<1>
In his target article 'Is the mind real?' (TA1) HFJ Muller (HM) suggests that belief in mind-independent reality (MIR) is self-contradictory and by definition excludes subjective experience from reality. He wants to avoid the contradiction by the acknowledgement of an unstructured origin- and- matrix for knowledge-structures and beliefs, within which all mental and world structures arise. Thus, the mind's experience is at the center of reality. HM suggests 'zero-reference method', also called 'zero-derivation' (0-D) or 'responsive reality formation' (RRF, in response TA1 R1), to denote the structuring of ongoing experience as it occurs, starting from no structure. In a later response (TA1 R12) HM introduces 'absolute MIR', as 'identical with traditional or absolute metaphysics including ontology', and 'as-if MIR', where 'one is expressly aware of the make-believe quality of the assumption of mind-independence of reality, and therefore ontology is impossible'.

<2>
I largely agree with HM's problem formulation [3], that some accepted fundamental theoretical views lead to the absurd conclusion that subjective experience is not possible. Whitehead (1929) identified similar difficulties in the philosophy and science of his time, and pointed to, as one problem, the frequent tendency for overstatement: the 'fallacy of misplaced concreteness'. 'This fallacy consists in neglecting the degree of abstraction involved when an actual entity is considered merely so far as it exemplifies certain categories of thought. There are aspects of actualities which are simply ignored so long as we restrict thought to these categories.' I think this caution is just as relevant today. Whitehead also forcibly maintained the central position of subjective experience: 'Finally, the reformed subjectivist principle must be repeated: that apart from the experiences of subjects there is nothing, nothing, nothing, bare nothingness.' This may be thought to reflect a view very similar to HM's 0-D theory. However, I think Whitehead in principle was closer to the 'detectism' view I will advocate here (Holmgren 1999). My answer to HM's article will very much be a sketch of this alternative view, which I think is a better response to the initial problem.

<3>
Stapp (1999) suggests that subjective experience, thought, ideas, mental causation, free will, etc, are in fact reconcilable with quantum theory. I cannot fully evaluate his argument, but I see his paper as a promising step towards making our problem more precise. He says: 'My purpose in what follows is to reconcile the insight of the founders of quantum theory, namely that the mathematical formalism of quantum theory is about knowledge, with the demand of Einstein that basic physical theory be about nature herself. I shall achieve this reconciliation by incorporating human beings, including both their body/brains and their conscious experiences, into the quantum mechanical description of nature.' Einstein was very clear about that mathematical physics is just a model of nature, but obviously he aimed at a complete model. On the other hand, he explicitly referred to psychology that which could not be dealt with in mathematical physics, so, since human minds are parts of nature, there is a contradiction. If Stapp's theory can solve that contradiction, it is certainly a step forwards.

<4>
However, any mathematical theory suffers from being in principle digital, i.e. expressible in any dual mode, like non-existence - existence, or 0 - 1, and in principle linearly proceeding in time. Most conscious experiences, on the other hand, (except only the digital and mathematical ones in abstract theorizing and discourse) are richly structured in many qualia, and are immediately experienced in full richness. I fully agree with HM, Whitehead, and many others, that subjective experiences, or conscious experiences as I prefer to say (including the abstract and digital ones), are the only entities which we have immediate access to, and they are real in every reasonable meaning of that word. However, in my opinion, they are just small parts of a much more extensive world, which is no less real, even though it is absolutely beyond reach for conscious experiences, and has to be in principle hypothesized. The relation between our conscious experiences and the external world, thus, is not one of interaction, but each conscious experience is the 'exposure to immediacy of a fragment of the world'. Since that which I vaguely call 'immediacy' is part of nature, and that which is within the immediacy is part of nature, and all in nature is 'process', it follows that conscious experiences not only 'detect' in a passive sense, but may also have a creative influence in the world.

