[1]
ABSTRACT

Henkel's proposal for a mathematical treatment of physical and mental reality will probably be compatible with an experience-centered view if some of his concepts can be further clarified in that respect. - In the discussion of this topic, the possibility suggests itself that views implying unqualified mind-independent reality (MIR) are the conceptual cause of both the so-called 'quantum weirdness' and the conceptual (so-called 'hard') part of the mind-brain problem. It seems feasible to counteract this difficulty by adding an 'as-if' qualification to MIR, which places the subject back into the center and thus in effect transforms MIR from an object-centered back into an experience-centered view. Discussion of this possibility is invited.


[2]
In his recent commentary (TA1 C12) Henkel examines the relation of the idea of mind-independent reality (MIR) to his theory of organism experience, as presented in his previous communications. Since he largely deals with nuclear physics, I will not attempt to present a full discussion of this matter, which is outside of my field of training. Instead I will go through his presentation step by step, with emphasis on conceptual aspects, from the experience-centered viewpoint of Responsive Reality Formation (RRF), or zero-reference, and these RRF considerations are added to Henkel's formulations in [square brackets]. I hope that this way of proceeding may be of some use, and I apologize in advance for any misunderstanding on my part.

[3]
In order to clarify his position, Henkel modifies <2> the label MIR to MCR (mind-contingent reality), with the connotation of a 'form of dependence' but retaining a 'hint of separateness'. [I must confess that I have difficulties with these terms; I would think that reality either is or is not mind-independent, or am I too naive here ? As a thinking aid, one might use Vaihinger's terminology and say that MIR is the same as as-if metaphysics (cf. TA1[33]; although Vaihinger's use of the term 'as-if' is in my opinion too restricted and therefore somewhat misleading). Or if you prefer, 'working metaphysics': mental structures (or more precisely, mind-nature structures) which are employed as a sort of skeleton or scaffolding for ongoing thinking. This might then perhaps cover both MIR and Henkel's MCR concept.]

[4]
Henkel notes <3> a similarity between Bateson's 'potential mapping through experience' and the idea of 'quantum potentiality, the notion in quantum mechanics of the representation of a quantum system before measurement, as a superposition state of all the potential results of such measurement. A quantum system before measurement is in a state of potentiality. This state is described in terms of a set of (superposed) potential states that are available for actualization through a quantum observation'. [What is and what is not 'available' for such actualization, and which results are 'potential', is decided on the basis of previously formed experiential structure and ways of handling experience, which had been accepted as reliable, and was formulated (in extrapolations from previous ongoing experience) in terms of theory and methodology. One might then say that 'availability' roughly means 'unstructured' but with theoretical limitations, and that 'actualization' means structured experience as expected in accordance with theory.]

[5]
<4> In the Copenhagen interpretation, an electron has no continuous existence in between observations, it just 'springs into being' when observed, and this 'is the basic 'quantum weirdness' phenomenon that so troubles physicists'. Bohr might have denied the independent reality of quantum potentiality. [What is meant here by 'being' is MIR for electrons and other particles. Unqualified MIR is always a misunderstanding, although one which is often useful. If I look at my hand I see only one side of it, the remainder of my knowledge about it is a construction, with elements supplied by (memory of) extrapolation from previous structured experience (visual, sensory, motor, etc.), plus knowledge acquired from anatomical illustrations, etc. I never have a 'complete present sensory knowledge' about my hand, nor about anything else. For knowing about my hand, MIR (that is, as-if my hand had a mind-independent existence) works quite well, it is reliable, but it is not reliable to the same extent for electrons. Since my hand is a construction, the more surprising point is perhaps why MIR does work for my hand than why it does not work for particles (if anything, the notion of MIR is what is 'weird', and - na_ve realists and empiricists not withstanding - epistemologists have not come to grips with it, in a convincing way). For electrons MIR is less reliable, and constrained by uncertainties, expressed as probabilities extrapolated (determined) from (and by) prior experiences. We can say that these probabilities are real; this is a statement in our belief in the reliability of the probabilities, they are no more nor less true than any other statements about is-ness, for instance about 'matter' which can be kicked if desired. All ontological statements, including all 'knowledge', are expressions of trust in the reliability of structures, which are in this case expressed in statistical terms (actually the reliability of probabilities can be quantified). (This type of consideration by the way applies also to 'I', which is not a structure to be 'found' (which Hume said he could not), but a tool created in us, partly spontaneously partly deliberately, which we employ for structuring thinking and action; if someone has a 'weak ego', that is his structuring problem, and his to improve if possible.)]

