distinguish between mental tools and unreachable nature-in-itself, as Vico had suggested.

[1]
This is a very stimulating discussion, which prompts me to re-think some questions. I will address a few of your points here.

In the meteorite example <8> you employ a meaning of MIR which differs from mine. MIR as I use it does not imply that we invent (make up) experiences (we may, but usually we do not). However, we structure experience, and no formed experience occurs without our formative activity, including the experience of meteorites. For instance we do not (have to) invent the meteorite, but in case we have time to structure it, it can only be what we perceive or say it is.

[2]
I have to admit though that the acronym 'MIR' can be interpreted in your sense, and therefore want to specify the expression for the present discussion to 'mind-independently structured truth & reality'. This is somewhat long but more specific (if you like, it can be abbreviated to MISTER and as-if-MISTER, though that sounds a bit funny).

[3]
The as-if aspect <8> applies in principle at all times, even if it is forgotten. It concerns not a particular event but a persistent change of viewpoint (ie, from 'view of T&R as pre-assembled outside experience' to 'view of T&R as structured within conscious and non-conscious experience'). It concerns all scenarios, including a possible absence of experience : when we talk about it now, we do that concerning the future via tentative forward extrapolation from within present structured experience; or for the past by speculative backward extrapolation, for instance to the big bang, which like the meteorite may or may not be strengthened in its validity by further investigation.

[4]
There is probably a further notion behind your reasoning, although you do not mention it specifically: that because we (have to) structure reality, it is somehow less real - if so, this is a misunderstanding. For instance, it is not a question of denial of reality <1>. The difference between the two views is not in the degree of reality but in the source of security for thought and action, which becomes less external and more internal (and thus in the reach of responsibility, which increases).

[5]
Possible future events, and suspected past events, happen, in case we structure them, in form of our structures, even if we are not there. This is because we can only think and talk by extrapolating from our present (ongoing) experience, and by means of employed old, and perhaps of newly created, structures. Others, or we ourselves, if they or we are around, may later-on of course use different structures, eg, they may say that the meteorite was actually a hydrogen bomb (or perhaps some nasty new invention we have not yet heard about). In that case it was in retrospect never a meteorite, and the bomb (etc) will then function as limiting concept (see [10] below). But if something happens very quickly we may be dead before experiencing much.

[6]
Evidently, as you write <9>, potentialities can be defined only in relation to experience (potentialities are our expectations, and can sometimes be expressed quantitatively as probabilities). But you then claim : 'MIR is there, potentially entering novelties, ... permeating all our experience'. Here again you use MIR in the sense of 'pre-manufactured outside of experience'. The problem is that MIR, nature-in-itself, cannot permeate our experience because it is out of reach in principle (cf Plato), not just outside current conscious experience as you suggest <11>, it cannot be talked about (cf Wittgenstein), it escapes us forever because it is a concept-generated fiction (cf.TA24 [53,67]). In no way can we think or talk about mind-independent reality, all we can do is extrapolate from ongoing experience - but we can pretend that we do, ie, talk about as-if-MIR.

[7]
Concepts, including concepts like potentialities or probabilities, say nothing about a mind-independently assembled reality. In contrast, concepts (of MIR or as-if-MIR type), images, and other mind-nature tools, are themselves not only potential but often quickly available to us for use (and can thus permeate our minds).

[8]
The 0-D view <11> is meant as a description of the structuring of experience. Your question 'where the experience comes from' <11> is itself already the result of an objectivist view elaborated within experience, and pre-supposes MIR-belief, as before. Experience is the only available starting point and cannot come from somewhere - you can do experiments which examine the physiological and other conditions needed for conscious experience but to do them you first have to be conscious (see also [13] below). There is a pre-assembled external world if you believe in the MIR fiction at face value. Otherwise, the external MIR world is a concept (tool) system available for use, which mostly works without problem.

[9]
The reason for switching from the MIR to the as-if-MIR position <10-11> is that MIR does not work in some cases, such as for the mind-brain question. Namely, in the MIR-view the mind would have to be mind-independent (or experience would have to be experience-independent), which is not possible; this so-called hard problem of consciousness results in numerous discussions (to say the least). In case of an as-if switch the traditional MIR-position is understood as a special instance of the as-if-MIR (or 0-D) view; or if you prefer, the as-if is a fall-back or back-up position for MIR.

[10]
Truth is in part a feedback question : mental tools, as designed and accepted, work to some extent and can be refined during use in mind-&-nature-experience, with the help of feedback, and there is often a sort of asymptotic approximation to a more or less stable feature, eg, to an optimal working concept, or to some numerical value. Such limiting entities can be built by individuals or by collectives. In many cases, as with your meteorite, the choice of concept possibilities is limited, but this does not change the basic question of structuring. In particular does this not make concepts mind-independently pre-constructed. But if you wish you could view such limiting entities as the reality beyond experience <11>. If tools work all the time, one tends to call them true (eg, within mathematics or logic), or in a different context also if some authority (eg, the bible) says so, even if they do not always work.

[11]
Mathematical and similar truths can generally be more precise and definite because they are human artifacts (cf Vico), it is a question of tool construction. This applies also to ethics, which are (normative) guidance-tools for understanding and behavior. Feedback is active here too, in the sense that mathematical or ethical tools may or may not be adequate for the task at hand, sometimes they have to be exchanged for others, or new ones may have to be designed.

[12]
'Common sense' <2,10> is more or less identical with na_ve realism, or regular MIR. There is nothing wrong with using these as handy tools (ie, as short-cuts for as-if-MIR), if one remains aware of their limitations. In particular, one has to be aware that one cannot jump over (ie, omit) subjective experience, which is the only possible entrance to any kind of reality; that this is often tried is the main practical problem with the MIR-view (cf Nagel's 'View from Nowhere'). - 'Normatively forbidding mixtures of concepts' <13> is in my opinion beside the point; what matters is what works (see above).

[13]
You say <14> that you 'don't believe that someone other than me, by any method, can have my own ongoing experience', but then that 'I do believe that ... correlates of qualia' will eventually deal with that (contradicting your first statement). As your neighbour across the Sund, Hamlet, said when he discussed his dream-sleep study, 'ay, there's the rub': correlates of qualia are not qualia. Ongoing subjective experience cannot be reached by starting from its correlates, because it comes first, although in objective reasoning the correlates are its pre-requisites.

[14]
That is, the objective correlates (which are recently becoming highly instructive concerning specifics of the physiological mechanisms underlying mental functions) are obtained with objective study methods which themselves are specialisations of subjective experience. It takes conscious researchers to do the studies, a view from nowhere will not do, besides being impossible (it is strictly as-if). And correspondingly, ongoing subjective experience is not, and cannot become, an outcome of objective studies.

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Herbert FJ Muller
e-mail <mdmu@musica.mcgill.ca