<1>
Let me respond to Muller's comment (R7 TO C6, TA1) [9], that representations-in-kind presuppose a pre-existing mind-independent reality, which characterizes my approach as Cartesian, by describing the extra-Cartesian nature of the *experiential feedback loop* which couples an organism to its environment, to which I obliquely referred in <2> and <6> of my commentary to TA1. I apologise for not amplifying the details of this experiential loop. Let me do so now. Every organism experiences through the process of a circular feedback loop with its particular environment. Differences in the environment are detected in the incoming perceptual arc of the loop and are used to update a model of the world, particular to the organism. Motor behavior in an outgoing arc modifies the environment in order to set up the next perception. The process of organism experience dynamically maintains the internal model -- if there were no differences, experience would be impossible -- a static world cannot be detected. Representations-in-kind, those without discrete referents, are part of this sequence of transformed differences, as they circulate in the loop. Representation-in-kind do not 'represent' as much as they 'embody' transformed difference.

<2>
The perception arc of the experiential loop detects *differences* in the world, (See Bateson reference), thus generating MacKay structural information, (See MacKay reference), used by the organism to update its representation-in-kind. Perception here is a symmetry breaking process, where some symmetry in the world is broken by detecting a difference. (A perfect sphere can be described mathematically by a rotational symmetry GROUP containing all possible rotations. The rotation group is unbroken until a particular point on its surface is singled out -- a difference from other points -- that breaks the symmetry and allows a pole to be identified.) The structural information associated with the symmetry breaking has two types of measurement, the unit, LOGON for the type of symmetry (dimensionality), and the unit, METRON for the precision or size of the group of elements in the symmetry. (In the case of the sphere, the LOGON value is one for the group of all points on its surface, the METRON value is infinity for the infinite number of surface points.)

<3>
The independent external world is a perfect symmetry - no differences -- and so has only *bare* existence -- no properties. Experience *clothes* the world with properties identified by the organism. (The notion of *bare* as unobservable is used in QED (quantum electrodynamics) to deal with the infinite intrinsic electric charge on the electron. If one subtracts an opposing, infinite charge contribution due to the electron's field, a *clothed*, finite, observable electronic charge results.) The independently existing external universe, considered apart from the loop, while indeed existing, is reduced to triviality.

<4>
The experiential feedback loop exhibits the immanence of mind in the world, since properties of the world are identified only through the coupling of organism and environment. Immanence of mind in matter or mind in the world, characterizes an extra-Cartesian approach -- Greek philosophy held this view, (See Collingswood reference, pg. 3). Transcendence of mind is Cartesian, where mind is separated from matter, See Collingswood reference, pg. 9).

<5>
An exemplar of this approach is Gregory Bateson's lecture on Form, Substance and Difference, included in his book 'Steps to an Ecology of Mind', pp 448-466. On pg. 453, he describes what we are calling symmetry breaking,

'I suggest to you, now, that the word 'idea' in its most elementary sense, is synonymous with 'difference.' Kant, in the 'Critique of Judgement' -- if I understand him correctly -- asserts that the most elementary aesthetic act is the selection of a fact. He argues that in a piece of chalk there are an infinite number of potential facts. The *Ding an sich*, the piece of chalk, can never enter into communication or mental process because of this infinitude. The sensory receptors cannot accept it, they filter it out. What they do is to select certain *facts* out of the piece of chalk, which then become, in modern terminology, information.'

Kant's facts are symmetry elements. Sensory perception filters symmetry elements by breaking the symmetry.

<6>
Bateson describes the distributed character of difference that circulates around the experiential loop, (Bateson, 1972), pg. 451-2, 'But what is a difference? A difference is a very peculiar and obscure concept. It is certainly not a thing or an event. This piece of paper is different from the wood of this lectern. There are many differences between them--of color, texture, shape, etc. [These types are identified/measured by LOGON value.] But if we start to ask about the localization of those differences, we get into trouble. Obviously the difference between the paper and the wood is not in the paper; it is obviously not in the wood; it is obviously not in the space between them, and it is obviously not in the time between them. (difference which occurs across time is what we call 'change') A difference then is an abstract matter.' Difference is what is circulated around the experiential feedback loop. It is called an elementary idea by Bateson.

<7>
Bateson's circulating difference sheds light on the issue of what it is that is represented by representations-in-kind, raised by Muller [6],

'The use of the terms 'representation' <1-4>, which Henkel employs in two ways, 'referents', and 'model of the world' <9> per se imply a belief in a Cartesian mind-independent outside (objective) reality which has to be 're'-presented inside the mind, either by concepts or, Henkel suggests, at an earlier stage 'in kind', for instance by 'vibration frequency'.

Conceptual representations have static, discrete referent entities, their denotatively associated, conceptual categories. In contrast, representations-in-kind are dynamic, being part of distributed, circulating differences. Rather than represent, they *embody* Bateson's circulating elemental ideas. This is the sense in which I attach the notion 'models of the world' to representations-in-kind.

<8>
Next let me respond to Muller's point [8], about the unstructured center of subjective experience,

'These considerations also are of an objective type (i.e., studies of brain function and of animal behavior), and do not include insights about (b) subjective experience - human or animal - which, in my opinion at any rate, would be the main aim of a non-Cartesian approach in this area. Here I have a difficulty with Henkel's point of view. Experience has a subjective unstructured center which cannot become an object, and which is furthermore at the center of all notions of 'reality' which it in fact creates and uses, on a make-shift basis.'

