ABSTRACT:

'Reality' in the title of Muller's paper will be taken by most, if not all readers, to be an absolute, objective reality. Yet such a reality casts the problem of the reality of mind into an almost intractable form, where mind is subjective and reality is objective. The present commentary takes the position, that, if Muller's intent is to argue for the reality of mind, then reality must be considered from a new point of view, namely, from the process of experience, common to all organisms. The key point is that Muller's 'indefinable encompassing matrix' from which human thinking emerges is the result of a lower level of experience involving a non-conceptual representation of the world, representation-in-kind.

KEYWORDS: extra-Cartesian, organism experience, representation-in-kind, abstract conceptual representation, structural information, selective information

<1>
At the core of Cartesian philosophy lies a philosophical tenet that may be vulnerable and leave room for a new paradigm. This is the tenet that physical reality resides exclusively in the external world. Consider a paradigm that gives up this tenet and replaces it with the tenet that reality is the product of a process, namely, the experience of living organisms. This view can be labeled: Extra-Cartesian Philosophy. This name is justified since the Cartesian split into two complementary forms of matter, physical and mental, is converted
into a single form, experiential process.

<2>
Let me start with a brief statement of the organism experience approach. Each organism generates its own reality, based on its experience. This reality spans both the organism's environment (its objective world) and its internal processing (its subjective experience). To emphasize this, perhaps the term 'reality' should be qualified as experiential, rather than physical. A hierarchy of experiential realties is generated by the evolutionary levels of complexity in the biological realm, culminating in the conscious, conceptual reality of acculturated humans.

<3>
With this in mind, recall some of Muller's terms, marked by here by the *.

From section [10]:
' all mental structures crystallize (and are constructed) within an *unstructured and therefore undefinable matrix*, which can be used as' a kind of zero-reference point. ........ This *indefinable encompassing matrix* is the reason why the mind cannot be defined; it is the source, center, and envelope of *experience* and encompasses all mental structures, such as *objects* (including the stone kicked by Samuel Johnson), words, numbers, and even gestalt-free qualia - and conversely, all mental structures are embedded in it.'

From section [11]: ' Despite the lack of structure, the origin can be experienced on a *pre-conceptual level*.'

If one associates 'experience' with 'representation of the world', Muller's terms can be given an experiential context. I take *indefineable encompassing matrix* as an underlying frame of explanation beneath the level of abstract conceptual *experience* or representation of the world. This lower level, pre-conceptual level experience uses representation-in-kind, not abstract conceptual representation. Indeed, it is the upper level or conceptual representation that allows mind to be *defineable* through the code/symbols of natural language to denotatively refer to abstract, categories, such as *objects*. Suppose Muller's qualification of this underlying notion as *unstructured and therefore undefinable matrix*, means that it lacks structured conceptual categories as referents. Then there is the possibility of imposing non-conceptual representation, namely representation-in-kind.

<4>
Beneath the level of conceptually structured representation is a non-conceptual level of representation, *pre-conceptual thought*. Let me characterize this level by calling its representation type *representation-in-kind*. What I mean by this is that there is a commonality between what is represented and its representation. Such a common physical medium is vibrational frequency. This physical parameter seems universal in living organism function. Hence when an organism internally represents its vibrational environment by some oscillatory structure, it need not use any arbitrary symbol/conceptual category pair to carry out the fundamental process of experience, representation of the world..

<5>
As an aside that is not crucial to the argument but lends credibility, let me mention a bit of quantum physics. This type of representation can be described using a highly conjectural, but, I feel, consistent quantum biological physics description. At the most basic level of life, the single-celled organism can experience and model the world using a QFT (quantum field theory) collective coherence, called a Bose condensation. Assume that both the cells themselves and their environment contain biomolecules that vibrate. Since these
molecules have electrically charged side groups, they radiate both phonons (mechanical motion quanta) and photons (IR electromagnetic field quanta). The frequencies of these vibrations are common to environment and organism. Suppose that the cells can generate internal representations of their environment -- by registering the frequency signatures of biomolecules inside special structures, called microtubules. So called Goldstone modes can support 'ordered standing waves' within microtubules, where tubulin, a biomolecule with an electric dipole configuration, can act as an 'organ pipe' and resonate in sympathy driven by outside vibratory phonon/photon radiation. Such a model is speculative, but follows from a growing relevant scientific literature.

