<1>
I want to believe that Herbert Muller and I gradually may converge on basically rather similar philosophical views. However, we come from different directions, and many issues remain to discuss and attempt to clarify. I have found Whitehead (1929) to express similar views as mine, in more detail than I have achieved, which appear clearly as soon as he is read as a 'detectist' (Holmgren 1999). Whitehead expressly wants to avoid the skepticism of Hume: 'If experience be not based upon an objective content, there can be no escape from a solipsist subjectivism. Hume fails to provide experience with any objective content.' He is also always aware of the provisional character of our conceptual constructions: 'There remains the final reflection, how shallow, puny, and imperfect are efforts to sound the depths in the nature of things. In philosophical discussion, the merest hint of dogmatic certainty as to finality of statement is an exhibition of folly.' No wonder, in this uncertain situation, that different opinions appear.

<2>
Whitehead's philosophy of organism is explicitly evolutionary. However, not until about 1936 to 1947, the 'modern synthesis' reconciled Darwin's theory with the facts of genetics. Soon before that, in the early twentieth century, 'the Darwinian theory of evolutionary change was at a nadir' (Futuyma 1986). Whitehead (1929) writes: 'It is well to remember that the modern quantum theory, with its surprises in dealing with the atom, is only the latest instance of a well-marked character of nature, which in each particular instance is only explained by some ad hoc dogmatic assumption. The theory of biological evolution would not in itself lead us to expect the sharply distinguished genera and species which we find in nature. There might be an occasional bunching of individuals round certain typical forms; but there is no explanation of the almost complete absence of intermediate forms. Again Newton's Scholium gives no hint of the ninety-two possibilities for atoms, or of the limited number of ways in which atoms can be combined so as to form molecules. Physicists are now explaining these chemical facts by means of conceptions which Plato would have welcomed.' It might be added that evolutionary theory now provides good explanations for the seeming absence of intermediary forms in nature.

<3>
HM [1] ascribes to me belief in a Plato-type metaphysical reality. In a way that is correct, since I reject the 'tabula rasa' view, which is central to HM's 'as-if-MIR' or 0-D theory. However, I don't believe in ideal states or ultimate divine goals unattainable for humans. I want to stay firmly within modern evolutionary views, population thinking, and all. Consciousness however certainly involves an abiotic aspect, distinctive types of 'matter' structured somehow in ruthlessly precise ways, that cannot be understood just functionally. One can wonder at what stage consciousness entered, was 'taken in use', in the biotic world. Perhaps, like light, it was in use already in very early organisms, and humans have just evolved a novel way of using it. Perhaps, more likely, it has entered into the biotic world at some later stage (remember that there are life forms not using light, not using sound, etc), and there is even the interesting possibility that it is a novelty in humans. We simply don't know yet. When the first glimpses of conscious experiences occur in a child, obviously they appear 'out of nothingness', as seen from the child's perspective. In the detectism view, however, this does not mean that they appear out of some 'empty space'. On the contrary, in accordance with evolutionary theory, a necessary requisite is a pre-established evolved and developed biophysical structure, a richly structured organism/environment system (Jarvilehto 2000). What causes our disagreement is something we agree upon: that no human can have immediate access to that structure. (However, to be more precise, fragments of the external world are transiently exposed to immediacy in conscious experiences. The biophysical correlates of conscious experiences, thus, can be in the external world, then transiently leave the external world and be within a conscious experience for a short while, and then again be in the external world. This is essential for the full integration of conscious experiences in a monist worldview.) Even in fully advanced scientific practices, structures in the external world can only be described and understood in extensive theoretical frames of reference, in complex structures of conscious experiences, i.e. in something entirely different than the external structures themselves, which will always remain metaphysical and hypothetic. HM then chooses to deny the existence, the reality, of structures outside conscious experiences, which is nothing but solipsism, while I trust that we, by natural evolution and cultural advancements, are equipped with rather good means for detection of the real external world. Admittedly, the detection takes place in an entirely different medium than the external world, in conscious experiences. The detection will always remain somewhat approximate, and we can never fully judge the magnitude of the approximation. In the detection (which is also action, 'scire est facere'), however, we engage real structures in the external world, and people can often attain a quite amazing precision in predictions about its future behavior, as verified in subsequent conscious detection.

<4>
Now, HM sees a paradox in my standpoint [1]: 'if, as he states, he proposes that reality is mind-independent, and secondly also that the mind is real, he would have to demonstrate that the mind (specifically, subjective experience) is or can be mind-(specifically, experience-) independent, and I don't think he has done that.' This logic misses the point of immediacy (Whitehead: 'presentational immediacy'). In the detectism view, the mind is highly mind-dependent, since parts of it can study other parts, thanks to the immediacy of conscious experiences. The relation to causation is complex, as expressed by Whitehead (1929): 'The unravelling of the complex interplay between the two modes of perception - causal efficacy and presentational immediacy - is one main problem of the theory of perception. The interplay between the two modes will be termed 'symbolic reference'. Such symbolic reference is so habitual in human experience that great care is required to distinguish the two modes. The ordinary philosophical discussion of perception is almost wholly concerned with this interplay, and ignores the two pure modes which are essential for its proper explanation.'