<9>
I draw again from Bateson, (Bateson, 1979), pg. 458 'What do I mean by 'my' mind? I suggest that the delimitation of an individual mind must always depend upon what phenomena we wish to understand or explain. Obviously there are lots of message pathways outside the skin, and these and the messages which they carry must be included as part of the mental system whenever they are relevant. Consider a tree and a man and an axe. We observe that the axe flies through the air and makes certain sorts of gashes in a pre-existing cut in the side of the tree. If now we want to explain this set of phenomena, we shall be concerned with differences in the face cut of the tree, differences in the retina of the man, differences in his central nervous system, differences in his efferent neural messages, differences in the behavior of his muscles, differences in how the ax flies, to the differences which the ax then makes on the face of the tree. Our explanation (for certain purposes) will go round and round that circuit. In principle, if you want to explain or understand anything in human behavior, you are always dealing with total circuits, completed circuits. This is the elementary cybernetic thought. The elementary cybernetic system with its messages in circuit is, in fact, the simplest unit of mind; and the transform of a difference traveling in a circuit is the elementary idea. More complicated systems are perhaps more worthy to be called mental systems, but essentially this is what we are talking about. This unit which shows the characteristic of trial and error will be legitimately called a mental system.'

<10>
I focus on Bateson's emphasis on *a complete circuit*. This delimits experience to that part of the universe that has its symmetry broken. Each individual organism will have its own subjective region of broken symmetry. This subjective experiential reality replaces absolute physical reality. This is my conception of the main aim of the extra-Cartesian approach referred to in Muller's request for 'subjective experience - human or animal - which, in my opinion at any rate, would be the main aim of a non-Cartesian approach in this area.'

<11>
This also responds to Muller's remark, in [9],

'In my opinion, we create or construct reality, both inside our minds and out there (that is, both of them within an undivided mind- nature experience),in which case there is no primary assumption of such >a split.

I would state this: We each construct our own reality by generating symmetry breaking differences, limited by the range of our particular experiential loops as they filter the perfect symmetry of the world out there. I call this range the *experiential aura*, the extent of the penetration of mind into the surrounding world through 'filtering differences'. The notion of experiential aura is a very important notion for the extra-Cartesian approach. Particularly for putting the conceptual foundation of objective scientific aspects on an experiential basis--something I am about to get to.

<12>
Having responded to specific points, now let me discuss points in Muller's abstract,[1].

<13>
Muller describes my comment as divided into two distinct parts, description of a non-Cartesian point of view, and a quantum physical explanation of the physical basis of consciousness. The approach to quantum physical explanation of anything is currently Cartesian, something I am trying to avoid, i.e. 'physical explanation' in terms of 'objective universal laws of nature'. In particular, unitary quantum theory and simply connected Hilbert space are explicitly Cartesian. I maintain that there is an extra-Cartesian interpretation of quantum theory (unrecognized and not of interest to the physicists I have tried to present it to), involving what are known as non-unitary transformations and partitioned Hilbert space. These ideas fall on deaf ears.

<14>
Muller's endorsement for 'A cooperative multidisciplinary effort to deal with questions of such type [a change from ontology to methodology], for instance concerning the relation of mind to brain, or of experience to scientific knowledge, appears desirable', prompts the following description of what physicists do. I employ the notion of *conceptual representation aura* as the essential idea. Physicists scientific concepts are shared within the community. This sharing is effectively a collective mind in the Bateson sense. Circulating differences drive the design, use and interpretation of results of scientific experimental apparatus. Thus, the whole experimental process is part of the physicists' collective mind. The design of the apparatus filters from the perfect symmetric universe; a particular physical system; a particular physical observable; and a particular resulting observed and interpreted value of that observable. The scientific experiential loop embraces in its aura the whole laboratory, including its 'physical' equipment. This imminence of mind is clearly extra-Cartesian.

<15>
Without going into technical detail, let me mention what the new paradigm would potentially be capable of. So-called quantum weirdness, the non-causal, non-local quantum phenomena that defy (Cartesian) common sense can be explained in terms of a 'generated experiential reality' that replaces the conventional 'absolute physical reality'. I refer to the double slit experiment, where a (Cartesian) particle electron goes through two slits at the same time. Also the Aspect experiment, that shows that a single two photon quantum system can extend many feet, yet still be capable of instantaneous (Cartesian) communication.

<16>
The new paradigm also resolves an issue in machine cognition. Recently, the New York Times reported artificial (computer-generated) classical music that is indistinguishable from Bach, and a computer drawing program that can paint pictures that are indistinguishable from human artist's work. In both cases the conceptual aura extends mind from a human artist or composer to his surrounding mechanical aids. The Cartesian view holds that the machines 'created' art on their own. The extra-Cartesian view couples the machines to human (composer and listener) into a single experiencing mind. A truly new cultural paradigm must emerge before these Cartesian paradoxes can be resolved.

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REFERENCES

Gregory Bateson (1972), 'Form, Substance and Difference', pp 448-466, in 'Steps to an Ecology of Mind',
Ballantine.

R.G. Collingswood (1945) , 'The Idea of Nature' Oxford.

Donald MacKay (1969), 'Information, Mechanism and Meaning', MIT.

NYTimes, Tuesday, Nov. 11, 1997, C1, 'Undiscovered Bach? No, a Computer Wrote It'.

NYTimes, Sunday, Nov. 16, 1997, 'Ideas & Trends: The Artist's Angst Is All in Your Head'

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[Identifying information about the author:
Joel Henkel, born 1930, physicist, Ph.D. in nuclear physics. Unaffiliated proponent of interdisciplinary study of the problem of the physical basis of consciousness. Interested in promoting new interdisciplinary scientific approaches to the problem, such as extra-Cartesian philosophy, nonunitary quantum theory, quantum biology and a generalized information theory of Donald MacKay.]

Joel E. Henkel
[e-mail <jhenkel@juno.com> ]