<5>
I like to watch birds. When I observe a singing Robin, I'm very certain that it has a real existence quite independent of my mind. On the other hand, on reflection, I know that my observation is partial. Probably, owing to earlier experiences, I can notice more details than most people. A specialist on Robins, like Lack (1965), however, would see and understand much more of the whole situation. If I, which God forbid, had been a lover of roast larks, the bird might have made my mouth water. If I had been the first human ever to observe such a bird, I might have given it a name and made history as the discoverer of a new species. If there are several birdwatchers, we may all look through our binoculars and agree that it is a Robin. To me, it is quite absurd to reject the MIR Robin, but yet I am certain that all I can know about it is given to me in conscious experiences, and then the question arises: do I really know about something I can call MIR, or do I only know about my conscious experiences?

<6>
Most of us would think it absurd to deny that there was a world before the human mind appeared on earth. We know about that world only by inference; still, we can be absolutely certain that it existed. So, we have at least one certain instance of MIR. Evolutionary theory was long thought to be a questionable hypothesis. Today, it is largely a fact, even though it will develop further. When conscious experiences begin to appear in a child, they don't come out of an 'unstructured origin-and-matrix', as HM suggests, but out of an enormously richly structured organism-environment system, as described by Jarvilehto (TA22). The initial and developing structure of the child's own body/brain is to a large extent decided by inherited structure, with a long evolutionary history. We can trust that this structure is evolved to function well in the world, so there is no reason to expect it to reflect the world in any systematically deceitful way. However, there are restrictions characteristic for the species; inherited structures (qualia, functional devices) restrict experiences, and can be changed only in evolutionary time. The evolutionary origin explains the permanence of qualia, that they appear approximately eternal and somewhat arbitrary, as most evolved structure.

<7>
The border between the inner and the external world is precisely that between a conscious experience and the rest of the world. Thus, borders between brain, body, and environment have little importance, just as Jarvilehto suggests. Human conscious experiences can change the external world, and structure from earlier conscious experiences ('memories') are stored in brain structure, in body structure, in tools, in buildings, in books, in computers, etc. We have learned very much about regularities in the external world, and we can often, with great confidence, leave to it to perform a lot of complex things quite outside our conscious control. As a common name for such chains of events outside conscious control, I suggest 'hidden variables'. In practice, we very seldom bother about exact knowledge about hidden variables. When I drive my car, knowledge about the functioning of its parts is normally not present in my conscious experiences. But, most often we can, if needed, pay attention to, and manipulate, that which is normally hidden. However, at the limits of our detector capacity, for example in particle physics and quantum theory, there may remain hidden variables absolutely beyond our reach.

<8>
Chemical events, for example in photosynthesis, are now discernible in a femtoseconds (10**-15 sec) timescale. But there are still certain approximations, hinting at hidden variables. Obviously, there is still a certain degree of uncertainty in science, and we can never, since we don't have direct access to the external world, only to conscious experiences, be certain about the amount of uncertainty. However, it is most often enough for us to discern and understand regularities, in order to make use of them in practical applications. For example, artificial photosynthesis may in the future provide us with unlimited amounts of harmless energy. We should learn, however, to be cautious with universal proclamations. The 'big bang' will probably remain just a hypothesis. For most practical purposes, however, we simply need not care about such limitary problems. In considerations of conscious experiences, on the other hand, we cannot ignore the fundamental questions. Even fundamental dimensions, like space and time, are formed within conscious experiences, and they cannot be strictly applied to conscious experiences themselves. Still, we cannot even think or talk without some reference to them, so I suggest we have to think about conscious experiences as a kind of entities, admittedly in a loose sense. It is of vital importance, though, that we think of them as integrated parts of nature, wholly integrated in organism-environment systems as suggested by Jarvilehto.