<6>
Granting the reasonableness of these resonant quantum states that 'mirror' the cells environment, this form of representation can be used by cells to continually update the ambient values of environmental frequency. In turn, mechanical effects can feed back on the environment. ( Technically, for example, cilia and flagella are
microtubules that are sensitive to shape change through motor effects activated by associated proteins.) This feedback cycle then can be a model for the experiential loop of every biological cell.

<7>
An important feature of frequency representation-in-kind is its scaleability. The quantum phenomenon of collective coherence provides an explanation for a hierarchical structure for representations-in-kind. Single quantum states can spread among many cells whose vibrations cohere in synchrony. This could explain the collective behavior of multicellular biological structures. More importantly, it sets the stage for the emergence of higher level conceptual experience.

<8>
The emergence of conceptual experience from pre-conceptual experience uses a second type of representation-in-kind. The physical phenomenon of synaptic discharge in neural nets supports a second physical common parameter for non-conceptual representation. Neurons act through waves of depolarization that travel down axons. The time series behavior of these pulse trains can act as a common medium for representations-in-kind for neurons. Note that pulse train behavior is common to both the environment (input stream) to a neuron and its internal status (output stream). So now we have two interacting types of representation-in-kind in nervous tissue: pervasive Goldstone modes and discrete depolarization waves. Since the axons and dendrites of neurons both contain microtubules, both Goldstone modes and neuron pulse trains can extend to macroscopic lengths in nervous tissue. Thus, multineural, distributed representations-in-kind can cover cerebral cortices.

<9>
The transition from representation-in-kind to code/symbolic conceptual representation involves a transition in the type of interaction among the brain's functional units. This is a kind of thermodynamic phase change from a 'dynamic' liquid phase to a 'static', frozen solid phase. Consider the brain's speech recognition representations: phonem/morphem pattern representations-in-kind and its high level sensory cortex representations: sight and sound representations-in-kind. They both track incoming sensory patterns and so are 'dynamic' or liquid phase representations. But when these two 'liquid' types become denotatively associated with each other, (as when Helen Keller learned the sign language word for water), a transition to a 'solid' type representation occurs. The high level sensory representations-in-kind, plays a new role, the abstract, conceptual categorical referent of a natural language word, which becomes a code/symbol. These denotative associations are fixed by natural language when words and their categorical referents are denotatively bonded. The resulting conceptual model of the world is thus permanently established and is not subject to updating and modification in the same way that new representation-in-kind 'image' experiences are, they evolve only as words change their meaning.

<10>
There already exists a full-fledged mathematical formalism for extra-Cartesian representation. It generalizes Shannon's information theory, which is limited to conceptual representation. This completely ignored limitation is the cause of much confusion in the current discussion of models of mind. Since it uses selective
information (whose unit is the BIT) to select particular code/symbolic messages from an ensemble of prepared possible abstract, categorical messages. it applies only to code/symbolic conceptual categorical representations.

<11>
Donald MacKay (*Information, Mechanism and Meaning*, MIT Press, 1969) has developed a theory that extends beyond this constraint. He uses the larger context of *representation* of the world, embracing both conceptual and non-conceptual representations. Representations-in-kind are measured using structural information, with the units of LOGON (dimensionality of the medium of representation, such as vibration frequency or the time series of pulse trains) and METRON (resolution or degree of confidence of the representation). Structural information can thus build a quantitative model of biomolecular frequencies and their associated representations-in-kind. Of course, Shannon selective information still applies to code/symbolic, conceptual representation, and so is the complementary quantitative model for conceptual representation.