<5>
Whitehead also explains how he differs from Kant, and this also applies to detectism: 'Thus for Kant the process whereby there is experience is a process from subjectivity to apparent objectivity. The philosophy of organism inverts this analysis, and explains the process as proceeding from objectivity to subjectivity, namely, from the objectivity, whereby the external world is a datum, to the subjectivity, whereby there is one individual experience. Thus, according to the philosophy of organism, in every act of experience there are objects for knowledge; but, apart from the inclusion of intellectual functioning in that act of experience, there is no knowledge.' This is one way to express 'the reformed subjectivist principle'.

<6>
Concerning my quote from Stapp (1999a), HM [2] remarks: 'One can show how QM - or objective science in general - originate in subjective experience, but not how subjective experience originates objectively in QM, for instance <9> in terms of a hidden variable.' The idea, however, is that in a very precise physical theory describing a situation where a conscious experience is part of the system, a 'logical gap' corresponding to the immediate conscious experience will appear. This is perhaps more clearly expressed in Stapp (1999b): 'I shall show here how the mathematical structure of quantum theory allows our thoughts to guide our actions: how the dynamical structure of quantum theory has a logical gap that certainly needs to be filled by something, and that is quite naturally filled by our stream of conscious thoughts.'

<7>
Implicit in Stapp's mathematical theory is that the same principle is valid in all situations where conscious experiences are present. This allows for qualia to be in principle beyond mathematical expression, as they reside, in the perspective of quantum theory and as I argue in detectism, in non-locality. This is also in accordance with Penrose's (1994) claim about non-computability, and implies mental causation, free will, etc, in relation to the physical world. (If quantum computers turn out to be viable, it may lead to a more subtle theoretical understanding.) In this perspective, also, quanta may seem to represent a limit for the resolution in the perceptual process, rather than a universal property of the external reality. The fact that the minimum amount of light the retina can register is precisely one photon then would come as no surprise ('homo mensura').

<8>
In [3] HM argues that: 'If the external (MIR) world is beyond reach, fragments of it are beyond reach too.' Then, for example, where are our memories stored when they are not at the moment remembered within an actual conscious experience, if not in the external world (in something similar to the biophysical correlates of consciousness)?

<9>
HM [4]: 'The structures last longer and as tools they are designed to cover a greater territory than any momentary experience, or also than the combined experiences of one's life time, or of all collective life times put together, can ever cover.' ... 'That many such configurations are inherited, or else socially transmitted to a large extent, does not change the fact that they influence one's reality-building. And the reality building includes 'objects' (as Piaget showed for children).' Yes, but where are these long lasting structures really stored, if there is no real external world outside our momentary experiences ? Do books, libraries, databases, etc, exist only in our momentary experiences?

<10>
In [5] HM admits that belief in MIR is of practical value in many situations, but says it does not work satisfactorily for e.g. quantum theory or the mind-brain relation. On the contrary, I think it is of utmost importance to make the relations to the external world as clear as possible just when we are getting close to the subtle issues of the human mind.

<11>
In [6] HM moves in a direction I like, saying: 'The structure-building does not imply that the experience is invented: experience is 'given', but the experiential structures are not.' ... 'And it is not absurd now, I suggest, to consider that this world-picture is our creation. This creation originated in ongoing experience, extrapolating from there with the help of structures which we have built, earlier or simultaneously (ad hoc, and including for instance the big bang), within experience, to deal with and expand on experience as needed.' I want to understand this to say very much the same as Whitehead in the above <5> quote about his difference from Kant. I might add, however, that 'we' have not built most of our brain/organism/environment structures; most of it has appeared, wholly beyond our control, in natural evolution. I think this answers also most of HM's remarks in [8] and [9].

<12>
I also like the multiperspective and multicultural view HM sketches in [7]. In a democratic society it is of utmost importance (within certain limits, tentatively agreed upon in law) to stay open and value very different kinds of attempts to understand reality, e.g. in science, in art, in history, in economics, in politics, in religion, etc. The same would apply at a global level (if global democracy and law could be established).

<13>
HM [9]: 'The absolute speed limit <9> by the way is an interesting example of structure positing, because for his theory Einstein presented it not as an experimental result, but posited it (as a pre-supposition, Voraussetzung), and to my knowledge this is still so. At least in principle this could act as a self-fulfilling prophecy, because if you accept a postulate as fundamental truth, your experimental results may tend to confirm it.' It is in fact firmly verified in experiments. However, it is a fascinating speculation that it might still be an artifact of our detector situation, linked with non-locality.