[6]
[My impression so far is that quanta only appear to be 'weird', and that the Copenhagen interpretation only appears to be a 'cop-out' (cf. Nunn, N15): namely only in case one insists on unqualified MIR for particles. I would appreciate knowing what others think about this idea. If this is an adequate view it means that the conceptual ('hard') mind-brain question and the conceptual QM problem ('weirdness') are closely related, indeed the same, and it would suggest a view which is not an attempt to 'explain' one of them by the other one; it would instead show a common root for both difficulties, namely the inadequacy, or if you like weirdness, of the MIR notion when it is used without an as-if correction.]

[7]
Henkel proposes <5> the concept of 'actuality- independent reality'. [This also has some MIR-like flavor, and it may be better to use instead a term like 'theoretical expectations', which more clearly implies an active subject.] 'Some physicists claim that conversion to actuality occurs when a 'meter reading is registered' whether or not any physicist looks at the meter.' Which as Henkel writes is an MIR statement. Others, including Bohr, have tended to doubt this.

[8]
For those who doubt it there is <6> a 'philosophical dilemma of requiring some form of independent reality for quantum systems that are not being observed. It is at this point that I am forced to generalize quantum theory, so that I can deal with the question of the reality of the not-experienced world. I posit a perfect invariance symmetry as a generalized, global quantum potentiality, one including both particular quanta and quantum systems in general. For me, this generalization solves the puzzle of the not-experienced world. Philosophically, if everything is considered a (quantum) potentiality, then there is no 'mind- independent reality'.' [I am not sure I understand the need for independent reality which Henkel mentions. As discussed above, the potentiality (or 'perfect invariance symmetry'), if I understand that correctly, is lack of structure, thus an open field for structuring, limited in this case by the theoretical expectations, i.e., by stored extrapolations from previous structured experience. And as he states himself, if everything is considered a (quantum) potentiality, then there is no need for MIR. This of course is the situation in general (i.e., structures emerge within no structure - if one uses a theory he will use this theoretical structure to exclude possibilities for structuring which are not to be expected according to it, and look for those which are, but of course there may be surprises). The generalized quantum theory would then be a special instance of this, and the 'perfect symmetry' identical with lack of structure; does this sound plausible ?]

[9]
How does this then relate <7> to the subject/object split ? 'If pre-conceived particular quantum systems have been generalized to one global potential quantum system, I have pushed pre-conceived quantum systems to a much more remote realm, beyond atoms, molecules, solids, earth, stars, galaxies, super clusters, etc. In the limit, I reach an asymptote, pushing the objective reality of pre-conception to infinity - to one global potential quantum system. This is my picture of MCR. It is infinitely remote, potential, not actual, and left with only one property, that of bare existence.' [This procedure seems somewhat reminiscent of the ones by Godel or Tarski, who destructed the idea of objective and logico-mathematical reality and truth from within. It appears that in Henkel's procedure the notion of mind-independent objective reality is thinned out from inside to the point of vanishing.]