<12>
In [15], Muller grapples with the problem of conceptualizing (objectifying) experience, which extends beyond conceptual objects into the non-conceptual realm, what the present commentary calls phenomenal representation-in-kind.

' Objectivated functions cannot be the mind in toto because experience is not an object. The objective method should, and can only, be understood as a tool within the wider perspective of zero-referencing; this proposition goes somewhat further, I would think, than Chalmers' more recent opinion (1997) that a phenomenological basis is needed for objective theorizing. '

We see the world as 'out there' by projecting our conceptual model to a 'view field' suitable for the survival value of quick reaction to our surroundings. Our underlying sensory processes build up representation-in-kind and then convert them to conceptual representations for our human consciousness.

<13>
The past, present and future are conceptions. The self is a socially constructed concept. Lower animals never get to the conceptual level and experience in a timeless present and have no sense of themselves
as individuals. In spite of this, their behavior is extremely sophisticated. Our theories of the world must use conceptual thought and conceptual consciousness, so Cartesianism works within limits. It is only when we question the basis for our own conceptual thought and consciousness that we must use extra-Cartesianism to 'get outside ourselves.'

<14>
In [19] and [20] Muller explicitly mentions the non-Cartesian approach:

' Mind (specifically the unstructured aspect of subjective experience) is an integral aspect of all mind-nature experience. To take this into account, it is necessary to go back to before the Cartesian primary subject/object split, not only in principle but in practice. Mind is at the center of experience, and always presently (here now) open and active.'

This point is crucial for progress in the study of the physical basis of consciousness. I have been unable to persuade my listeners of this possibility.

<15>
In [33] Muller mentions the physicist's dogma of studying the objective world:

' Now comes the greatest difficulty for the proposed zero-reference point of view: does the foundation of reality in belief mean that 'things' (or 'systems') depend on what we think of them ? For instance, would they not be there if no-one perceived them ? Should we really believe that the moon exists only when we look at it ?, as Einstein asked in objection to the Copenhagen theory of Quantum Mechanics. Of course they would be there, we have to say - once we extrapolate from ongoing experience. '

Physicists claim to study the objective world that inherently contains 'laws of Nature'. This is a strong statement of Cartesianism. To ask if the moon is 'real' if we don't look at it, assumes the Cartesian definition of reality, that conceptual objects exist in an independent environment. Extra-Cartesianism negates the Cartesian definition of reality, so the question becomes meaningless in the new context.

<16>
Muller continues by referring to conceptual categories as 'metaphysical icons' requiring natural language:

' But we also have to be clear that at this point we have already transcended the ongoing flow of experience (which occurs 'here and now'), and have proceeded to base our thinking on opinions and predictions stemming from an arsenal of more or less invariable extrapolated (transcendental or ontological) as-if fictions (a term introduced by Hans Vaihinger). These are not elements of present experience, but metaphysical icons, immobilized in memory, often with the help of language, which are suitable for stable belief concerning parcels of mind-nature experience, pertaining more either to nature, or to mind, or more or less equally to both. Mind-independent reality, a view from nowhere or from nowhen, and other transcendental beliefs, are envelopes of such as-if fictions.'

Using the term 'as-if' to qualify conceptual representations does give an proper extra-Cartesian flavor. However, it does have the connotation that it is 'make-believe' and that representations-in-kind are not 'as-if', so must be realer. This impression is somewhat misleading. Extra-Cartesian reality is the result of a two step progressive process. Stopping after the first step yields 'low level reality', continuing to the final step yields 'high level reality'. Neither is 'as-if'; both are 'real.'

Joel Henkel

[Identifying information about the commentator:
Joel Henkel, born 1930, physicist, Ph.D. in nuclear physics. Unaffiliated proponent of interdisciplinary study of the problem of the physical basis of consciousness. Interested in promoting new interdisciplinary scientific approaches to the problem, such as extra-Cartesian philosophy, nonunitary quantum theory, quantum biology and a generalized information theory of Donald MacKay.]

<jhenkel@juno.com>