<14>
HM [10]: ' 'Psychology has a key role for the integration of all knowledge': one can put it that way, but it is important to realize that some of the greatest present difficulties concern conceptual rather than experimental aspects. This is often referred to as epistemology, but as JH notes it may be best handled in an inter-disciplinary exchange, because it concerns many people in many fields.' My formulation is intentionally provocative, but it is seriously meant. Fodor (1980) says: 'But the theory which characterizes the objects of thought is the theory of *everything*; it's all of science. Hence, the methodological moral of Putnam's [1975] analysis seems to be: the naturalistic psychologists will inherit the Earth, but only after everybody else is finished with it. No doubt it's alright to have a research strategy that says 'wait awhile'. But who wants to wait *forever*?' Putnam (1975) introduced a distinction between 'psychological states in the wide sense' and 'psychological states in the narrow sense'. Fodor (1980): 'A psychological state in the *narrow* sense is one the ascription of which does not '(presuppose) the existence of any individual other than the subject to whom the state is ascribed'. ... Putnam remarks that methodological solipsism (the phrase, by the way, is his) can be viewed as the requirement that only psychological states in the narrow sense are allowed as constructs in psychological theories. Whereas, it's perhaps Putnam's main point that there are at least *some* scientific purposes (e.g., semantics and accounts of intertheoretical reference) which demand the wide construal.' HM's demand for 'working metaphysics' perhaps can be understood as the suggestion of a kind of methodological solipsism, which in Fodor's (and e.g. Chomsky's) case means computational psychology. Obviously, it is perfectly legitimate to intentionally apply such 'mental discipline'; it is in accordance with how humans generally construct and use tools, and it can be very successful, as in the Chomskyan tradition. Psychology, however, cannot be generally normatively restricted; it simply has to deal with all kinds of conscious experiences. Since the fundamental ingredients in conscious experiences, qualia, appears to be non-computational, other kinds of theorizing and practice are just as legitimate, even if they are far from mathematical formalization, and thus not fit Bertrand Russell's characterization of mathematics: 'remote from human passions, remote even from the pitiful facts of Nature ... an ordered cosmos, where pure thought can dwell as in its natural home, and where one, at least, of our nobler impulses can escape from the dreary exile of the actual world.'. In the actual world, in all kinds of conscious experiences, such endeavors as morals, psychotherapy, sympathetic psychopathology, and those in the list above <12>: art, history, politics, religion, etc, and, obviously, all experiences in ordinary life, are just as legitimate and important to study and practice as that which can be treated in abstract mathematical formalisms.

<15>
In his conclusion [11], HM says: ' JH writes <12> that he sees no need for an as-if. He wants to stay with a variety of Platonic metaphysical outside reality. ('Realism' always implies this, although in contrast to him, other authors commonly neglect to mention the metaphysical aspect.) I suggest that such MIR-belief is a special case of (or a shortcut for) 'as-if-MIR' (or 0-D) use.' HM seems to define 'reality' as 'that which can appear immediately in subjective experiences', and then it follows that the external world is not real; it is just a construction within our conscious experiences. To my intuition, this is a too artificial restriction of the use of the word 'reality'. I simply like to think of Robins, Common Swifts, and above all my fellow human beings, as real living creatures in a real world, evolved according to principles of natural evolution and, for humans, cultural development, and not as only constructions of my own mind. I can still be fully aware of the subjectivity of my experiences of them.

<16>
HM's suggestion that MIR-belief is a special case of 'as-if-MIR' use is based on two notions [12]: '(a) that all mental-mind-and-world structures are developed within a not originally divided, nor otherwise structured, but not-invented, ongoing subjective experience' and '(b) that concepts have experience-transcending aspects built into them from the start, as do also gestalten and (objective physiological) receptor configurations'.

<17>
To (a), I want to comment that qualia (as HM also said in [8]) come into being and provide structure from the beginning. The 'not-invented' aspect in fact points to the external world providing structure. 'As-if-MIR' misses the aspect of evolutionary origin. This is a valid criticism against all 'tabula rasa' theories. To (b): The experience-transcending aspects are linked with the external world. Even highly abstract concepts, e.g. in geometry and mathematics, are linked with structures in the external world, in the biophysical correlates of consciousness.