<9>
It seems that we can express all events in the external world, when no conscious experience is thought to interfere directly (in a macro scale), within classical physical theory (relativity theory included) with laws that have a 'local' character. The special theory of relativity explains this in a simple way, and establishes Einstein's locality universally, where the speed of light in a vacuum, c=3x10**8 m/sec, is an absolute speed limit for the transmission of any signal or information. Quantum theory is different, as explained earlier, and it is unavoidable to have the observer as an integrated part in the studied system. A structured entity, like a conscious experience, with dimensions, say, roughly within a part of a human brain, and with all information within it immediately present, is not reconcilable with Einstein's locality (obviously, the speed limit c matters even in this relatively small volume, in, for example, a time scale of femtoseconds). Perhaps the problem will turn out to be solvable in quantum theory, but we are not there yet, so we may so far loosely think of hidden variables, which may turn out to be nothing but the conscious experiences themselves. In the external world, however, there seems to be no need for this kind of hidden variables; Einstein's locality seems to prevail throughout. As observers within conscious experiences, we notice that the external world is structured in a complex way, and that structure carrying information is densely distributed, often transmitted, appearing as hidden variables, at speeds near c, but often at much lower speeds, like sound waves. Structures carrying information can also lie 'dormant', as hidden variables, in memory, in books, in the fossil record. In current speculation, non-locality is often, in rather mysterious ways, thought to apply universally. In my opinion, it is more parsimonious to ascribe non-locality only to conscious experiences.

<10>
Psychology is generally thought to deal with experiences and behavior. Since we only have access to conscious experiences, behavior should now be treated as a subcategory of the all-embracing taxon conscious experiences. Psychology, thus, has a key role for the integration of all knowledge, in fact the whole world, into a single overarching theory. This, of course, means that psychology has to be coordinated with all other domains of knowledge; even philosophy or religion have to be less inclusive than psychology. Detectism is a suggestion for such an overarching theory, and it now seems reasonable to attempt at establishing a tentative taxonomy for the targets of research, conscious experiences. I shortly described my suggestion for a taxonomy, with two main dimensions, qualia and distributions, in my commentary to Jarvilehto's target article (TA22 C7), and I don't repeat that here. For details, I refer to my paper.

<11>
Detectism simply means that we detect the world, but we are also parts of the world. Our means for detection, the human mind, has a special construction, that appeared in the world through natural evolution. Our conscious experiences, which are not just passive but creatively can cause change in the world, thus are restricted in certain species characteristic ways, which can be changed only in evolutionary time (perhaps in the future, though, by manipulation of hereditary structure). The appearance of the world for us, thus, is biased. Since we have similar approximately eternal qualia (except for abnormal cases, like colour blindness), and since we share distributions to a large extent in nature and in society, we have good possibilities for successful exchange of information and cooperation. By digital thought we have developed objective means for detection and action in the world, which have extended our organism-environment systems enormously. Digital thought, however, in principle deals with distributions and is almost devoid of values, which are closely linked with qualia. Now, it is of vital importance for us also to improve our understanding of dynamics within each of us and in our societies, which are characterized and influenced by qualia. In conscious experiences, we can to some extent free ourselves from evolutionary restrictions and instinctive behavior, and choose our common future.

<12>
There are similarities between 0-D theory and detectism, especially the radical application of the 'subjectivist principle'. A crucial difference, however, is my firm conviction that there is a real external world for us to detect; there is no need for an 'as-if'. It is a different matter that our detection is, and probably will remain, imperfect. Still, nature very often can answer our questions, when we learn to pose them properly.

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REFERENCES

Holmgren, J. 1999. Detectism - a suggestion for the taxonomy of conscious experiences. Available at
http://w1.411.telia.com/~u41104695/taxonomy.html .

Lack, D. 1965. The Life of the Robin. Witherby

Stapp, H.P. 1999. Attention, Intention and Will in Quantum Physics. Journal of Consciousness Studies, August/September 1999.

Whitehead, A.N. 1929. Process and Reality. Cambridge University Press

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Jan Holmgren
e-mail: <j.holmgren@telia.com>