[10]
[If the 'as-if' aspect of MIR were included in its use, it would in effect place the subject back into the picture, and thereby transform MIR from an object- centered back into an experience-centered (RRF) view, from which it was originally derived; in that case the 'as-if MIR' is the subject's tool to structure mind- nature experience. I would like to ask whether such an approach might become a plausible access for dealing with some questions raised by Henkel's proposal. For instance:
Why does Henkel want to maintain the fiction of objective reality, that is, of MIR or MCR ? (I assume it is because physical theory traditionally implies an MIR view).
Or more specifically, what function can traditional MIR serve here ? I am not saying that it cannot have any function, but I would like to be convinced of some helpful aspect; so far it seems to me to mainly reflect an ambiguity - by implicitly eliminating the subject - which may cause confusion. (Explicit elimination of the subject results in an impossible 'view from nowhere' or 'from nowhen', as proposed respectively by Nagel and by Price; see TA1 for references.)
Perhaps the theme of an asymptotic approach to infinity, as formulated in this connection by Henkel, is of use (although of course an asymptote is defined as a reference line which can not be 'reached'; an alternative term could be 'tangent', which does touch at one point, but actually 'asymptote' I think conveys the function of MIR (or of Henkel's MCR) more accurately, because both can never be reached). In such a case we might be dealing with a mathematical tool which can be clearly defined. Can the 'unreachability' or the 'vanishing' of MIR or MCR be quantified ?
The idea of 'bare existence' is close to the one of 'unstructured experience', for which, however, there is no claim for objectivity, since it is by definition pre-objective and pre-MIR.
Why would MCR not be 'actual' while it is in use ? An as-if MIR would be an actual supporting structure (somewhat like for a tent which is supported in part or entirely by outside fixtures) in intense use, even though it cannot be reached inside in ongoing experience; it is something supplied (by structure creation) in addition to ongoing experience. Or, if you prefer, it would correspond to Plato's cave parable, except that Plato did not add the as-if correction.]

[11]
Then Henkel discusses <8> three degrees of physical reality: classical physics with objective reality of things, quantum potentiality which awaits conversion to actuality, and global potentiality where everything awaits conversion to objective actuality through organism experience (and where organism experience is subjective/objective). [I am not certain how helpful this classification is. The most important point here is not mentioned: that these are mind-nature structures, or concepts, of increasing sophistication, rather than levels of outside (i.e., mind-independent) reality. The first degree is na_ve realism, or empiricism, the second and third reflect the impact of the quantum MIR difficulties on na_ve realism, which at level three leads to the (quasi or entire ?) dissolution of MIR. And <9> the 'potentially observable' status refers to expectations according to extrapolated (i.e., theory-provided) structures. In RRF terms one would say: 'we can structure it, or create it', and if we use a theory, we would say that this structuring can be done within the framework of previously accepted expectations.
I have discussed Henkel's concept of 'organism experience' elsewhere (TA1 R9[1-4]), and will not repeat this here. I am still not certain how helpful this concept is in the present context.]

[12]
The general Lagrangian equation <10> has symmetry properties that reflect its generality ... when some constraints are added the symmetry is reduced and properties are added. <11> 'Generalizing ... we find a correspondence with the experience of a living organism. The starting Lagrangian of the generic mechanical system, in a first degree reality context, corresponds to the perfect invariance symmetry of the universe in a third degree reality context.' [While the mathematical aspects of this escape me, my general understanding is that Henkel wants to express in mathematical terms the functions of simple mechanisms, organisms, and the universe. My main problem here (obviously among many others) is to understand the term 'perfect invariance symmetry of the universe', since it seems to me that the universe is not without structure. I would thus appreciate clarification of that meaning.]

[13]
'There can be no unobserved world, if this means unobservable' <13>. [This too needs clarification. World, or nature, is part of undivided mind-nature experience. Ongoing experience, with its unstructured center, is very limited compared to its extrapolated and stored aspects. There can be no unobservable mind nor unobservable nature, which is the same as saying that there can be no unqualified MIR. On the other hand the stored experience stems, in one way or another, from earlier ongoing experience, thus from observed mind or nature. Thus all world is world which has been 'observed'. 'Not-yet-observed world' I guess simply means lack of structure, but why should that be called 'world', even if it is qualified as 'shadow world' ? Or does it mean 'expected world', according to theory ? In any case, the term 'observation' usually implies MIR; does it here ?]

[14]
My impression is that Henkel's proposal will likely be compatible with an experience-centered view if the more important ones of these concepts can be clarified in the sense of experience-centering.


Author: Herbert FJ Muller
<mdmu@musica.mcgill.ca>