Abstract: The strength of Muller's article is its appeal to a root experience of an indefinable encompassing matrix from which human thinking emerges. It is also in his belief that subjectivity is not merely subjective and that objectivism cannot obtain objective knowledge by denying subjectivity. The weakness is his failure to notice that since consciousness exists, it can be studied objectively as well as can the non-conscious entities that objectivism exclusively focuses on. To achieve his goals, Muller needs to explain how we can achieve objective knowledge of subjective consciousness.

KEYWORDS: subjectivity, objectivity, consciousness, epistemology



<1>
On 27 Jun 1997, in a paper entitled 'IS THE MIND REAL?', Herbert F. J. Muller suggested the idea of a zero-reference method for studying the mind-brain and mind-reality relations, based on an indefinable encompassing matrix, which is the source, center, and envelope of human experience. Specifically, he wrote: '[5] (A) Concerning the first part of this question, I want to propose that the reason for this conceptual problem is the exclusive objectivism of many investigators: the explicit or implicit conviction that objectivity is the only valid method of inquiry. Objectivity deals with circumscribed and more or less invariable (that is, closed, or self-contained) and verbally labeled parcels of experience, for instance of gestalt type . . . . ' '[6] But ongoing experience (the subjective aspect of the mind) remains always open for structuring and cannot itself become a closed gestalt, or invariable object.'

<2>
The contrast that Muller draws in [5-6] is not, as he intends, between subjective experience and non-subjective reality, but between reality and particular concepts. Impersonal reality as well as subjective awareness is constantly changing. Thus, treeness may be an invariable concept, but trees are, like subjective experience, ever changing. There are no closed systems in reality, whether personal or impersonal. What are closed or static are concepts we have of reality. Like mountain climbers who proceed slowly for foothold to foothold, we survive by constructing temporary models of reality. Like mountain climbers, if we take any particular position as a permanent home, we are likely to perish.

<3>
Muller's confusion as to the nature of subjectivity is seen in the following statement. '[6] The center of the open mind is always at the origin of mental structures, ...' This is proffered as an experiential given of subjectivity. As such, it fails to distinguish between experience and the interpretation or explanation of it. Thus, in deep mindfulness, or pure awareness, I experience no center, only a flow of events which I retrospectively attribute to being within my own consciousness. We can discuss our differences as to whether there is a center to consciousness. But to do so we must establish some methodology for our inquiry by answering questions such as: Are there two different experiences being reported here? Or is it the same experience being conceptualized differently? And since conceptualization of conscious experience colors that experience, turning it into yet a different experience, where is the firm ground on which we can decide these issues?

<4>
'[6] ... and so is objective mind-independent reality [impossible], which if assumed turns subjective experience into a 'hard problem' (David Chalmers), or more correctly: into a paradox which cannot be resolved. The difficulty is not an 'explanatory gap' in an objective explanation of consciousness, but it is that: exclusive objectivism (or exclusive empiricism) will not work as a basis for theorizing about subjective experience.'

<5>
The preceding quote misconstrues the 'hard problem' to depend upon an objectivist viewpoint. If that were true, there would be neither a hard problem nor a paradox, but no problem at all, since an objectivist view is blind to any consciousness at all. In fact, the 'hard problem' is independent of the *epistemological* issue of whether truth is best achieved by an objectivist methodology. It is the *ontological* issue of how conscious processes (or functions or subjects, etc.) can be caused by unconscious ones. It is like wondering how a set of blue boxes could account for the existence of red ones.

<6>
'[7] To summarize this difficulty: if reality were mind- independent, the mind would have to be mind-independent in order to be real.' Muller here [7] makes the extremely common and disastrous mistake of equivocating on 'mind'. Reality is *given* as consciousness independent. That is, I am now looking at a computer screen that is a constraint on my thinking. If I say I am looking at the seashore, I am wrong. That in no way implies that the computer screen is mind-independent, in the sense that it would continue to exist even if I did not. My mind may unconsciously be hallucinating the screen. But that is a further question about the cause of my experience. What is clear from within consciousness, is that I am not consciously dreaming this screen up.