<18>
HM [12]: 'My present opinion is then that MIR has a more limited range of usefulness for analytic purposes than as-if-MIR, while in contrast traditional MIR - to the extent that it takes things for granted - may offer greater stability (certainty) for individual and group action than as-if-MIR. This certainty may of course turn out to be illusory.' I certainly don't want to argue for taking things for granted. But I find 'as-if-MIR' to be a rather vacuous starting point, if it is not enriched with the 'givens' mentioned above: innate structure, and the mind's interaction with the external world; and then we are back in the MIR position. When an interest for philosophizing appears in us, we always find ourselves already within extensive metaphysical commitments, and each of us has to start from there. We should be ready to move from such a perhaps rather accidentally achieved state, and perhaps consider 'working metaphysics' [11] in different situations. Even if we cannot achieve truth, however, it seems reasonable to strive towards more and more truthlike thought structures, where coherence is a criterion, and attempt to move towards some consensus.

<19>
As appears in the following quote from John Dewey's essay 'The Influence of Darwin on Philosophy' (1910), reproduced in Futuyma (1986), there was an early awareness of the great philosophical impact of Darwinism. In the detectism view, the Darwinian revolution should now be extended to the fundamental properties of our conscious experiences, the qualia. 'Old ideas give way slowly, for they are more than abstract logical forms and categories. They are habits, predispositions, deeply engrained attitudes of aversion and preference. Moreover, the conviction persists - though history shows it to be a hallucination - that all the questions that the human mind has asked are questions that can be answered in terms of the alternatives that the questions themselves present. But in fact intellectual progress usually occurs through sheer abandonment of questions together with both of the alternatives they assume - an abandonment that results from their decreasing vitality and a change of urgent interest. We do not solve them: we get over them. Old questions are solved by disappearing, evaporating, while new questions corresponding to the changed attitudes of endeavor and preference take their place. Doubtless the greatest dissolvent in contemporary thought of old questions, the greatest precipitant of new methods, new intentions, new problems, is the one effected by the scientific revolution that found its climax in the 'Origin of Species'.'

<20>
However, I also agree with Young's (1999) attitude towards Darwinism: ' On the one hand, Darwin's theory of evolution by natural selection is one of the most important ideas in history and perhaps the most important idea for understanding human nature, and extrapolations from evolutionary mechanisms to psychological and social theory are, in principle, very welcome. However, we already know a lot about human nature from literature, religion, philosophy and other fruits of the cogitations of clever and profound thinkers who have pondered these matters literally over millennia, if you think of the traditions extending from the Platonic Dialogues, the Aristotelian corpus, Greek tragedy, the great theological texts from, for example, India, China, Japan, Islam and Christianity, Renaissance thought, Shakespeare and so on up to Marx, Kierkegaard, Freud and insightful thinkers in our own time whose place in history is as yet less clear. ... We need to bring Darwinian insights into the broad culture of knowledge and wisdom about human nature. What we need not to do is privilege ideas with the adjective Darwinian in front of them, as if that label provides a guarantee of trustworthiness or profundity, and its absence means that the holders of other ideas are mired in error and/or befuddled irrationality. We already have some profound ideas about human nature, thank you very much. It would be nice to have some more but not if they want to elbow out the good ones we already have. You might think this obvious until you hear some of the zealots and hucksters who are immodestly and aggressively claiming that they - because they are Darwinians - are uniquely qualified to represent scientific rationality and that this form of rationality stands above and can replace others.'

<21>
In detectism I suggest a synthetic and overarching theory that intelligibly integrates the human mind in a monist worldview. It puts the abstract sciences into their proper place, as valuable intellectual tools, and legitimates other, less strictly formal, profound endeavors to orient and direct ourselves in the world.

REFERENCES

Fodor, J.A. 1980. Methodological solipsism considered as a research strategy in cognitive psychology. The Behavioral and Brain Sciences 3: 63-109.

Futuyma, D.J. 1986. Evolutionary Biology. Sinauer Associates.

Holmgren, J. 1999. Detectism - a suggestion for the taxonomy of conscious experiences.
http://w1.411.telia.com/~u41104695/taxonomy.html .

Jarvilehto, T. 2000. The theory of the organism-environment system: IV. The problem of mental activity and consciousness. Integrative Physiological and Behavioral Science 35:1 in press.
http://wwwedu.oulu.fi/homepage/tjarvile/art4.htm

Penrose, R. 1994. Shadows of the Mind. Oxford University Press.

Putnam, H. 1975. The meaning of meaning. In Gundersen, K. (ed.), Minnesota studies in the philosophy of science. 7. Language, mind and knowledge. University of Minnesota Press.

Stapp, H.P. 1999a. Attention, Intention and Will in Quantum Physics. Journal of Consciousness Studies, 6, No. 8-9: 143-164.

Stapp, H.P. 1999b. Whiteheadian Process and Quantum Theory.
http://www-physics.lbl.gov/~stapp/wh3.txt .

Whitehead, A.N. 1929. Process and Reality. Cambridge University Press.

Young, R.M. 1999. The meanings of Darwinism: then and now.
http://www.human-nature.com/rmyoung/papers/pap124h.html .

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Jan Holmgren
e-mail: <j.holmgren@telia.com>