<7>
Muller's syllogism therefore works differently, depending on whether (1) we identify consciousness with mind or (2) use the latter to refer to that which performs mental activities, some conscious and some unconscious. Under (1), the syllogism reads: if reality were consciousness-independent, consciousness would have to be consciousness-independent to be real. This would at best be self-contradictory, though it may simply be gibberish. However, under (2), the syllogism reads: if mind (which performs both conscious and unconscious mental acitivities) were mind-independent, mind would have to be mind-independent to be real. As formulated, this could stand clarification, but it is tenable as an expression of the empirical science of mind. That is, mind is mind-independent: we can think about our mental activity and correct our thinking on the basis of what we find our mental activity really to be. And yes, this is consistent with what we mean to be real in the first instance: to exist independently of our conscious thinking or subjective experience, so that what is real acts as a constraint on our thinking, determining whether that thinking is correct or incorrect.

<8>
[7] ... A 'scientific study of consciousness' cannot imply mind-independent reality; if it does, it cannot say anything about subjective experience. Such an assumption is self-contradictory - not only for the understanding of mind but also in general. This would seem to be a fairly obvious point, but it is neglected in some recent publications on consciousness and related matters.' It is neglected because it is not only not obvious, it is false, if my preceding argument is valid.

<9>
'[8]-------------------------------------------------------------------
TABLE 1 :

THE UNSTRUCTURED MATRIX as the origin of mental structures (various terms)

The APEIRON is the source and sink of all structures (Anaximander and others) *
CHAOS (originally = cleft, later = disorder) in Greek thought since at least Hesiod
TOHU WA BOHU in the Bible
TABULA RASA as the start of thinking (Locke and others)
The ENCOMPASSING (das Umgreifende, Jaspers)
FACING NOTHINGNESS (and doing something with it: Existentialists)
CONSTRUCTION and DE-CONSTRUCTION as needed (i.e., ad-hoc; Postmoderns)
VOID as background of thinking (Murdoch)
BACKGOUND (Searle)
GLOBAL WORKSPACE (Baars)

A simple neutral term might be: ZERO-REFERENCE METHOD

The practical problem is to use such a method on an ongoing basis, and indeed the *functional* [commentator's emphasis] aspect is much more important than any static term which might be employed.
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<10>
This matrix is very useful, but Muller misconstrues its theoretical significance, because of his theoretical errors identified (?) above. I think its strength is practical rather than theoretical. That is, I think it is a perspective that conscious subjects can use dynamically to emotionally free themselves from clinging to any particular belief or way of thinking. In other words, the matrix can be used experientially to help develop an awareness that does not identify itself with its thinking -- to develop a kind of observing ego, though something much richer than what that term suggests in therapeutic contexts. The reference to Anaximander [11] gets to my point.

<11>
'[11] Anaximander of Miletus said that all things arise from this apeiron, that they commit injustice against it and against each other, and that they will have to return back into it.' '[10] This origin was called 'apeiron' by pre-Socratic philosophers, and corresponds (I think) to the 'tabula rasa' of Locke and others,...' Locke's tabule rasa was completely passive. To Muller's credit, his is dynamic.

<12>
I won't comment on the rest of the article, not because it is not rich in insights, but because I see it as skewed theoretically, as suggested, such that all I would be doing is repeating the points I've already made and simply applying them to specific details.

<13>
In sum, the strength of Muller's article is its appeal to a root experience of an unspecified matrix from which human thinking emerges. It is also in his belief that subjectivity is not merely subjective and that objectivism cannot obtain objective knowledge by denying subjectivity. The weakness is his failure to notice that since consciousness exists, it can be studied objectively as well as can the non-conscious entities that objectivism exclusively focuses on. To achieve his goals, Muller needs to explain how we can achieve objective knowledge of subjective consciousness, a topic to which I will turn in an article I am submitting for posting in this Forum.


[Commentator: Gary Schouborg, Ph.D., Philosophical Psychology, is partner of Performance Consulting, which facilitates planning, meetings, and teamwork efforts of both profit and not-for-profit organizations. He has published in philosophy, religious studies, poetry, and business.
Walnut Creek, California, USA.
Email: garyscho@worldnet.att.net]

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